COURT OF APPEAL. GIBBS & Co. (LIMITED) v. NEVILLE & Co. the Rolls, and I do not mean to repeat what he has said. As to the authorites, Dayrell v. Hoare only shows that the lessor under such a power cannot impose a burden on the rest of the land. I interpret the language of Littledale, J., as having reference to the case before him, and that only, and I know of no authority for saying that he intended what has been attributed to him. The other case, Buckley v. Howell, turned upon the provision for the re-investment of the purchase-money, and the effect of that decision has been removed by subsequent legislation. There is enough to enable us to say that conveyancers have not taken so narrow a view of the usual leasing power as we are asked to do here. I do not understand that Cozens-Hardy, J., expressed any opinion of his own. He only thought he ought not to overrule the decision of a judge of co-ordinate authority, but to leave it to us to take the responsibility of reversing it. COLLINS, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. Appeal allowed. COURT OF APPEAL. and solicited orders in Spain and sold heating apparatus to customers there. The defendants claimed £3,000 damages. The plaintiffs, in their reply, joined issue as to the defence, and as to the counterclaim they denied that the liability of Gibbs under the agreement of the 20th of June, 1892, had been taken over by them. They farther pleaded in paragraph 13 of the reply as follows: "The defendants from August, 1892, to the year 1898 acted as the plaintiffs' agents in Spain for the sale of and to obtain orders for the installation of heating apparatus, and during such period in breach of their duty towards and of their implied promise to the plaintiff's as such agents, and without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, added unreasonable and excessive amounts by way of commission or remuneration for themselves to the plaintiffs' estimates before submitting the same to the intending customers, and thereby caused the plaintiffs to lose orders and suffer loss, which loss the plaintiffs claim to set off against the counterclaim of the defendants (if any) herein. Solicitors, Farrar, Porter, & Co., for Barker & Roger- In the alternative, if the said alleged agreement of son, Chester. GIBBS & Co. (LIMITED) v. NEVILLE & Co. (a.) Practice - Pleading - Counterclaim · Counterclaim in reply-Right of plaintiff to plead set-off to counterclaim-Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), s. 24, sub-section 3—Ord. 19, r. 3; ord. 21, rr. 10-17. The plaintiffs claimed a balance of an account. The defendants counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract. The plaintiffs in their reply denied the contract, and further pleaded that, if there was such a contract, the defendants had broken it, and they claimed damages for such breach. Held, that, although the cause of action in respect of which the plaintiff's claimed damages in their reply existed before the issue of the writ, the plaintiffs were entitled to raise the mutter in their reply, and were not bound to introduce it into their statement of claim by amendment. Toke v. Andrews, 30 W. R. €59, 8 Q. B. D. 428, approved. Appeal from the refusal of Phillimore, J., to strike out a paragraph of the plaintiffs' reply. The plaintiffs, who carried on business as manufacturers of hot water apparatus, sought to recover from the defendants the sum of £650, the balance of an account for work done and materials supplied. The defendants by their defence admitted liability under the claim to the amount of £113; but they set up a counterclaim, alleging that prior to August, 1892, the business carried on by the plaintiffs had been carried on by Robert Renton Gibbs; that, by an agreement in writing dated the 20th of June, 1892, between Gibbs and the defendants, Gibbs undertook that he would not for a period of twelve years manufacture or supply any heating apparatus for or to any person in Spain other than the defendants, or canvass or solicit orders for any heating apparatus in Spain; that in August, 1892, the plaintiffs, on acquiring the business heretofore carried on by Gibbs, agreed in writing to take over the liability of Gibbs under the agreement of the 20th of June, 1892, and the defendants assented thereto; and that the plaintiffs in breach of the agreement had canvassed (a.) Reported by F. G. RUCKER, Esq., Barristerat-Law. the 20th of June, 1892, was ever binding upon the plaintiffs (which is denied), then in breach of their duty towards and of their implied promises to the plaintiffs arising thereunder and from the mutual relationship thereby established, and without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, the defendants added unreasonable and excessive amounts by way of commission or remuneration for themselves to the plaintiffs' estimates before submitting the same to the intending customers, and thereby caused the plaintiffs to lose orders and suffer loss, which loss the plaintiffs claim to set off against the counterclaim of the defendants (if any) herein." Registrar of Liverpool ordered paragraph 13 of the On the application of the defendants the District reply to be struck out. Phillimore, J., reversed the order of the district registrar. The defendants appealed. Leslie Scott, for the defendants.