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as his agent or as a trespasser. 2. If the trustee in the bankruptcy elects to treat the trustee under the deed as a trespasser, he can only claim from him any property of the bankrupt which remains in his possession unconverted, and the value, at the time when he took possession, of any property which he has taken possession of and has converted. In re Riddeough, Ex parte Vaughan

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p. 258

(6) Held: That where a bankruptcy petition is presented by a creditor founded on an act of bankruptcy committed by the failure of the debtor to comply with the terms of a bankruptcy notice to pay a judgment debt, and an appeal is pending from such judgment, it is a matter of discretion for the Registrar whether he will make a receiving order, or stay the proceedings, and the Court of Appeal will not interfere unless such exercise of discretion is clearly wrong. In re Rhodes, Ex parte Heyworth

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p. 269 (7) Held: That where by failing to comply with the terms of a bankruptcy notice a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy under sect. 4, sub-s. 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, any creditor may avail himself of such act of bankruptcy for the purpose of presenting a petition, and the right to present a petition is not limited to that creditor by whom the bankruptcy notice has been served. In re Hastings, Ex parte Dearle

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p. 281

APPEAL.]—(1) Held: That by reason of the provisions of sects. 103 and 104 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, an appeal from an order of the judge to whom bankruptcy business is assigned upon an application under sect. 5 of the Debtors Act, 1869, will now lie directly to the Court of Appeal, and not as formerly to a Divisional Court. In re Lascelles, Ex parte Genese

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p. 183

(2) Held: That an application for leave to appeal under sect. 2 of the Bankruptcy Appeals (County Court) Act, 1884, from the decision of a Divisional Court, sitting as a Court of Appeal, from a County Court in bankruptcy, should be made in the first instance to a Divisional Court.

That such application for leave to appeal ought to be made to the Divisional Court immediately after such Divisional Court has pronounced its decision. In re Walker & Son, Ex parte Nickoll & Knight

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p. 249 (3) Held: That where a bankruptcy petition is presented by a creditor founded on an act of bankruptcy committed by the failure of the debtor to comply with the terms of a bankruptcy notice to pay a judgment debt, and an appeal is pending from such judgment, it is a matter of discretion for the registrar whether he will make a receiving order or stay the proceedings, and the Court of Appeal will not interfere unless such exercise of discretion is clearly wrong. In re Rhodes, Ex parte Heyworth

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p. 269 (4) Held: That where the trustee rejects a proof tendered by a creditor, and from such rejection an appeal is brought, it is not sufficient to apply to the Court within the twenty-one days limited by Rule 174 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1883, to fix a day and time for the hearing of the appeal, but notice of motion in the usual way must be served on the trustee within the twenty-one days. In re Gillespie & Co., Ex parte Morrison & Aitcheson

(5) Appeal out of time.

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p. 278

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ARRANGEMENT.]-See Scheme of Arrangement.

ASSIGNMENT-Of Book Debts.]—An assignment of the book debts will carry the books, so that the person entitled to the book debts under the deed is entitled to the books of account; and Rule 259 was intended to apply only to a case where a person not entitled to the debts sets up some claim to the books. In re White & Co., Ex parte The Official Receiver

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p. 77 Of Lease, Goodwill, Stock, &c.]-The debtor, who carried on business at two different premises, within a few days of filing his petition, executed an assignment handing over his interest in the lease, goodwill and stock of one of the said premises to a judgment creditor who was threatening to levy execution, such assignment to be in full satisfaction of the whole judgment debt, and the judgment creditor was to redeem the lease of the property, which had been deposited on mortgage with a loan society, and to pay rent due, &c.

Held: That there was no proof that the motive of the debtor was to prefer the creditor; that at the time of the assignment the judgment creditor could seize and have his debt paid out of the goods at both the places of business of the debtor; that the effect of the assignment was to relieve the debtor of liability at one place of business, and could not be deemed to be a fraudulent preference. In re W. H. Wilkinson, Ex parte The Official Receiver

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p. 65 Of Property to Trustee for Benefit of Creditors generally.]—(1) Held: That the fact that a large majority in number and value of the creditors of a debtor have assented to a deed assigning to trustees all the debtor's property for the benefit of his creditors generally, is not a "sufficient cause" within the meaning of sect. 7, sub-s. (3), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, for dismissing a petition for a receiving order against the debtor presented by a dissenting creditor even for a small amount; such receiving order being founded on the act of bankruptcy committed by the execution of the deed.

