Oldalképek
PDF
ePub

these appearances of preparation, our position with respect to the Durbar is materially and unfavourably changed from what it was three days before, and that there is now more risk of collision than there has been yet, seeing that the Ranee, from circumstances not unlikely to deceive her, and others, suspects that we are in co-operation with her enemies, and had appealed to the troops at Lahore, communicating to them the report of the order for preparation at Umballa, ascribed to your Excellency, and the troops have offered to do whatever she will sanction against the English.

4.-But, though there is more risk of disturbance now than formerly, and though our intercourse with the Lahore state is, for the moment, embarrassed; yet I beg, with the utmost deference to your Excellency's better judgment, to state that I consider nothing as yet likely to occur, and indeed very little to be at present possible, which could lead me to do more than make the application usual in such cases for support from the officer commanding the division; and that I do not even now propose, as far as matters have yet gone, to call on him to do more than maintain his usual vigilance.

5.-The bulk of the Lahore army had been lately sent by this Government, in reliance on our good faith, against the Jummoo Rajahs, and towards Cashmere and the country beyond the Jhelum, which is disturbed; supposing the Durbar to collect every man in Lahore and its vicinity, including the garrison of Umritsir and other detachments, to countermand the march of the troops now proceeding to Jummoo, and allowing nothing for men on leave, or sick, or false musters, they can only collect of regular troops as follows:

[blocks in formation]

a number inferior, I believe, to that of the troops in the Sirhind

division, and in a state of such utter disorder that their nominal leaders cannot get them to face the armed peasantry of Jessotas, nor do anything but plunder the people, insult and beat their officers, and return at will to their own homes. In addition to this, they have, however, the following undisciplined troops :— Irregular infantry, 1,500; two battalions of Heera Singh's hill-men, who have joined the Sikhs for high pay, and have received muskets, and are now at drill :

Irregular horse, 4,750, including those at Umritsir, detached to the Sutlej, Jaghurdars, &c.

I think that the most probable source of disturbance will be, that the restriction to fourteen miles from Lahore of their troops detached towards the Sutlej will be withdrawn, and that this disorderly rabble will interrupt the dawks, and commit outrages on the south side of the river, as well as on the north; but it will be most likely in a way not easily distinguished from ordinary gang robberies and forays.

SIR,

[blocks in formation]

The Political Agent to the Commander-in-Chief.

Governor-General's Agency, November 20, 1845.

Since I had the honour of waiting on your Excellency to-day, I have received Lahore letters of the 18th instant (morning).

During the night of the 17th the chiefs had agreed on, and the Durbar had ordered in writing, the following plan of operations :

The army was to be divided into seven divisions, one to remain at Lahore, and the rest to proceed against Roopar and our hills, Loodiana, Hurrekee, Ferozepore, and Scinde, while one was to proceed to Peshawur; and a force under Rajah Gholab Singh was to be sent to Attock.

Each division was to be of 8,000 to 12,000 men against Ferozepore, under Sham Singh Attareewalla, whose estates adjoin the place against which it was to act. Against Hurrekee, is to go Rajah Lal Singh; against Loodiana, Sirdar Tej Singh, the new Commander-in-Chief; and against Roopar, a brother of Sena Singh Mujeeteea.

The force under Sham Singh is to be 4,000 horse and two brigades of infantry, with guns; under Rajah Lal Singh, 4,500 horse, and two infantry brigades; under Sirdar Tej Singh, four brigades of infantry (one of them irregulars, and one new levies), and 1,000 horse, &c.; but till the plans of the Durbar are in actual execution they cannot be considered fixed, and therefore I do not trouble your Excellency with further details.

With respect to the probability of their actual moving, 1 must say that my correspondents in Lahore seem to doubt it, though they are perplexed. The causes, however, which have so suddenly led the Durbar to such lengths may carry it further; and indeed it is difficult to see how they can stop now without a change of government—a thing not unlikely. Still, prudence requires that we should act as if they would not change their minds, and I therefore most respectfully venture to submit to your Excellency the following suggestions:

First, that the carriage of the troops in this division should be drawn into the stations, both for security, and to enable the troops to move at the shortest notice; and that the European troops in the hills should be held in readiness to march; to move them is a work of time, and needs some preparation. I shall write to the sub-commissioner and the other local authorities without delay to collect coolies; but I shall be glad to hear from your Excellency the numbers required, and also on what roads supplies, &c., should be got ready.

With respect to further measures, I must of course speak with extreme diffidence; on the whole, I am inclined still to hold the opinions that I had the honour of expressing verbally; and I may now add, that the matter seems to have come to a pitch which

makes some notice of it by our Government not easily avoidable; and this being the case, and as the Governor-General is so near, it may be desirable to await his arrival, or his decision as to the extent of what may be done, before making any movements, unless we hear of the Sikh army having actually crossed the Sutlej.

In all this, however, I speak with the utmost submission to your Excellency's better judgment; but I beg to add, that in whatever your Excellency may decide on, I shall esteem it an honour to give it whatever aid I can. I have, &c. (Signed)

G. BROADFOOT.

The Agent to the Governor-General to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Camp, Umballa, November 20, 1845. I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General, a copy of a demi-official letter to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as affairs at Lahore assumed their present form.

Not to delay the messenger, I must reserve a fuller report till to-morrow; but I may add to what has been already communicated demi-officially, and what will be gathered from my letters, that no complaint of any kind has been made to me by the Durbar, and that the pretext of a grievance alleged has been dropped by the Durbar, and rejected by the troops. The truth is, all are in a false position, from the unlooked-for results of the cry against the English, to serve a party purpose, and all, moreover, are indifferent to war with us, from their firm persuasion that, if victorious, they will find new means of power and wealth, and, if beaten, that they will be, what most of them desire, the heads of a subsidiary, instead of an independent state.

This opinion has never received any countenance from me, but the very contrary; and the Durbar will by this time have received the perwannah which I addressed to the Vakeel, when the in

trigues which had led to the present state of things assumed a serious form. It will be seen from the enclosed copy of it, that no warning could be plainer, and, as therein indicated, that it is only a repetition of former warnings.

Continued letters from my assistants, respecting the rumours on the frontier, showed that our posts there were vigilant; and I abstained, therefore, from communicating with the military authorities, in order to prevent the Durbar having the smallest ground to say that any menacing preparations or movements on our part had been taken up, for this ground has been already alleged in their consultations, as justifying their present movements; nay, even after I had yesterday received a communication on the subject from the Major-General commanding the division, I forebore to write to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and even to-day I ventured to recommend to his Excellency that no steps should be taken for the present. Since then, however, authentic intelligence has reached me that the Durbar has openly adopted, and ordered in writing, a fixed plan of operations against the English, and I, accordingly, addressed to his Excellency the Commander-inChief the letter, of which a copy is annexed.

I now only suggest abstinence from movement on account of the vicinity of the Governor-General, who will probably think the matter now one which has gone too far to be left unnoticed, whether the troops actually move from Lahore or not.

That I presumed to suggest any delay whatever is owing to this: It appears to me that the frontier is too long to be defensible in all points by any force we can move; that our two posts on the frontier are strong enough to maintain themselves till relieved; and that to attempt reinforcements, therefore, in anticipation of those of the Sikhs would be useless as protecting the open country, and might impede any operations which the Governor-General may resolve

Moreover, the delay recommended is only one of two or three days, till an answer to this letter can be received.

The Sikh sirdars on this side of the Sutlej have for many months past been called on to keep their troops in readiness to repel the

« ElőzőTovább »