and such debtor subsequently stopped payment and presented a bankruptcy petition, and a composition was accepted by the creditors-

Held: That the debtor had been guilty of rash and hazardous speculations, and that, even if the composition were reasonable, the Court ought to refuse its approval. In re Rogers, Ex parte Rogers.

p. 159

(2) Held: That where, before a composition is approved by the Court, the business of the debtor is carried on by the official receiver, who makes payments out of his own pocket, and incurs personal liability for the purpose of carrying on such business, the proper order for the Court to make on approving the composition is, that the official receiver shall forthwith deliver up possession of the debtor's estate to the trustee under the composition, and that such trustee shall pay to the official receiver what may be found due to him out of the first assets which come into his hands. In re Taylor, Ex parte The Board of Trade. p. 264

COSTS-Of Trustee on Sale of Mortgaged Property.]-Held: That the provisions of Rules 78 to 81 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870 (compare Nos. 65 to 69 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1883), were not intended to fetter the Court in cases where an application has been made to the Court by a mortgagee of property of the bankrupt for a sale of such property as provided by the rules, so as (1) to compel the Court to give the conduct of such sale to the trustee in the bankruptcy: or (2) to compel the Court to give the trustee a first charge on the proceeds of the sale for his costs and expenses in cases where the conduct of the sale has been taken away from him. In re Jordan, Ex parte Lloyd's Banking Company p. 41

Of Execution.]-Held: That the meaning to be attached to the words "costs of the execution" in sub-section 1 of section 46 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, is different to the meaning to be attached to the same words in sub-section 2 of the same section. Under the words "costs of the execution" in sub-section 1 the sheriff is not entitled to "poundage." In re W. and J. Ludford

p. 131

Of Public Examination.]—Held: 1. That the words "any proceeding in Court" in section 105, sub-section 1, of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, do not include a second meeting of the creditors under a bankruptcy petition, summoned for the purpose of confirming a scheme of arrangement of the debtor's affairs accepted at the first meeting.

2. That the Court has in consequence no power to order the costs of the petitioner incidental to such second meeting to be paid out of the debtor's estate.

3. But the words do include the public examination of the debtor, and the Court has power to order costs incidental to such public examination to be paid out of the estate. In re Strand, Ex parte The Board of Trade and The Official Receiver

• p. 196

Of Solicitor.]-(1) Held: That where, after the presentation of the bankruptcy petition, proceedings are carried on by a debtor, from which the official receiver comes to a clear conclusion that substantial advantage has accrued to the debtor's estate, such ought to be looked upon in the light of salvage, and the costs attendant upon the proceedings in question should be allowed out of the estate. In re F. H. Johnstone, Ex parte Angier

p. 213

(2) Held: That an application by the Board of Trade for a review of taxation of the costs of a solicitor under Rule 104 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1883, can only be made for the benefit of the estate; and where there is no estate and no trustee such rule will not apply. In re Rodway, Ex parte Phillips

p. 228 Of Trustee under Deed of Assignment.]—Held: That where a deed of assignment of the whole of their property executed by the debtors for the benefit of their creditors generally contained a provision for the payment out of the assets in the first instance of the costs and expenses of the trustee under the said deed of assignment, such trustee was not entitled (on the debtors being adjudged bankrupt upon a petition founded on the deed as an act of bankruptcy) to retain as against the trustee in the bankruptcy assets in his hands, on the ground that a sum exceeding the said assets was due to him for work and labour done. In re J. and H. Richards, Ex parte The Official Receiver

p. 242 Of Shorthand Writer's Notes.]--See In re Day, Ex parte The Trustee p. 251 Personal Liability of Trustee for.]-Where notice had been served on the trustee requiring him to decide whether he would disclaim or not within twentyeight days in accordance with the terms of section 55, sub-section 4, of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and the trustee did not within that time signify his intention as required, leave to disclaim given only on condition of payment of a month's rent to the landlord, such rent, together with the costs of the landlord, to be paid by the trustee personally. In re Page, Ex parte The Trustee. p. 287 When Appeal out of Time.]—See In re Blenkhorn, Ex parte Blease and Blease.

p. 280

DEBTORS ACT, 1869.]—Held: That by reason of the provisions of sections 103 and 104 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, an appeal from an order of the judge to whom bankruptcy business is assigned upon an application under section 5 of the Debtors Act, 1869, will now lie directly to the Court of Appeal, and not as formerly to a Divisional Court. In re Lascelles, Ex parte Genese

DELEGATION OF JUDGE'S AUTHORITY.]-See Registrar.

