CHAP. LI. Objects of Britain-the repression of French principles, and the prevention of French aggrandizement.—Sir John Scott the attorney general introduces a bill for preventing traitorous correspondence-arguments for and against-modified, passes into a law.-Motion for peace.-Reasonings of Mr. Fox respecting the war and its probable effects.-The propositions are negatived by unprecedented majorities.—Mr. Sheridan proposes an inquiry into the alleged sedition.-His motion rejected. -Motion for parliamentary reform by Mr. Greyarguments for.-Mr. Whitbread.-Arguments against. -Proposition reprobated as peculiarly unseasonable at such a period—and rejected. State of commercial credit, and causes of its being affected.-Mr. Pitt proposes an advance of public money on the security of mercantile commodities. The proposition is adopted,and revives mercantile credit.---East India company's charter on the eve of expiration. Mr. Dundas presents a masterly view of the prosperity of India under the present system. He proposes the renewal of the charter.-His plan is passed into a law.-Measures adopted to render British India farther productive. Plan of agricultural improvement. -Sir John Sinclair-inquiries of in Scotland and England. Result, that agriculture is not understood and practised in proportion to the capability of the country. -proposes the establishment of a board of agriculturethe proposal adopted.-Lord Rawdon's motion respecting debtors. Increase of the army and navy.-National supplies.-A loan.-Taxes.-Session closes.-Commencement of campaign 1793.-French invade Holland-reduce Breda.-Hundart and Gertruydenburgh surrender. -Dumourier besieges Williamstadt and Maestreicht. The British forces arrive in Holland.-The French raise the siege of Williamstadt.-Attacked by the Austrians at Winden-defeated.-French generals accuse VOL. IV. I CHAP. LI. 1793. Objects of Great Britain each other.-Dumourier evacuates the Netherlands-disapproved by the convention—privately proposes to make peace with the allies and restore monarchy-suspected by the French government-summoned to return to Paris to answer for his conduct-sounds the dispositions of the army-finding them unfavourable, deserts to the Austrians. opera THE grand purposes of the British government in its conduct respecting France were to repress the tion of revolutionary princes in this country, and to prevent the French system of aggression and aggrandizement the repres- from being longer carried into successful execution on the French continent. In this twofold object originated the measures principles of external policy adopted by parliament during the prevention remainder of the session, and also some of those that were of French confined to internal regulation. sions of and the aggrandizement. Sir John attorney WAR having been declared against a foreign country, Scott, the it was obviously expedient to prevent correspondence general, between British subjects and the hostile party. To render introduces this prohibition effectual, sir John Scott, attorney general, preventing on the 15th of March introduced a bill for preventing, traitorous during the war, all traitorous correspondence with the dence. king's enemies. The law of treason was founded upon a a bill for correspon statute of the 25th of Edward III. which had been the subject of legislative exposition in different laws, enacted since that period. The acts declared treasonable in that statute were principally reducible to two heads; to compass, that is, to intend or project the king's death; to levy war against the king, and to abet or assist his enemies. Since that period, during wars, parliament had repeatedly passed laws which applied the general principle to the existing case; by specifically prohibiting adherence or assistance to nations at enmity with our sovereign. Agreeably to the original statute, and the consequent exand against planatory acts the present bill was framed. Former laws Argu ments for f See vol. ii. 394. g An act had passed in the reign of queen Anne to prevent all traitorous correspondence which prohibited any person from supplying the enemies with arms, naval or military stores, or from going out of the kingdom to the enemy's country without license. A similar act of William and Mary had carried the regulation farther; it prohibited goods and merchandises of every sort. See Statutes at large. LI. 1793. had, in such circumstances, prohibited British subjects CHAP. from sending military stores, arms, ammunition, and provision, of various enumerated kinds. The present bill, besides interdicting these articles, prohibited purchases of French funds or French lands. The reason of this prohibition was, that, as the French government proposed to carry on war against this country by the sale of lands, British subjects if allowed to purchase such land would not only feel an interest in the property which they had thus acquired, but furnish the enemy with the means of carrying on war against ourselves. It was further proposed that no persons should be allowed to go from this country into France, without a license under his majesty's great seal; and that their neglect of this clause should be deemed a misdemeanour; and that no persons, though subjects of this country, coming from France, should be allowed to enter this kingdom without a passport or license, or giving to a magistrate such security as he should require. The last regulation was to prevent the insurance of vessels which should traffic with France. THE bill was opposed as inconsistent with the treason laws of Edward III. the principles of the British constitution, with justice and commercial policy. The provision against