It cannot then be supposed that a land-tax will not be the consequence of a Union. If the quota of land-tax to be paid by Ireland be in proportion to that paid by Great Britain, as the representation of the former is to that of the latter in the Lower House of the United Parliament, namely, one-fifth, and if the debt of Ireland be consolidated with that of England, and the Irish land-tax appropriated to pay the interest of that debt as far as it goes, then no other additional taxes should be imposed on Ireland by the United Parliament. For some time after the Union, she should continue to pay her present ones only as an equivalent for them, until, after certain periods to be agreed on in the treaty, she falls in by degrees, as she acquires the ability, to pay as England does.

The most intricate part of the business consists in determining the duration of this interval, and the gradual steps by which Ireland at last becomes an integral part of the Empire, and participates in common of all its burthens and fortunes. It seems clear, however, in general, that the customs, prohibitions, and charges, on all foreign and colonial importations, must be the same in both countries pending this interval; that the import and export duties at present obtaining between them should be gradually abolished during its continuance, and the defalcation in point of revenue thence arising gradually made up from other sources by the Parliament of the Empire.

All offices not necessarily abolished by the Union should remain as at present. The Lord-Lieutenant and State officers, the military establishments, the courts of justice (an appeal lying from Chancery to the House of Lords of the Empire), the Treasury, the Exchequer, the Revenue Board, &c., are all offices that do not require any alteration, except what may be safely committed to the Parliament of the Empire.

In their elections, the Irish Peers may follow the Scotch model. The 300 actual representatives of the Lower House may be reduced to 100, by lopping off rotten Boroughs, or by lumping them together, as was the case in Scotland. The

Catholics to be elegible to serve in the United Parliament whenever the laws against them are repealed in Great Britain.

Remarks on the foregoing Outlines.

That a Union, according to the foregoing, or some other plan, is practicable, the example of the Scotch Union abundantly shows. That the negociation would be, to a very great degree, arduous and difficult is readily acknowledged; but these very difficulties should only serve as stimulatives to attempt the measure, in case it can be shown to be absolutely necessary. A great many arguments seem to show the absolute necessity of this measure.

1st-A vast majority of the inhabitants of Ireland are either rebels, or inclined to become so. A great majority again of these rebels are Catholics, inimical, for the most part, on that score alone, to the existing Government, and therefore, on a double account, incapable of being suddenly transformed into good subjects. A great many among the lower orders of the northern Dissenters are inclined to join with them in their attempt to overthrow the Constitution, or, at least, to introduce Democratic reform. Now, a Provincial Legislature and a Deputive Executive want that policy and union, that weight and energy, necessary to contrive wise measures, but principally to carry them into effect against the powerful impulse of such combustible materials. The united strength and wisdom of the Empire alone, acting on a constant plan, and far removed from the little party squabbles that divide the inhabitants of this country, are adequate to command obedience and impose silence on such jarring elements.

2nd-The object of the disaffected, that is, the great majority of the numbers, at least, in this island, being confessedly a separation from Great Britain, and the formation of a Republic under the auspices of France, it becomes a measure of the most imperative necessity openly to counteract and

utterly to defeat this scheme by uniting this country to Great Britain.

No other measure can effectually and radically destroy this detestable plan, which equally involves in its success the ruin of both countries. Were it put down for the present, it would be perpetually brought forward under one shape or another, fomented by French intrigue from abroad, and disappointed ambition at home. Clandestinely, or openly, a degree of enmity to our happy constitution will be long harboured here; our inveterate enemies, with their usual dexterity, will avail themselves of every violent appearance it puts on to blow it up into a flame. The millions they plunder in other countries will be lavished here to corrupt our peasantry and unprincipled men of fortune; and their proximity to our shore, together with their efforts to acquire a considerable importance at sea, which cannot long be unsuccessful, may, at last, enable them to land their myriads in this country, and endeavour, by one great effort, to tear asunder the British diadem.

This they would begin by attempting to revolutionize Ireland. Now, the resistance that the Empire could make to such an attempt would be vastly greater than it could exert at present, should a Union previously take place.

The unity of the Legislature would of itself be a mighty advantage. The history of the Irish Parliament for the last seventeen years evidently shows that it is no easy matter for a British Minister to keep that body in good humour; that concessions highly flattering to the independence of the kingdom, but highly dangerous to its connexion with Great Britain, were obliged to be made to that body; and concessions, demands, and measures, are endeavoured to be forced upon it from without doors in Ireland, which neither it nor the British Minister can make any other reply to than with arms. In short, both the Parliament and people of Ireland have, for the seventeen years past, been almost entirely engaged in lessening by degrees their dependence on Great Britain, in weakening the

connexion, and paving the way for the separation of the two countries, which last is now actually attempted.

It signifies nothing to say that their views were honourable and patriotic; that Ireland was held in chains by the Sister Kingdom; and that they had a right to seize the moment of her depression and generosity, or what else you choose to call it, to rescue themselves from this indignant situation. All this may be readily acknowledged, and yet the effect of all these patriotic exertions be still the same, viz., that the connexion between the two countries is reduced by them almost to a single thread, the unity of the executive power, and a negative on the laws passed in the Irish Parliament. Should this negative be exercised on any important occasion, the two countries are unavoidably committed. Ireland has only to make some extraordinary demand, to ask for some privilege the violation, suppose, of the navigation act in her favour and to threaten separation in case of refusal.

She may differ with the Sister Kingdom respecting the general means of defending the Empire, contribute only as she chooses to that defence, cripple the operations of the executive power in both countries, by obstructing it at home; and, though she contributes but a small proportion indeed to the expenses of the general defence, her loans being, for the most part, filled in England, she may yet, by her unsettled situation and wavering conduct, open the door, as at present, to the demon of French Democracy, and so become the means of destruction to the whole British Empire.

I do not say that the present members of the Irish Legislature are at all inclined to come to these extremities; their conduct has been in the highest degree loyal, and their attachment to England sincere. But who can answer for their successors, nay, who can ever answer for themselves, in case the Rebellion should acquire such a firm consistence, and be so powerfully supported by Gallic force or machinations as to seem in a fair way of succeeding? Should our enemies fail of

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erecting a Republic, they will at least endeavour to establish an independent Monarchy here—an idea not quite unpalatable in this country. This would, no doubt, be a temporary shadow, to vanish on the approach of their beloved Democracy; but it might serve to hoodwink some of the great here, and cajole them by degrees into their schemes. In short, they will employ every art, means, and device, to sow dissensions between the two countries and to commit the two Legislatures. If their emissaries have been already so successful among our common people, it will require time only to enable them to bribe or delude some of the great to become their leaders. Even the hallowed walls of Parliament may at last conceal traitors.

To prevent these evils, as far as they can be prevented, a Legislative Union seems the only radical security. Such a measure might, indeed, for the moment, tend to increase the number of the disaffected somewhat in this country, as it could not be expected to be carried without a great deal of opposition. But, as this country is at present in a very tumultuous state, a little less or a little more disturbance would not materially affect the Empire; and it is, perhaps, this very circumstance, combined with some others sufficiently obvious, that renders this the most favourable moment for the attempt. In a very little time, the united efforts of loyalty and the spirit of both countries will put an end to the ferment both here and in England.

A few Irish Catholics of fortune returned for this country, who are generally very loyal men, would be lost amidst the crowd of their Protestant brethren deputed to the United Parliament, and, so far from being dangerous, would utterly evanesce among the vastly superior numbers that would compose that Parliament. I do not know whether Great Britain will ever propose such a Union to this country, nor do I know whether she would so alter her laws as to admit Catholics to sit in her Parliament; but I do know that, were such a scheme