Held, that the appellant was only liable to pay the proportion from the 21st of October to the 30th of November, 1898.-DAVIS v. WOODFIELD, Q.B.D. ; 81 L. T. 782.

4. Rating-Lairages-Frofit-earning capacityEvidence of receipts and expenditure-Structural value-Ordinary method of ascertaining rental value unavailable-Principle of assessment. The appellants were the owners and occupiers of certain lairages, consisting of lands and buildings situated on the side of the River Mersey. These hereditaments were assessed to the poor rate. In ascertaining the rental value of these premises for the purpose of assessing the rate it was not possible to compare them with other similar hereditaments, as no other lairages existed in the neighbourhood; nor by merely considering the structural value of the buildings and the value of the land on which they stood was it possible to ascertain the rent a hypothetical tenant from year to year would give. The profit-earning capacity of the hereditaments, together with the structural value, were therefore taken into consideration, and evidence of the receipts and expenditure of the appellants in the conduct of the business of the lairages was admitted.

Held, that such evidence was admissible, and that the proper principle of assessment had been adopted.-MERSEY DOCKS v. BIRKENHEAD UNION, C.A., 259; [1900] 1 Q. B. 143; 69 L. J. Q. B. 260; 81 L. T. 798.

5. Rating-Land used for exhibition of advertisements-Advertisement hoardings—Advertisement contractor-Advertising Stations (Rating) Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 27), s. 3.-An advertisement contractor hired from builders and owners of land the right to affix advertisements upon the hoardings erected by the builders during building operations, and affixed thereto the advertisements of the persons whose advertisements he had agreed to exhibit.

Held, that the advertisement contractor was not a person who permitted the land on which the hoardings stood to be used for the exhibition of advertisements within the meaning of section 3 of the Advertising Stations (Rating) Act, 1889, and that he was not rateable, as beneficial occupier, in respect of such land.-BURTON v. ST. GILES-IN-THEFIELDS, &c., UNION, Q.B.D., 222; [1900] 1 Q. B. 389; 69 L. J. Q. B. 184; 82 L. T. 24.

6. Rating-Market garden-Land covered with greenhouses" Agricultural land"-" Buildings or other hereditaments"—Agricultural Rates Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 16), ss. 1, 5, 9.-Glasshouses within a market garden usued solely for purposes connected therewith are not “agricultural land” within the meaning of the Agricultural Rates Act, 1896, so as to entitle the occupier to the partial exemption given by that Act.

Decision of the Court of Appeal (46 W. R. 401, [1898] 1 Q. B. 683), affirmed.-SMITH v. RICHMOND, H.L., 115; [1897] A. C. 448; 81 L. T. 269.

7. Rating-Police station-Residences of officers.Premises erected by a county council for the purposes of a police station, in addition to cells for prisoners and other offices constituting the police station, comprised three dwelling-houses exclusively occupied by the superintendent, inspector, and sergeant respectively and their families for their domestic use, all three residences being within the boundary wall of the police station. These dwelling-houses might be visited and inspected at any time, and in respect thereof a certain sum was

Poor Law. 140

deducted as rent from the salaries of the officers. The officers might be required to move elsewhere at any moment, but whilst they were attached to the station it was necessary that they should be resident within or adjacent to the station, and when appointed they were compelled to reside in such houses. There was frequent communication passing between the officers and those in charge of prisoners, and no prisoner could be locked up, bailed, or remanded unless one of the three officers was present.

Held, that the three dwelling-houses of the officers were a part of the police station, and were therefore with the police station exempt from rateability to poor rate.-CROSS v. WEST DERBY UNION, Q.B.D.; 81 L. T. 645.

8. Rating Public-house ·Assessment Rateable value-Trade profits. When assessing licensed premises for the poor rate, the existence of the licence and the amount of business done thereon is proper matter of inquiry and consideration. Evidence of the actual profits made by the occupier are also admissible, but is to be avoided where possible.

