HIGH COURT.

bye-law-that is, whether the rule applies to all such steam vessels as are not proceeding up or down river, but are crossing from one side to the other, or are turning round, as this vessel was. If such a construction is to be given to the bye-law, it applies to small and short vessels as well as to the largest and longest.

I cannot construe the rule to mean more than

it seems to me to state, and I think I should be doing 80 if I held that it applies to every steamer which is being turned round in the river, although I do not say that a vessel so turning might not at some time, whilst in progress of turning, be crossing towards the other side. It would depend upon the facts of each case, and it seems to me to be very hard as against steam vessels if such vessels, when athwart the tide, in the act of turning round for the purpose of getting into dock, were held in all cases when in such a position to be bound to keep out of the way of vessels navigating up and down the river. Such vessels, in obeying the rule, would necessarily have to put themselves sometimes in positions of extreme difficulty and danger.

On the facts of this case I find that The Dalmatia was, at the time of the collision, partly athwart the river, and not in motion through the water, or moving ahead or astern over the ground, but was slowly swinging to her anchor in the act of turning round, and was not a vessel crossing the river within the rule; but, even if she were, I find as a fact that her omission to keep out of the way of the tug in no way caused or contributed to the collision. Those in charge of the tug had heard the four-blast signal from the Dalmatia which, under article 40 of the bye-laws, indicated that she was turning round. The article in question states that "When a steam vessel (in circumstances other than those mentioned in bye-law 36) is turning round, or for any reason is not under command, and cannot get out of the way of an approaching vessel

she shall signify the same by four blasts of the steam whistle." It is admitted that that signal was sounded by The Dalmatia. The master of the tug thought that by the time he reached The Dalmatia she would have swung head to tide, but he miscalculated his speed and distance, and as he approached The Dalmatia he put on his engines full speed and made a dash for it, with the result, that although he passed through in safety so far as the tug was concerned, one of his barges collided

with the rudder of The Dalmatia. If he had eased his engines sooner, and kept them eased

longer, there would have been no collision, and in my judgment it was by his negligence alone that the casualty occurred. The view is confirmed by the advice I have received from the Elder Brethren of the Trinity House who are assisting me. The result of the evidence enables me to find that the actual distance between the stern of The Dalmatia and the Russian barque was not as great a distance as was alleged by the defendants. With regard to certain entries in the engine-room log of the steamship, believing as I do the evidence from The Dalmatia, that the engines had been stopped for a few minutes before the collision, I disregard the entry in the log as affording positive proof that the engines were moving astern at the time of the collision. I find as & fact that there was not a bad look-out on board The Dalmatia, and, in the circumstances of the case, I pronounce the defendants' tug The John Hollway alone to blame for the collision.

Solicitors for plaintiffs, Stokes & Stokes.

Solicitors for defendants, William Hurd & Son.

COURT OF APPEAL.

PAYNE . HOGG. (a.) Prohibition-Salford Hundred Court-Jurisdiction"Cause of action "-Plea to the jurisdiction-Want of -Salford Hundred Court of Record Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. cxxx.), 88. 6, 7.

The expression "the cause of action" in section 6 of the Salford Hundred Court of Record Act, 1868, means the whole cause of action.

Whitehead v. Butt, 7 Times L. R. 609, approved.

By section 7 of the Act, "Save and except as aforesaid, no defendant shall be permitted to object to the jurisdiction of the court otherwise than by special plea, and if the want of jurisdiction be not so pleaded, the court shall have jurisdiction for all purposes.'

Held, that a defendant, against whom judgment had been signed in default of appearance in an action in the Salford Hundred Court, where the claim did not exceed £50, could not get a writ of prohibition on the ground that the cause of action did not arise within the jurisdiction of the court, as section 7 conferred jurisdiction on the court in such a case in the absence of a plea to the jurisdiction.

Chadwick v. Ball, 14 Q. B. D. 855, 33 W. R. Dig. 172, followed.

Appeal from an order of the Divisional Court, affirming the decision of the judge at chambers, directing a writ of prohibition to issue to the high steward and bailiff of the Court of Record for the Hundred of Salford, and to the plaintiff, restraining them from further proceeding on a judgment obtained in that court.