It is the intention of the legislature that proposals for a composition or scheme of arrangement shall only be entertained after a receiving order has been made. That an official receiver ought not to appear at the hearing of an appeal from a receiving order, unless it is necessary for him to do so for the purpose of bringing some special circumstance to the notice of the Court; and this special circumstance the Court will take into consideration when the costs are applied for. In re Dixon & Wilson, Ex parte Dixon & Wilson

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p. 98 (2) Held: That where a deed of assignment of the whole of their property executed by the debtors for the benefit of their creditors generally contained a proviso for the payment out of the assets in the first instance of the costs and expenses of the trustee under the said deed of assignment, such trustee was not entitled (on the debtors being adjudged bankrupt upon a petition founded on the deed as an act of bankruptcy) to retain as against the trustee in the bankruptcy assets in his hands, on the ground that a sum exceeding the said assets was due to him for work and labour done. In re J. & H. Richards, Ex parte The Official Receiver .

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• p. 212 (3) Held: That where a debtor has assigned the whole of his property to a trustee for the benefit of his creditors generally, and such trustee has taken possession of the property and carried on the debtor's business, in the event of

the debtor subsequently being adjudged bankrupt on a petition founded on the act of bankruptcy committed by the execution of the deed of assignment, the trustee in the bankruptcy must elect to treat the trustee under the deed either as his agent or as a trespasser.

If the trustee in the bankruptcy elects to treat the trustee under the deed as a trespasser, he can only claim from him any property of the bankrupt which remains in his possession unconverted, and the value, at the time when he took possession, of any property which he has taken possession of and has converted. In re Riddeough, Ex parte Vaughan.

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• p. 258 ATTORNEY.]-Held: That a bankruptcy petition presented by a creditor may be signed on behalf of such creditor by his duly constituted attorney. In re Wallace, Ex parte Wallace

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p. 246

BALANCE ORDER.]—Held: That a "balance order" made in the voluntary winding-up of a company, whereby a contributory was ordered to pay in to the liquidator certain calls made in respect of the said company before the commencement of the winding-up, is not a "final judgment" within the meaning of section 4, sub-section 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, so as to support a bankruptcy notice. In re Sanders, Ex parte Whinney

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p. 185 "final

BANKRUPTCY NOTICE.]—(1) A garnishee order absolute is not a judgment" against the garnishee within the meaning of section 4, subsection 1 (g), so as to make the failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice founded upon it an act of bankruptcy on the part of the garnishee. Ex parte Chinery, In re Chinery

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p. 31 (2) Held: That where a bill has been given by a debtor, upon whom a bankruptcy notice has been served, for the amount of the judgment debt, and has been taken by the creditor, such bill is sufficient satisfaction of the requirements of the bankruptcy notice under section 4, sub-section 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, so as to prevent such creditor afterwards proceeding to obtain a petition against the debtor on the bankruptcy notice. In re Matthew, Ex parte Matthew .

P. 47

(3) Held: That the fact that an order has been made against a defendant requiring him to pay the taxed costs in an action within a specified time, does not constitute such order a "final judgment" within the meaning of section 4, sub-section 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, so as to entitle the plaintiff, in the event of the defendant failing to comply with the terms of the order, to obtain a bankruptcy notice against the defendant founded on the order. In re Cohen, Ex parte Schmitz

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p. 55 (4) Irregularity of bankruptcy notice and petition-Bankruptcy petition in name of partners-Bankruptcy of one partner between service and hearing of petition-Amendment. In re Owen, Ex parte Owen

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p. 93 (5) Held: That a "balance order" made in the voluntary winding-up of a company, whereby a contributory was ordered to pay in to the liquidator certain calls made in respect of the said company before the commencement of

the winding-up, is not a "final judgment" within the meaning of section 4, sub-section 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, so as to support a bankruptcy notice. In re Sanders, Ex parte Whinney

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p. 185

(6) Held: That a creditor in order to serve a bankruptcy notice under section 4, sub-section 1 (g) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, must be entitled and in a position to issue execution: and that in consequence a bankruptcy notice against a judgment debtor cannot be issued by the executor of a creditor who has obtained final judgment, unless such executor has first obtained leave from the Court to issue execution on the judgment under Rule 23 of Order XLII. of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883. In re Woodall, Ex parte Woodall. p. 201

