France will not move without England, and Austria without Prussia, and Prussia will not move without being certain that the movement will be agreeable to the Emperor of Russia. The object of our measures, whatever they are, should be to obtain an engagement, or at all events a clear understanding among the five Powers, that in case of the dissolution of the Turkish monarchy the disposition of the dominions hitherto under its government should be concerted and determined upon by the five Powers in Conference. It is obvious that in the existing state of the Turkish Power such an agreement cannot form the subject of a treaty or convention. The hypothesis on which such agreement would be founded would cause the evil immediately, against the consequences of which it would be intended eventually to guard.

* The object must be approached then hy another mode, probably a guarantee with an engagement between the Powers that they will consider as a subject for general discussion and concert any measures to be hereafter taken respecting the Turkish empire. I am aware of the objections to a guarantee, particularly in this country and as applied to a country which, as in this case, we have not defended and have allowed to be conquered and overturned. But a concert growing out of a guarantee appears to me the measure the best calculated as well to calm the anxiety, the fears, and expectations which must be the result of this transaction as to satisfy this country that the best that could be done has been done for its interests. This measure, however, will not prevent the necessity for our making a remonstrance to the Emperor upon what has passed.

• This remonstrance, strong in facts yet moderate and respectful in language, should be so drawn as to be producible if necessary; but it should not be produced or ever come to light if we should be able to attain our object, that of obtaining a concert upon the future fate of the Turkish dominions. It might lead to this desired concert by drawing from the Emperor a proposition that it should take place; or by inducing other Powers to propose it upon seeing the statement of our opinion upon what has passed and our views of the future. If a concert should take place, our answer to the public would be that we are assured that the crumbling to pieces of the Turkish government would not create a war, and would not occasion such an accession of dominion and power to any State as would alter the general balance of possession and give reasonable cause of apprehension to others.


These are, we believe, as nearly as possible the principles which regulate, at this moment, the policy of the great Powers of Europe; and though the dissolution of Turkey has not made such rapid progress as was anticipated fifty years ago, the remedy proposed is the same.

In justice to the Emperor Nicholas it must be said that he released the Porte from some of the harshest conditions of the agreement, and reduced the indemnity; but the Duke of Wel


lington condemned the Treaty not for its effect on the Turks, but for its consequences to ourselves and the other Powers of Europe.

* This government admits that if the Treaty of Peace is to be considered only in relation to the status quo of the belligerents at the period it was negotiated and signed, it is moderate. The Grand Seignior, his family, his government, his capital, his arsenals, and everything belonging to him, were at that moment in the power of the Emperor of Russia. But that is not the view in which we think the Treaty ought to be considered. We think that it ought to be considered in relation to the Emperor's previous professions and promises; particularly by this government, which professed its intention of not delivering its opinion, till the peace should be concluded; which was kept in the dark upon the terms intended to be dictated, till those terms were actually concluded and signed; and to which hopes have been held out of an inclination to modify those terms.

"After such a war it is not easy to discover the terms of peace, which would leave the Porte in a state to exercise with independence the powers of its government. But this I must say, that if the negotiators of the Treaty of Peace—instead of keeping steadily in view his Imperial Majesty's professions and promises ; his professions to maintain the independence of the Porte; his promises not to add to his dominions; and his Imperial Majesty's relations with his Allies, particularly England and France, whose governments have expressed an anxious interest to maintain the independent existence of the government of the Porte—had desired to destroy that government by the demands of Russia, by the weakness in which they have left it to resist these demands, and by the surrender of the independent exercise of powers, without which no government can exist in a state of independence, they would have dictated exactly the Treaty which has been concluded.

• There is one point, however, upon which our interests in the Mediterranean particularly require that this government should have explanation. That is, the right of the Porte to regulate the resort of ships of war to its own waters. This is a point upon which all the Powers of the Mediterranean must feel an interest; and we must know whether the Porte is, or is not, independent of Russia in the exercise of the powers of government in relation to it.'

Amongst the curious episodes with which this volume abounds none are more amusing than those which relate to the King and other members of the Royal Family. The Duke, who knew them well, and would have fought for the Crown, like an old Cavalier, had it hung on a bush, has certainly not spared the illustrious personage who happened to wear it. In the middle of August 1829, just as Diebitsch was crossing the Balkan and Polignac opening his ill-omened campaign against the liberties of France, George IV., suffer




ing from cataract and the distressing symptoms of the malady which was within a year to end his life, conceived the notion that he would take a trip to Paris ! We believe this strange whim has never been mentioned before : and this is how the Duke of Wellington dealt with it.

To the King.

• Walmer Castle, August 26, 1829. Sir William Knighton has communicated to me your Majesty's wish to go to Paris; and I assure your Majesty that nothing would gratify me more than to promote any wish of your Majesty.

• It is needless to discuss the state of the law upon the subject of the King quitting this country; as what I am now about to submit to your Majesty turns upon the circumstances of the time.

There is no doubt that it is important that all the friendly relations between your Majesty and the King of France should be cultivated as much as possible; and particularly those of a personal nature. The happiness and prosperity of your Majesty's kingdom, and the peace of the world, depend in a great degree upon these relations.