The action was brought in the Salford Hundred Court to recover £16 08. 9d. principal and interest due on a promissory note signed by the defendant as the maker at Buxton, outside the jurisdiction of the court, and made payable to the plaintiff at Manchester, within the jurisdiction of the court. The writ of summons in the action on its face commanded the defendant, within eight days after service thereof, to cause an appearance to be entered, and it gave notice that in default of the defendant so doing the plaintiff might proceed therein and judgment might be given

an

in her absence. The defendant did not enter appearance, and judgment was accordingly signed against her, and execution was issued. The defendant thereupon applied for a writ of prohibition as above, on the ground that the Salford Hundred Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action.

The Divisional Court held that, as the cause of action arose out of the jurisdiction of the court, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action, section 7 of the Salford Hundred Court of Record Act, 1868, only giving the court jurisdiction in such

* Section 6 of the Salford Hundred Court of Record Act, 1868, gives the court authority to try (1) personal actions, if "the cause of action" arises within the Hundred, provided that the debt or damages sought to be recovered do not exceed £50, except by consent; (2) actions of ejectment between landlord and tenant where the land sought to be recovered is situate in the Hundred, and the annual rent or the annual value thereof does not exceed £50; (3) any action whatsoever, with certain exceptions, (a.) Reported by W. F. BARRY, Esq., Barristerat-Law.

C. A. Russell, Q.C., and Walter R. Warren, for the plaintiff.-The cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Salford court, and therefore a writ of prohibition cannot issue. This point was not argued in the Divisional Court, as that court were bound by the decision in Whitehead v. Butt, 7 Times L. R. 609, purporting to follow Cooke v. Gill, 21 W. R. 334, L. R. 8 C. P. 107, and Read v. Brown, 37 W. R. 131, 22 Q. B. D. 128. The decision in Whitehead v. Butt is wrong. "Cause of action" in section 6 of the Salford Hundred Court of Record Act, 1868, does not mean the whole cause of action. At common law "" cause of action" means every fact material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. But in a particular statute the meaning may be different. The words occurred in section 18 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, and they were held to mean the act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint: Jackson v. Spittall, 18 W. R. 1162, L. R. 5 C. P. 542; Vaughan v. Weldon, 23 W. R. 138, L. R. 10 C. P. 47. That is the meaning of the words in this Act. The act in the present case which gave the plaintiff his cause of complaint was the non-payment of the note at Manchester. That is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. They also referred upon this point to section 50 of the Act of 1868. Secondly, if the "cause of action" means the whole cause of action, section 7 of the Salford Hundred Court of Record Act, 1868, gave the court jurisdiction over the action as there was no plea to the jurisdiction. Section 7 does not apply to the cases mentioned in the proviso in section 6, and in those cases a writ of prohibition can be issued. But as the claim does not exceed £50 section 7 applies, and the effect is to give the court jurisdiction subject to be defeated by a special plea being put upon the record. In Chadwick v. Ball, 14 Q. B. D. 855, 33 W. R. Dig. 172, the Court of Appeal, overruling Oram v. Brearey, 25 W. R. 695, 2 Ex. D. 346, held that the words at the end of section 7, "and if the want of jurisdiction be not so pleaded the court shall have jurisdiction for all purposes," extended the jurisdiction of the court. As the defendant did not appear and plead the want of jurisdiction, the court had jurisdiction. The decision of the Divisional Court, that section 7 only applies where the time has arrived for pleading and no plea to the jurisdiction is put in, cannot be supported. As was pointed out by Baggallay, L.J., in Chadwick v. Ball, there is no distinction drawn in the section between a stranger and a party to the suit. A stranger could never put in a plea in the action. There is no difficulty in holding that the court has a defeasible jurisdiction between the issue of the writ and the time for putting in a defence. In

by consent: provided that if in the course of any action (except where a consent has been signed) it shall appear upon oath to the judge or registrar that the debt or damages sought to be recovered, or the annual rent or value of the land exceeds £50, &c., then the judge or registrar shall order all proceedings in the action to be stayed.

Section 7: "Save and except as aforesaid, no defendant shall be permitted to object to the jurisdiction of the court otherwise than by special plea, and if the want of jurisdiction be not so pleaded the court shall have jurisdiction for all purposes."

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Chapman v. Mattison, Andr. 191, at p. 198, it was said that where a County Palatine had jurisdiction and the action was brought in one of the superior courts at Westminster, the latter should hold plea thereof if there was no plea to the jurisdiction. That recognized a jurisdiction in the courts at Westminster defeasible by a plea being subsequently put on the record. The Divisional Court were therefore wrong. As the want of jurisdiction, if any, was not apparent on the face of the proceedings, the court in its discretion should refuse, in the circumstances, to grant & prohibition. They referred upon this point to Broad v. Perkins, 37 W. R. 44, 21 Q. B. D. 533; Farquharson v. Morgan, 42 W. R. 306, [1894], 1 Q. B. 552.

