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125. Can it be questioned if the North Americans were to allow a body of hereditary legislators to arise among them, that they would be some of the greatest fools the world has ever heard of? If then, the establishment of such a body would evince the very climax of folly,-can it be supposed the maintenance of it would be less foolish? Can it be doubted that every hour it remained among the Americans, they would publish to the whole of the living generation, and all future generations of mankind to the end of the world; that they were some of the most besotted fools on the whole earth,-some of the most immoral among men?

126. Some idea may thus be obtained of the unspeakable folly of the Americans allowing an hereditary legislative to exist among them. Suppose a private family was to allow one of its members, one of the most incapable and immoral among them; a man fit for little else than to eat, drink, and sleep; to be maintained for no other purpose than to interfere in all the concerns of every one of his relations, so that no man in the family could do as he pleased as to the marriage of his daughters, or the placing out his sons; or any woman scarcely be allowed to choose, whether she shall order beef or mutton for her husband's dinner: no one would, we apprehend, question that the members of such a family, except perhaps the interferer general, were all mad together. But what shall be said of every family throughout a whole nation permitting such interference? And that all families do, while they tolerate an hereditary legislative, is abundantly evident: as the members of such legislative, by assisting in the enactment of unrighteous laws, or allowing those of their predecessors to remain unrepealed; so operate on the productive and other powers of society, as most materially to interfere in the way men shall marry their daughters, or place out their sons. And they go beyond interfering as to whether women shall order beef or mutton for their husbands' dinners, as in a certain instance we can mention, they are the prime instruments which prevent thousands and tens of thousands of families from having either. Not a few of the unhappy persons to whom we are alluding, from having their right to the land abstracted from them in opposition to all righteous law; being at times only able to obtain potatoes without even a little salt to savour them, and not always enough of these. (v. 266.)

127. If an hereditary legislative was most unhappily to get footing among the North Americans, and the nation did nothing more than for ever to prevent it from interfering with having anything to do in making or altering the laws; thus allowing the members of it to retain the land and amount of taxation they illegally engrossed; assuredly it would be one of the brightest days in the whole history of America, a day which should be observed with universal festivity throughout the country, from

its utmost extremities, north and south, east and west. But of course it would be a far greater achievement, to take from them the land they illegally engrossed, and the amount of taxation they illegally levied. We would not however have them kept upon potatoes without salt; let them have as much beef and pudding as they can eat; but it should be made felony for any one of them ever to be seen within a hundred miles of the hall of the legislative. Thus much then on the subject of two coexistent legislative bodies.

128. A government emanating from part of a nation, may comprise one, a few, or many. It may be hereditary, elected for the lives of the members, or for a limited period. It may also be compounded of the hereditary and elected; and necessarily be of transient or permanent duration.

129. A purely despotic government can exist no where but in the imagination. The chief magistrate can only be considered as one of the aristocracy, and he is not always the most powerful. At the head of the unlawful association that supports such a government, must necessarily be the aristocracy.

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130. Time in reference to governments, may perhaps be compendiously divided into two portions, from the flood to the Christian era, and thence to the present time. As to the former portion, little is known of its history but what the annals of the Greeks, Romans, Asiatics, and the Bible contain. We have briefly adverted to the state of Greece. (vi. 68.) The political constitution of the Romans was perpetually changing. The Asiatic constitutions were principally despotic, not unlike the Russian or Persian at present. Hence the rise of hereditary sovereigns. The constitution of the Hebrews, (which we shall have to consider at length) as it came from God, was purely democratic, except as regarded their foreign bondmen.'-As to the latter portion, at the time of our Lord's appearance, the Romans were masters of a large part of the Western World. When their empire declined, about five hundred years after the Christian era, the southern parts of Europe were overran by immense irruptions of men from the north and east. The generals who headed these forces, in many cases, took possession of the countries they conquered, themselves engrossing large portions of the land, and dividing a great part or all of the remainder among their officers and soldiers. Hence the former proprietors were reduced to a less or greater degree of subjection, and were, therefore, designated slaves, the military being styled freemen. Such was the origin of the feudal system in Europe. The word feudal comes from feodum, compounded of od, possession or estate, and feo, wages or pay; intimating that the grant was made as a recompense for service. The general in chief assumed the office of sovereign, and his principal officers became hereditary legislators. Hence the

rise of the hereditary legislative bodies that now afflict the countries where they exist. Their rise alone must satisfy every reader of discernment that they are utterly illegal.

131. The feudal system gave rise to constant disputes between the principal commanders or sovereigns, and their officers or the nobles, either in their own persons or those of their descendants. To keep down the power of the nobles, the sovereigns had frequently recourse to the people at large. Hence arose elected legislatives, emanating from a part of the people, beyond all question equally unlawful with hereditary legislatives and executives. Hence also we see the rise of those unlawful constitutions, an hereditary legislative and executive, and a co-existing elected legislative. As to which, we may repeat what we have just said about hereditary legislatives, that the mode by which such constitutions was established, must satisfy every discerning reader of their utter illegality in the sight of Heaven. These hopeful constitutions were, as far as our researches extend, unknown in the ancient world. They arose, we see, on the ruins of the Roman empire.

