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CHAPTER IX.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

BY

MAJ.-GEN. WM. R. SHAFTER, U. S. V., Commanding General.

IN

N April, 1898, it was decided by the War Department to assemble troops on the Atlantic seaboard, with a view to their mobilization for use in Cuba. At that time I was in command of the Department of California and was stationed at San Francisco. Orders came to proceed to New Orleans; upon arrival there I was directed to come to Washington, at once, for consultation with the President and was informed that the command of the first expedition that would be sent to Cuba was to be given to me. It was understood that this expedition would be what is termed a "reconnoissance in force," for the purpose of communicating with General Gomez, supplying him with arms and ammunition and ascertaining the number of his men and their position. It was to be organized at Tampa, Florida. I proceeded to Tampa and practically commenced the work of organizing troops for the expedition, and incidentally the 5th and 7th Army Corps. On May 30 a telegram was received from the Headquarters of the Army in which it was stated: "Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo boats have been seen in the Harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet."

Transports had already been assembled in Tampa Bay. Orders were immediately given for loading aboard these transports the necessary subsistence and quartermaster's supplies, and for the embarkation of the authorized number of troops and their material. The facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa, for embarking the troops and the large amount of supplies. required, were inadequate, and with the utmost effort it was

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not possible to accomplish this work as quickly as I hoped and desired.

On the evening of June 7, orders were received to sail without delay, but with not less than 10,000 men. After some of the transports had started out and had reached the lower bay, telegraphic instructions were received from the Secretary of War directing that the sailing of the expedition be delayed until further orders. This delay was occasioned because the Navy reported that a Spanish war vessel had been sighted in the Nicholas Channel. The ships in the lower bay were immediately recalled. On the next day, in compliance with instructions from the Adjutant-General of the Army, the necessary steps were taken to increase the command to the full capacity of the transports and the expedition sailed on June 14, with 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men.

The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful. The health of the command remained remarkably good, notwithstanding the fact that the conveniences on many of the transports, in the nature of sleeping and closet accommodations, space for exercise, etc., were not all that could have been desired.

While passing along the north coast of Cuba, one of the two barges we had in tow broke away during the night and was not recovered. The loss proved to be very serious, for it delayed and embarrassed the disembarkation of the army. On the morning of June 20 we arrived off Guantanamo Bay and about noon reached the vicinity of Santiago, where Admiral Sampson came on board the headquarters transport. It was arranged between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban General Garcia, at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles to the west of the Morro. During the interview, General Garcia offered the services of his troops, comprising about 4,000 men in the vicinity of Aserraderos, and about 500 under General Castillo at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles east of Daiquiri. I accepted his offer, telling him however that although no military control could be exercised over him except such as he would concede, yet as long as he served under me I would furnish his command rations and ammunition.

From the time the orders were received every effort possi

ble was made to become familiar with the surroundings of Santiago, both as to the terrain and the climatic conditions with which we should have to contend. The description given in the "Journal of the Siege of Havana" of the experience of the English Army during their siege of Havana in 1762 was re-read. Valuable information was also obtained from two natives of Cuba, who were on the Segurança with me, one of them a civil engineer who had assisted in making surveys in the vicinity of Santiago. From General Garcia also additional information was received which was of great value in planning the attack on Santiago. At this interview with General Garcia, all the possible points of attack were for the last time carefully considered and, for the information and guidance of Admiral Sampson and General Garcia, the following plan of campaign was then and there outlined.

With the assistance of the small boats of the Navy, the disembarkation was to commence on the morning of the twenty-second at Daiquiri. On the twenty-first, 500 insurgent troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, increasing the force already there to 1,000 men. This force under General Castillo was to attack the Spanish force. at Daiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarkation. (This movement was successfully made.) To mislead the enemy as to the real point of our intended landing, I requested General Garcia to send a small force, about 500 men, under General Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabañas, situated on the coast a few miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago harbor, and where it was reported that the enemy had several hundred men intrenched and from which a trail leads around the west side of the bay to Santiago. Admiral Sampson was requested to send several of his war ships, with a number of the transports, opposite this town, Aserraderos, for the purpose of making a show of disembarking there. In addition the Admiral was asked to cause a bombardment to be made at Cabañas, upon the forts around the Morro, and also at the towns of Aguadores, Siboney and Daiquiri. The troops under General Garcia, remaining at Aserraderos, were to be transferred to Daiquiri or Siboney on the twenty-fourth. This was successfully accomplished at Siboney.

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