by the fourteen successive Cabinets, of the corruption prevalent in the Polish civil service and army administration which has found public expression in a series of financial scandals in the law courts. But how does Pilsudski propose to cure the inefficiency of the Polish Diet by constitutional methods, or to form an efficient Cabinet where the men and means are obviously lacking? As to the civil service, before one can enforce decency one has to pay a living wage. But when a few years ago British experts were sent to Warsaw to reorganize the Polish police and rightly insisted on proper pay as the first step in reform, the Poles answered, with equal justification, that they could not pay salaries to policemen higher than those of senior officials. Where is the money to be got for the necessary scaling-up of pay, which would, of course, have to be extended to the innumerable army officers and noncommissioned officers.

There are two hopeless elements in Poland's situation. The first is that she has excessively extended her frontiers, so as to include over ten and a half million non-Poles in a population of twenty-seven millions. To maintain her dominion over the vast stretch of ethnic Russian lands in the East, and over the Corridor and Upper Silesia in the West, she has to keep up an army far in excess of her financial capacities. Her own army will peacefully ruin her before her opponents move a single a single battalion. Still, Pilsudski, its creator and an out-and-out militarist, is the last man to reduce it.

But even without this excessive expenditure, Poland's economic and financial position would be very serious indeed. The industry of the late 'Russian' Poland grew up within the tariff barriers of the old Russian Empire and worked for its wide and rich. markets, in which it enjoyed a preferential position such as it can never ob

tain in the future. With the loss of these markets it has lost its natural basis. The Upper Silesian industry, on the other hand, has grown up in the very closest union with Germany, and the partition of the country meant a severe blow to both. But while the Germans, with their superior efficiency, and better position with regard to world trade, are managing to readjust themselves to the new situation, the Polish part of Upper Silesia is doomed. Nor is the position of Poland's agriculture better than that of its industry. 'German' Poland has lost its preferential position in the adjacent Berlin market, Galicia has lost it in Vienna and Bohemia; and at present Polish agriculture, as a commercial enterprise, has ceased to pay. Moreover, the threat of agrarian reform' hangs over the heads of the big landowners who in the past were the chief producers for export. An atmosphere of uncertainty pervades the economic life of the Polish countryside.

Last but not least comes the problem of emigration. Before the war from the territories now included in Poland at least sixty thousand Jews and a hundred thousand peasants emigrated to America every year, which, besides easing the position at home, produced a continuous inflow of money remitted by the emigrants to their families or brought back by peasants returning to their native villages. Twelve years have passed since this mass emigration came to an abrupt end, and the inflow of American and Canadian money, which formed a most important item in Polish finance, is ebbing. Moreover, before the war, every summer many hundred thousand Polish peasants used to go as season laborers to Germany; now Germany does not require them to the same extent, and anyhow prefers to do without them. It was possible to establish wide frontiers for Poland with the help of French bayonets, but economically

Poland cannot exist without the goodwill of Germany and Russia, which she is not likely to obtain with her present frontiers. Emigration to France, which at one time absorbed some of Poland's surplus in men, has practically ceased, and anyhow was never a sufficient substitute for that to America and Germany. In the absence of a demand for laborers from abroad, passports are rightly refused by the Polish Government. As a result the absurd but sinister rumor has gone about villages that it is the landlords who are trying forcibly to keep the peasants at home for their own profit; and it is whispered that 'blood will flow.'

If the agrarian reform hangs like a menace over the heads of the big landowners, it dangles as an irritating, unfulfilled promise before the eyes of the peasants. For more than seven years it has been 'legislated' about; still, so far very little indeed has been done. But how is it to be done? If the peasants had money with which to pay for the land, the big landowners, in their present truly distressed economic position, would be only too glad to sell it at even much less than reasonable prices. But the peasants have not got the money, least of all those who need the land most. If, therefore, confiscation on a practically Bolshevist basis is to be avoided, the land has to be bought for the peasants by the State. Where is the Polish State to find the means for a transaction of such magnitude?