132. Almost all the efforts in favour of liberty in every country of Europe, says Dr. Robertson, have been made by the new power [the people] in the legislature. In proportion as it rose to consideration and influence, the severity of the aristocratical spirit decreased; and the privileges of the people became gradually more extensive, as the ancient and exorbitant jurisdiction of the nobles was abridged.-(View of the Progress of Society in Europe.) (6—130.)

133. Assuredly, no other evidence is wanting of the apostacy of men from their Great Creator, than what the constitutions and codes of nations afford. (6—246.)

134. If, reader, you have the slightest doubt of a pure democracy being the only lawful government in the sight of Heaven, for all nations in all their ages,-imagine a country having superseded its government, and therefore wanting another. Then assume that the democratic is not lawful. Next endeavour to note how the nation should proceed in the formation of its constitution, in accordance with the divine will: (7.) and again, to adopt the words of Paine, you will soon find yourself in "a labyrinth of difficulties, from which there is no way out but by retreating" to what has been elsewhere stated. (i. 48.) The more the matter is studied, the more certain will every ingenuous person be that this is the only conclusion at which he can arrive. This, the Lord of hosts has purposed, and who shall disannul it?'-We, therefore, perhaps cannot better close this chapter than by an extract from the works of Dr. Hutcheson.

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135. Civil power, says he, is most naturally founded by these three different acts of a whole people:

1. An agreement or contract of each one with all the rest,

that they will unite into one society or body, to be governed in all their common interests by one council.

2. A decree or designation made by the whole people of the form or plan of power, and of the persons to be entrusted with it.

3. A mutual agreement or contract between the governors thus constituted and the people (i. 40.): the former obliging themselves to a faithful administration of the powers vested in them for the common interest, and the latter obliging themselves to obedience.-(Moral Philosophy.)

CHAP. VIII.

MODE OF SUPERSEDING UNLAWFUL CONSTI

TUTIONS.

It is possible to exclude men from the right of voting, but it is impossible to exclude them from the right of rebelling against that exclusion. When all other rights are taken away, the right of rebellion is made perfect.- (Paine's Princip. of Government.)

In all states and conditions the true remedy of force without authority is to oppose force to it. The use of force without authority always puts him that uses it into a state of war as the aggressor, and renders him liable to be treated accordingly.-(Locke on Gov.)

1. Rebellion, according to its strict acceptation, signifies "insurrection against lawful authority." Hence there can never be rebellion against a government forcibly emanating from part of a nation, however it may be constituted, and for however many ages it may have been maintained: it never having derived any "lawful authority" from God, or those only empowered by him to appoint a government-namely, the great electoral assembly.

2. Lawless opposition may, however, be even more criminal in the sight of Heaven to an unlawful government, than to a lawful one. The latter might be able much more effectually speedily to suppress the opposition. Besides, though a government emanating from part of a nation is unlawful in the sight of Heaven, it is the one the majority of the people thinks proper to have maintained: if this was not so, it would be superseded. Against even such a government, it is therefore wholly unjustifiable to excite opposition for the sole purpose of increasing the anarchy. (vi. 177.) Bad as things were before, this makes them worse. We have seen that all that an unlawful government can lawfully do, is to supersede itself. (vi. 180.)

rise of the hereditary legislative bodies that now afflict the countries where they exist. Their rise alone must satisfy every reader of discernment that they are utterly illegal.

131. The feudal system gave rise to constant disputes between the principal commanders or sovereigns, and their officers or the nobles, either in their own persons or those of their descendants. To keep down the power of the nobles, the sovereigns had frequently recourse to the people at large. Hence arose elected legislatives, emanating from a part of the people, beyond all question equally unlawful with hereditary legislatives and executives. Hence also we see the rise of those unlawful constitutions, an hereditary legislative and executive, and a co-existing elected legislative. As to which, we may repeat what we have just said about hereditary legislatives, that the mode by which such constitutions was established, must satisfy every discerning reader of their utter illegality in the sight of Heaven. These hopeful constitutions were, as far as our researches extend, unknown in the ancient world. They arose, we see, on the ruins of the Roman empire.

132. Almost all the efforts in favour of liberty in every country of Europe, says Dr. Robertson, have been made by the new power [the people] in the legislature. In proportion as it rose to consideration and influence, the severity of the aristocratical spirit decreased; and the privileges of the people became gradually more extensive, as the ancient and exorbitant jurisdiction of the nobles was abridged.—(View of the Progress of Society in Europe.) (6—130.)

133. Assuredly, no other evidence is wanting of the apostacy of men from their Great Creator, than what the constitutions and codes of nations afford. (6-246.)

134. If, reader, you have the slightest doubt of a pure democracy being the only lawful government in the sight of Heaven, for all nations in all their ages,-imagine a country having superseded its government, and therefore wanting another. Then assume that the democratic is not lawful. Next endeavour to note how the nation should proceed in the formation of its constitution, in accordance with the divine will: (7.) and again, to adopt the words of Paine, you will soon find yourself in "a labyrinth of difficulties, from which there is no way out but by retreating" to what has been elsewhere stated. (i. 48.) The more the matter is studied, the more certain will every ingenuous person be that this is the only conclusion at which he can arrive. This, the Lord of hosts has purposed, and who shall disannul it?'-We, therefore, perhaps cannot better close this chapter than by an extract from the works of Dr. Hutcheson.

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135. Civil power, says he, is most naturally founded by these three different acts of a whole people:

1. An agreement or contract of each one with all the rest,

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