-The question is, whether a plaintiff can counterclaim in his reply. The right to counterclaim is given by section 24, sub-section 3, of the Judicature Act, 1873, and that sub-section expressly limits the right to a defendant, as also do ord. 19, r. 3, and ord. 21, rr. 10, 17. The plaintiffs' proper course is to amend their statement of claim: James v. Page, 85 Law Times, 157. The learned judge thought he ought to follow the case of Toke v. Andrews, 30 W. R. 659, 8 Q. B. D. 428. But there the cause of action in respect of which the plaintiff was allowed to counterclaim was one which arose after the issue of the writ. The case of Alcoy and Gandia Railway and Harbour Co. v. Greenhill, 44 W. R. 117, [1896] 1 Ch. 19, was also referred to. W. D. McConkey, for the plaintiffs, was not called upon to argue. COLLINS, L. J.-I am of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed. The plaintiffs, who are a limited company, claim for the balance of an account. The defendants set up a counterclaim on an agreement alleging a bargain which they say the plaintiff company adopted by way of novation, and for breach of which they claim damages. The plaintiffs in their reply deny that the agreement is binding on them, and further in effect say that, if the agreement is binding on them, the defendants broke it, and they, the plaintiffs, have a claim against the defendants in respect of such breach for unliquidated damages. They use this claim as a set off against the defendants' counterclaim. The point is now taken that the plaintiffs have set up a counterclaim in their reply, and that the rules do not contemplate such a thing COURT OF APPEAL. WRIGHT v. JOHN BAGNALL & SONS (LIMITED). being done. Reference is made to the case of James v. Page, where, however, the counterclaim was one in the full sense of the term-that is to say, it was used as a sword and not as a shield. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs' counterclaim ought to be struck out of the reply, and the statement of claim amended. The question is whether the rules are so strict as to compel us to order the plaintiffs to follow that course. The plaintiffs do not want to rely on the agreement on which the defendants base their counterclaim; and, if they were forced to deal with it in their statement of claim, they would have to set up two inconsistent causes of action, on one of which they would only want to rely in the case of the defendants raising a particular defence. It seems to me it would be obviously unjust to force the plaintiffs to introduce this matter into their statement of claim by amendment. I think they have put it in its proper place by pleading it in their reply. In my opinion the case of Toke v. Andrews establishes a principle which justifies us in affirming the decision of Phillimore, J. ROMER, J., concurred. Appeal dismissed. COURT OF APPEAL. from permanent injuries. At the time of the accident his wages were 21s. a week. On the 26th of November, 1898, the appellant's wife saw the respondents' clerk, who told her to get a note from the hospital and bring it in three weeks' time to the works, when her husband would be "due for compensation," and that she would get half his wages. At the end of the three weeks she went with the hospital note to the works, and received 10s. 6d., and from that time either the appellant or his wife continued to receive that sum each week until the 6th of September, 1899, either from the respondents or from the insurance company with whom the respondents were insured. About Easter, 1899, the appellant saw the respondents' manager, when an offer of £15 was made to him as compensation, but the appellant refused to take it. A few days afterwards the appellant saw the manager again, when the appellant said that he would take £200. The manager said: "If you talk about £200 we will go to the court with you." At Whitsuntide the manager offered the appellant £30, saying that he thought that the insurance company would give that amount. The weekly payments having stopped on the 6th of arbitration to assess the compensation payable under the Act of 1897. The respondents, in their answer, Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Lydall & Sons, for T. & September, 1899, the appellant filed a request for T. Martin, Webb, & Martin, Liverpool. Solicitors for the defendants, Field, Roscoe, & Co., took the objection that the claim for compensation for Alsop, Stevens, Harvey, & Crooks, Liverpool. WRIGHT v. JOHN BAGNALL & SONS (LIMITED). (a.) Master and servant-Employers' liability-Accident Compensation-Claim not made within six monthsWaiver Agreement to pay compensation-Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37), s. 2, sub-section 1. A workman was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, which totally incapacitated him from work. His employer paid him half the amount of his average weekly wages from the second week after the accident, and negotiations took place between them as to paying the workman a lump sum in lieu of the weekly payment. The parties were unable to agree upon the amount, and after the expiration of six months from the accident the negotiations ceased and the weekly payment was stopped. The workman thereupon took proceedings to have the compensation assessed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, when the employer took the objection that the claim for compensation was not made within the six months. Held, that, in the circumstances, there was evidence of an agreement by the employer to pay compensation under the Act, the only question left open being the amount of compensation, and that, in such a case, the employer was precluded from taking the objection that the claim for compensation was not made in time. Appeal from the award of the deputy judge of the Walsall County Court under the Workmen's Cɔmpensation Act, 1897. The appellant, George Wright, was a wagoner in the employment of the respondents, John Bagnall & Sons (Limited), who were iron manufacturers, and on the 23rd of November, 1898, he received personal injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. He was taken to the hospital suffering (a.) Reported by W. F. BARRY, Esq., Barristerat-Law. was not made within six months from the occurrence of the accident, as required by section 2, sub-section 1, of the Act. In reply to this objection the appellant contended that the respondents were by their conduct precluded from setting it up. The deputy county court judge held that "the claim for compensation" meant the filing of the request for arbitration, and that, therefore, the application was out of time.