state the limitations consistently with the possible events on which the reversion may fall into his possession. He is allowed a license of blundering to such an extent, that, in one instance, a reversionary estate was held to pass under a will, in which the testator expressly declared that he had no interest! (Doe d. Howell v. Thomas, 1 Scott's N. R. 360.) Here he actually possessed a disposing power over the reversion in fee of certain estates, limited to his sons in strict settlement; though fully believing he had no such power, he said so in his will. It is therefore quite immaterial that the testator had no such intention in his mind when he made his will, where the words used are large enough to pass the property, and he really has a disposing power over it. Where his language is ambiguous, and there is other property to which the limitations are applicable, still in such cases, if it be possible to extend the scope of the words used so as to embrace a reversion, however remote, it is done, as was amply decided in Mostyn v. Champneys, 1 Scott's N. R. 293, where the reversion in fee was expectant on an estate tail of which the testator was tenant-in-tail; but it was held that, having used the words "estates, whatsoever and wheresoever, over which he had any disposing power," they carried reversionary estates as well, though he had them not in his contemplation at the time.

Another class of cases is well illustrated by the decision of Lord Eldon, in that of Church v. Mundy, 12 Vesey, 427, where the testator, having a reversion in fee expectant on an estate tail in his brother, devised all his real and personal estate to B. for her life, and on her death to his said brother and his heirs; but in the event of his death before B., then to B. absolutely, and at her disposal. Lord Eldon decided, that the reversion passed, notwithstanding that the property passed according to the limitations was only such as B. might first enjoy during her life, and which the brother might take after her death; whereas the reversionary estate in question could not fall within these conditions, and could come to B. only after the death of the brother and his heirs. But Lord Eldon laid it down, and certainly in accordance with common sense, that inasmuch as the testator had no other real estate to which the limitations could apply, and he clearly had a disposing power

over the reversion, it was better to give the fullest scope to the words used, "all my real estate," than to supply the deficiency by conjecture.

It seems, therefore, that where there are no express words which carry the fee in reversion, the Courts will import from the context the probable intention of the testator to give that effect; and that where there are express words, broad enough to include the reversion, it will pass without the testator's intention at all; so strong is the inclination to give the largest possible construction to wills, and to extend the net to its utmost possible limit.

In a similar spirit, it is not necessary in order to an estate tail, that it should be created by the proper words of inheritance, so long as they can be implied from the context. The explanation of latent ambiguities is also conducted on the same principle. In Bervosconi v. Atkinson, 17 Jur. 128, where Sir J. Page Wood, V.C., held that "intestacy was the very last resort which the Court will be driven to adopt," extrinsic evidence was admitted to show the person who was the legatee, it being uncertain whom the testator meant, owing to a latent ambiguity; and this is not unusual, but of established usage. Even where there are two perfectly irreconcilable and repugnant dispositions of property, the Court is nowise at a loss, and settles the matter by giving effect to whichever stands last. General are preferred also to specific legacies. (7 Hare, 382.)

The case of Butt v. Thomas (the latest decided, and reported in the Law Times of June 30) affords a further illustration of the construction of wills, as regards estates for life, or in fee, or in tail.

The descent of vested remainders has also been the subject of conflicting decisions and complex law. One of the latest cases decided in connection therewith being Shum v. Hobbs (24 Law Journ. Chan. 377).

There are many other branches of the law, having reference to the construction of wills, which open up subjects of much importance, and on which light may be thrown by further investigation and analysis: to these we shall probably recur in a future paper.

ART. IX. THE STATUTE LAW COMMISSION.

THIS

OUR LEGISLATIVE SEBASTOPOL.

HIS is the great mystery of the day-a great mystery in the sense of a great work—and in the sense of a great secret.

In the former sense, it might solve many difficulties, both in political and in legal statesmanship. Administrative reform it might relieve of half its difficulties; and in like manner, by placing the law in the simplest state practicable, facilitate legal education of the future members of the profession; give us advocates no longer devoted to one or two corners of the field of law, and judges, both in our local and general courts, who shall be masters of the principles and practice of jurisprudence; and, finally, by the illustration which our law in action would receive from the publicity of the tribunals by means of the press, a people conversant with law in its higher as well as its ordinary relations and effects.