P. 183

DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR.]—(1) In a case where a scheme of arrangement of the debtor's affairs, duly agreed to and confirmed by the creditors in accordance with the provision of section 18 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, contained a clause to the effect that "the debtors shall be discharged when the committee of inspection so resolve"

Held: That such provision dealing with the discharge of the debtors was unreasonable, and not in accordance with the intention and scope of the Act; and that a scheme containing such a provision ought not to be approved by the Court, even though the debtors themselves asked that such approval should be given. In re Clarke, Ex parte Clarke

p. 143 (2) Held: That the fact that a bankrupt has brought an unsuccessful action, the costs of which he is unable to pay, is not sufficient cause to justify the Court in refusing his discharge on the ground that under sub-section 3 (c) of section 28 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, such bankrupt has contracted a

debt without having any reasonable ground of expectation of being able to pay it. In re J. Williams

p. 91

DISCLAIMER.]—(1) Held: That where application for leave to disclaim is made by a trustee in a bankruptcy, a demand of the landlord for rent in respect of the premises sought to be disclaimed will not be entertained by the Court unless such landlord has been kept out of his property for the benefit of the creditors, and the creditors have obtained some advantage therefrom. In re Zappert & Co., Ex parte The Trustee.

p. 72

(2) Held: That in cases where a trustee in a bankruptcy seeks to disclaim, if subsequent to the adjudication any advantage has been derived from the use of the landlord's property, that is the use of the creditors and not of the debtor, and for this advantage the landlord is entitled to be paid. In re T. Brooke, Ex parte The Trustee.

P. 82 (3) Application by trustee for extension of time in which to disclaim, the application being made after the time allowed by the Act for disclaiming had expired. In re G. Price.

p. 153 (4) Held: That where a trustee seeks to disclaim a lease under section 53 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the Court may, if it thinks fit, under subsection 3 of section 55 permit such trustee to remove fixtures. In re Moser, Ex parte The Trustee.

p. 244

(5) Quære: Whether the words of sub-section 6 of section 55 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, are intended to apply to a landlord. In re Parker & Parker, Ex parte Turquand

p. 275 (6) Where notice had been served on the trustee requiring him to decide whether he would disclaim or not within twenty-eight days in accordance with the terms of section 55, sub-section 4, and the trustee did not within that time signify his intention as required, leave to disclaim given only on condition of payment of a month's rent to the landlord, such rent, together with the costs of the landlord, to be paid by the trustee personally. In re Page, Ex parte The Trustee

p. 287 DIVIDENDS, UNDISTRIBUTED.]—Application on behalf of the Board of Trade for an order directing trustees to pay certain undistributed funds and dividends into the Bank of England. In re James Pearce, Ex parte The Board of Trade

DIVISIONAL COURT.]-See Appeal.

p. 56

DOMICIL.]-Held: 1. That section 6, sub-section 1 (d), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which provides that a creditor shall not be entitled to present a bankruptcy petition against a debtor, unless such." debtor is domiciled in England, or, within a year before the date of the presentation of the petition, has ordinarily resided or had a dwelling-house or place of business in England,” must be taken to mean domiciled in England as distinguished from Scotland or Ireland.

2. That the onus of proof of the domicil is, in the first instance, on the creditor presenting the petition.

3. That it is not sufficient, in order to throw the onus of proof on the other side, for the petitioning creditor to show that the debtor is an officer in the British army on active service out of England, and belongs to a regiment, the hcad-quarters of which are in England, and bears an English name.

4. A Scotchman or an Irishman does not lose his domicil of origin by accepting a commission in the English army. (Yelverton's Case, 29 L. J., P. & M. 34, followed.) In re Mitchell, Ex parte Cunningham

p. 137

ELEGIT.]—(1) Whether, in a case where possession of the goods of a debtor had been taken by the sheriff under a writ of elegit on December 22nd, 1883, but no delivery had been made to the judgment creditor prior to January 1st, 1884, when the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, came into operation (by which statute it is provided that writs of elegit shall no longer extend to goods), the judgment creditor was still entitled to delivery of the goods previously seized.