Pilsudski's coup was acclaimed, welcomed, even provoked, by the Parties of the Left, the Socialists and the Radical Peasants. They will expect him to pay them the price of their support. How can he possibly do it? And if he does not, what will be the result of the disappointment? For some time his very great personal prestige may keep the

masses in check; but how long? If in a rich country like France, faced by an exclusively fiscal crisis, a Napoleon were to arise, he could set things right within six months. But Pilsudski is not a Napoleon, although his admirers have worked up about him an almost Napoleonic legend. He is not an administrator, nor does he understand economics; and Poland is not France. Pilsudski's first attempt at forming a Government from his own followers, in November 1918, failed because they proved to be admirers who did nothing except adore him and live on the capital of his personal prestige. After some two months he was glad to be rid of them and summon a Cabinet composed of his previous political opponents. These were not much more efficient, but at least the discredit did not fall on him. The other reason why the first attempt at a Pilsudski Government failed was that it was deliberately sabotaged by the Parties of the Right, which have on their side the middle classes, practically the entire bureaucracy, and the whole of late German-Poland. This sabotage will infallibly be repeated. If Pilsudski were a Mussolini, he might perhaps break down such resistance, but then, fighting the bourgeoisie, he would finish as a Lenin; he is not the one, and will not become the other.

The entire experiment will probably end in miserable failure, which in the very best case will leave the prestige of the one great man in Poland much impaired, the Constitution shaken, a fatal precedent set, the Polish army still further drawn into politics, — - which have been its curse from the very beginning, the nation still more divided, and the econonic position even more hopeless than it was before the coup. It is reported that Pilsudski feels depressed. One cannot wonder.

POLAND'S business depression, which has now lasted without a break for two years, has become increasingly serious during the last three months. Its present phase has several peculiar features. During the earlier stages of the crisis the stagnant market for Polish manufactures, and the unemployment that accompanied it, were ascribed to the stabilization of the currency. But to-day stabilization is a thing of the past. After a period of minor fluctuations late in March, the dollar suddenly began to mount higher during April, until it reached ten and eleven zloty, which is equivalent to a depreciation of fifty per cent in the value of the latter unit. Remarkably enough, however, this fall in the value of the money did not bring with it the usual symptoms of inflation, for it was not the result of an increase in the circulating medium. In fact, between December 1925 and March of the present year the total circulation of bank notes and treasury bills, taken together, actually decreased in round numbers from 815 million zloty to 773 million zloty.

Consequently we are in the presence of acute depreciation without an increase in the circulating medium. The dollar is rising, although there is a great scarcity of local currency. On the other hand, however, prices have

1 From Die Rote Fahne (Berlin official Communist daily), May 16

the fall of the zloty. In other words, Poland simultaneously exhibits the contradictory symptoms of a stabilization crisis with a shortage of capital and credit, and of an inflation crisis with a sudden rise of prices.

Foreign exchange has gone to pieces, although a favorable trade balance has been secured by increasing exports and ruthlessly discouraging imports. Between July 1925 and February 1926 imports declined from 173 million zloty to 69 million zloty, while exports simultaneously increased from 87 million zloty to 131 million zloty.

As the result of the high prices at home, caused by the rapid adjustment of quotations to the foreign rating of the zloty, plus the lack of a circulating medium, Polish manufacturers are unable to compete in foreign markets. The increase in exports, consequently, is due to larger shipments abroad of agricultural products. In fact, so much grain has been sent out of the country that a serious food shortage is feared before the next harvest is gathered. On the other hand, the Government's Draconic measures to curtail purchases abroad have reduced the imports, not only of luxuries, but also of essential raw materials, so that Polish manufacturers are seriously embarrassed for want of metals, wool, and cotton. This applies to industries employing iron and steel, and in a higher degree to the textile manufacture. In fact, so serious is the situation of the spinners that several firms have migrated to other

countries. Some twenty of these, though mostly smaller enterprises, have removed to Rumania, taking their skilled operatives with them; and we now hear of proposals to move several factories from Yugoslavia. Considerable sales of idle textile machinery have been made by local spinners and weavers to French manufacturers, and also to Italian firms. Simultaneously the title to other factories is passing to foreigners. Already one of the largest woolen mills in Lodz is in the hands of its foreign creditors, to whom its owners were hopelessly indebted for raw materials.