Dodds v. South Shields Assessment Committee, 43 W. R. 532, [1895] 2 Q. B. 133, commented on.

Decision of the Court of Appeal ([1899] 1 Q. B. 667, 47 W. R. Dig. 148) affirmed.—CARTWRIGHT v. SCULCOATES UNION, H.L., 394; [1900] A. C. 150; 69 L. J. Q. B. 403; 82 L. T. 157.

9. Rating-Separate assessment of different portions of same hereditament. The mere fact that the different portions of one undivided hereditament are capable of commanding rents if let to different occupiers does not impose any obligation upon the rating authority to assess and rate the different portions separately.

Whether for rating purposes a particular area of land is to be treated as one hereditament or as more than one is a question of fact.-NORTH-EASTERN RAILWAY Co. v. YORK UNION, Q.B.D.; [1900] 1 Q. B. 733; 69 L. J. Q. B. 376; 82 L. T. 201.

10. Rating-Sewage carrier-Sewage carrier partly above, partly below ground-Liability to be rated.The respondents were the governing body of a united drainage district, and they constructed a sewage carrier for conveying the sewage of the district to the sea. The total length of the sewage carrier was about 17 miles, of which some 23 miles passed through or over land situated in the parish of R., which land was previous to the construction of the sewage carrier, and still remained so, rated for the relief of the poor.

The appellants were the assessment committee of the said parish of R., and they assessed the respondents in respect of the whole of that portion of the sewage carrier which passed through or over land in the parish of R.

The quarter sessions court held that such portion only of the sewage carrier in the parish of R. ss was carried on concrete arches was rateable, bat that those parts of it which were laid either below the natural surface of the land or on an embankment covered and grassed over were ordinary underground sewers, and came within the exception of rating applicable thereto.

Held, on appeal, that as there had been some interference with the surface of the ground, and as it was impossible to dissever those parts of the sewage carrier which were above from those parts below the natural surface of the ground, the whole of the carrier that passed through or over the land of the appellants was a rateable subject, and liable to be rated accordingly.-NEWPORT UNION v. YSTRADY

FODWG SEWERAGE BOARD, Q.B.D., 382; [1900] 1 Q. B. 365; 69 L. J. Q. B. 280; 82 L. T. 58.

11. Relief Improper relief · Strike Wilful refusal to work-"Sudden and urgent necessity Poor Law Act, 1601 (43 Eliz. c. 2), ss. 1, 2-Poor Law Act, 1834 (4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76), 88. 15, 42, 52, 54, 105-Poor Law Audit Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 91), 8. 4-Vagrants Act, 1824 (5 Geo. 4, c. 83), 8. 3. The payment by poor law guardians out of the poor rates of any money for setting to work or for the relief of able-bodied men, who are at the time able to obtain and perform work at wages sufficient to support themselves (and their wives and families, if any), is unlawful, and ought to be disallowed by the auditor on auditing the guardians' accounts. But this statement of the law does not include relief given to or for the wives and children of such men; and it is also without prejudice to, and is in no way to affect, the power of the Local Government Board to remit such disallowed payments, even although unlawfully made, under the statute 11 & 12 Vict. c. 91, s. 4, or any other statute enabling them so to do.

Decision of Romer, J. (80 L. T. Rep. 618, 47 W. R. Dig. 149), reversed.

It is not, however, lawful for guardians to refuse relief to those who are in immediate physical need of it, and are at the time unable to obtain and perform work, on the gronnd that such persons have reduced themselves to their present incapacity to obtain and perform work by their own wilful neglect and refusal to work in the past.ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. MERTHYR TYDFIL UNION, C.A., 403; [1900] 1 Ch. 516; 69 L. J. Ch. 299; 82 L. T. 662.