Held, that the judgment creditor was still entitled to delivery of the goods. Hough v. Windas

p. 1

(2) Whether, in a case where possession of the goods of a debtor had been taken by the sheriff under a writ of elegit on December 22nd, 1883, but no delivery had been made to the judgment creditor prior to the debtor being adjudicated a bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which came into operation on January 1st, 1881 (by which it is provided that writs of elegit shall no longer extend to goods; and, further, that an execution against goods must be completed by seizure and sale in order to entitle the creditor to the benefit of the execution in case of the debtor's bankruptcy), the judgment creditor was still entitled to delivery of the goods seized.

Held That the judgment creditor was not deprived of his right to the delivery of the goods. In re Windas & Dunsmore, Ex parte Hough

p. 22

(3) Held: That notwithstanding the provisions of section 146 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, a writ of elegit still extends to leaseholds. Richardson v. Webb

EXAMINATION.]-Seo Public Examination.

p. 40

EXECUTION.]—Held: That the meaning to be attached to the words "costs of the execution" in sub-section 1 of section 46 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, is different to the meaning to be attached to the same words in subsection 2 of the same section. Under the words "costs of the execution" in sub-section 1, the sheriff is not entitled to poundage." In re W. & J. Ludford

p. 131

EXECUTRIX.]-See Bankruptcy Notice (6). In re Woodall, Ex parte

FINAL JUDGMENT.]—(1) Held: That the words "final judgment" in section 4, sub-section 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, must be construed in their strict technical senso of a judgment in an action which established a liability previously existing of a debtor to a creditor. In re Chinery, Ex purle Chinery

p. 31

(2) Held: That the fact that an order has been made against a defendant requiring him to pay the taxed costs in an action within a specified time, does not constitute such order a "final judgment" within the meaning of section 4, sub-section 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, so as to entitle the plaintiff, in the event of the defendant failing to comply with the terms of the order, to obtain a bankruptcy notice against the defendant founded on the order. In re Cohen, Ex parte Schmitz

p. 55 (3) Held: That a “balance order” made in the voluntary winding-up of a company, whereby a contributory was ordered to pay in to the liquidator certain calls made in respect of the said company before the commencement of the winding-up, is not a "final judgment" within the meaning of section 4, sub-section 1 (g) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, so as to support a bankruptcy notice. In re Sanders, Ex parte Whinney

P. 185

(4) Held: That where a bankruptcy petition is presented by a creditor, founded on an act of bankruptcy committed by the failure of the debtor to comply with the terms of a bankruptcy notice to pay a judgment debt, it is a matter of discretion for the registrar whether he will make a receiving order or stay the proceedings; and the Court of Appeal will not interfere unless such exercise of discretion is clearly wrong. In re Rhodes, Ex parte Heyworth

p. 269 FIXTURES.]-(1) A lease of a mill and warehouse made October 1st, 1880, for twenty-one years contained the following covenants and provisoes :—

"That in case the said lessees shall during the said term be bankrupts, or file a petition in liquidation, or make an assignment for the benefit of their creditors, then the said term hereby created shall cease."

"That on the determination or cesser of the said term the machinery-room, warehouse and chimney shall be and remain the property of the company, but all the machinery, and also all the other buildings erected by the lessees, shall be their property, and shall be removed by them previously to the determination or cesser of the said term, unless it shall be then mutually agreed by the said company and the lessees that the company shall purchase them. The said lessees in case the same shall be removed to make good all damage which may be caused in their removal."

"That the several articles and things mentioned in the schedule hereto (consisting of iron columns and beams in boiler-room, wood floor in oil mill, and other articles), shall be the property of the lessees, and shall be removable by them; the said lessees making good all damage done by such removal."

In March, 1884, the lessees presented a bankruptcy petition under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, upon which a receiving order was made.

Held: 1. That the lessees had taken such steps under the Bankruptcy Act, as, having regard to the provisions of the new Act and to section 149 of it, would justify the lessors in saying that the clause of forfeiture applied, and that consequently the presentation of the petition by the lessees caused a cesser of the term under that proviso.

2. That the official receiver was entitled to the articles mentioned in the clauses above, notwithstanding the forfeiture. In re Walker, Ex parte Gould, Official Receiver

p. 168