1. County council-No election on appointed dayMandamus-Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), s. 70.-Under section 70 (2) of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (which is incorporated in the Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41), by section 75 of that Act) an order for a peremptory mandamus to the returning officer to hold an election will issue in the first instance on the ex parte application of a duly qualified elector. -West Sussex County Council, Re, Q.B.D.

2. Parliament - Election petition - Corrupt and illegal practices - Particulars of charges-Offences committed after the date of petition.-In an election petition alleging certain specific offences and "other corrupt and illegal practices before, during, and after the election," the petitioner cannot, unless the petition be duly amended, include in his particulars or give evidence of offences alleged to have been committed subsequent to the date of the presentation of the petition.-Cremer v. Lowles; Haggerston Election Petition, Re, C.A., 629.

3. Registration-Parliament-Franchise-Adjudication upon claims and objections-Closing the lists— 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 41.-A revising barrister gave notice that his court would be held on two successive days, and that the lists would be closed at the conclusion of the sitting on the second day. On the evening of the second day, having satisfied himself that there were no more claimants or persons objected to present who were desirous of being heard, he declared the lists closed. On the following day the revising barrister sat in court to read the lists and to initial names inserted or expunged. Whilst this was being done a person applied to be heard in support of his claim to be on the list

Held, that the lists having been declared closed, the applicant had no right to be heard in support of his claim.-Reg. v. Soden, C.A., 449.

4. Registration-Parliament-Franchise-Notice of objection- Omission — Mistake — Amendment.-The omission of merely formal matter in a notice of objection to a voter when such omission arises through a mistake, and is not of such a nature as to make it likely to mislead or cause hardship, may, and should, be amended by the revising barrister.

B. served notice of objection to A., whose name was on the list of voters for the parish of St. S. in the parliamentary borough of E. The notice set out the number of A. on the list and the grounds of objection, but omitted to state the parish in the list of which A.'s name appeared, contrary to the form given in the Registration Order, 1895. There were twenty-seven parishes in the borough of E. The revising barrister held that the omission rendered the notice bad, but having found as a fact that it arose through a mistake, and had misled no one and causes no hardship, he amended it and caused no hardship, he amended it and allowed the objection.

Held, that the revising barrister was right. Bridges v. Miller (20 Q. B. D. 287) distinguished. -Sandford v. Beal, Q.B.D.

5. Registration-Parliamentary franchise-Occupation elector-Claim for vote in borough-Description of qualification-Two dwelling-houses-Omission in claim of the word "successive"-Power to amend— Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 26), 88. 24, 28 (13)—Registration Order, 1895, Schedule 3, Part I., paragraph 17 (b).A notice of claim to have claimant's name inserted in the list of occupation electors for a borough was

in the following terms:-"(third column) Nature of qualification-Dwelling-house; (fourth column) Description of qualifying property-69, Richmondroad; 3, Hamilton-square." The claimant had in fact occupied during the qualifying period in immediate succession the two houses set out in the fourth column. The claim was objected to on the grounds, first, that it was not a claim for successive occupation, the word "successive not being inserted in the third column; and, secondly, that the revising barrister had no power to amend the The claim by inserting the word "successive." barrister overruled the objections, and amended and allowed the claim.

Held, (1) (Vaughan Williams, J., dubitante) that the notice of claim, on the reasonable construction of its terms, must be taken to be a claim for successive occupation; (2) that having regard, however, to the Registration Order, 1895, Schedule 3, Part I., paragraph 17 (i) (b), the qualification was not sufficiently described in the claim, which ought to have contained the word "(successive) in the third column; and (3) that the barrister had power under section 28, sub-section (13), of the Registration Act, 1878, to amend the claim by inserting therein the word "(successive).”

Quare, whether there is any power to amend a claim which, on the reasonable construction of its terms, is equivocal.

Hitchins v. Brown, 2 C. B. 25; Foskett v. Kaufman, 34 W. R. 90, 16 Q. B. D. 279; and Plant v. Potts, [1891] 1 Q. B. 261, 39 W. R. Dig. 142, discussed.-Soutter v. Roderick, Q.B.D., 205.

6. Registration-Parliament-Service franchisePart of a house - Cubicle · Separate occupation Occupation as a dwelling-Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 26), 8. 5 -Representation of the People Act, 1884 (48 Vict. c. 3), s. 3.-A police constable had the exclusive occupation of a cubicle in a police station. The cubicle was one of a number contained in one room. It was separated off from the rest of the room by a partition seven feet high not reaching to the ceiling, and was entered by a door opening into a passage which passed down the room. The cubicles had air, light, and warmth in common. The whole building was under the control of the chief constable, who could order any constable to change his cubicle at any time. The constable slept in the cubicle, but could not without leave take his meals there or smoke there, or go into it during the day time. He had the key of the door, but he was bound to let the inspector in at any time, and he could be ordered to give up the key.