66

12. Separation of parish from union—. -Adjustment of rights and interests Property" of unionFixing" amount to be paid by union to parish— Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834 (4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76), 8. 32-Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41), 88. 24 (2) (d), 26 (1).-By section 32 of the Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834, the Local Government Board may make an order for the separation of a parish from a union, and in such case the board are required to ascertain the proportionate value to every parish of the union of the "workhouses or other property" held or enjoyed by the union for the use of the poor, and to "fix the amount" to be received or paid by every parish affected by the separation.

On the separation of a parish from a union under this section, and on the adjustment of the rights and interests of the union and parish respectively,

Held, that annual sums which the union is entitled to receive from the county council of the county under the Local Government Act, 1888, in respect of the salaries of registrars and the costs of the officers of the union, are "property " within the meaning of the section, and that the Local Government Board have jurisdiction to apportion the same and to fix the amount to be paid by the union to the parish in respect of such sums.

Held, also, that an apportionment of these annual sums according to the rateable values of the union and parish respectively, as shown by the valuation lists in force during the year, is a "fixing of the amount to be paid by the union to the parish within the meaning of the section; and that the Local Government Board have jurisdiction so to make the apportionment and to order that the union shall in each year pay to the parish the amounts of such annual sums so fixed according to the rateable values.-REG. v. WILLESDEN GUARDIANS, Q.B.D.; 82 L. T. 385.

13. Settlement-Irremovability-Division of parish -County of Wilts (Calne, &c.) Confirmation Order, 1890, arts. 15, 16.-By article 15 of the Wilts (Calne, &c.) Confirmation Order, 1890, as between C. Within and C. Without, every person who on or before the 25th of March, 1890, has acquired a settlement in C. shall be deemed to have acquired such settlement either in C. Within or C. Without, according as the acts or circumstances conferring such settlement shall have been done either in C. Within or C. Without. And if such acts have been done partly in one and partly in the other, then according to the last place of residence, except where such person shall have ceased to reside in either C. Within or C. Without. The provisions of this clause were to have effect unless or until the settlement shall be duly determined to be in some other parish.

By article 16 of that order it is provided that any person who shall have acquired a status of irremovability in the parish of C. shall be deemed to have acquired such status from C. Within or C. Without, according as he resided on the 25th of March, 1890, or if he was in receipt of relief as he was residing when he became chargeable.

A pauper went to reside in May, 1887, in C. parish, in that portion of the parish which became C. Within, when by the order of 1890 C. was divided into C. Within and C. Without.

In September, 1891, he ceased to reside in the parish of C. Within, and has not resided there since.

Held, that he had not acquired a settlement in C. Within when he left in September, 1891.CALNE UNION v. ST. MARY, ISLINGTON, Q.B.D.; 69 L. J. Q. B. 400; 82 L. T. 121.

14. Settlement-Removal of pauper- Irremova bility-Break of residence.-A., & pauper, having an original settlement in the C. Union, had by residence become irremovable in the E. Union, and was sent to the E. Workhouse. Her son was in the C. Workhouse, and, in order to be with him, she obtained her discharge from the E. Workhouse and went to reside for a week with a relative in another union in order to break her status of irremovability in the E. Union, after which she returned to the E. Workhouse, in order to be sent to the C. Union.

Held, that an order for her removal to the C. Union was rightly made.-CAMBRIDGE UNION v. EDMONTON UNION, Q.B.D., 559; [1900] 2 Q. B. 111; 69 L. J. Q. B. 584; 82 L. T. 495.

See also Inland Revenue, 13; Justices, 1; Lunacy, 4.

POWER:

1. Appointment · Execution Limited power Exercise by will-General words of appointment— General powers-No reference to limited powerIntention.-A testatrix had two general powers of appointment in addition to a limited power to appoint the income of certain property to her husband for life. By her will, which contained no reference to the limited power or to the property subject thereto, she gave, devised, and bequeathed all her real and personal estate, and appointed all real and personal estate over which she might have a power of appointment unto her husband absolately.

Held, that the testatrix had clearly expressed her intention of exercising every power she had in favour of her husband, and that the limited power was therefore exercised. REW, RE, REW WIPPELL, Ch.D. Kekewich, J.; [1899] 2 Ch. 536; 81 L. T. 384.

v.