Pickford, Q.C., and Le Riche, for the defendant, were not called upon to argue the first point. The second question depends upon the true meaning of section 7 of the Act of 1868. That section means that in a case like this until the time for pleading comes the court has no jurisdiction. When the time for pleading has arrived the section makes the omission to plead the want of jurisdiction equivalent to a consent to give the court jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is thus extended by the omission to put in a special plea. If the contention of the plaintiff is correct, the court has an anomalous jurisdiction liable to be ousted by plea. Such a jurisdiction is unknown. In Chapman v. Mattison it was not said that the superior courts at Westminster had jurisdiction liable to be ousted by plea. There the superior courts had no jurisdiction at all, but as prohibition would not lie to a superior court, the only mode of taking the objection to the jurisdiction was by plea. The construction contended for by the plaintiff would have the effect of putting an end to objections to the jurisdiction, because defendants in these small cases will not care to go to the expense of pleading the want of jurisdiction when, if the plea is successful, they cannot get any costs. They will prefer to pay the claim, and the practical result will be the extension of the jurisdiction of the court. In Chadwick v. Ball the court merely held that section 7 meant that a defendant cannot take his chance of success in the inferior court, and then turn round and apply for a prohibition.

They also referred to Mayor of London v. Cox, 16 W. R. 44, L. R. 2 H. L. 239; Mayor's Court Procedure Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii.), s. 15.

C. A. Russell, Q.C., was not called upon to reply.

A. L. SMITH, L.J.-This is an appeal from the decision of the Divisional Court affirming the order of the judge at chambers directing a writ of prohibition to issue. The plaintiff brought an action in the Salford Hundred Court to recover £16 Os. 9d. due

upon a promissory note signed by the defendant at Buxton and made payable to the plaintiff at Manchester. The writ of summons which was served upon the defendant required her within eight days after the service thereof to enter an appearance, and gave her notice that in default of her doing so judgment might be given in her absence. That was a distinct intimation to the defendant that unless she entered an appearance to the action judgment might be given against her. She did not enter an appearance. It is not suggested that she does not owe the money. After the time limited for appearance the plaintiff signed judgment and execution was issued. I may observe that everything appeared to be regular on the face of the proceedings. The defendant then took out a summons for a writ of prohibition to restrain all further proceedings in the action, which the judge at chambers granted, his decision being affirmed by the Divisional Court.

The first point taken by the plaintiff in this court

raises the question as to what is the meaning of the words "the cause of action" in section 6 of the Salford Hundred Court of Record Act, 1868. The law is well settled that, in the case of these courts of limited jurisdiction, "the cause of action means all matters which together make up the cause of action. All those matters must take place within the area of the jurisdiction. The promissory note was signed by the defendant at Buxton, outside the area of the jurisdiction of the Salford court, and as that is a material ingredient in the cause of action, a fact necessary to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, the Salford Hundred Court had, apart from section 7 of the Act of 1868, which I will next consider, no jurisdiction to entertain the action.

The next question is whether the defendant can now set up the objection to the jurisdiction of the Salford court. Section 6 of the Act of 1868 shows that the Salford court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It is admitted that if the judge of the Salford court were to try an action dealing with a matter beyond the pecuniary limits of his jurisdiction, a prohibition would lie to restrain him from doing so. Then comes section 7, which provides that "save and except as aforesaid, no defendant shall be permitted to object to the jurisdiction of the court otherwise than by special plea, and if the want of jurisdiction be not So pleaded the court shall have jurisdiction for all purposes." The Divisional Court have held that the section only requires the objection to the jurisdiction to be taken by special plea when the time for pleading has come. That seems to me to be adding to the section words which are not there, and for which there is no necessity. The defendant did not think fit to enter an appearance and put in a plea to the jurisdiction. If a defendant in such a case as this wishes to object to the jurisdiction he must appear and plead the want of jurisdiction. If he does not do that the court "shall have jurisdiction for all purposes." The very point was brought before this court in Chadwick v. Ball. The difference between section 7 of the present statute and section 15 of the Mayor's Court Procedure Act, 1857, was there pointed out. Baggallay, L.J., after pointing out that a provision was introduced into section 7 of the Salford Court Act which was not in section 15 of the Mayor's Court Act-namely, that if the want of jurisdiction be not So pleaded, the court shall have jurisdiction for all purposes-said that by reason of that provision the omission to plead to the jurisdiction conferred jurisdiction on the Salford Hundred Court for all purposes. In that case, no doubt, the defendant had put in a statement of defence, and had not pleaded to the jurisdiction. To my mind, however, that makes no difference. The section seems to me to set up, in cases to which it applies, an absolute prohibition against raising the objection to the want of jurisdiction except by plea. Lindley, L.J., took the same view, for he said that section 7 does not touch the question of the jurisdiction of the superior court to prohibit where there is no jurisdiction in the