* He further said that the payment by the respondents to the appellant each week up to the 6th of September, 1899, of the exact sum to which the appellant was entitled under the Act, and the commencing of such payments at the time required by the Act, were calculated to make the appellant believe that he was receiving these payments by virtue of the Act and to lull him into a state of false security; but, on the other hand, the appellant should have known his rights under the Act, and if he thought that he had arrived at an arrangement with the respondents, he should have got them to enter into a memorandum of agreement embodying the terms of the arrangement, and registered the memorandum. He did not think that the respondents were precluded from raising any defence they might have on account of the lateness of the appellant's claim. He did not think that the respondent's conduct could dispense with the requirements of the statute, the language of section 2, subsection 1, being peremptory, that proceedings “shall not be maintainable" unless the claim for compensation were made within six months. He accordingly held that the appellant was not entitled to compensation, and made an award in favour of the respondents. Disturnal, for the appellant.-The respondents by their conduct have waived the requirement of the Act as tɔ making the claim for compensation within Since the hearing before the deputy county court judge the Court of Appeal decided in Powell v. Main Colliery Co., post, p. 534, that "the claim for compensation," which was required by section 2, subsection 1, to be made within six months after the accident, meant the filing of the request for arbitration. The decision of the deputy county court judge upon that point was, therefore, not sought to be disturbed. C. A. C. A. WRIGHT V. JOHN BAGNALL & SONS (LD.).—POWELL v. MAIN COLLIERY Co. (LD.). six months after the occurrence of the accident. There is nothing in law to prevent them from waiving their right to take the objection of the lapse of time. The limitation of time in section 2, sub-section 1, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, affects the remedy only, like the Statute of Limitations, and does not bar the right. By rule 17 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1898, it must be specially pleaded, and if not pleaded the objection cannot be taken. Section 1 of the Act gives the right to compensation; section 2, sub-section 1, only deals with the remedy. Further, the repondents are estopped by their conduct from denying that the claim for compensation was made within the six months. The deputy county court judge was therefore wrong. He referred to Ramsden v. Dyson, 14 W. R. 926, L. R. 1 H. L. 129. there seems to me to be clear evidence of an agreement that compensation would be paid, the only question left open being the amount. The respondents, if that were made out in fact, would not be in a position to set up the defence of the lapse of time. I further think that the respondents have also debarred themselves from setting up the defence by treating the matter as still open to negotiations and leading the appellant to act upon that view, and they cannot now set up as a defence the expiration of the six months during the negotiations. In my opinion there is abundant evidence upon which the judge can hold that the respondents are not in a position to raise the defence and there is nothing in point of law to prevent the judge from so holding. The case must therefore be remitted to the deputy county court judge. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. There is evidence of an agreement that the respondents are liable to pay compensation, the amount, in case of disagreement, to be fixed by arbitration. In these circumstances, if an agreement is made out in fact, the lapse of time ought not to be allowed to be set up by the respondents to defeat that agreement and to prevent the compensation being assessed. ROMER, L.J., concurred. W. F. Craies, for the respondents.-It is immaterial that the right to compensation is given in one section and the limitation upon the exercise of that right is imposed by another section. Section 2, sub-section 1, says that proceedings for the recovery of compensation "shall not be maintainable" unless the claim for compensation is made within the six months. That constitutes a bar which the arbitrator must take notice of when it is brought to his notice by being pleaded. The claim cannot be waived until it is made. If there is an agreement to pay comThe respondents agreed to continue the weekly paypensation, the proper course is to sue upon the agreements of 10s. 6d. instead of having the case remitted ment and not to take proceedings under the Act, or else to file a memorandum of the agreement under rules 38 to 44, when the agreement can then be enforced. The making of the claim within six months is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, and such a condition precedent cannot be waived: Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (3rd ed.), p. 543. The limitation of time can only be waived by the omission to plead it. Nor is there any estoppel preventing the respondents from setting up the truth. East India Co. v. Paul, 7 Moo. P. C. 85, and Supple v. Cann, 9 Ir. C. L. R. 1, were also referred to. COLLINS, L.J.