2. Appointment-Power to appoint invested fund―

Appointment of specified sums of cash-Increase in
value of investments.-A father by his will gave to
trustees a sum of £30,000 (to be invested as he
directed), upon trust to pay the interest and annual
proceeds thereof to his daughter during her life,
and after her death the same sum, together with the
interest and annual proceeds thereof, was to be held
on such trusts as the daughter should appoint in
favour of her children or grandchildren, with a trust
over in default of appointment.

The daughter by her will recited verbatim the gift
in the father's will, and then, in exercise of the
power, appointed that "the said sum of £30,000,
togother with the interest and the annual proceeds
thereof, by the said will of my father to be held in
trust for me, my children and grandchildren, and
over which I have such power of appointment as
aforesaid,” should after her death be held by the
trustees of her father's will upon trust as to £1,000
"part thereof" for her daughter Emmeline; upon
trust as to five sums of £1,000, £4,000, £6,000,
£6,000, and £6,000 respectively, each of which was
described as "other part of the said sum of
£30,000," on trust for five others of her children
respectively, and upon trust as to another sum of
£6,000, which was described as "the residue of the
said sum of £30,000," for her other child. At the
time of her death the securities on which the
£30,000 had been invested were worth £39,000.

Held, that the testatrix was dealing with the
fund as an invested fund, and that the whole of it
was appointed in the proportions indicated by her
will.-CRUDDAS, RE, CRUDDAS v. SMITH, C.A.;
[1900] 1 Ch. 730; 69 L. J. Ch. 355; 82 L. T. 514.

3. Appointment-Transfer of property by all parties
interested-Release of power. Any dealing with
property subject to a power of appointment which
is inconsistent with the exercise of that power,
releases the power.-FOAKES v. JACKSON, Ch.D.
Farwell, J., 616; [1900] 1 Ch. 807; 69 L. J. Ch.
352.

4. Execution-Power to be exercised by will attested
by two witnesses-Donee of power a domiciled French
subject-Holograph will exercising power unattested—
Wills Act, ss. 9 and 10-Lord Kingsdown's Act (24
& 25 Vict. c. 114).-Testatrix, by the will of her
father, who died in 1824, was given a general power
of appointment over a fund in court "by will, or
any writing in the nature of a will, to be respectively
executed by her in the presence of and attested by
two witnesses." Testatrix, being a domiciled French
subject, in 1894 made a holograph will in the
French language, and thereby disposed of the fund
in question. This will was not attested, and was
consequently invalid according to English law, but
it was admitted to probate in England by reason of
its being valid according to the law of the domicil
of the testatrix.

Held, (1) that neither sections 9 and 10 of the
Wills Act nor Lord Kingsdown's Act applied, inas-
much as the testatrix was domiciled abroad; (2)
that to enable the will of the testatrix to operate as
an execution of the power, the special formalities
(such as attestation) required by the instrument
creating the power should be complied with, and it
was not enough that the will of the testatrix was
valid as a will, according to the law of her domicil.

In re Price, Tomlin v. Latter, ante, p. 373,
approved.-BARRETTO v. YOUNG, Ch.D. Byrne, J.;
[1900] 2 Ch. 339; 69 L. J. Ch. 605.

5. Execution Special power of appointment by
will-Will made prior to creation of power.--A
special power of appointment authorizing the
donee to appoint by will in favour of a particular

Practice.
144

person, will not be exercised by a will made by the
donee prior to the creation of the power, wherein
the testator appointed to such person all the
residue of the property over which at the time of
his death the testator should have a disposing
power.-HAYES, RE, TURNBULL v. HAYES, Ch.D.
Byrne, J.; [1900] 2 Ch. 333.