COURT OF APPEAL.

the court should not proceed with the action and give judgment in it. With regard to the question of the exercise of the discretion of the court in granting a writ of prohibition, if it were necessary to decide the case upon that ground, I should not be at all inclined to grant a prohibition in the circumstances of this

case.

COLLINS, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. With regard to the first question, it seems to me to be quite clear that the words "the cause of action" mean the whole cause of action as explained in Cooke v. Gill, and have not the same meaning as the court in Jackson v. Spittal placed on the special words, "a cause of action," in section 18 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852. I now come to the second the Salford Court Act of 1868. I must say that I question-namely, the construction of section 7 of have felt some misgiving upon this, but upon the whole I think that we are concluded by authority. Two alternative views were open. One was that section 7 the Salford Hundred Court, and did not enlarge was merely a rule of pleading in the jurisdiction of the court; merely, in fact, defining the mode in which the objection to the jurisdiction could be taken in the court itself. That was the view taken by the Divisional Court in Oram v. Brearey. The other view was that the section enlarged the jurisdiction of the court. This last view was that taken by this court in Chadwick v. Ball. Though I can see a possible middle view between those two, it is too fine to accept, and if we loyally accept the decision in Chadwick v. Ball, we must hold that in such a case as the present section 7 confers jurisdiction on the Salford Hundred Court. It was urged that this is a very curious kind of jurisdiction, which depends upon a contingency happening subsequently-namely, the contingency of the defendant not putting upon the record a special plea to the jurisdiction. For myself I see no difficulty in holding that the court has, in cases where the claim does not exceed £50, and in cases other than those specified in the proviso to section 6 of the Act of 1868, what has been called a defeasible jurisdiction, which can only be ousted by a special plea to the jurisdiction. Whether this court in Chadwick v. Ball had before their minds all the consequences of their decision, I do not know; but from what I know of those local courts I should have had some misgiving in holding that they had an unlimited territorial jurisdiction, leaving it to the defendant to oust the jurisdiction by a special plea. However that seems to me to be a matter for the Legislature to consider. This court has so decided, and that decision seems to me to be in accordance with the natural meaning of the words of the section. As pointed out by Baggallay, L.J., the section draws no distinction between a stranger and a party to the suit, which tends to show that the section does not merely lay down a rule of pleading in the court itself. I also agree with my lord upon the question

of discretion.

raise the question of want of jurisdiction. To oust the jurisdiction of the court in such a case there must be a special plea to the jurisdiction. The defendant in this case did not choose to appear. Upon the expiration of the time limited for entering an appearance, the court was bound to give judgment for the plaintiff, as in the absence of a plea to the jurisdiction, it had by section 7 jurisdiction over the action. There is another ground upon which the appeal should succeed. The want of jurisdiction did not appear on the face of the record, and, therefore, the court had a discretion as to granting a probibition. If ever there was a case in which the court in its discretion should refuse to grant a prohibition, it is this case. I also agree with what my brethren have said upon the point as to the meaning of "the cause of action."

The apportioned expenses of private street works executed under the Private Street Works Act, 1892, become a charge on the premises affected thereby as from the date of the completion of the works, and not merely as from the date of the final apportionment.

COURT OF APPEAL.

to the plaintiff Stock for £1,000. The purchase was to be completed on the 11th of November then next, and up to that day all "outgoings" were (if necessary) to be apportioned.

On the 22nd of November, 1898, the defendant as beneficial owner," conveyed the land to the plaintiff.

On the 29th of November, 1898, the final apportionment of expenses was made by the council, and on the 29th of December, 1898, they gave notice to the plaintiff that his premises were liable to be charged with the sum of £130 148. as his proportion of the expenses of the works, and that, unless this sum was paid within one month, interest at 4 per cent. would be charged.

The plaintiff called on the defendant to pay this amount, and on his declining to do so the plaintiff paid it himself, and this action was brought to enforce repayment by the defendant.

