- an exaggeration, according to Mr. Ellis-but he said nothingabout Michael Macnamara of The Vine. At the same time, it was the presence, not of a bar sinister, but of a yardstick sinister in his coat of arms that chiefly filled him with shame. When he was marrying his first wife he wrote 'Esquire' in the register as a description of his father's profession. There is no evidence, apparently, as to whether Meredith himself ever served in the tailor's shop after his father moved from Portsmouth to St. James's Street, London. Nothing is known of his life during the two years after his return from the Moravian school at Neuwied. As for his hapless father (who had been trained as a medical student but went into the family business in order to save it from ruin), he did not succeed in London any better than in Portsmouth, and in 1849 he emigrated to South Africa and opened a shop in Cape Town. It was while in Cape Town that he read Meredith's ironical comedy on the family tailordom, Evan Harrington; or He Would Be a Gentleman. Naturally, he regarded the book (in which his father and himself were two of the chief figures) with horror. It was as though George had washed the family tapemeasure in public. Augustus Meredith, no less than George, blushed for the tape-measure daily. Probably, Melchizedek Meredith, who begat Augustus, who begat George, had also blushed for it in his day. As the great 'Mel' in Evan Harrington, he is an immortal figure of genteel imposture. His lordly practice of never sending in a bill was hardly that of a man who accepted the conditions of his trade. In Evan Harrington three generations of a family's shame were held up to ridicule. No wonder that Augustus Meredith, when he was congratulated by a customer on his son's fame, turned away silently, with a look of pain.

The comedy of the Meredith family springs, of course, not from the fact that they were tailors, but that they pretended not to be tailors. Whether Meredith himself was more ashamed of their tailoring or their pretentiousness it is not easy to decide. Both Evan Harrington and Harry Richmond are, in a measure, comedies of imposture, in which the vice of imposture is lashed as fiercely as Molière lashes the vice of hypocrisy in Tartuffe. But it may well be that in life Meredith was a snob, while in art he was a critic of snobs. Mr. Yeats, in his last book of prose, put forward the suggestion that the artist reveals in his art, not his 'self' (which is expressed in his life), but his 'anti-self,' a complementary and even contrary self. He might find in the life and works of Meredith some support for his not quite convincing theory. Meredith was an egoist in his life, an anti-egoist in his books. He was pretentious in his life, anti-pretentious in his books. He took up the attitude of the wronged man in his life; he took up the case of the wronged woman in his books. In short, his life was vehemently pro-George-Meredith, while his books were vehemently anti-George-Meredith. He knew himself more thoroughly, so far as we can discover from his books, than any other English novelist has ever done.

He knew himself comically, no doubt, rather than tragically. In Modern Love and Richard Feverel he reveals himself as by no means a laughing philosopher; but he strove to make fiction a vehicle of philosophic laughter rather than of passionate sympathy. Were it not that a great poetic imagination is always at work, in his prose, perhaps, even more than in his verse, his genius might seem a little cold and head-inthe-air. But his poet's joy in his characters saves his books from inhumanity. As Diana Warwick steps out in

the dawn she is not a mere female human being undergoing critical dissection; she is bird-song and the light of morning and the coming of the flowers. Meredith had as great a capacity for rapture as for criticism and portraiture. He has expressed in literature as no other novelist has done the rapturous vision of a boy in love. He knew that a boy in love is not mainly a calf but a poet. Love in a Valley is the incomparable music of a boy's ecstasy. Much of Richard Feverel is its incomparable prose. Rapture and criticism, however, make a more practical combination in literature than in life. In literature,

criticism may add flavor to rapture; in

life, it is more likely to destroy the flavor. One is not surprised, then, to learn the full story of Meredith's first unhappy marriage. A boy of twentyone, he married a widow of thirty, high-strung, hot, and satirical like himself; and after a depressing sequence of dead babies, followed by the birth of a son who survived, she found life with a man of genius intolerable, and ran away with a painter. Meredith apparently refused her request to go and see her when she was dying. His imaginative sympathy enabled him to see the woman's point of view in poetry and fiction; it does not seem to have extended to his life. Thus, his biography

The Nation

is to a great extent a 'showing-up' of George Meredith. He proved as incapable of keeping the affection of his son Arthur, as of keeping that of his wife. Much as he loved the boy, he had not been married again long before he allowed him to become an alien presence. The boy felt he had a grievance. He said probably without justice that his father kept him short of money. Possibly he was jealous for his dead mother's sake. Further, though put into business, he had literary ambitions a prolific source of bitterness. When Arthur died, Meredith did not even attend his funeral.