See also Limitation Statutes, 5; Will, 15, 16, 22.
PRACTICE:-

1. Account-Certificate-Entries disallowed-Dis-
cretion of court-Digging of pitch. Where an
account ordered by the court is limited to pitch
dug and won from certain specified lands, entries
relating to pitch in other lands must be excluded,
and a certificate made in disregard of this rule will
be varied by disallowing them.-BENNICOURT v.
LE GENDRE, P.C.; [1900] A. C. 173; 69 L. J. P. C.

21.

2. Appeal-Appeal as to costs only-Judge's dis-
cretion not exercised-Costs, charges, and expenses-
Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), s. 49.—
Notwithstanding section 49 of the Judicature Act,
1873, an order as to costs, which are in the judge's
discretion, is, if made in pursuance of a general
rule which excluded the exercise of that discretion,
subject to a right of appeal.

The City of Manchester, 27 W. R. 697, 5 P. D.
221, followed on this point.

Charles v. Jones, 35 W. R. 88, 33 Ch. D. 80, not
followed.

There is no right of appeal against an order as to
discretionary costs on the ground only that the
same order deals with trustees' charges and ex-
penses, as to which there is no appeal.

Charles v. Jones approved on this point.

In re Chennell, Jones v. Chennell, 26 W. R. 595, 8
Ch. D. 492, disapproved.-BEw v. Bew, C.A., 124;
[1899] 2 Ch. 467; 81 L. T. 284.

3. Appeal-Appeal from inferior court-Right to
appeal from High Court to Court of Appeal-Juris-
diction to give leave to appeal—Judicature Act, 1873
(36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), 8. 45-Judicature Act, 1894
(57 & 58 Vict. c. 16), s. 1, sub-section 5.—Where a
Divisional Court, after deciding an appeal from an
inferior court, refuses leave to appeal, the Court
of Appeal has jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal.
-GODMAN v. MOSES, C.A., 689.

-

-

4. Appeal Court of Appeal Application to
Divisional Court to set aside judgment of official
referee-Judicature Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 16),
8. 1 (5).-Where an action has been tried before an
official referee, and an application is made to a
Divisional Court to set aside the judgment of the
official referee, the decision of the Divisional Court
is final, and there is no appeal to the Court of
Appeal without leave.-DAGLISH v. BARTON, C.A.,
50; [1900] 1 Q. B. 284; 81 L. T. 551.

5. Appeal-Jurisdiction-Appeal to House of Lords
from interlocutory order of the Court of Appeal in
Ireland-Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (39 & 40
Vict. c. 59), 88. 3, 12-Supreme Court of Judicature
Act (Ireland), 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. 57), s. 86.—An
appeal does not lie to the House of Lords from an
interlocutory order of the Queen's Bench Division
in Ireland, or from an order of the Court of Appeal
in Ireland made on appeal therefrom.-GOSFORD
(EARL) v. IRISH LAND COMMISSION, H.L.; 81 L. T.
330.

6. Appeal-Petition of right- Contract — Con-
struction-Canada, Law of-Quebec.-An appeal
lies to the Queen in Council from a decision of the
Court of Queen's Bench on a petition of right.

The respondent contracted with the Government of Quebec to do certain work for a term of years at one agreed price. The contract did not contain any undertaking on the part of the government to employ the respondent for all or any of such work.

Held, that no such undertaking could be implied, and that the respondent could not recover damages against the Crown for not employing him to do all or any part of such work during the specified period.-REG. v. DEMERS, P.C.; [1900] A. C. 103; 69 L. J. P. C. 5; 81 L. T. 795.

7. Appeal Special leave· Appeal in formâ pauperis-Jurisdiction of Privy Council to stay an order for sale, pending appeal.—Where a petitioner had obtained leave to appeal in regular form, an order granting leave to prosecute the appeal in forma pauperis was made.

On petition for special leave to appeal (1) from a decree in a matrimonial separation suit; (2) in a mortgage suit; (3) from an order for execution of the last-mentioned decree,

Held, that there being ground for appealing from the mortgage decree, the leave should be extended to both suits, which were mixed up together.

