parliament not followed by any bad consequences, and
why, 234, 235.
Democracy, remarks on, 44.
Dictators, their great power, 151. 193. Their absolute
power was often useful, 229. See Rome.
Dissolution of the parliament, its effects, 50. Easily ef
fected by the crown in England, 226.
Edward I., surnamed the English Justinian, 33.
Elections, laws relating to them, 48. 66. Grenville's bill
for deciding contested elections, 67, note. Advantages aris-
ing from the right of the people to elect representatives,
164. 176. See People.
Elizabeth, queen, the inquisitorial court of High Commis-
sion, established during her reign, 41.
Emancipation of sons, in Rome, manner of, 87.
England, the power of the king becomes very great at the
era of the Conquest, 25. The lords or barons much depen.
dent on the crown, 26. Are thence compelled to unite in a
common cause with the people, 29. Different from France,
in forming one compact united kingdom, 31. This circum-
stance favours the establishment of public liberty, ibid. A pe.
culiarity of its government, viz. the advantageous manner to
public liberty, in which revolutions have constantly been
concluded, 189, &c. The strictness with which laws favour-
able to the liberty of the subject are executed, 199, &c. See
Commons. Remarkable impartiality in the courts of law,
208. Instances quoted, 209, note. 210, note. Farther stric
tures on the same subject, 238. Singular law-doctrine, con-
cerning the authority of government, and the liberty of the
subject, 243. The people's situation different from that of
the people in Rome, 255. See People. The balance of the
people in government is connected with the right of pro-
perty, 258. See Taxation. Divisions among the people
never carried very far, 284. The lower class possessed of a
considerable spirit of order and justice, 286.
Equity, courts of; an inquiry into the meaning of the word,
and their real office, 86. A court of this kind existed in
Rome, 87. See Prætor. Remedies afforded by the English
courts of Equity, 89. How these courts were first instituted,
90. The opposition they met, ibid. Their method of pro-
ceeding to enforce appearance, and submission to their de-
crees, ibid. Are kept within much more strict bounds than
the prætor's equity court was in Rome, 91. Farther defini-
tion of their office, 93.
Executive power, lodged in the king, is more easily re-
pressed when confined to a sole indivisible seat, 127, &c.—
is taken out of the hands of the representatives of the peo-
ple, 160. Great advantages thence arising, 161. See Crown.
Faire sans dire, the motto quoted, 282, note.
Favourite of the people, how prevented in the English
constitution from acquiring a power dangerous to public
liberty, 121, &c. See Commonwealth.
Felton, his answer to the bishop of London, 109, note.
Feudal government introduced in France through a long
series of events and years, 23. Is introduced suddenly and
at once in England by the Conquest, 25. Consequences of
this difference, 26.
France, the feudal government was established in it very
slowly, 23. The crown was at first elective, 24. The autho-
rity of the king originally very inconsiderable, 24. 26. The
barons were in great measure independent of the crown,
ibid. These circumstances were prejudicial to the liberty of
the people, 26. The kingdom was formed by an aggregation
of different sovereignties, 27. The remarkable treaty by
which the war for the public good was terminated, 32. Ge-
neral estates, how constituted, 34, note. The third estate, or
commous, never possessed any weight, ibid. A remarkable
insurrection, 36. Edits enrégistrés, 52. Expedient for dis-
missing the parliament of Paris, 225. The jealousy of the
crown against that assembly, 233. Comparison between the
French and English constitutions in regard to the right of
taxation, 276, 277.
Franklin, Dr. quoted, 280, 281.
French language introduced into the English laws by
William the Conqueror, 52. Is still used by the king in de-
claring his intention to the parliament, ibid.
General warrants, set aside, 261, note.
Geneva, republic of, mentioned, 134. 146. 173. 261, notes.
George 1., king, led into an imprudent step, 268. 271,
Germany, by what cause the growth of the power of the
crown was checked there, 37, note.
Gracchi, how forsaken by the people, 152.
Grand jury, its office, 103.
Grecian commonwealths, revolutions in them only fa
vourable to the particular interests of leaders and dema-
gogues, 188. The reproach made them by Cæsar, 211, note.
Guise, death of the duke of, 224.
Habeas Corpus act, when passed, and for what purpose,
114. The tenor of it, ibid. The particular occasion of it,
201. Expressions of judge Blackstone on the subject, ibid.
By what means finally settled, 261.
Hale, judge, quoted, 33. His description of the office of
a jury, 107, 108.
Henry I., charter of, 30.
Henry VIII., his great power, 40. Was unsupported by a
standing army, 215.
Holt, judge, remarkable opinion delivered by him, 179.
Hugh Capet, the first hereditary king in France, 24. The
haughty answer of a French lord to him, 25, note.
Hume, Mr. a few words on the character given by him of
James II., 247, note.