Mr. Ellis has shown Meredith up, not only as a husband and a father, but as a hireling journalist and a larkdevouring gourmet. On the whole, the poet who could eat larks in a pie seems to me to be a more shocking 'great man' than the Radical who could write Tory articles in a newspaper for pay. At the same time, it is only fair to say that Meredith remains a sufficiently splendid figure in Mr. Ellis's book even when we know the worst about him. Was his a generous genius? It was at least a prodigal one. As poet, novelist, correspondent, and conversationalist, he leaves an impression of beauty, wit, and power in a combination without a precedent.

GERMANY'S MERCHANT

FLEET

THE Kölnische Zeitung publishes an article about the present state of Germany's mercantile fleet. When war broke out, Germany had at her disposal 5,500,000 tons. Almost 3,500,000 tons were abroad, unable to reach a home port. Out of these 3,500,000 2,500,000 succeeded in escaping to neutral ports, where they enjoyed the right of asylum. The following figures, representing thousands of tons, indicate the German tonnage in the various countries: United States, 620; Chile, 320; Brazil, 239; Portugal and colonies, 230; Netherlands and colonies, 180; Spain and colonies, 207; Italy and colonies, 170; Turkey, 73; Argentine, 64; Norway, 50; Peru, 43; Uruguay, 43; Mexico, 38; China, 21; Greece, 18; Siam, 18; Cuba, 16; Colombia, 15; and Danish colonies, 8. Eight thousand tons were in Austria. Five hundred and fifty thousand tons, being in enemy ports, were confiscated, while 324,000 were taken as prizes. The more than 2,000,000 tons at home were increased by 125,000 tons by the rapid conquest of Belgium, 75,000 tons in Russia were recaptured, while Germany succeeded in bringing home 24,000 tons from Norway. Turkey joined the Central Empires, by which 73,000 tons were secured, though not coming to Germany. Later, 33,000 tons in Turkey were lost through enemy action, while at present the remaining 40,000 tons, and 25,000 out of the 75,000 recaptured in Russia (being in the Black Sea), are in the enemy's hands as a result of the armistice conditions, though they remain German property.

From these figures it appears that more than 2,250,000 tons are at home. Of the aforesaid countries only Chile, Holland, Spain, Argentina, Norway, Peru, Uruguay, Mexico, Colombia, and the Danish colonies remained neutral. The more than 950,000 tons in these countries ought to have been safe; but, nevertheless, Germany has to record losses. Peru and Uruguay confiscated all German vessels; Chile and Argentina did the same as to some merchantmen, while Germany had to deliver 60,000 tons to Holland and Spain as compensation for vessels sunk. The 8,000 tons in the Danish colonies changed ownership with those colonies.

At present 725,000 German tons are still lying in neutral ports. This, added to the tonnage at home, gives a total of 3,000,000 tons gross untouched German property. The Kölnische Zeitung considers the 400,000 tons confiscated by Italy and Portugal as German property, as both these countries seized the German merchantmen before they themselves had entered the war. The 225,000 tons confiscated by countries which remained neutral are also German property, as well as the aforesaid 65,000 tons in Turkey and in the Black Sea, though they are in enemy hands at present. As peace will be dictated to Germany,' the Kölnische Zeitung says, there are no prospects that Germany will get back the 1,500,000 tons seized by enemy countries, or the 324,000 tons which are prizes. This tonnage amounting to more than 1,800,000 tons, of which 700,000 were sunk by Germany's war measures must be considered lost.

Summarizing, the Kölnische concludes that out of the 5,500,000 tons

of Germany's merchant fleet 3,700,000 tons are still German property. Out of this amount 2,250,000 are at home or in the immediate vicinity; 750,000 tons are untouched in neutral ports; 625,000 tons have been confiscated by neutrals for their use; while 65,000 are in enemy hands in connection with the armistice conditions. The remainder, being 1,800,000 tons, must be considered lost. Taking into account that out of the vessels at home 250,000 tons have been lost in war-service, then 3,500,000 are still German property. To this should be added the vessels newly constructed during the war, estimated at least at 1,000,000 tons. Consequently, the total tonnage of Germany's merchant fleet is about 4,500,000 tons. The Kölnische remarks: 'Of course, it is not to be anticipated what will really remain to us,' and ends by suggesting the release of the whole of this shipping space, this being a plain demand of humanity for the revictualing of the country.

The Morning Post

THE NEED OF AN INTERALLIED FINANCIAL LEAGUE

BY EDMOND THÉRY
Editor of L'Économiste Européen

By the latest estimate, the war has cost the Entente nations down to December 31, 1918, about 650,000,000,000 francs, of which more than half (in the form of unliquidated expenditure, banknotes, and short-term Treasury notes) has still to be refunded.