The Privy Council have no jurisdiction to order a stay, pending the appeal, of a sale directed by the court below in execution of its decree in (2).— QUINLAN v. CHILD, P.C.; [1900] A. C. 496.

8. Assignment-Debt-Security-Power to assignee to sue in name of assignor-Absolute assignment— Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), 8. 25, sub-section 6.-The plaintiffs made an advance to a customer who, in consideration thereof, assigned to them the whole of his rights and interest under an agreement between himself and others, of whom the defendant was one, as security for the repayment on demand of the advance, and by the assignment he appointed the plaintiffs his nominees in pursuance of the provisions of the agreement, with power to exercise all his rights thereunder either in his name or in the plaintiffs' own name, and he appointed them his attorneys in that behalf. In an action to recover from the defendant moneys alleged to be due under the agreement,

Held, that the assignment was not an absolute assignment within the meaning of section 25, subsection 6, of the Judicature Act, 1873.

Tancred v. Delagoa Bay Railway Co., [1889] 23 Q B. D. 239, and Comfort v. Betts, [1891] 1 Q. B. 737, distinguished.-MERCANTILE BANK OF LONDON v. EVANS, C.A.; [1899] 2 Q. B. 613; 81 L. T. 376.

9. Attachment-Commission-Trustee-SolicitorDebtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 4—Debtors Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 54).-Under a will the persons entitled to possession of the B. estates might sell the heirlooms, but were to replace them out of the proceeds of sale by articles of a similar character. F. was co-trustee with C., the tenant for life of the B. estates, and C. with the consent of F. sold the heirlooms, and received the purchasemoney, but did not purchase other articles in their place. The purchaser paid F. £200 in connection with the sale. Before F. (who was a solicitor) was appointed a trustee he received £200 from an insurance company as commission on policies effected through him on C.'s life as security for trust money lent to C. On the death of C. the B. estates passed to the plaintiff, who commenced an action for the administration of the estate of C., and an order was made directing F. to pay the plaintiff the £200 received in connection with the sale of the heirlooms, and also the £200 received from the insurance

company. F. failed to comply with that order, and the plaintiff applied for leave to issue a writ of attachment against him.

Held, that the payment of the £200 received as commission from the insurance company ought not to be enforced by attachment as the matter was not within the exception in section 4 of the Debtors Act, 1869; but that attachment ought to issue in respect of the £200 paid by the purchaser of the heirlooms.-BERWICK (LORD) v. LANE, C.A.; 81 L. T. 797.

10. Attachment-Married woman-Judgment debtor -Order for payment into court-Default-Writ of attachment Separate estate-Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 21), 88. 1 (2), 18, 24 -Debtors Acts, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), 88. 4, 5; 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 54)—R. S. C., ord. 42, rr. 4, 24. -A married woman, married before 1882, was, as administratrix of a deceased intestate, ordered to pay into court a sum forming part of the estate. In default a motion was made for leave to issue a writ of attachment against her.

Held, that, in the absence of proof of a breach of trust or devastavit, an order for payment by the defendant out of her separate estate would not be appropriate and that the order for the issue of the writ of attachment ought to go.-TURNBULL, RE, TURNBULL v. NICHOLAS, Ch.D. Stirling, J., 136; [1900] 1 Ch. 180; 69 L. J. Ch. 187; 81 L. T. 439.

11. Attachment-Undertaking to execute an indenture-Rules of Court, 1883, ord. 41, r. 5.-Where defendants committed a breach of their undertaking forthwith to execute an indenture,

Held, that there ought either to be service in accordance with ord, 41, r. 5, of the Rules of Court, 1883, or a four-day order. An order therefore was made that the defendants should on or before the 5th of December, or subsequently within four days of the service of the order, execute the deed tendered to them by the plaintiff.-HALFORD v. HARDY, Ch.D. Kekewich, J.; 81 L. T. 721.