-This is an appeal by the workman against the decision of the deputy county court judge who held, as I read his judgment, that it was nct open to him to consider whether the circumstances of the case debarred the respondents from raising the objection of the lapse of time. The objection has been taken in the respondents' answer that "the claim for compensation " was not made within the six months. It seems to me that in the circumstances of to the deputy county court judge. Solicitors for the appellant, J. Mitchell, for Willcock & Taylor, Wolverhampton. Solicitors for the respondents, Morgan, Price, & Mewburn, for Hargreave & Heaton, Birmingham. Appeal. (A. L. Smith, Collins, and March 16. POWELL v. MAIN COLLIERY Co. (LIMITED). (a.) Master and servant-Employers' liability-AccidentCompensation" Claim for compensation"—Initiation of proceedings-Time within which they must be made -Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37), 88. 1, 2 (1). By section 2, sub-section 1, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, it is provided that " Proceedings unless for recovery of compensation shall not be maintainthe claim for compensation has been made within six months from the occurrence of the accident." Held, by the court (Romer, L.J., dissenting), that the words "claim for compensation must be taken to mean not the mere notice that the workman intends to claim compensation for injuries arising from the accident, but the actual invocation of the jurisdiction of the tribunal which has power under the Act to award compensation. this case the judge was wrong in holding as a matter This was an appeal under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, by the defendants from a decision of his Honour Judge Bishop sitting at Neath County Court. The question raised in this case was whether the words "claim for compensation " in section 2, subsection 1, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, which must be made within six months of the date of (a.) Reported by E. G. STILLWELL, Esq., Barristerat-Law. COURT OF APPEAL. POWELL v. MAIN COLLIERY Co. (LIMITED). the accident, mean the delivery of a notice of claim by the workman to the master, or the filing of the request for arbitration in the county court. The respondent, Powell, a workman in the employment of the appellants, the Main Colliery Co., was on the 21st of December, 1898, injured by an accident in the course of his employment. On the 2nd of May, 1899, he served on the appellants a written notice of the accident, and another notice claiming compensation under the Act. On the 4th of October, 1899, more than six months after the date of the accident, he filed in the Neath County Court a request for arbitration in the form provided in the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1898. The appellants filed an answer in which they denied that the respondent was entitled to any compensation because he was out of time, the request for arbitration not having been filed within six months of the accident. The learned county court judge, however, overruled the objection, and awarded the respondent compensation to the amount of 13s. 11d. a week. From this decision the Main Colliery Co. now appealed. The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37), provides as follows: Section 1, sub-section 3.-"If any question arises in any proceedings under this Act as to the liability to pay compensation under this Act (including any question as to whether the employment is one to which this Act applies), or as to the amount or duration of compensation under this Act, the question, if not settled by agreement, shall, subject to the provisions of the first schedule to this Act, be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the second schedule to this Act." Sub-section 4.-"If within the time hereinafter in this Act limited for taking proceedings an action is brought to recover damages independently of this Act for injury caused by any accident, and it is determined in such action that the injury is one for which the employer is not liable in such action, but that he would have been liable to pay compensation under the provisions of this Act, the action shall be dismissed, but the court in which the action is tried shall, if the plaintiff shall so choose, proceed to assess such compensation, and shall be at liberty to deduct from such compensation all the costs which in its judgment have been caused by the plaintiff bringing the action instead of proceeding under this Act. . . ." Section 2, sub-section 1.-"Proceedings for the recovery under this Act of compensation for an injury shall not be maintainable unless notice of the accident has been given as soon as practicable after the happening thereof, and before the workman has voluntarily left the employment in which he was injured, and unless the claim for compensation with respect to such accident has been made within six months from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury or in case of death within six months from the time of death. Sub-section 2.