But I have come to the conclusion, though with great doubt and hesitation, that the legislature in this Act intended to be verbose and tautologous, and those who drafted this Act intended to say the same thing twice over. Having come to that conclusion, the interpretation must follow. I desire most emphatically to say that I can be no party to consenting to weaken or do away with an acknowledged rule of construction of statutes unless in extreme cases. I think this is an extreme case. But I take leave to enter my most earnest protest that this mode of drafting Acts of Parliament does not conduce to clearness. I cannot disagree from the judgment.

BOWEN, L. J.:

The question to be decided in the present case is whether the provisions as to writs of elegit of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, affect a writ which has been issued and under which the sheriff had seized before the coming into operation of the Act on the 1st January, 1884.

At common law the writ of elegit, like other writs of execution, would probably bind the debtor's goods from the date of its issue, but by the Statute of Frauds it was provided that no writ of execution should bind the property of the goods but from the time of its delivery to the sheriff. Under a writ of elegit the sheriff was directed to deliver the goods to the creditor to satisfy the debt. But a direction to deliver implies an authority to seize. And it was held in the Court of Appeal in Ex parte Abbott (L. R., 15 Ch. Div. 447) both that the sheriff is entitled to seize the debtor's goods under a writ of elegit at once before the holding of the inquisition, and also that from the time of such seizure the creditor becomes a secured creditor.

The Bankruptcy Act of 1883 puts an end for the future to the operation of writs of elegit so far as goods and chattels are concerned. The question in the present case is how far the language in which this salutary alteration of the law has been expressed affects the case of writs under which, on January 1st, 1884, there had been a seizure but no delivery. The sections which apply to it are sections 146 and 169. The first observation to be made on section 146 is, that the writ of elegit is not abolished altogether,

1884.

HOUGH

v.

WINDAS.

1884.

HOUGH v.

WINDAS.

but is only restricted in future to lands. In the second place it is
to be remarked that the words of the section are couched in the
very widest form. In spite of this generality of expression, even if
the words stood alone, we should still be bound to search for such
a construction to be put upon them as would neither prejudicially
affect vested rights nor render abortive the legal effect of things
already done. A writ of elegit upon seizure under it by the
sheriff has begun to operate, and a vested right has been thereby
acquired, unless it was the intention of the legislature to destroy
it. The difficulty, however, of placing a restricted construction
upon section 146, so as to respect the rights of a creditor who had
already seized between the passing of the Act and its coming into
operation, arises principally from the fact that the subject of writs
of elegit is again specifically dealt with in section 169. This latter
section repeals so much of the Statutes of Westminster the Second,
chapter 18, as relates to the debtor's chattels, saving, however, any
right or privilege already acquired. It was forcibly argued before
us that the effect of this latter section taken alone being of itself
to prevent goods and chattels being taken in execution under any
writ of elegit issued after January 1st, 1884, it followed as a
matter of reasoning that the enactment contained in section 146
would have nothing at all on which to operate unless it was
intended expressly to apply to cases where the execution has begun
but had not been perfected by delivery before that date. It
appears to me that the answer to this somewhat formidable argu-
ment is to be found in a study of the framework of the Bankruptcy
Act, 1883, so far as it works a repeal of previous legislation. It
does not seem to me possible, under the scheme adopted, to treat
the repealing section 169 as an independent section or one intended
to do more than to repeal expressly in a group those portions of
previous statutes which had already been repealed by implication
in the body of the Act. This appears to be the scheme of drafting.
The mere fact, therefore, that an express repeal of certain pro
visions as to elegit is contained in section 169 would not be an
argument for putting on the earlier sections any construction which
they would not independently demand. I think that the words
with which the saving clause in section 169 begin, viz.,
“The
repeal effected by this Act shall not affect any right, &c., acquired

under any enactment so repealed," are large enough, whether so designed by the draftsman or not, to save vested rights both against the operation of section 169, the general repeal clause itself, and also against that of the previous clauses of the Act. I also think, even without the saving clause, that section 146, unless it is to receive some special force from the co-existence of another clause, may itself receive a reasonable construction which would except from its operation writs under which, prior to January 1st, the sheriff had already seized. Both the recognized rule that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested rights, and it may be the effect of the saving clause in section 169 itself would be to withdraw from the operation of section 146 all writs which, like the present, were already in force prior to January 1st. For these reasons, though I do not think the matter perfectly free from doubt, I have arrived at a distinct conclusion that the judgment of the Court below should be reversed.

