Axioms of Cooperative Decision MakingCambridge University Press, 1991. júl. 26. - 348 oldal Problems of fair division, equitable cost-sharing, division of a joint benefit, or the choice of a truly democratic voting rule are familiar subjects of dispute in technologically advanced democracies. This book provides a comprehensive and unified presentation of these technically heterogeneous subjects that are linked by common axioms. |
Tartalomjegyzék
Foreword | 9 |
Acknowledgments | 11 |
Introduction | 11 |
Overview | 11 |
Egalitarianism versus utilitarianism | 11 |
11 Egalitarianism | 13 |
12 Classical utilitarianism | 19 |
Exercises | 24 |
Exercises | 162 |
Regulated monopoly | 166 |
71 Two production economies | 169 |
72 The core of the public good economy | 171 |
73 The core of the private good economy | 174 |
74 Marginal pricing in the public good economy | 179 |
75 Marginal pricing in the private good economy | 181 |
76 Two welfare egalitarian core selections | 184 |
Social welfare orderings | 30 |
21 Social welfare orderings and collective utility functions | 33 |
22 Scale and zero independence | 35 |
23 Independence of common utility pace | 39 |
24 Separability | 42 |
25 Reduction of inequality | 45 |
26 Inequality indices | 51 |
Exercises | 56 |
Axiomatic bargaining | 61 |
31 Social choice functions | 63 |
32 Nashs independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom | 67 |
33 Issue monotonicity | 69 |
34 Population monotonicity | 71 |
35 Separability | 75 |
36 Additivity | 77 |
Exercises | 79 |
Costsharing games and the core | 87 |
41 Standalone and subsidyfree principles | 89 |
42 Balanced games | 95 |
43 Pricing of a multioutput monopoly | 98 |
44 NTU games | 102 |
Exercises | 103 |
Values of cooperative games | 107 |
51 The Shapley value | 109 |
52 Convex games | 112 |
53 Characterizations of the Shapley value | 116 |
54 The nucleolus | 121 |
55 Core selections | 129 |
56 Characterization of the nucleolus | 132 |
Exercises | 136 |
Equal versus proportional sharing | 145 |
61 The surplussharing model | 147 |
62 The costsharing model | 148 |
63 The leveling tax and head tax | 150 |
64 The Shapley value and nucleolus cost sharing | 153 |
65 Decentralizability | 157 |
66 Separability | 159 |
77 Technological monotonicity | 189 |
Exercises | 191 |
Strategyproof mechanisms | 196 |
81 Noncooperative manipulations | 197 |
82 Strategyproofness and the pivotal mechanism | 201 |
83 Strategyproof cost sharing | 205 |
84 The class of demandrevealing mechanisms | 209 |
85 Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism | 213 |
Exercises | 217 |
Majority voting and scoring methods | 225 |
91 Condorcet versus Borda | 228 |
92 Equity and monotonicity properties | 233 |
93 Reinforcement and participation | 236 |
94 Sequential majority comparisons | 240 |
Exercises | 248 |
Strategyproofness and core stability | 256 |
101 The GibbardSatterthwaite theorem | 258 |
102 Singlepeaked preferences and Condorcet winners | 263 |
103 Core stability | 267 |
104 The minority principle | 271 |
105 Strategic voting and implementation theory | 276 |
Exercises | 277 |
Aggregation of preferences | 283 |
the majority rule and other methods | 285 |
dictators | 288 |
oligarchies | 291 |
114 Acyclic social welfare | 293 |
equivalence of AHA and strategyproofness | 298 |
116 Social welfare orderings on the singlepeaked domain | 300 |
117 Rationalizable choice functions | 306 |
118 Condorcets aggregation method | 310 |
Exercises | 312 |
Bibliography | 317 |
327 | |
330 | |
Más kiadások - Összes megtekintése
Gyakori szavak és kifejezések
a₁ agent i's allocation anonymous anticore axiom axiomatic b₁ binary candidates Chapter characterization choice function compute Condorcet consistent Condorcet winner Consider cooperative games corresponding cost function cost sharing cost-sharing game decentralizability defined Definition denote domain egalitarian SCF elected equal example Exercise feasible set feasible utility vectors fixed formula given grand coalition Hence implies independence individual utilities inequality Lemma leximin Lorenz Lorenz curve maximal Moulin Nash equilibrium Nash's neutral NIIA nonempty NTU game nucleolus ordering outcome Pareto optimal phantom voters Pigou-Dalton pivotal mechanism preference profile problem proof prove quasi ordering quasi-linear returns to scale Section Shapley value Show single-peaked social choice social choice theory social welfare solution strategyproof subset superadditive Suppose surplus surplus-sharing Theorem theory tion u₁ u₂ unique utilitarian utilitarian CUF utility function utility level value operator veto function voters voting paradox voting rule x₁ zero