a clear intention to restrict the plain general words of an independent clause, that clause shall receive its exclusive, unrestricted, and absolute meaning. In that case, the assignor in a deed of assignment of a lease, (after reciting the original lease granted to another, for the term of ten years, which by mesne assignments had vested in him, and that the plaintiff had contracted for the absolute purchase of the premises,) bargained, sold, assigned, transferred, and set over the same to the plaintiff, for and during all the rest, &c, of the said term of ten years, in as ample a manner as the assignor might have held the same, subject to the payment of rent, and performance of covenants; and then covenanted that it was a good and subsisting lease valid in law, of and for the said premises thereby assigned, and not forfeited, &c., or otherwise determined, or become void or voidable. It was held that the generality of this covenant for title, which was supported by the recital of the bargain for an absolute term of ten years, was not restrained by other covenants, which went only to provide for or against the acts of the assignor himself, or those who claimed under him; such as, 1st, a covenant against incumbrances, except an under lease of part by the assignor for three years; 2ndly, for quiet enjoyment; 3rdly, for further assurance. And, therefore, as it appeared that the original lease was for ten years, determinable on a life in being, which dropped before the ten years expired, though not till after the covenant of the assignor; the court decided that the assignee might assign a breach upon the absolute covenant for title. A covenant was entered into for quiet enjoyment during a term, without the lawful let, suit, interruption, &c. of J. M., his executors, &c., or any other persons whatsoever, claiming or having any estate or right in the premises, and that free, &c., discharged by J. M. his heirs, &c., defended and indemnified from all former gifts, grants, &c. by J. M., or their or either of their acts, procurement, &c; preceded by a covenant that the lease was a good lease, notwithstanding any act of J. M., and followed by a covenant for further assurance by J. M., his executors, &c., and all persons claiming any estate under him or them. The Court held (Park, J., dissentiente), that the covenant for quiet enjoyment extended only against the acts of the covenantor, and those claiming under him, and not against the acts of all the world. The Court considered, that looking to the whole of the deed, and viewing the restrictive nature of the covenants immediately preceding and following, the intention of the party must have been to covenant only for his own acts, and those claiming under him; and that the words "all persons whatsoever," must be understood to mean persons of the description in the other covenants (†). The defendant purchased an estate charged with an annuity to M. S., and as part of the bargain he covenanted with the vendor "to pay the annuity to the person who, for the time being, should be entitled thereto; and that he would at all times indemnify the vendor from all actions, claims, &c. on account of the annuity." The annuity was only charged on the land, and was not a personal charge on the vendor. The Court decided, that the covenant to pay the annuity was absolute and independent, and not qualified by the covenant of indemnity; and therefore that the vendor might sue for the non-payment of the annuity to the party entitled, although he (the vendor) was not, and could not be damnified (u) In general an instrument must be construed by the provisions contained in it, and not by any thing dehors; but in some cases equity will look even to a second instrument, in construing the effect of a former (a). And several deeds made at the same time to effect one object, will, at least in equity, be construed as one assurance, but so that each shall have its distinct operation to carry on the main design (y). Thus, where a father put his son apprentice, and entered into a bond of 10007. for his fidelity, and at the same time took a covenant from his master, that he should at least once a month see his apprentice make up his cash. It was held, on a bill filed to be relieved against an action brought on the bond, that the bond and the covenant ought to be taken as one agreement; and therefore that the father should be answerable for no more than the master could prove the apprentice embezzled in the first month when the embezzlement began (≈). So where a man covenanted by marriage articles to pay the legacies charged upon his wife's estate, and gave a statute and also a mortgage of his own estate to secure the same, and by an indorsement upon the mortgage the same was to be void, unless the wife's estate was (t) Nind v. Marshall, 3 Moor, 703; 1 B. & B. 319, S. C. (u) Saward v. Anstey, 10 Moor, 55 ; 2 Bing. 519, S. C. (x) Fowler v. Hunter, 3 Y. & J.506. (y) 1 Fonbl. Tr. Eq. 5th ed. 436, 7. (z) Montague v. Tidcombe, 2 Vernon R. 519. settled upon him for life, &c., according to the marriage articles; this indorsement, though upon the mortgage only, was held to be sufficient in equity to discharge the statute and articles; for all the instruments being executed at one and the same time, authenticated by the same witnesses, and part of the same agreement, were to be viewed but as one conveyance (a). LEX LOCI :--We have observed that, in many instances, regard shall be had to the usage or custom of the place where a contract was made, or to which it has reference, in order to discover the meaning of dubious terms used therein (b). "It may be necessary to put a different construction on leases made in populous cities, from that, on those made in the country. We know that in London different persons have several freeholds over the same spot; different parts of the same house are let out to different people. That is the case in the Inns of Court. Now it would be very extraordinary to contend, that if a person purchased a set of chambers, then leased them, and afterwards purchased another set under them, the after-purchased chambers would pass under the lease (c)." A lease was granted of a warren in Suffolk: the landlord covenanted to pay 601. per thousand for the rabbits, which the tenant was to leave on the premises. It was held that parol evidence might be received, to shew that by custom in Suffolk in such cases, one thousand rabbits meant one thousand two hundred; and