The questions also arose, whether this apportioned sum was an "outgoing" which the vendor was under his contract for sale bound to discharge; whether the amount was an "incumbrance" on the property, and, if so, whether it was an “incumbrance” which after conveyance came within the vendor's covenant against incumbrances, which, under the Conveyancing Act of 1881, is implied from the use of the words" as beneficial owner" in a conveyance.

Kekewich, J., held, upon the construction of the Private Street Works Act, 1892 (as distinguished from the Public Health Act, 1875), that the apportioned of the completion of the works, and that consequently sum became a charge upon the land as from the date it was an incumbrance existing at the date of the conveyance to the plaintiff, and that the defendant bound to discharge it. was, under his implied covenant against incumbrances,

The defendant appealed.

If, therefore, the premises are sold free from brances after the completion of the works, but before the date of the final apportionment, the sum finally apportioned thereon is payable by the vendor.

Decision of Kekewich, J. (ante, p. 6), affirmed. This was an appeal against a decision of Kekewich, J. (ante, p. 6), and raised a question under the Private Street Works Act of 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57)—viz., whether the sum finally apportioned as payable by the owner of premises fronting a street, in respect of works (such as sewers) executed in the street by the local authority, becomes a charge upon the premises as from the date of the completion of the works, or only as from the date of the final apportionment of the expenses of the works among the various owners of premises abutting on the street. The land to which the action related, which was situated at West Ham and abutted on Queen's-road, had changed hands between the date of the completion of works executed under the Act by the council of the county borough of West Ham, and the date of the final apportionment of the expenses among the property owners.

The works were commenced on the 4th of April, 1898, and were completed on the 26th of July, 1898.

On the 10th of October, 1898, the defendant Meakin, who was the then owner of the piece of land in question, entered into an agreement to sell it

(u.) Reported by PAUL STRICKLAND, Esq., Barristerat-Law.

It is not an incumbrance The charge does not arise before final apportionwithin section 7 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881. ment: Tubbs v. Wynne, [1897] 1 Q. B. 74, 45 W. R. Dig. 168. This does not come within the covenant against incumbrances. This is not suffered by a person conveying, which imports something over which the vendor has control: Hobson v. Middleton, 6 B. & C. 295; Vendors and Purchasers, by Lord St. Leonards (13th ed.), p. 491. There was no charge at all until the final apportionment was made. Sections 13 and 14 of the Private Street Works Act, 1892, are substituted for section 257 of the Public Health Act, 1875. Under section 257 of the Public Health Act, 1875, the charge is a charge upon the "premises": Corporation of Birmingham v. Baker, incumbrance; if it is an incumbrance it is not one the 17 Ch. D. 782, 30 W. R. Dig. 121. This is not an vendor was bound to discharge. Until the date of final apportionment there was nothing to go out: Batchelor Plumstead Board of Works v. Ingoldby, 21 W. R. 77, v. Bigger, 60 L. T. Rep. 416, 37 W. R. Dig. 99; 817, L. R. 8 Ex. 63, 174. In In re Boor, Boor v.

Hopkins, Kay, J., held it was not an outgoing. The Sim. 433, 9 L. J. Ch. O. S. 173. plaintiff cannot recover: Barraud v. Archer (1831), 2

Ogden Lawrence, Q.C., and P. F. Wheeler, for the plaintiff, referred to Hornsey Local Board v. The Monarch Investment Building Society, 38 W. R. 85, 24 Q. B. D. 1; In re Bettesworth and Richer, 36 W. R.

544, 37 Ch. D. 535; In re Furtado and Jeffries, 27 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 466; Egg v. Blayney, 36 W. R. 893, 21 Q. B. D. 107.

Warrington, Q.C., in reply, referred to Barraud v. Archer.

VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.J., delivered the judgment of the court as follows: The question in this case is whether the vendor of a piece of land at West Ham is liable to indemnify the purchaser against the sum of £130 148. claimed by the urban sanitary authority as expenses of works executed by such authority under the Private Street Works Act, 1892. The agreement for sale and purchase was made on the 10th of October, 1898. The day fixed for the completion of the purchase was the 11th of November, 1898, and the purchase-money was paid by the plaintiff (the purchaser) and the conveyance completed on the 22nd of November, 1898. The works in question were completed on the 26th of July, 1898. The resolution authorizing the execution of the works was dated the 27th of July, 1897, which was prior to the acquisition of the property by the defendant, the vendor. The defendant conveyed as beneficial owner; the conveyance recited that the defendant had agreed to sell to the plaintiff free from incumbrances; and the conveyance was by a mortgagee, at the request and the direction of the defendant as beneficial owner, to hold the said land in fee simple freed and discharged from the claims of the said mortgagee. The notice of final apportionment was on the 29th of December, 1898.