As a result of this industrial crisis unemployment is mounting rapidly. The number of idle workers officially registered increased between November 1925 and March 1926 from 219,000 to 354,000, which indicates that about four industrial operatives out of every ten are without a job. This does not tell the whole story, however, for more than half of the people nominally employed are working short time. As a result, riots of the unemployed, some of which are attended by bloodshed, occur almost daily; for only a part of those in enforced idleness are on the dole. Since Poland has a favorable trade balance, and since there has been no inflation of the currency, the fall of the zloty can be explained only by the hopeless condition of the public finances and the failure of the Government to secure loans abroad. The Budget is in a deplorable state, in spite of strenuous efforts to economize. Although, according to official figures, public expenditures have been cut down within three months from 217 million zloty to 122

million zloty, the revenues have shrunk during the same period from 181 million zloty to 114 million zloty. The Treasury is absolutely empty, and it is a serious problem to find money to pay the salaries of the Government's employees.

Negotiations between the Polski Bank and an American consortium for a loan guaranteed by the tobacco monopoly have fallen through. Professor Kemmerer, to be sure, was most optimistic as to Poland's financial future, but his opinion extracted no money from the pockets of doubtful bankers. Consequently the supply of foreign bills in the Polish Central Bank is completely exhausted. Since Polish exporters naturally prefer under present conditions to keep most of the proceeds from their shipments on deposit abroad, the demand for such bills inevitably exceeds the supply. Eager bidding for them has therefore raised their price and depressed correspondingly the value of the zloty. Last February the Polish Bank pledged its gold reserves to the amount of a million pounds sterling to the Bank of England in order to satisfy the exigent demand for foreign bills. The Government hoped by this measure to peg the zloty at 7.30 to the dollar, which was its value at that date; but the effort proved futile.

Consequently Poland's economic situation is extremely precarious. It is no exaggeration to say that her business mechanism is completely out of gear. Her experience certainly affords an interesting object lesson for other countries that are trying to stabilize their currency upon a gold basis.

[THIS is a translation of a private telegram to Neue Zürcher Zeitung, dated, 'On board the Norge in the vicinity of Nome, May 14.']

ON Thursday morning at 8.55 A.M. the Norge rose with a cargo of twelve tons, including fuel, from King's Bay, Spitzbergen. Before we left Amsterdam Island we corrected our compass by solar observations and wireless signals, so that, in order to facilitate our later radiogonometric tests, we might follow close to the meridian that passes through the King's Bay wireless station. We navigated through broad sunshine except for the last hour before we reached the Pole. This part of our journey offered nothing of especial interest, since all the land we sighted had already been flown over by the Amundsen-Ellsworth expedition last year. Our course was constantly regulated by radiogonometric checks, and by observations of longitude whenever the sun was in a favorable position.

By half-past two next morning we were able to ascertain by a successful solar observation that we had arrived over the Pole. Our vessel descended to a lower elevation. We throttled down the motors, and Amundsen, Ellsworth, and Nobile threw over the national flags of their respective countries. These were attached to sharp-pointed steel staffs, which stuck upright in the ice and remained there. During this ceremony the crew of the Norge stood

1 From Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Swiss Liberal Republican daily), May 17

with bared heads. The fluttering banners on the glistening ice below made a wonderful picture.

We circled over the Pole and turned in the direction of Point Barrow. Everyone was on the alert to discover land, for we were crossing a tract of the globe's surface more than twelve hundred miles long which had never before been seen by human eye. About seven o'clock we reached the Ice Pole, which is regarded as the most difficult point of access on the earth's surface, and shook hands joyously over our achieve

Soon afterward a dense fog compelled us to ascend to a great elevation, but frequent apertures in the cloud blanket enabled us to see large stretches beneath. We were unable to make out any land. Heavy clouds gathered above us, and gradually sank down until they mingled with the fog below, compelling us to continue blindly through the mist.

This was the beginning of the most anxious part of our journey. We sank to a lower elevation, but encountered a snowstorm. When we ascended to get out of that, frost gathered on the cordage and outer metal portions of the airship and rapidly accumulated into a thick coating of ice. The cloud-bank was so high that we could not ascend above it without too great a sacrifice of gas. We kept experimenting, however, with different altitudes, keeping a sharp eye on the temperature and the ice accumulation, but found no level where we escaped this impediment