-"Notice in respect of an injury under this Act shall give the name and address of the person injured, and shall state in ordinary language the cause of the injury and the date at which it was sustained, and shall be served on the employer, or, if there is more than one employer, upon one of such employers." The other three sub-sections of this section provide for the method of serving such notice. Ruegg, Q.C. (A. Bertram with him), for the appellants. The plaintiff's claim was out of time. The notice served by him on the 2nd of May, 1899, was not a "claim for compensation" within section 2, COURT OF APPEAL. sub-section 1. The "claim for compensation" means the actual taking of proceedings before the tribunal which has power under the Act to deal with the matter and make an award. The plaintiff did not take proceedings in such court for more than six months after the date of the accident. He is, therefore, clearly too late. Section 2, sub-section 1, says that proceedings for recovery under the Act shall not be maintainable unless the claim for compensation has been made within six months of the accident. There are two cases in favour of this interpretation of the Act. one in Scotland and one in Ireland, Bennett v. Wordie & Co., 1 Court of Sessions Cases, 5th Series, 855, 36 Scottish L. R. 643; and Marno v. Workman, Clark, & Co., 33 Irish Law Times Rep. 183 (since affirmed in the Irish Court of Appeal, but not as yet reported). S. T. Evans, for the respondent.-A "claim for compensation " is made when the workman serves a notice on his employer that he has sustained an injury in his employment and that he intends to claim compensation. The respondent therefore made his claim in good time. The word "proceedings" in both section 1, sub-section 3, and section 2, subsection 1, has the same meaning, and clearly refers to some step taken before the request for arbitration has been made. Ruegg, Q.C., replied. A. L. SMITH, L.J.-We have now before us a point of law which has given rise to a great deal of difference of opinion amongst learned county court judges throughout the country. I should, however, point out that when this point has been dealt with in the High Court, either in Scotland or in Ireland, there has been no difference of opinion; but those decisions, of course, are not binding on us in this court. It seems to me that, as regards the time in which a claim can be made by the workman against the master, the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, has, in substance, followed the provisions of the Employers' Liability Act, and there cannot be a doubt, in my opinion, that if you read section 4 of the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, this present Act is cognate, although, as we all know, it imposes a further obligation upon the master, because he is liable to make compensation to his workman although he has been guilty of no negligence at all, whereas under the Employers' Liability Act negligence would have to be proved. Section 4 of that Act provides that "An action for the recovery under this Act of compensation for an injury shall not be maintainable unless notice that injury has been sustained is given within six weeks, and the action is commenced within six months from the occurrence of the accident." Under the Workmen's Compensation Act it is to be given as 800n as practicable. I think that the difficulties which have arisen in this case as to the meaning of the expression "claim for compensation "" in section 2, sub-section 1, of the Act of 1897 are due to the fact that in adopting from section 4 of the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, the limit of time there provided for taking proceedings under the Act, the Legislature was unable to use the same phraseology as employed in the Employers' Liability Act, because, under the Act of 1897, there is no action, but the whole thing is "arbitration" from beginning to end. The county court judge sits as an arbitrator, and the other tribunals provided for in the Act can only act as arbitrators. What the Legislature has done in the Act of 1897 is to say (section 2, sub-section 1) that " proceedings for the recovery under this Act of compensation for an injury shall not be POWELL v. MAIN COLLIERY Co. (LIMITED). COURT OF APPEAL. maintainable unless notice of the accident has the been given as soon as practicable after happening thereof." Then they change the phraseology altogether as used in section 4 of the Act of 1880; they do not say, "unless notice of claim for compensation be given," but what they say is, "and unless the claim for compensation with respect to such accident has been made within six months from the occurrence of the accident." What is the "claim for compensation " ? Does it mean a notice by the workman to the master that he claims compensation, or does it mean the initiation of some proceeding which will give to some tribunal the power of deciding under the Act whether he has a right to obtain compensation from the master? Now, there are difficulties in this Act, as one cannot deny. Take section 1, sub-section 3. I should say that the expression " proceedings "in that section does not mean the initiation of legal proceedings in a court. Take section 1, sub-section 2 (b), where you have the expression "and shall not be liable to any proceedings independently of this Act." I think that that means the same as 66 proceedings" means in section 2, sub-section 1-viz., the initiation of proceedings, whether before the committee, the county court judge, or before the arbitrator who is agreed upon between the parties. Now, it has been argued that that is not so. It was said: How does a workman commence proceedings which will culminate in an adjudication? I do not see any difficulty myself. The man would go to the committee which represents himself and his master and say, "I have met with an accident in my master's pit, and I ask you to adjudicate between my master and me. Please take up the proceeding and adjudicate thereon." That