Leaseholds with free holds Leaseholds held for long terms of years are fre settled to go quently settled together with freehold land. In such cases the leaseholds are assigned to trustees to be held upon such trusts as shall correspond, as nearly as the rules of law and equity will permit with the uses declared of the freeholds, with a like proviso, to meet the event of the death under age of a tenant in tail by purchase, as in the case of chattels personal settled to go with freeholds (1). (1) See Williams on Settlements, 223; Davidson, Prec. Conv. vol. iii. 599, 3rd ed.; vol. iv. 399, 4th ed.; vol. i. 337, 5th ed. CHAPTER II. OF JOINT OWNERSHIP AND JOINT LIABILITY. THERE may be a joint ownership of joint ownership of any kind of per- Joint owners. sonal property, in the same manner as there may be a joint tenancy of real estate (a); and the four unities of possession, interest, title, and time, which characterize a joint tenancy of real estate, apply also to a joint ownership of chattels. But as no estates can exist in personal property, the distinctions which hold with respect to joint estates for life, in tail, or in fee, do not occur in a joint ownership of personalty. If personal property, whether in possession or in action, be given to A. and B. simply, they will be joint owners, having equal rights. as between themselves, during the joint ownership, and being, with respect to all other persons than themselves, in the position of one single owner. Hence it follows Joint bond, that if a bond or covenant be given or made to two or more jointly, they must all join in suing upon it (b); and a release by one of them to the obligor is sufficient Release by to bar them all (c). As a further consequence of the one bars all. unity of joint ownership, the important right of sur- Survivorship. vivorship, which distinguishes a joint tenancy of real estate, belongs also to a joint ownership of personal property. Whether the subject of the joint ownership be a chattel real as a lease, or a chose in possession as a horse, or a chose in action as a debt or legacy, the surviving joint owner will be entitled to the whole, (a) See Williams, R. P. 130, 17th ed. (b) Slingsby's case, 5 Rep. 18 b. ; Petrie v. Bury, 3 Baru. & Cress. 353; 1 Wms. Saund. 291, i. 1, 5. all must sue. W.P.P. C C Trustees of personal estate made joint owners. Succession Duty Act, 1853. The share of joint owners under a will need not vest at the same time. Limitation to unaffected by any disposition which the deceased joint owner may have made by his will, unless the joint tenancy should have been previously severed in the lifetime of both the parties (d). And for this reason trustees of settlements of personal estate are always made joint owners, in order that the surviving trustees may take the entire fund, rather than that the executors. or administrators of any trustee who may happen to die should have any right to intermeddle with the share of the deceased. Where any beneficial interest accrues to any joint owner by survivorship, it is deemed a succession within the Succession Duty Act, 1853, and as such liable to the succession duty (e). If the joint ownership be created by a will, it is not necessary that the shares of all the joint owners should vest at the same time. Thus under a bequest to A. for life, and after his decease to the issue (ƒ) or children (g) of B., without words of severance, all the issue or children, born in A.'s lifetime, will become entitled jointly, though some may not be living when the shares of the others become vested interests. On the decease of any of them therefore before payment, the survivors will become entitled to their shares. A similar exception to the unity of time occurs also in the case of a devise of real estate by will (h). In analogy to the rule by which a joint estate in joint owners, fee-simple in lands is created by a limitation to two or their execu tors, adminis- more, their heirs and assigns, it was customary with conveyancers to make a gift of personal estate to two or trators and assigns. (d) Litt. sects. 281, 282; Lady (e) Stat. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51, s. 3; ante, p. 380. See also, p. 379, as to account duty. (f) Bridge v. Yates, 12 Sim. 645. (g) Amics v. Skillern, 14 Sim. 428. (h) See Williams, R. P. 133, 17th ed. and cove more jointly, by limiting it to them, their executors, administrators, and assigns. This, however, though usual, was not strictly necessary. In ill-framed instruments, limitations of personalty were sometimes made to two persons, "and the survivor of them, and the executors and administrators of such survivor." If, however, the persons are simply made joint owners, the law will be sufficient of itself to carry the property to the survivor. And it is now by no means unusual to vest personal estate in two or more persons, as joint owners, simply by conveying it to them, without further words. Bonds Joint bonds and covenants, when intended to be given or made to nants. two or more jointly, were in like manner usually given or made to the obligees or covenantees, their executors and administrators; or, ifthe subject-matter were assignable,to them,their executors, administrators and assigns. But it was always unnecessary expressly to extend the benefit of a personal covenant or obligation, made with or to two or more persons jointly, to the survivors of them or to their executors, administrators or assigns (i). And it is now not unusual simply to express that such. covenants and obligations are made with or to certain specified persons, without further words (). But when Joint or entered into with two or more persons, bonds or covenants cannot, as respects the obligees or covenantees, be joint or several, at their election, for one and the same cause; for otherwise the Court would be in doubt for which of them to give judgment (). And whether a covenant be joint or several depends much more upon the subject-matter than upon the words employed. If each of the covenantees has a separate interest, each may have a separate cause of action, and the covenant will accordingly in such a case be several, though ex (i) See Williams's Conveyancing Statutes, 236, 498, n. (a). (k) See ibid. p. 498. See stat. 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 60 (ibid. pp. 235-237), as to the effect of a covenant, a contract under seal (7) 5 Rep. 19 a; 1 East, 501. several. Partners in trade, no sur session. Otherwise as to choses in action at law, But not in equity. pressed to be made with the covenantees jointly and severally (m). But if each of the covenantees has not a separate cause of action, all of them must concur in suing upon the covenant, even although it be expressed to be made with some of them, "and as a separate covenant" with the others (n); for if all may sue, all' must (0). An exception to the right of survivorship between vivorship of joint owners occurs in the case of partners in trade. In choses in pos- this case the law, in order to the encouragement of commerce, vests in the executors or administrators of a deceased partner, the share of the deceased in all personal chattels in possession, such as merchandize or ships, which were the joint property of the partnership (p)But this rule does not extend at law to choses in action, which must accordingly be sued for in the name of the survivor (9). In equity, however, the share of the deceased partner, both in the choses in possession and in action belonging to the partnership, devolves on his executors or administrators. The consequence is that, though the choses in action must be sued for by the surviving partner, he will be a trustee of the share of the deceased partner for his executors or administrators (~). The same rule was applied in equity even to real estate partnership purchased for the purposes of a trading partnership (8), and conveyed to the partners as joint tenants in fee. On the decease of any of them, equity held the sur Real estate purchased for purposes. (m) 5 Rep. 19 a; 1 Wms. Saund. 155 a, n. (1). (n) Slingsby's case, 5 Rep. 18 b; Anderson v. Martindale, 1 East, 497; Foley v. Addenbrooke, 4 Q. B. 197; Hopkinson v. Lee, 6 Q. B. 964; Bradburne v. Botfield, 14 M. & W. 559; Wakefield v. Brown, 9 Q. B. 209; Keightley v. Watson, 3 Ex. 716. (0) 4 Q. B. 208; Wetherell v. Langston, 1 Ex. 634; Pugh v. Stringfield, 3 C. B., N. S. 2. (p) Co. Litt. 182 a; Kempe v Andrews, 3 Lev. 290 ; Rex v. Collector of Customs, 2 M. & S. 223; Buckley v. Barber, 6 Ex. 164. (q) Martin v. Crompe, Lord Raym. 340; S. C. 2 Salk. 444; 2 Wms. Saund. 117 b, n. (2). (r) Jeffereys v. Small, 1 Vern ' 217; Lake v. Craddock, 3 P. Wms. 158. (8) Randall v. Randall, 7 Sim. 271. |