James I., liberty begins to revive in his reign, 41. His
lofty notions concerning regal authority, ibid. Keeps his
ground against the restless spirit of the times, 247.
James II., how his dethronement was effected, 46. Was
inexcusable in his conduct, 247. Received no assistance
from his numerous army, 251.
Impeachment, public, what, and its effects, 64. The king's
pardon no bar to the prosecution of an impeachment, 65.
Can it prevent the execution of the judgment? ibid. In.
stances of ministers and judges impeached by the commons,
66, 67. 200-206.
Imprisonment, the methods formerly used for liberating
imprisoned persons, 113. They were insufficient against the
power of the court, ibid. A new force given to them by the
petition of right, 114. Habeas Corpus act, ibid.
John, king, grants the great charter, 31.
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, his opinion concerning the office of
the courts of equity examined, 86.
Judges, independence of, 57. Their office, in criminal
causes, is only to direct the jury, and afterward to pro-
nounce the law, 106. Cannot alter mode of punishment, 110.
Instances of judges impeached, 201. See Courts.
Judicial power, in regard to criminal matters, the neces-
sary cautions in establishing such power, 95, &c. Should
not be trusted, especially in a free state, to any too power-
ful persons or bodies, 99. Allusions to the French courts of
law, 100, note. See Trial. May be said in England to be
in the hands of nobody, 111. Lodged in the people, 231.
Junius's Letters quoted, 106, note. 201.
Jury, how they are to shape their verdict, 106. Must de-
cide both upon the fact and the criminality of it, 107. What
rules must be followed in their opinion, ibid. Judge Hale's
remarkable passage in that respect, 108. Usually pay a great
regard to the judge's direction, 112. The effect of their re-
commending to mercy, ibid. See Trial and Judicial
Power.
Justice, impartiality of its administration in England,
208.237. See Law and Judicial Power.
King, his prerogative by the constitution, 48. 52, 53. The
restrictions set by law upon the exercise of the same, 55.
57.60. He is not to interfere, nor his privy-council, in the
decision of causes either civil or criminal, 62, note. It is
disputed whether he can remit the prosecution of a sen-
tence awarded in consequence of an impeachment, 65. Not
to be named in debates, 154. The last instance of one using
his negative voice, 222. See Crown.
Laws. See Legislation. Laws of England, 71. Difficulty
in procuring just ones, 142. All who can influence the exe-
cution of them are to be strictly watched, 159. A very ne-
cessary caution in framing them, 160.
Law, criminal, how strictly the letter of it is adhered to
in England, without any extension, 108. 244. Great mildness
of it, 112. See Punishment.
Legislative power, how formed in England, 48, &c. Ad-
vantages arising from its being divided, 130, &c. Remark-
able constancy in its operations in England, ibid. Not so in
ancient commonwealths, 131. See Parliament.
Legislation, mode of, in commonwealths, 133. Inconve
niency of it, 134. The manner in which laws are framed in
England, 135. Advantages of the same, 136. See Pro-
pounding. Would it be an advantage if laws were enacted
by the people at large? 142-148. See People.
Liberty, causes of English, 28, 29. Its progress, 30, &c.
Private liberty, 67. The word much misapplied or misun-
derstood, 139. A more accurate definition of the same, 141.
How the provisions to secure it should be directed, 159.,
Singular law-doctrine in England concerning the liberty of
the subject, 244.
Livy quoted, 145. 151. 183. 185–187. 193, 194.
Lords, the house of, how constituted, 50. Not suffered by
the commous to frame, or even alter, a money-bill, 51. 60.
Make it a standing order to reject all money-bills to which
bills of another nature have been tacked, 56. 218. Have not
given up their claim in regard to altering money-bills, 60,
note. The great pre-eminence allowed them in point of ce-
remony over the commons, 132. Can vote by proxy,
ibid.
Unite in a common cause with the people against the power
of the crown, 29. 42. 162. 200. Abridge their own personal
privileges, 205. Their impartiality in their judicial capacity,
207. Cannot be charged with having abused their privilege
of trying their own members, ibid. Defeat the attempts of
the commons on the crown's prerogative, 218. Their own
attempts defeated by the commons, 219. A bill is framed to
limit their number, 268. The great importance of that bill
generally overlooked, 271, note. See Parliament and
Peers.
Lyttleton, lord, quoted, 177, note.
Machiavel's History of the republic of Florence quoted,
Magna Charta, remarkable extensiveness and impartiality
of the provisions of, 189.
Marlborough, duke of, easily dismissed from his employ.
ments, 126, note. 223.
Martial, courts, a remarkable dispute between one and
court of law, 249, note.
Martial law must be universal, where the authority of the
government is supported by a standing army, 241.
Members of the house of commons, their personal privi.
leges, 205. Instances of some punished by their own house,
ibid. See Commons.
Military power, a cause of anxiety to those sovereigns
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