would be, in my judgment, a claim for compensation. The same thing would happen, in my opinion, with regard to an arbitrator. He might try and appoint an arbitrator, or if an arbitrator was not appointed, he could say, "This is my claim which is to be arbitrated upon between me and my master." was In this case the workman met with an accident on the 21st of December, 1898; on the 2nd of May, 1899, he sent these two notices to the master: "Please take notice that on the 21st of December, 1898, William Powell, of Mount Pleasant," and so on, injured," and so on, dated the 2nd of December, signed William Powell. This notice is in print, and evidently is sent out on behalf of the man by some union or agency. Then on the same day the following notice is also sent: "Take notice that I claim the sum of 158. per week from the 4th of January, 1899, until such date as I shall be able to resume work, as compensation for injuries received on the 21st of December." Now, I should have thought prima facie, and I did think prima facie at one time, that that was a good claim for compensation within the meaning of section 2. sub-section 1, but having heard this case argued, I have come to the conclusion that it is not 80. Proceedings" in section 1, sub-section 3, may mean something different to what I am going to say: but when I come to sub-section 2 of section 1, I think the meaning of the word "proceedings" and "claim for compensation" can be discovered. Take section 1, sub-section 4, where we find the words, "if within the time hereinafter in this Act limited for taking proceedings." What is the meaning there of the expression "taking proceedings"? Does it mean the sending of a notice to the master that he, the workman, is going to claim compensation? I do not think so. I think it means the initiative proceedings in the court which would culminate in a judgment or in an award. Then what is the meaning of the words in section 2, sub-section 1, COURT OF APPEAL. "unless the claim for compensation with respect to such accident has been made within six months" ? What is the "claim for compensation"? My view is that it is the claim before the court or tribunal which is to decide it. Now, I wish to point out for myself what would be the position if the other reading is correct. I say that the master is entitled to six months; I mean he is entitled to immunity after six months after the date of the accident. If a man makes a claim, as in this present case-viz., "I claim compensation," and he does not go on, but lets it hang, it may be, for twelve months or fifteen months or twenty months, what is a master to do? It is said " "Oh, he can initiate proceedings for himself." I do not agree with that. This Act was passed for the purpose of giving workmen a claim against their masters, although one or two precautions are put in in favour of the master, such as the six months' limit. It is said that all the rules can be altered, but I think it must be admitted that every rule which has been drawn for the purpose of carrying out this Act has only application to the workman taking proceedings and not to the master taking proceedings. It is said that they could all be altered, and they could all be made to fit in with the master taking proceedings against the man. I do not agree; but what I will say is this: That if this Act was drawn with the view that the master should take proceedings against the man so as to prevent a claim (as in the present case) hanging over the master's head, it is strange that the Legislature did not put some explicit provision into the Act; whereas if the claim for compensation be what I say it is-viz., the initiation of the proceedings before the assessing tribunal, if the workman did not go on, the master could compel him to proceed. " Form 1 in the Appendix to the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1898, is headed thus: Application for arbitration by an injured workman with respect to the compensation payable to him." That is the heading of the matter. "In the county court of Then they give the name and address of the applicant and the name and address of the respondent. Then "An arbitration under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, is hereby requested between A. B." (the applicant) and C. D. & Co. (Limited)" (the respondents) “ as to the amount of compensation payable to the said A. B. under the said Act in respect of personal injury caused to the said A. B. .." It then goes on and says, "Amount claimed as compensation. Date of service of statutory notice of accident on respondents, and whether given before workman voluntarily left the employment in which he was injured." Then the name and address of the applicant (the man), and the name and address of the respondent (the master), and their respective solicitors. If a claim for compensation other than this document was contemplated by the statute, is it not a remarkable thing that there should not have been put into these particulars the date when the claim for compensation was lodged or served on the defendant? But there is not a word said about the service of the notice of the claim, or the giving of a notice of a claim upon the master. It is left out. Why is that? It seems to me that that was left out simply because this form, which I have just read, is the very form of the claim for compensation which the statute contemplated the workman should have to give. For these reasons I come to the conclusion that this document which was served on the master is not a "claim for compensation" within section 2, subsection 1. Seeing that a claim for compensation as in this case has been held to be bad by two of the judges |