So many wonderful things have happened in our time, that we would fain hope this consummation, withheld from us for 300 years and more, may finally be vouchsafed to some among us living at this period.

Our great difficulty is the mystery of the proceedings of the Commission. Discussions have taken place among its members, and a course has been marked out, but nobody knows what it is; and so it is shut out from that wholesome discussion by which public opinion is formed, and brought to aid useful public undertakings, while distrust, like a mist, hangs over the operation, and it is thought to be a job and a failure.

One cannot visit either House of Parliament without witnessing scenes which make one yearn for the fruit of the labours of the commission. Bills, or embryo statutes, are introduced, in disregard of the law, in disregard of the labours of the same legislative body at the same time, and in disregard of the objects and uses of the very persons and authorities for whom they are

intended; and some thirty or forty measures are night after night struggling for a hearing, till at last the House, worn out with much importunity, passes them, without having a discussion at all, the weary member having watched and waited many a day, being called away by other avocations, or fairly exhausted. This is a serious matter, not to be vindicated by the plea that men's minds are occupied with war. If war be so engrossing, let provision be made for the other cases which will not await a return of peace.

In the present case, we have to some extent that provision in the Statute Law Commission; and it requires but such a business-like and frank dealing with the powers which that commission enjoys, to earn for it a position and a usefulness that will make it one of the best and most dignified institutions that we have. Let it but ascertain the law as it is, and thus give the basis of operation for the legislature in its proper work. The history of the commission, its circumstances, and its manner of action, so mysterious and reserved, have not only not allowed it to acquire credit and influence, but have deprived it of the prestige which it would have enjoyed.

Of this there is abundant evidence in the proceedings of the House of Parliament in the present session. In the House of Lords, where the greater number of its most distinguished members are to be found, a marked, even sullen silence barely broken in the Commons, one or two divisions, in one of which the Government were signally beaten, and in the other nearly so, although three Cabinet Ministers had spoken earnestly, and at large, upon the matter.

:

Unfortunately, these proceedings have been insufficiently reported, from the circumstance, as we apprehend, that the consolidation of the law has not yet attained, in popular apprehension, the character of a great measure, affecting every man's interest in every relation, and peculiarly calculated to advance every other measure, public and private, either now or hereafter before the public.

Within the walls of the House of Commons the case is different. The interest on the subject is great, and every member feels that his labours of drudgery will be reduced the moment

the work is done, and that each well-directed step in the progress must sensibly hasten this consequence.

We wish to assist the aspirations of the House, by suggesting a practical course.

The natural and well-established rule for the construction of statutes, is, first, to ascertain the law; secondly, to ascertain the grievance; and, thirdly, to ascertain the remedy. Let no Bill for the alteration or amendment of the law be introduced till the Statute Law Commission, or a Select Committee of either House, or, mayhap, a Joint Committee of both Houses, have reported, in an assigned well-considered manner, the state of the law, the alleged or supposed defects, and the remedies, as well those which have been adopted in like cases, as those which have been proposed for the case in hand.

This is a work requiring no invention, but simply research— a work which would not involve the supersession of the functions of higher or more appropriate authorities, but simply assistance, and such too as, if properly and systematically compiled, with sufficient references to the sources of information, might be collated and tested: it would be as laborious as useful, but as feasible as essential to the proper conduct of legislation.

The preparation of such a work in detail would be the appropriate duty of the Statute Law Commission, or rather of those professional persons whose assistance the Statute Law Commission employs.

The Legislature, having before it its material so well arranged, might proceed by two methods in the execution of its workby resolution and by instruction. By resolution, as to the principles of the measure; by instruction to its committees as to the details.

Having, in the first instance, or with the aid of subsequent experience, framed standing orders for its guidance in the structure and language of its acts, officers corresponding to the examiners of Petitions and the Committee of Standing Orders, might be employed to examine the Bills, in order to ascertain whether they had conformed to the laws of Parliament in force as to such matters.

In this way, Parliament would be relieved of a class of opera