that the landlord was only bound to pay for rabbits reckoned at that rate (d). It is an undoubted general rule, that a contract shall be construed according to the law of the country where it is made, and in which it is to be performed; and not according to the law of another country into which either of the parties may happen to remove, and in which a suit thereon is instituted (e). (a) Lawrence v. Blatchford, 2 Vern. 457; 1 Fonbl. Tr. Eq. 5th ed. 437, 8. (b) Ante, 69. (c) Per Ashurst, J., Doe v. Burt, 1 T. R. 703. (d) Smith v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728. (e) See the cases, 3 Chit. Com. L. 107,8; Pothier on Contr. Per Cur. in Melan v. Duke de Fitzjames, 1 B. & P. 138; and De la Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 284. By the Code Napoleon, or French Civil Code, Book 1, tit. 1, art. 13, &c. it is provided, "That the foreigner who shall have been permitted by the government to establish his domicile in France, shall enjoy in that country all civil rights, so long as he shall continue to reside there." "A foreigner, although not resident in France, may be cited before the French courts, to enforce the execution of engagements contracted by him in France with a Frenchman; he may In an action for money paid for the defendant's use, but not for necessaries, it appeared that the cause of action accrued in Scotland, and that the defendant was under age. It did not appear from the evidence what was the law of Scotland in regard to the defendant's liability. Lord Eldon said :-"What the law of Scotland is, with respect to the right of recovering against an infant for necessaries, I cannot say; but if the law of Scotland is, that such a contract as the present could not be enforced against an infant, that should have been given in evidence; and I hold myself not warranted in saying, that such a contract is void by the law of Scotland, because it is void by the law of England. The law of the country, where the contract arose, must govern the contract; and what that law is should be given in evidence to me as a fact. No such evidence has been given, and I cannot take the fact of what that law is, without evidence (ƒ).” So, where it appeared in an action upon an unstamped Jamaica agreement, that by the law of that island the contract required a stamp, and was void for want of it-the Court held that the action in this country could not be maintained (g). But it is only in the case of instruments made in his Majesty's dominions that any objection to the receipt of such instruments for want of a stamp, in pursuance of the law of the place, can be effectually made upon the trial of an action in this country. Our courts do not notice the revenue laws of another state; therefore where assumpsit was brought for money lent in France, and unstamped receipts were produced in proof of the loan, evidence to shew that by the law of France such receipts required stamps to render them valid, was rejected (h). This is an exception to the general principle of reciprocity. The assignee of an Irish judgment by cognovit, may sue in this country in his own name (¿). be summoned before the tribunals of France, on account of engagements entered into by him with Frenchmen in a foreign country. "A Frenchman may be summoned before a French court, for engagements contracted by him in a foreign country, though with a foreigner. În all causes, except commercial ones, in which a foreigner shall be plaintiff, he shall be required to give security for the payment of the costs and damages incident to the suit, unless he possess in France immoveable pro perty of value sufficient to guarantee such payment." (ƒ) Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. R. 163. (g) Alves v. Hodgson 7 T. R. 241; 2 Esp. R. 528, S. C.; and see Clegg v. Levy, 3 Camp. 166. But the foreign law must be clearly proved by the party objecting, and how, id.; Miller v. Keinrick, 4 Camp. 155. See Bire v. Moreau, 2 C. & P. 376. (h) James v. Catherwood, 3 D. & R. 190. (i) O'Callaghan v. Marchioness of Thomond, 3 Taunt. 82. But in seeking to enforce a remedy by action in this country upon a foreign contract, all the rules and provisions of our law which have relation to, and regulate the time and mode of proceeding, and the practical conduct of the suit, shall be consulted; without regard to the foreign law upon the subject of the remedy upon the agreement. As to the remedy, the lex domicilii shall prevail. An instrument was made in Scotland, which, by the Scotch law, had the operation and effect of a bond; and, by that law, a term of forty years was allowed, within which a suit might be instituted upon the obligation. To an action brought in this country upon the instrument as a Scotch bond, the defendant pleaded the English statute of limitations: the declaration set forth the Scotch term of limitation. Upon demurrer to the plea, it was considered that the remedy in this country was to be governed by our law of limitation, and that the claim here was barred thereby, and the defendant had judgment (k). And a defendant may be arrested here for a debt contracted abroad, (in Portugal,) although the foreign law does not permit an arrest for such a demand (1). But it seems that our courts will not, in some cases, afford redress on a contract made abroad, if it be expressly stipulated in such contract that no proceeding thereon shall be taken in a foreign country. Thus, in Johnson v. Machielson (m), which was an action for a seaman's wages, it appeared that the seamen were foreigners, and had agreed in their own country "that they would not in foreign parts prosecute payment of any money whatever of the captain, but be satisfied with what he might be pleased to advance them abroad in deduction of their wages." It was contended that the jurisdiction of our courts could not be thus excluded; but Lord Ellenborough said, "If this were merely the regulation of a foreign government, I should leave that government to enforce it, by punishing the infraction of it, or by any other means that might be more effectual. But by the personal contract between the individuals before the Court, it is expressly stipulated that the mariners shall not sue the captain for wages in (k) The British Linen Company v. Drummond, 10 B. & C. 903, cited in 1 B. & Ad. 284, 5. (1) De la Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 284. The Court overruled the decision, in Melan v. Duke de Fitz james, 1 B. & P. 138. In the latter |