12. City of London Court-Jurisdiction-Issue of summons with leave-Cause of action arising within the city-London (City) Small Debts Extension Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. lxxvii.), s. 39-County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), ss. 74, 185.—In the City of London Court it is not necessary, in actions where the jurisdiction of the court is based on the cause of action arising within the city, that the leave of the judge or registrar should be obtained for the issue of the summons.-FELTON v. Bower, Q.B.D., 349; [1900] 1 Q. B. 598; 69 L. J. Q. B. 351; 82 L. T. 419.

13. Costs Action against public authority — Solicitor and client costs-Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), s. 1 (6).-Where an action is dismissed against a public body acting in execution of statutory or other public duty, the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, s. 1, gives the defendant corporation solicitor and client costs in the action, but the Act does not apply to appeals.

Decision of the Court of Appeal, sub nomine, Fielding v. Morley Corporation, 47 W. R. 295, [1899] 1 Ch. 1, affirmed.-FIELDING v. MORLEY (MAYOR) H.L., 545; [1900] A. C. 133; 69 L. J. Ch. 314; 82 L. T. 29.

14. Costs-Action against public authority-Trial with jury―Jurisdiction of judge to deprive successful authority of costs-Good cause-Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), s. 1 (b)— Ord. 65, r. 1.—The power given by ord. 65, r. 1, to the judge at the trial of an action to deprive a successful party of costs is not taken away or

affected by section 1 (b) of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893; and, therefore, if in an action brought against a public authority for any act done in pursuance of any Act of Parliament or of any public duty or authority, judgment is obtained by the defendants after a trial with a jury, the judge has, for good cause, a discretion to deprive the successful defendants of costs; and in determining what is good cause the judge may take into consideration the antecedent conduct of the party which led to the litigation.

Cree v. St. Pancras Vestry, [1899] 1 Q. B. 693, not followed. BOSTOCK V. RAMSEY DISTRICT COUNCIL, Q.B.D., 254; [1900] 1 Q. B. 357; 69 L. J. Q. B. 108; 81 L. T. 756.

15. Costs · Arbitration Reference of actionCosts of reference in discretion of arbitrator-Award for less than £50-Scale of costs-R. S. C., 1883, ord. 65, r. 12.-Where an action of contract is referred to arbitration, whether compulsorily or by consent, upon the terms that the costs of the action shall abide the event of the award, and the costs of the reference and award shall be in the discretion of the arbitrator, if the arbitrator awards the plaintiff a sum less than £50 and orders that the defendant shall pay the plaintiff's costs of the reference and award, such costs may be taxed on the High Court scale, although by virtue of ord. 65, r. 12, the plaintiff's costs of the action can only be taxed on the county court scale.

Moore v. Watson, 15 W. R. 429, L. R. 2 C. P. 314, overruled.

Galatti v. Wakefield, 4 Ex. D. 249, 27 W. R. Dig. 59, followed. STREET v. STREET, C.A., 450; [1900] 2 Q. B. 57; 69 L. J. Q. B. 574; 82 L. T. 648.

16. Costs-Debenture-holder's action-Insufficient assets. Where the assets in a debenture-holder's action were sufficient to pay off the first debentureholders in full, but not sufficient to pay the second and third debenture-holders in full,

Held, that the plaintiff in the action was only entitled to party and party costs.-QUEEN'S HOTEL Co., CARDIFF, RE, VERNON TIN PLATE Co., RE, Ch.D. Cozens-Hardy, J., 567; [1900] 1 Ch. 792; 69 L. J. Ch. 414; 82 L. T. 675.

17. Costs-Higher scale-Special ground-Allegation of fraud-Ord. 65, r. 9.-The mere fact of an allegation of fraud being made in an action by the unsuccessful party is not a special ground for obtaining costs on the higher scale under ord. 65, r. 9, even when the amount at stake is large and the questions of law and fact raised are difficult.ASSETS DEVELOPMENT Co. v. CLOSE, Ch.D. Buckley, J., 699.