(7) Held: That where a bankruptcy petition is presented by a creditor founded on an act of bankruptcy committed by the failure of the debtor to comply with the terms of a bankruptcy notice to pay a judgment debt, and an appeal is pending from such judgment, it is a matter of discretion for the registrar whether he will make a receiving order or stay the proceedings; and the Court of Appeal will not interfere unless such exercise of discretion is clearly wrong. In re Rhodes, Ex parte Heyworth

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p. 269 (8) Held: That where, by failing to comply with the terms of a bankruptcy notice, a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy under section 4, subsection 1 (g), any creditor may avail himself of such act of bankruptcy for the purpose of presenting a petition, and the right to present a petition is not limited to that creditor by whom the bankruptcy notice has been served. In re Hastings, Ex parte Dearle

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p. 281 BILL OF EXCHANGE.]—Held: That where a bill has been given by a debtor, upon whom a bankruptcy notice has been served, for the amount of the judgment debt, and has been taken by the creditor, such bill is sufficient satisfaction of the requirements of the bankruptcy notice under section 4, subsection 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, so as to prevent such creditor afterwards proceeding to obtain a petition against the debtor on the bankruptcy notice. In re Matthew, Ex parte Matthew

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p. 47 BILL OF SALE.]-Held: That an injunction restraining a person, not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings, from dealing with property of the debtor claimed under a bill of sale, the validity of which is disputed, ought not to be granted without requiring an undertaking to be given for damages by the person obtaining the order. In re F. H. Johnstone, Ex parte Abraham

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p. 32 BOARD OF TRADE.]-See Committal; Trustee; Review of Taxation, &c.

BOOK DEBTS.]—Held: That an assignment of the book debts will carry the books, so that the person entitled to the book debts under the deed is entitled to the books of account; and that Rule 259 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1883, was intended to apply only to a case where a person not entitled to the debts sets up some claim to the books. In re White & Co., Ex parte The Official Receiver. p. 77

CHANCERY DIVISION-Stay of Proceedings in.]—Held: 1. That when receivers, appointed in an action for dissolution of partnership, are discharged

by order of the judge in bankruptcy, their office is to determine from the date of the order by which they are discharged.

2. That the remuneration of such receivers shall be assessed by the registrar. In re Parker & Parker, Ex parte The Official Receiver

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p. 39

Transfer of Action pending in.]—(1) Held: That when application is made under section 102, sub-section 4, of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, for the transfer of an action pending in another Division of the High Court, some proof must be afforded that advantage is likely to be derived by reason of such transfer to the judge in bankruptcy. Quære, Whether in a case where a receiving order has been made, but the debtor has not been adjudicated a bankrupt, the Court has any jurisdiction under section 102, sub-section 4, of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, to make an order to transfer. In re White & Co., Ex parte The Official Receiver

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P. 77

(2) Held: 1. That where an order has been made under sub-section 4 of section 125 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, transferring proceedings for the administration of a deceased debtor's estate from the Chancery Division of the High Court to the Court exercising jurisdiction in bankruptcy, the latter Court may make an administration order on an ex parte application by a creditor. 2. But such order cannot be made until the expiration of two months from the date of the grant of probate or of letters of administration, unless either the legal personal representative of the deceased debtor consents thereto, or unless such debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy within three months prior to his decease. In re J. A. May, Ex parte E. May

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p. 232

COMMITTAL.]—(1) Bankruptcy Act, 1883, section 102; Bankruptcy Rules, Nos. 20, 22, 23, 26 and 49-Motion to commit-Affidavit of service not mentioned in notice of motion. In re J. Pearce, Ex parte The Board of Trade

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p. 111

(2) Bankruptcy Rules, 1883, Rule 78-Application for substituted service of notice of motion to commit. In re J. Pearce, Ex parte The Board of Trade. p. 135 (3) Committal-Undertaking to prove means-Office copy judgment-Affidavit in denial of satisfaction-County Court Rules, 1875, Order XIX. Rule 9—Exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of County Court. In re Stone, Ex parte Nicholson, In re Philby; Ex parte Nicholson

COMPOSITION.]-See Scheme of Arrangement.

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P. 177

(1) A Court to whom application is made to approve a composition accepted by the creditors of a debtor under section 18 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, must exercise its own discretion in determining whether such composition is reasonable and calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, and if such Court is not satisfied with all the circumstances attending the debtor's conduct and the acceptance of the composition, it is its duty to refuse its approval.

In a case where a debtor within the space of about eighteen months had allowed a debt due to him from a person whom he knew to be in pecuniary difficulties to increase from 32,000l. to more than 60,000l., and it appeared that to the amount of 11,000l. this increase was due to accommodation bills,

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