But I am confident that your Majesty's presence at Paris at the present moment is not calculated to improve those relations. The King of France has lately made a change in his ministry which, whether beneficial or otherwise, is very unpopular at Paris; and is most falsely attributed to the influence of your Majesty's servants. Nothing would be more false than to state that the cause of your Majesty's visit to Paris at this moment, unexpected as it is, is the desire to countenance, support, and establish the administration recently formed by the King of France. But however unfounded such an assertion, it would be openly made by some, and believed by others, to the great inconvenience of the King of France and his government.

It will be impossible for your Majesty to visit Paris assuming any title or in any character which can conceal that which belongs to you; and I consider it to be essentially necessary that your Majesty should be received upon your arrival at Paris, not only by the King and his Court and his servants, but by the public at large, with the attention, respect, and affection which are due to you. If I have not mistaken the state of the public opinion at Paris at the present moment, I cannot doubt that you would not be received as the King of this country, whatever his title and character, and particularly your Majesty ought to be. I believe that the King of France would not have the power to protect your Majesty from those effects of the public temper occasioned by the late changes in his ministry falsely attributed to your Majesty's counsels.

It is not fit that your Majesty should be placed in the way of risking such events; which would be equally disagreeable to your Majesty's feelings and to those of your people, as they would be undeserved, and as they would eventually prove detrimental to the friendly relations between the two countries.

· I beg that your Majesty will believe that, in writing upon this sub

ject, I have been guided solely by my desire to prevent the occurrence of circumstances which will hurt your Majesty's feelings, and will make you very uncomfortable ; and will for that reason greatly irritate all your people.

All of which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,


So no more was heard of the Parisian excursion!

But his Majesty was not always so easily dealt with. He had conceived, as is well known, an inveterate hatred against Mr. Denman for something he had said at the Queen's trial. The story has been fully related by Mr. Greville and by the Duke of Wellington. But it now appears that in spite of Denman's disavowal of a malicious intention and the King's magnanimous declaration of pardon (which had been drawn up by the Duke), George IV. still declared that he would never admit him to his presence; and his obstinate vindictiveness gave rise to violent altercations with his Ministers. It would take a good deal to wring such a cry as this from the stern Duke:To Sir William Knighton.

November 10, 1829. “My dear Sir William,—I saw the King, and had a very distressing scene with him. It ended by his approving of the act of his ministers of last night, and his determining that he would hear no report till the Recorder should be well enough to make it. His majesty did not mention your name, and I did not tell him that I had seen you.

• If I had known in January 1828 one tithe of what I do now, and of what I discovered in one month after I was in office, I should never have been the King's minister, and should have avoided loads of misery! However, I trust that God Almighty will soon determine that I have been sufficiently punished for my sins, and will relieve me from the unhappy lot which has befallen me ! I believe there never was a man suffered so much, and for so little purpose ! · Believe me ever yours most sincerely,


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No sooner was the independence of Greece extorted from the Porte, than it became necessary to decide who was to be King of the Hellenes. The Duke of Wellington knew Capo d'Istria too well to have any faith in him ; for it had transpired that whilst this patriot was protesting of his pure devotion to the interests of Greece, a sum of 40,0001. was actually placed to his credit in London by the Russian Government, on the very day the Treaty for the emancipation of the Greeks was signed. Indeed, Capo d'Istria was at this very time dissuading Prince Leopold from accepting the Greek Crown, and he was himself assassinated by a Greek not long afterwards. Prince Leopold was the English candidate, not because he had been connected by marriage with this country, but because he was the man best qualified for such a task. But George IV. treated his son-in-law with a royal hatred, and was soon found to be carrying on every species of intrigue, through the Duke of Cumberland and others, to procure the election of some other German Prince.

It is impossible within our present limits to enter upon the very varied topics to be found in these volumes. They are an invaluable contribution to the history of the times, and we highly applaud the courage of the noble Editor in taking care that his father's opinions and correspondence should be published in their integrity. No memoir of the Duke of Wellington can have half the value of his own letters. The greatest of men are, after all, but short-sighted mortals; and one is surprised to perceive how little the Duke seems conscious that he was himself standing on the brink of a precipice, that his Government was incurably weak, that his party was broken up, that the old Tory principles were worn out, and that England was on the eve of the most momentous changes she had witnessed for a hundred and fifty years. When these things happened, it seemed to the old Tory servant of the Crown that the crack of doom was come. But happily he outlived the catastrophe, and in his later years he saw his country, under the rule of a more honest and enlightened Court, restored to entire peace and raised to an unprecedented point of prosperity by the triumph of the very principles to which he had been himself most opposed.

It is, fortunately, not our duty to follow the oscillating and uncertain tendencies of political events and pending negotiations which have swung many of our daily and weekly contemporaries to and fro, with singular inconsistency, in the course of the last few months. Our object is rather to unravel this tangled web, and to mark out some definite system of policy, by the application of fixed principles and historical traditions ; and we see no reason to depart from the course we have hitherto pursued. In reviewing the Two Chancellors,' in July of last year, we showed that the result of Prince Gortschakoff's schemes and intrigues had been to place Russia in the alternative of a rash war or an inglorious peace. In October we pointed out that the scheme and object of the Russian Minister was to shake off and annul the restrictions

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