After the treaty of peace has been signed, the wealthiest of these nations will try to improve the quality of their money in circulation as quickly as possible and to adjust their financial status to the gold standard which, since the demonetization of silver by Germany in 1872, that is to say, for the last forty-seven years, has been the only medium of international exchange.

This adjustment will increase the difficulties which the less fortunate nations will encounter in converting into gold, pounds-sterling, dollars, or francs, the debts which they will have to collect from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey-debts on which they rely, however, to pay the debts which they themselves have contracted in the course of the war, whether to their wealthy allies or to neutral countries.

Thus the conversion by each nation of the war-damages to be paid by the Quadruplice is likely to arouse among the nations of the Entente an antagonism which Germany would inevitably make the most of, to attempt to evade all or part of her engagements.

Such competition between the Allies would be an unpardonable blunder, for it would divide them after a few years; whereas, a common fund for the liquidation of enemy debts would have the immense advantage of maintaining for a long time the great principles of alliance and solidarity which have united them in the defense of the right and of the liberty of the peoples, and which finally have given them the victory.

As early as 1916, following the difficulties with which the Allied nations would be confronted, in case of an individual liquidation of their war-debts, I wrote in L'Économiste Européen of November 17 of that year:

In order to avoid the possibility that the

wealthy nations, by settlements on their own account, may involuntarily sacrifice the interests of those Allied nations which enjoy less exterior credit, it is indispensable that the expenditure and all the damages incurred by them, which are a direct result of the war, should be grouped together in the form of a unified debt, including all such expenditure and damages, and having the combined guaranty of the nine Allied nations.

We will discuss here neither the amount nor the form of the international liquidation loan which will take care of the unified debt, but will point out that it must be created, issued, and administered by a special bank,

the managing council of which will include a representative from each Allied nation.

Each of these nations will receive from

the special bank that portion of the capital of the international loan corresponding to the amount of its war-debts and damages; and this portion will enable its government to convert at par the loans contracted on account of the war within its own limits, also to turn into cash damages duly verified.

Each nation being responsible with respect to its co-Allies, for the fraction of the international loan which will thus have been assigned to it, will be debited every three months by the special bank with the amount of interest and the share of the sinking fund corresponding to its quota of the unified debt.

But the special bank will likewise collect, for the account of the Allied nations, the amount of the indemnities which those nations have been able to lay upon their enemies. These collections will diminish the amount of the arrears which each Allied nation will have to pay into the special bank. It is the system of contingent quotas (matricula) which the Imperial German Treasury, before the war, collected from the confederated States.

In order to guarantee to each of the Allied nations the stability of its exchange, each one of them will adjust with the special bank the amount of its arrears in its

own national money, reckoned at a parity with gold; and, reciprocally, the coupons and matured bonds of the liquidation loan will be payable in national money to be accepted at a parity with gold, in all the Allied nations.

There will thus be established, within each one of the groups of the Allied nations a financial adjustment which will improve the foreign credit of each country, which will facilitate considerably their reciprocal economic and financial relations, and, for that very reason, will make gold much less necessary to them.

This plan was at the time considered too daring by some and unreasonable by others; but would it not be well to-day to examine it thoroughly, or, at least, to segregate that part of it relating to the collection and conversion in common of the debts to be recovered from the enemy for all the nations of the Entente as a whole?

To sum up in order to obtain a

prompt performance of the financial engagements entered into in their favor, the nations of the Entente must form among themselves a genuine financial alliance, creating a special organization which shall collect for the common account all sums to be received from the four enemy countries, and transform these credits into liquidation bonds, to be distributed to each of the Allies entitled thereto.

All the countries of the Entente which join in a common guaranty of the special bank's operations of conversion will be able to use the bonds issued by this bank as a means of adjusting the financial operations that took place between them during hostilities.

Just as Germany imposed upon France, in 1871, the expense of conversion into gold-credits, or into American, English, French, Italian, Belgian money, so the conversion of marks, crowns, levs, or Turkish pounds, will be at the expense of the debtor countries.

Unity of action on a united front has shown the nations of the Entente the immense advantage which a close grouping of their military forces must necessarily afford them: unity of liquidation of their war-debts will enable them in the same way,-rich and poor alike, to adjust rapidly their financial status under most favorable conditions.

The less fortunate nations will thus benefit by the credit of the richest; but the latter will find it to their advantage in this way, that unity of liquidation of the said debt will have the result of assuring in practice, for many years, the principle of the moral and material alliance which has united them so happily during the war.

An individual adjustment would produce results diametrically contrary to these. It must be avoided at any cost; for Germany would profit by it to try to take her revenge.

Le Figaro