zanillo division. It is true that Rios was baffled by Colonel Escario's sudden sally and due credit is given to this Spanish commander for his ability to avoid engagements with the Manzanillo infantry. In excuse for General Rios it may be stated that although his infantry was not able to engage the enemy on account of the impossibility of covering all the roads properly, his cavalry, marching out of Manzanillo at dusk, rather unexpectedly fought the enemy incessantly, as will be explained later in this chapter.

On June 21, Col. Carlos Gonzalez with his brigade was taken to Daiquiri on one of the American transports. General Shafter ordered Gen. W. Ludlow, chief of the Engineer Corps, to build pontoons at the beach of Aserraderos, for the embarkation which was accomplished with considerable

trouble.

The landing of Cuban troops at Daiquiri was a wise and able manœuvre that gave the key to the whole invasion of the territory and gave perfect security to the disembarkation of the American troops. The Spanish were menaced by the navy from Punta Cabrera to Punta Berracos, being fired upon along nearly the whole line. Colonel Cebreco was feigning an attack on the west of Santiago. The Spaniards were scattered, holding forts in all the iron-mining region, covering very feebly an extensive territory which they were unable to protect against an enemy already in it and perfectly familiar with every trail, and the powerful fleet that constantly swept the coast with its guns. The assistance of the Cubans in the operation, clearing the way and attacking by land, while the fleet bombarded the fortifications, gave success to the disembarkation of General Shafter's army. This has been passed over in silence by all writers and is one of the facts that I distinctly wish to impress upon the reader. To illustrate the dashing attack of the Cubans by land, it may be well to recollect that at Siboney they entered under the fire of Spanish musketry and of the bomb-shells of the American fleet, compelling the enemy to retreat to Firmeza, and from there to Savilla. In this attack General Castillo suffered a number of casualties, some of them inflicted by the fleet's artillery, proving that the navy did not expect that the Cubans could carry

the village so quickly and under such a hail of bullets from the ships.

At 7 A. M. of the 25th, the Cuban troops began to embark in boats towed by launches of the U. S. N. to the transports that lay a mile and a half off. General Sanchez commanded the forces that were taken on the Leona, General Capote those on the Seneca, and General Cebreco those on the Orizaba. Col. Candelario Cebreco was left in command of the forces on shore at Aserraderos and of those that were detached on duty west of Santiago.

General Garcia, his staff, and Generals J. Rabi, S. Lora and R. Portuondo were invited aboard the Alamo by Gen. William Ludlow, who showed himself a perfect gentleman in the highest acceptance those words have; we all knew he was an able engineer and a good West Point scholar before we had the pleasure of meeting him. After that trip, strong ties of warm friendship united us all to General Ludlow, which tightened each day during the campaign, for he was our neighbor in the trenches. During all that period, General Garcia's army happened to be on the right of General Lawton's division, of which Ludlow's brigade was the extreme right.

On the afternoon of the 25th, General Sanchez landed at Siboney and the other Generals with their forces on the morning of the succeeding day. General Garcia established his headquarters in the village and awaited General Shafter's orders. When we jumped out of the surf, an officer approached General Ludlow and informed him hurriedly of what had occurred during his absence. I saw the General look suddenly grave when he learned that Captain Capron had been killed the day before, and he quickly inquired how the fight had begun. The officer could not tell exactly; so many contradictory versions were given that he hardly understood how it came. Later on we heard from our own men and from some correspondents the details of the Guasimas fight, with words of praise on every lip as to the bravery of the Rough Riders and their commanders. But one could hear some criticisms, for the movement ordered by General Wheeler, the gallant old soldier hero of a hundred battles, was considered reckless because such a comparatively small force had

advanced upon a position held by the enemy, whose number no one could exactly tell. It was logical to think that at that point a large force must be camped, considering that all the garrisons of the fortifications of the mining zone had retreated to that point and to Aguadores. The criticisms grew sharper when it was ascertained that General Castillo's forces, after driving the enemy out of Siboney and vicinity, had attacked the retreating Spaniards on the 23rd and skirmished all that day at Las Guasimas, meeting with a strong defense. When this fight of the Rough Riders was referred to General Garcia, he said :—

"It is always of good moral effect to soldiers that have never fought a battle to win the first one and it produces, naturally, an opposite effect on the one that is defeated. The Americans have done well if they have rushed to the front and carried the enemy, even if it was executed in a reckless way. By this time the Spanish soldier is perfectly satisfied that the Yankees are men of pluck. And if, in a couple of more fights, the Americans advance in the same manner, rest assured that as soon as the Spaniards see the blue shirts moving towards them, they won't wait a minute and will take to their heels terror-stricken."