If the charge had been a charge for expenses incurred by the local authority under the Public Health Act, 1875, there is no doubt but that such a charge would, having regard to the dates of the agreement to purchase and the conveyance on the one hand and the date of the execution of the works on the other, have been a charge against which the vendor would have had to indemnify the purchaser. The charge under the Public Health Act, 1875, however, is a charge which can only arise on failure of the owner of the land to comply with the notice of the urban authority and the execution by the urban authority of such works by reason of such default by the landowner, and is, moreover, a charge taking effect from the date of the completion of the works, whereas the charge under the Private Street Works Act, 1892, certainly is not a charge arising on default of the landowner, and it is argued is not a charge from the date of the completion of the works. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider from what date the charge under the Act of 1892 takes effect, and whether the fact that the charge does not arise on default of the landowner makes any difference in the obligations of the vendor towards the purchaser; and this makes it necessary to consider the terms of the material sections of the Acts of 1875 and 1892. Under section 257 of the Public Health Act, 1875, the expenses incurred by the local authority, for the repayment whereof the owner of the premises for or in respect of which the same are incurred is made liable by that Act (i.e., by section 150), may be recovered from any person who is the owner of such premises when the works are completed for which such expenses have been incurred, and until recovery such expenses are made a charge on the premises in respect of which they were incurred, and it was held in In re Bettesworth and Richer that the expenses became a charge upon the completion of the works, and that this was so notwithstanding the fact that the owner could not be compelled to pay until the cost had been made out and apportioned. In other words, the charge was held to be subsisting although it could not

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be enforced until the provision in the last paragraph but one of section 257 had been worked out-i.e., until the apportionment of the expenses had become binding by the lapse of three months after notice of apportionment without any written notice of dispute being given by the owner. This decision turned entirely on the words of sections 150 and 257, which plainly gave a charge so soon as the works had been completed and the expenses incurred by the local authority on the failure of the owner of the land to execute the works in compliance with a notice served in pursuance of the powers given by section 150.

The charge which has to be considered in the present case is given by section 13 of the Private Street Act, 1892, and we have to determine if this charge, like the charge under the Public Health Act, 1875, takes effect from the time of the completion of the works. We think it does. The Act of 1892 is by section 1 to be read as one with the Public Health Acts, of which the Act of 1875 is the principal Act, and the charge created by section 13 of the Act of 1892 is to be a charge to the like extent and effect as under section 257 of the Act of 1875. It seems to us to follow, unless there is in section 13 or some other section of the Act of 1892 something clearly to the contrary, that the charge under section 13 will take effect, like a charge under the Act of 1875, from the time of the completion of the works the expenses of which are charged. But it is said that section 13 itself makes express provision to the contrary, because it says, any premises included in the final apportionment, and all estates and interests from time to time therein, shall stand and remain charged .. with the sum finally apportioned on them, or if objection has been made against the final apportionment with the sum determined to be due as from the date of the final apportionment, with interest at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum.” It is said that the effect of these words is that there is no charge until the date of the final apportionment, and therefore not from the date of the completion of the works. We cannot agree with this contention. We think that the effect of these words is, first, to provide that the amount of the charge shall be that fixed by the final apportionment or in case of objection by the determination of the objection; and, secondly, interest is to run on the sum ultimately fixed from the date of the final apportionment. In other words that the owner of the land is not by his objection to the final apportionment to escape interest on the sum finally fixed between the date of the final apportionment and the date of the final determination of the objection. We think, therefore, that there is nothing in section 13 to prevent the charge taking effect from the completion of the works, and when the whole Act of 1892 is considered we find a great deal to lead to the conclusion that the Act means that the charge shall date from the completion of the works, and not from the final apportionment. In the first place, there is the general consideration that it is not likely that the Legislature should have intended the charge to date from the final apportionment, because the final apportionment is an event the date of which can be fixed quite arbitrarily by the officers of the local authority. Moreover, to make the charge commence with the completion of the works is to make the charge coincide with the benefit. In the next place, the whole scheme of the Act points to a charge being intended prior to the final apportionment. First, there is the provisional apportionment of the estimated expenses on the premises liable to be charged. This, subject to objections to be made within a month, fixes the premises to be charged and the proportions to be borne. All this has to be done before the works are