18. Costs-Order of county court, action upon.—An action cannot be maintained in the High Court upon an order of a county court for the payment of costs. -FURBER v. TAYLOR, C.A., 689.

19. Costs-Probate action-Three wills-Severance in defence. In a probate action the validity of the earliest of three wills was established. Of the four defendants in the action, who were all beneficiaries under the first will, the two who were executors of the first and second wills received the same benefits under the second will, while the other two were cut out under the second will. All four were cut out under the third will.

Held, that there was such a divergence of interests between the two pairs of defendants that the latter pair was justified in appearing separately, and was therefore entitled to have a separate taxation and payment of costs.-BAGSHAW v. PIMM,

C.A., 422; [1900] P. 148; 69 L. J. P. 45; 82 L. T. 175.

20. Costs-Security for costs-Foreigner resident abroad-General inquiry-Claimant to fund in court -Person in position of plaintiff.-As a general rule a claimant under a general inquiry cannot be required to give security for costs.

Where a solicitor was ordered to pay into court a fund in his hands belonging to a client subject to the claims of certain alleged incumbrancers thereon, and an inquiry was directed who was entitled thereto, a foreign claimant resident out of the jurisdiction was ordered to give security for costs upon the ground that, in the special circumstances of the case, the inquiry was equivalent to an interpleader issue in which the claimant was in the position of a plaintiff.-MILWARD & Co., RE, C.A.; [1900] 1 Ch. 405; 69 L. J. Ch. 247; 82 L. T. 339.

21. Costs-Set off-Solicitors Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 127), 8. 28-R. S. C., ord. 65, r. 14.—An order may be made allowing a judgment debtor to set off against the damages due from him damages due to him from the judgment creditor on 8 judgment in another action, notwithstanding the existence of an order under the Solicitors Act, 1860, 8. 28, charging the first-mentioned damages with a solicitor's costs.

So held by A. L. Smith and Vaughan Williams, L.JJ., the latter doubting.-GOODFELLOW v. GRAY, C.A.; [1899] 2 Q. B. 498; 81 L. T. 314.

A.

22. Costs - Taxation Barrister Fees. brought an action against B., which was dismissed with costs. A. appealed, and the Court of Appeal, without calling on counsel for the respondent, dismissed the appeal with costs. A. objected to pay the fee of B.'s leading counsel in the Court of Appeal on the ground that such counsel was not present at the hearing of the appeal.

Held, that the objection must be overruled; and that the court would not disturb the uniform practice extending over forty years, of allowing the fees of non-attending counsel in party and party taxation.-CHARMAN v. BRANDON, Ch.D. Kekewich, J.; 82 L. T. 369.

23. Costs Taxation Fixed costs Substituted service of writ—Ord. 3, r. 7—Ord. 65, r. 27 (38)Central Office Practice rule 18.—On a taxation of costs under ord. 3, r. 7, the plaintiff claimed £2 10s. for costs of substituted service of the writ. The master allowed £1 only on the ground that by the practice adopted at chambers that was the sum invariably allowed.

Held, that the practice could not be justified.— FLATAU v. CULLEN, C.A., 36; 81 L. T. 402.

24. Creditors' deed-Account-Discretion-R. S. C., ord. 55, r. 10.-The court will, in the exercise of its discretion, under ord. 55, r. 10, not order an account of the dealings and transactions of a trustee under a creditors' deed of arrangement, where it can determine the questions between the parties without such order, and where such order would have mischievous results, notwithstanding that the trustee may have been guilty of some misconduct in his duties.-CAMPBELL v. GILLESPIE, Ch.D. CozensHardy, J., 151; [1900] 1 Ch. 225; 69 L. J. 233; 81 L. T. 514.

25. Discovery-Affidavit of documents-Claim of privilege-Sufficiency of affidavit.-Where a defendant in making an affidavit of documents claims that certain documents in his possession are privileged from inspection on the ground that they relate solely to his own case and do not tend to