1893. MAY Bartrum, 19 Ch. D. 394; Bolton v. Ferro, 14 Ch. D. 171. Under the Dominion Insolvent Act of 1875 a creditor holding security at the time of the insolvency could not realize the security, and prove on the estate for the balance: In re Beaty, 6 A. R. 40; Deacon v. SIEVEWRIGHT. Driffil, 4 A. R. 335. In an administration suit a creditor cannot be compelled to value any securities held by him. He is entitled to rank for the full amount of his claim, and to realize any securities as well, provided that he must not ultimately receive more than 100 cents on the dollar: Rhodes v. Moxhay, 10 W. R. 103; Cooper v. Molsons Bank, 26 Can. S. C. R. 611, at p. 621. And this rule also applies to the administration of assets under a common law assignment, unless otherwise provided by the deed of assignment: Bolton v. Ferro, 14 Ch. D. 171; Beaty v. Samuel, 29 Gr. 105; Eastman v. Bank of Montreal, 10 O. R. 79; Young v. Spiers, 16 O. R. 672. An instructive case in this connection is Molsons Bank v. Cooper, decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, March 9th, 1898, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada. The respondents were boot and shoe manufacturers at Toronto, and they had an account with the Molsons Bank. Having applied to the bank for a line of credit, they received from the manager, on June 13th, 1891, a letter stating that the Board had granted them a line of credit to the amount of $150,000, to be secured by collections deposited, at a rate of interest of 6 per cent., with one-quarter commission on all cheques and collections outside the city of Toronto. To that letter there was a postscript stating that its meaning was not that the advances should be fully covered by collections, but as near as the respondents could. The respondents stopped payment in August, 1893. In the interval the bank had made large cash advances to the firm in the way of discount of their promissory notes. The respondents from time to time handed the bank large numbers of their customers' notes and bills as collateral security for the advances so made. At the time of the firm's failure the bank held their promissory notes to the amount in all of $145,000, all of which had been discounted, and in addition the bank held as collateral security a large number of customers' notes. These latter they proceeded to realize upon, and at the time of the commencement of this action had received $83,000. This action was brought upon the firm's paper for the recovery of the whole indebtedness, $145,000, and the defence was set up of payment or satisfaction in whole or in part by the money received from the collateral notes. The object of the bank in not applying the money received from the collateral security was that in the distribution of the estate of the firm under the Creditors' Relief Act, they might prove for their whole debt, and so obtain a larger dividend. Mr. Justice Rose gave judgment for the bank for the full amount of the notes sued upon, holding that they were not obliged to credit the money in their hands against the notes, but were entitled to retain the fund so realized as a reserve fund, carrying the amount to the credit of a suspense account. The Divisional Court, on appeal, 26 O. R. 575, set aside this judgment, deciding that the bank were bound to apply the money in reduction of the respondents' debt, and that it ought to be applied pro tanto in payment of the notes sued upon. The bank appealed to the Court of Appeal, which restored the original judgment of Mr. Justice Rose, 23 A. R. 146, though the Court was divided. The Supreme Court of Canada, on further appeal, 26 Can. S. C. R. 611, unanimously decided against the bank. An appeal taken to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was dismissed. The full text of the judgment of Lord Halsbury, L.C., who delivered the judgment of the Committee, has not been received at the time of this writing. 1893. MAY V. His Lordship is, however, thus reported in a summary of his SIEVEWRIGHT. judgment: The suit raised the question, Were the appellants entitled to treat the sum they had received and realized of the securities as not having been received at all, or were they entitled to recover in respect of the entire amount of their indebtedness? No such right as they alleged could possibly exist. The bargain was intelligible enough-namely, that an overdraft should be allowed, and that cheques, bills, and securities should be deposited to secure repayment. The intention of the parties was made still more clear by the postscript to the letter:-" The meaning of the above is not that the advances shall be fully secured by collections, but as near as you can." It was admitted that $83,000 had been received and realized by the bank on those collateral securities. As the bank received the money, or turned the securities into money when they received them, it was impossible to say that the indebtedness between them and their debtors was otherwise than diminished to the extent of the money which the bank put into their pockets. ROBERTSON v. APPLEBY ET AL. Practice-Parties-Assignment of cause of action after suit brought-The After the bill was filed in a suit brought by a married woman by Held, that under sections 96 and 97 of the Supreme Court in Equity Act, 1890 (53 Vict. c. 4), an application to continue the suit in the name of the assignee could be made ex parte, subject to the order being varied or set aside if the defendants were prejudiced in their security for costs. A mortgage executed by Benjamin H. Appleby and wife to The Provincial Building Society was assigned to Rosanna Reid, wife of Joseph Reid. Rosanna Reid commenced a foreclosure suit upon the mortgage by William Robertson, her next friend, and her husband was joined in the suit as a defendant. During the continuance of the suit Rosanna Reid died, leaving a will by which she appointed her husband and Eliza Mitchell executors, and the suit was continued by them on suggestion as plaintiffs. Subsequently they assigned the mortgage to William Robertson, and obtained an ex parte order substituting Robertson as the plaintiff in the 1893. March 14. This suit was brought by a married woman by her next friend. After filing the bill she died and her executors assigned the cause of action to the next friend; and the plaintiff's counsel applied to me, and I granted an ex parte order under section 97 of 53 Vict. c. 4, substituting the assignee as plaintiff in lieu of the original plaintiff. The defendants' counsel applied to me to discharge the order, and the plaintiff's counsel showed cause. The sole question argued was whether a plaintiff can voluntarily assign his interest in a suit, during its pendency in this Court, to another person, and that other person carry on the suit under the section referred to. The two sections, under which it is claimed this may be done, are 96 and 97, and which enact as follows: "96. A suit or matter shall not become abated by reason of the marriage, death or bankruptcy of any of the parties, if the cause of action survive or continue and shall not become defective by the assignment, creation or devolution of any estate or title pendente lite, but the suit shall be allowed to proceed in favour of or against the surviving party or by or against the person to or upon whom such estate or title has come or devolved; the Court may, if it be deemed necessary, order that the husband, personal representative, trustee or other successor in interest, if any, of such party or parties be made a party." 