Englishmen returning to the country, was the bestowal of a power on the king to banish, during the war, every British subject now in France. Though he might return, in certain cases, by giving security, who were to be the judges of the amount of that security? This was to be left to a magistrate: here one man was to be put under the discretion of another, who might render his return impossible, by exacting security to an amount that could not be given." The restriction upon the purchase of lands was represented as extremely impolitic: it was alleged to be founded upon an absurd supposition, that Britons having here the most permanent security for their money, would send their capital to France, where they could have no security. Frenchmen, on the other hand, found property exposed to the revolutionary grasp in their own country; and, to escape spoliation, had sent many and large sums of money to Britain to be vested in our funds, and also h See speeches of messrs. Erskine and Fox. Parliamentary debates, 1793. LJ. CHAP. great quantities of other precious moveables: as proscription advanced they must wish to send more to the place of 1793. safety. If the present regulations were adopted, France would no doubt follow the example: we should render her goverement the most essential service, by forcing Frenchmen to employ their money in their own funds. Instead, therefore, of preventing, as proposed, the efflux of money to the country of our enemies, we would prevent its influx into our own; and by the project of withholding resources from the enemy, we should add to his strength. The bill was defended as conformable both to the general law, and to special acts passed in periods of war. The particular provisions most strongly combatted were supported as necessary in the precise and specific nature of the present war; the circumstances in which it was founded, and the projected resourses of the enemy. After many debates, the two clauses most severely reprobated, concerning the return of British subjects, and the purchase of property in Modified, France, were abandoned. Undergoing these important changes, and several much less material modifications, the proposed bill was passed into a law. it passes into a law. Motions REPEATED motions were made in the houses of par. for peace. liament in order to procure peace. Of these the most important was a proposition of Mr. Fox, after the first successes of the allies, and the retreat of the French armies from the Netherlands. Intelligence having arrived, that the French, leaving the scenes of recent invasion and aggression, had retired within their ancient frontiers; Mr. Fox, professing to consider the avowed objects of the war as now attained, proposed an inquiry into the reason of its continuance; and moved an address to his majesty praying him to make peace. SuppoReasonings sing, for the sake of argument, the present a just, of Mr. Fox prudent, and necessary war at the beginning, he conexpedien- tended that the alleged reasons no longer existed. Holland, our ally, was not now exposed to any attack: France predicting would willingly purchase peace by insuring the continuance of that safety, whereas he was afraid perseverance in cy of the war, and its effects. i The historical narrative of these events is somewhat subsequent: I here only mention a result on which Mr. Fox founded part of his reasoning. 69 LI. 1793. carrying on war along with the combined powers, would CHAP. again expose her to danger. The French had, no doubt, manifested designs of aggrandizement, but these had arisen from the successful repulsion of confederate attack. Besides, must England go to war with every continental power that perpetrates injustice? Was not the conduct of the partitioners of Poland equal in infamy and iniquity to the aggressions of France? Were the people of England to suffer all the miseries of war because the people of France were unjust, when that injustice, be it ever so atrocious, was violating no right of Englishmen? They had, indeed, threatened the security of his majesty's allies; but now confined within their own territories, they were occupied in defending their frontiers against the combined powers. The danger apprehended from their former conquest was no longer a subject of just uneasiness and alarm. The French were, at present, in great internal confusion and distress; and Britain could form no views of aggrandizement from the situation of her adversary. Even were justice and humanity out of the question, would policy and prudence authorize this country to seize the possessions of France? What advantage could we derive from promoting the conquering and incroaching plans of other powers? Having driven France from the territories of her neighbours, for what purpose were we to persevere in a war, unless to invade her dominions? If we did make an inroad into her territories, could such a movement be to attain our professed objects, security and defence? By continuing the war we should manifest an intention of either dismembering her empire, or interfering with the government which her people chose to establish. These objects our government had uniformly disavowed, and the declared ends of hostilities had been compassed. The most favourable season for offering peace was in the midst of success; when the enemy were sufficiently humbled to feel the evils of war, without being driven, by the haughtiness of the conquerors, to desperate efforts, which might turn the tide of victory. Those, who calculated probable exertions of men fighting for conceived liberty and independence by the usual course of military events, fundamentally erred in expecting similar effects from totally |