Our General knew the Spaniards well. He had sized them up accurately in those few sentences, as was demonstrated at the end of the campaign, when the Spanish soldiers were heard to exclaim;—" Oh, those Americans are devils: when they advance one must get out of their way, and d - quickly too!"

Gen. D. Castillo has been accused of not keeping his appointment on the morning of the 24th to advance on Las Guasimas, and he in defense says that he made no such appointment with any American commander. He also states that he had sent to headquarters ample information of the enemy's position and had put at the disposal of the Americans all the men that as guides and scouts were to aid in the operation, and that he had distinctly informed General Young that he could not go because there would be left in Siboney no senior Cuban commander to receive orders from General Shafter and General Garcia. The latter, with three thousand men, was to disembark that day from Aserraderos. As I have already stated, the forces were not able to embark on the

24th because the pontoon bridge had not been completed, but they were expected to arrive at Siboney on that date.

I firmly believe that General Wheeler did right in pushing forward to Las Guasimas the van of the invading army, but the movement ought to have been combined with another column that should have previously advanced, taking the other trail. If there was a mistake in this fight, it certainly was due only to the lack of a flanking force that would have facilitated the advance of the main column. Col. Leonard Wood did what a good level-headed soldier would have done in similar circumstances-push forward.

In Cuba, a flanking force must always have excellent guides, with a section of chapeadores, armed with machete only, to open the way through the thick undergrowth, bejuco, and tangled bushes; otherwise the manigua—as it is called by the Cubans is absolutely impenetrable, and deploying in such a country without men that know how to handle the machete is absurd.

The Spanish official report of the engagements sustained on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of June against the Cubans under Col. C. Gonzalez and the Rough Riders commanded by Col. Leonard Wood, is as follows:

Santiago de Cuba, June 24th, 1898. "General Rubin's column under orders of the commanderin-chief of the Fourth Army Corps was attacked yesterday at noon and again in the evening.

"This morning considerable forces with artillery guns made a resolute attack and were repulsed, losing many men.

"On our side we had, in the two days, seven dead, José Lances, Captain of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, and Zenon Borregon, second Lieutenant of the same battalion, seriously wounded; Francisco las Tortas, first Lieutenant of the regiment of Royal Artillery, slightly wounded; two privates seriously wounded and two slightly wounded. Various contusions.

"General Rubin had on the heights of Sevilla three companies of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, three of San Fernando, all the detachments from the forts gathered the day before, and two Plasencia guns. Rubin had divided his force in three echelons-as Lieut. Jose Müller affirms,

* Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, translated and published by the Navy Department, 1899.

the foremost one under Commander Alcaniz, formed of three companies of Puerto Rico troops and one mobilized company.

"On the 23rd, this echelon alone checked the enemy's advance in the morning and again in the evening, the echelon having been reinforced by one company from San Fernando, half engineers, and two guns. When the battle was over the forces withdrew to their former positions, the echelon remaining on the same site.

"At daybreak on the 24th, the echelon was reinforced by two companies from Talavera, and not only resisted a strong attack of the enemy but also forced the latter to retreat.

"In spite of this advantage, they received orders to withdraw because the enemy was approaching the Morro by rail, and, as there were not forces enough to oppose him, it would have been surrounded. In compliance with the order received, the column withdrew to the city."

If Lieutenant Müller's statement be correct, the enemy had about five hundred men at Las Guasimas on the first echelon, and now it does not appear queer that the Cubans should not be able to carry the position, as they were a much smaller force than their opponents.

General Shafter continued on board the Segurança till the road to La Redonda had been opened by the engineers. It was quite difficult to carry him any dispatches when the sea was rough, because the boats could hardly approach the pontoon bridge, and then there was no launch ready to take you to where the Segurança was lying, by no means near shore. All the launches were busy landing the regiments and only as a courtesy of the midshipmen in charge could you get aboard the floating headquarters of the 5th Army Corps.

It was

Our troops were ordered to camp on the outskirts of the village and General Cebreco's force on the road to La Redonda. Gen. D. Castillo had organized a good system of receiving daily information from the city and we were pretty well posted on what was going on in Santiago. through this channel that General Garcia received and afterward presented to Rear-Admiral Sampson a map of the harbor, with important data of the fortifications, showing where the torpedoes and ships were lying. All this valuable service was performed by Cubans willingly and without remunera