66 97. An order that the proceedings shall be carried on between the continuing parties and such new party or parties, may be obtained ex parte on application to the Court or Judge, upon an allegation of such change or transmission of interest or liability, or of such person interested having come into existence, and unless the Court or Judge shall otherwise direct be served 1893. upon the continuing party or parties or their solicitors, and also upon each such new party, unless the person making the application be himself the only new party, APPLEBY et al. and such order shall from the time of such service be binding upon such party or parties, and such new party or parties shall thenceforth become a party or parties to the suit and shall be bound to enter an appearance thereto in the office of the Clerk within the same time and in the same manner as if he or they had been served with a writ of summons, unless otherwise directed in such order; provided that it shall be open to the party or parties so served within twenty days after such service to apply to the Court by motion or petition to discharge or vary such order; provided also, that if any party so served shall be under any disability other than coverture, such order shall be of no force or effect as against such party until a guardian or guardians ad litem shall have been duly appointed for such party, and until the expiration of twenty days from such appointment." At first I thought that although such proceedings did apparently come within the strict words of the Statute that such words as "by the assignment" are equivalent to any assignment-yet in view of the proba bility of a solvent plaintiff assigning to an insolvent, and thus working injustice to the other party, that is, thereby depriving the defendant of his security for costs, it might not be so intended. But I think the provisions of the 97th section give the Judge the right to vary the order in all cases where it is necessary and his duty to make the defendant secure for the costs. In this matter the executors of the original plaintiff substituted her next friend for the original plaintiff who was alone liable for the defendants' costs. This in no way altered the defendants' security for costs. I therefore think that my order was right and that there is no necessity to vary it or set it aside. As the defendants have not succeeded they must pay the costs of this application. The next friend of a married woman must be a solvent person: Hind v. Whitmore, 2 K. & J. 458; and if not solvent an order may be made to stay proceedings till a new next friend be appointed or security for costs given: Pennington v. Alvin, 1 ROBERTSON v. Palmer, J. v. 1893. S. & S. 264, overruling Dowden v. Hook, 8 Beav. 399; and see Martano v. Mann, 14 Ch. D. 419; Schott v. Schott, 19 Ch. D. ROBERTSON 94; Re Thompson, 38 Ch. D. 317; Stovel v. Coles, 3 Chy. Ch. 421. In Jones v. Fawcett, 2 Ph. 278, overruling S. C. 11 Jur. 687, the Court refused, on the application of a plaintiff, a married woman, to remove her next friend, and appoint another, where it was evident that the defendant's security for costs would be thereby prejudiced. APPLEBY et al. An application by plaintiffs to amend by striking out the names of any of their co-plaintiffs will only be allowed upon security for costs being given: Attorney-General v. Cooper, 3 My. & Cr. 258; Lloyd v. Makelam, 6 Ves. 145; Motteux v. Mackreth, 1 Ves. Jr. 142; Fellowes v. Deere, 3 Beav. 353; Swan v. Adams, 7 P. R. 147. If the next friend of a married woman is changed in the course of the suit, he must give security for the costs already incurred, and proceedings will be stayed in the meantime: Witts v. Campbell, 12 Ves. 492; Payne v. Little, 16 Beav. 563. Under the former practice, if after a suit was instituted, any circumstances occurred, which, without abating the suit, occasicned an alteration in or transmission of the interest in the suit of any of the parties, or rendered it necessary that new parties should be brought before the Court, the proper method of doing it was by supplemental bill: Fraser v. Dewitt, 1 P. & B. 738. Thus if a plaintiff, suing in his own right, made such an alienation of his property as to render the alienee a necessary party to the suit, but not at the same time to deprive himself of all right in the question, he brought the alienee before the Court by supplemental bill, or the alienee might himself file a supplemental bill against the original plaintiff and the other parties to the suit, to have the benefit of the proceedings. In like manner if a plaintiff, suing in his own right, was entirely deprived of his interest, but was not the sole plaintiff, the defect arising from this event was supplied by a bill of this kind. If the interest of a plaintiff, suing in autre droit, entirely determined by death or otherwise, and some other person thereupon became entitled to the same property under the same title, as in the case of an executor or administrator upon the determination of an administration durante minore aetate, or pendente lite, the suit was added to or continued by supplemental bill. In the cases above put the parties to the suit are still, to a certain extent, able to proceed with it, though from the effect of the change of interest, occasioned by the subsequent event, the proceedings are not sufficient to attain their full object; also, that, in the case of the death of a party suing in autre droit, if the suit is continued by the individual succeeding to the character of the deceased plaintiff, there is no change of interest which can affect the parties, but only a change of the person in whose name the suit must be prosecuted. Where, however, a sole plaintiff, suing in his own right, was deprived of his whole right in the matters in question by an event subsequent to the institution of the suit, as where a plaintiff assigned his whole interest to another, the plaintiff was no longer able to prosecute for want of interest, and his assignees claiming by a title which might be litigated, the benefit of the proceedings could not be obtained by means of a supplemental bill, but was sought by what was called an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill. See Dan. Ch. Pr. (4th Am. ed.) 1515, et seq. By the Improvement of Jurisdiction of Equity Act (15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 52) (Imp.), it was provided that upon any suit becoming abated by death, marriage or otherwise, or defective by reason of some change or transmission of interest or liability, it should not be necessary to exhibit any bill of |