Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making

Első borító
Cambridge University Press, 1991. júl. 26. - 348 oldal
Problems of fair division, equitable cost-sharing, division of a joint benefit, or the choice of a truly democratic voting rule are familiar subjects of dispute in technologically advanced democracies. This book provides a comprehensive and unified presentation of these technically heterogeneous subjects that are linked by common axioms.

Részletek a könyvből

Tartalomjegyzék

Foreword
9
Acknowledgments
11
Introduction
11
Overview
11
Egalitarianism versus utilitarianism
11
11 Egalitarianism
13
12 Classical utilitarianism
19
Exercises
24
Exercises
162
Regulated monopoly
166
71 Two production economies
169
72 The core of the public good economy
171
73 The core of the private good economy
174
74 Marginal pricing in the public good economy
179
75 Marginal pricing in the private good economy
181
76 Two welfare egalitarian core selections
184

Social welfare orderings
30
21 Social welfare orderings and collective utility functions
33
22 Scale and zero independence
35
23 Independence of common utility pace
39
24 Separability
42
25 Reduction of inequality
45
26 Inequality indices
51
Exercises
56
Axiomatic bargaining
61
31 Social choice functions
63
32 Nashs independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom
67
33 Issue monotonicity
69
34 Population monotonicity
71
35 Separability
75
36 Additivity
77
Exercises
79
Costsharing games and the core
87
41 Standalone and subsidyfree principles
89
42 Balanced games
95
43 Pricing of a multioutput monopoly
98
44 NTU games
102
Exercises
103
Values of cooperative games
107
51 The Shapley value
109
52 Convex games
112
53 Characterizations of the Shapley value
116
54 The nucleolus
121
55 Core selections
129
56 Characterization of the nucleolus
132
Exercises
136
Equal versus proportional sharing
145
61 The surplussharing model
147
62 The costsharing model
148
63 The leveling tax and head tax
150
64 The Shapley value and nucleolus cost sharing
153
65 Decentralizability
157
66 Separability
159
77 Technological monotonicity
189
Exercises
191
Strategyproof mechanisms
196
81 Noncooperative manipulations
197
82 Strategyproofness and the pivotal mechanism
201
83 Strategyproof cost sharing
205
84 The class of demandrevealing mechanisms
209
85 Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism
213
Exercises
217
Majority voting and scoring methods
225
91 Condorcet versus Borda
228
92 Equity and monotonicity properties
233
93 Reinforcement and participation
236
94 Sequential majority comparisons
240
Exercises
248
Strategyproofness and core stability
256
101 The GibbardSatterthwaite theorem
258
102 Singlepeaked preferences and Condorcet winners
263
103 Core stability
267
104 The minority principle
271
105 Strategic voting and implementation theory
276
Exercises
277
Aggregation of preferences
283
the majority rule and other methods
285
dictators
288
oligarchies
291
114 Acyclic social welfare
293
equivalence of AHA and strategyproofness
298
116 Social welfare orderings on the singlepeaked domain
300
117 Rationalizable choice functions
306
118 Condorcets aggregation method
310
Exercises
312
Bibliography
317
Author index
327
Subject index
330
Copyright

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