before acquired experience and wifdom, in the management of public affairs. But events have unfortunately demonftrated, that public employments and power improve the understanding of Men in a lefs degree than they pervert their views; and it has been found in the iffue, that the effect of a regulation which, at first fight, feems fo perfectly confonant with prudence, is to confine the People to a mere paffive and defenfive share in Legiflation, and to deliver them up to the continual enterprizes of thofe who, at the fame time that they are under the greatest temptations to deceive them, poffefs the most powerful means of effecting it.

If we caft our eyes on the Hiftory of the ancient Governments, in thofe times when the perfons entrusted with the Executive power were still in a state of dependence on the Legiflature, and confequently frequently obliged to have recourse to it, we fhall fee almost continual inftances of felfifh and infidious laws proposed by them to the Affemblies of the people.

And thofe Men in whose wisdom the law had at firft placed fo much confidence, became, in the iffue, fo loft to all fenfe of fhame and duty, that when arguments were found to be no longer fufficient, they had

recourfe to force; the legislative Affemblies became so many fields of battle, and their power, a real calamity.

I know very well, however, that there are other important circumftances befides those I have just mentioned, which would prevent diforders of this kind, from taking place in England (a). But, on the other hand, let us call to mind that the person who, in England, is invested with the Executive authority, unites in himself the whole public power and majefty. Let us reprefent to ourselves the great and fole Magiftrate of the Nation, preffing the acceptance of thofe laws which he had proposed, with a vehemence fuited to the ufual importance of his defigns, with the warmth of Monarchical pride, which muft meet with no refufal, and exerting for that purpose all his immenfe refources.

It was therefore a matter of indifpenfable. neceffity, that things fhould be fettled in England in the manner they are. As the moving fprings of the Executive power are, in the hands of the King a kind of facred

(a) I particularly mean here, the circumftance of the People having entirely delegated their power to their Reprefentatives the confequences of which Inftitution will be difcuffed in the next Chapter.

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depofitum, so are thofe of the Legislative power, in the hands of the two Houfes. The King muft abftain from touching them, in the fame manner as all the fubjects of the kingdom are bound to fubmit to his prerogatives. When he fits in Parliament, he has left, we may fay, his executive power without doors, and can only affent, or diffent. If the Crown had been allowed to take an active part in the bufinefs of making laws, it would foon have rendered useless the other branches of the Legislature.

CHA P. V.

In which an Inquiry is made, whether it would be an Advantage to public Liberty, that the Laws Should be enacted by the Votes of the People at large.

UT it will be faid, whatever may be

BUT

the wisdom of the English Laws, how great foever their precautions may be with regard to the fafety of the individual, the People, as they do not themselves exprefsly enact them, cannot be looked upon as a free People. The Author of the Social Contract carries this opi

nion even farther; he fays, that, though "the people of England think they are free, "they are much mistaken; they are fo only

during the election of Members for Par"liament as foon as these are elected, the "People are flaves-they are nothing (a)."

Before I answer this objection, I shall observe that the word Liberty is one of those which have been moft mifunderstood or mifapplied.

Thus, at Rome, where that clafs of Citizens who were really Mafters of the State, were fenfible that a lawful regular authority, once trusted to a fingle Ruler, would put an end to their tyranny, they taught the People to believe, that, provided those who exercised a military power over them, and overwhelmed them with infults, went by the names of Confules, Dictatores, Patricii, Nobiles, in a word, by any other appellation than that horrid one of Rex, they were free, and that fuch a valuable fituation must be preserved at the price of every calamity.

In the fame manner, certain Writers of the prefent age, mifled by their inconfiderate admiration of the Governments of ancient

(a) See M. Rouffeau's Social Contract, chap. xv.

times, and perhaps also by a defire of presenting lively contrafts to what they call the degenerate manners of our modern times, have cried up the governments of Sparta and Rome, as the only ones fit for us to imitate. In their opinions, the only proper employment of a free Citizen is, to be either inceffantly af fembled in the forum, or preparing for war.—Being valiant, inured to hardships, inflamed with an ardent love of one's Country, which is, after all, nothing more than an ardent defire of injuring all Mankind for the fake of that Society of which we are Members-and with an ardent love of glory, which is likewife nothing more than an ardent defire of committing flaughter, in order to make afterwards a boast of it, have appeared to these Writers to be the only focial qualifications worthy of our esteem, and of the encouragement of law-givers (a). And while, in order to fupport fuch opinions, they have used a profufion of exaggerated expreffions without any diftinct meaning, and perpetually repeated, though without defining them, the words daftardlinefs, corruption, greatness of

(a) I have used all the above expreffions in the fame fense in which they were used in the ancient Commonwealths, and ftill are by most of the Writers who defcribe their Governments.