Lord Justice COTTON desires me to say that he agrees with the rest of the Court, that the judgment appealed from must be . reversed.

Solicitors: Lyne & Holman for the judgment creditor.

Ingledew & Ince for the debtor.

Maynard for the sheriff.

CASES relied upon or referred to in the arguments and judgments:

Payne v. Drewe, 4 East, 523.

Clerk v. Withers, 6 Mod. Rep. 293, 299, 300.

Ex parte Abbott, In re Gourlay, L. R., 15 Ch. Div. 447.
Giles v. Melsom, L. R., 6 H. L. Cas. 24.

1884.

HOUGH

v.

WINDAS.

BEFORE MR. REGISTRAR PEPYS.

1884.

Jan. 22.

PRACTICE.

IN RE WILLIAM WILLIAMS.

Bankruptcy Act, 1883, Section 17, Sub-section 9.

Public Examination: First Meeting of Creditors not concluded.

Held: That the public examination cannot be concluded until the adjourned first meeting of creditors has been concluded.

THIS was the first public examination under the Bankruptcy

Act, 1883.

The debtor, William Williams, had presented a petition against himself.

The first meeting of creditors had been summoned, but was adjourned owing to the absence of a quorum.

W. W. Aldridge, the official solicitor, said :—

The examination of the debtor must necessarily be adjourned. The first meeting of creditors has not been concluded. (Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 17, sub-s. 9.)

PEPYS, REGISTRAR:

The Bankruptcy Act, 1883, section 17, sub-section 9, says that an order declaring that the public examination of a debtor is concluded shall not be made "until after the day appointed for the first meeting of creditors." The section, in fact, provides that the public examination shall not be concluded before the day fixed for the first meeting, but that is a very different thing to the conclusion of the first meeting. It does not necessarily follow that the examination must be adjourned until after any adjournment of the first meeting. A first meeting might be adjourned from time to time, and it might add very greatly to the expense if the public examination were obliged to be adjourned in the same way. The point is a very important one, and the matter had better stand over for a week for consideration.

January 29th.

PEPYS, REGISTRAR:

Last week I expressed some doubt upon the question of adjourning the public examination in cases where the first meeting has been adjourned. Since that time I have considered the matter I am now clearly of the opinion that in no case ought the public examination to be concluded until the adjourned meeting is concluded.

1884.

IN RE WILLIAM WILLIAMS.

Jan. 29.

JURISDICTION.

IN RE EVAN JONES.

Bankruptcy Act, 1883, Sections 94, 99 and 169-Bankruptcy Rules, 1883,

Rule 264.

Delegation of Judge's Authority—Jurisdiction of Registrar-Pending Business.

Application to the registrar on behalf of the trustee in a bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, that a solicitor should pay over to such trustee certain moneys alleged to be in his hands and to belong to the bankrupt's estate.

Objection. That under the terms of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the registrar had no jurisdiction to hear the application.

Held.—That the registrar had jurisdiction.

IN the year 1871, on the death of one Hugh Jones, letters of

administration of his estate were granted to Evan Jones and a Mrs. Cheverton, and as a large sum of money was required for carrying out the administration, Evan Jones and Mrs. Cheverton handed such sums to A. F. Barnard, a solicitor, who paid 3,1607. into the Inland Revenue Office for administration purposes.

In November, 1875, Evan Jones was adjudicated a bankrupt. In 1878, the surplus sum of 3,0007. remaining after payment of the succession and other duties in the administration of Hugh Jones was, upon the application of A. F. Barnard, returned to him by the Inland Revenue Office.

On January 24th, 1884, an application was made by the trustee in the bankruptcy of Evan Jones to Mr. Registrar Hazlitt for an

M.

с

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE MATHEW.

1884.

Jan. 29.