Held, by the Court of Appeal (Rigby, L.J., dissenting), that the cubicle was not separately occupied by the constable as a dwelling within section 5 of the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, 1878.

-

Barnett v. Hickmott, 43 W. R. 284, [1895] 1 Q. B. 691, approved.-Clutterbuck v. Taylor, C.A., 531. 7. Registration Parochial elector FreemanDuty of town clerk-Local Government Act, 1894 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 73), 88. 2 (1), 44 (1)—6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, 88. 47, 48.-A freeman has no right, in default of other qualification, to have his name placed on the list of parochial electors.

Semble, there is no duty imposed on the town clerk in printing the lists of parliamentary electors to place the name of a freeman under some parish. -Hart v. Beard, Q.B.D., 154.

8. Registration-Parochial elector-Local government Woman-Qualification. Ownership-Local Government Act, 1894 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 73), s. 2,

sub-section 1; s. 43.—A woman is not entitled to be on the parochial electors' register by reason of her ownership of property within the parish.

Decision of the Queen's Bench Division, ante, p. 78, [1896] 1 Q. B. 1, affirmed.-Drax v. Ffooks, C.A., 393.

EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ACTS.-See COUNTY COURT, 10; MASTER AND SERVANT, 1, 4. ESCHEAT.-See INTESTATES ESTATES ACTS, 2. ESTOPPEL :

1. Contract of indemnity-Evidence as to abandonment of claim.-The plaintiff and defendant jointly guaranteed to a bank payment of a certain cash bond, the plaintiff agreeing with the defendant to indemnify him from all liability thereunder. Seven years afterwards the bank released the guarantors from liability on payment by each of £1,000.

In a suit by the plaintiff to declare the agreement of indemnity discharged, and to restrain the defendant from continuing his action thereon,

Held, that in the absence of a contract to discharge it, the defendant could not be estopped from enforcing it by any representation, express or implied, of his intention to abandon it. To raise an equity on behalf of the plaintiff there must have been misrepresentation of existing facts.

Jordan. Money, 5 H. L. Cas. 185, approved.Chadwick v. Manning, P.C.

2. Judgment-Privies in estate-Fishery in nontidal waters.-A judgment inter partes is an estoppel against privies in estate only when the estate has been acquired by the person sought to be estopped subsequent to the date of the judgment.

A claim by an individual to a several fishery in non-tidal waters is not a question of public interest on which a judgment which does not work an estoppel is admissible against strangers. Burgho's Estate, Re, CH.D. (Ir.)

De

See also BANKRUPTCY, 5; BILL OF EXCHANGE, 2; COMPANY, 13, 19, 41; PATENT, 4. EXECUTOR:

1. Devisee-Fixtures-Tapestry.-Tapestry on the walls of a room in a family mansion, which was called the "Tapestry Room," had about a century ago been affixed to the walls of the room in a manner that skilled witnesses said would now be used if it was required to fix tapestry permanently. The mansion-house had been settled by the will of a former owner in strict settlement, but the will made no mention of the tapestry. The tapestry was claimed as a chattel by the residuary legatee of the will as against the devisee of the mansionhouse.

Held, that as regards fixtures a claim by an executor against a devisee was on the same footing as a claim by an executor against an heir; that on the evidence in this case the tapestry was a fixture and passed under the devise of the mansion; and that the case fell within the principle of the decisions relating to claims to fixtures as between executor and heir, and was covered by the decision in D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, 15 W. R. 186, L. R. 3 Eq. 382.-Norton v. Dashwood, CH.D. CHITTY, J., 680.

2. Executor and residuary legatee—Equitable charge of assets by executor or legatee-Creditor of testatorNotice-Priority-Right to follow assets.-Where an executor, who is also residuary legatee, by a legal or equitable assignment and for valuable consideration transfers assets to a person who has no notice of the existence of unsatisfied debts of the testator, or of circumstances rendering such conduct on the

part of such executor improper, and such transferee has given proper notice of his charge, such assignment will hold good against the unsatisfied creditors of the testator.-Graham v. Drummond, CH.D. ROMER, J., 596.

3. Legacy - Appropriation. An executor may appropriate specific shares to a legatee, and even to himself if he is a legatee; and it is not necessary to the validity of such an appropriation that a proportionate amount of the specific shares should at the same time be appropriated to the other legatees. -Richardson, Re, Morgan v. Richardson, CH.D. NORTH, J., 279.

4. Retainer-Principal-Surety.-A testator mortgaged a reversionary interest as surety for his son, and died bequeathing a share of the residue of his estate to this son. After the testator's death the son became a bankrupt (in 1859) and never obtained his discharge. Neither the executors nor mortgagees proved in the bankruptcy. Certain payments were made by the executors and also by beneficiaries under the will to the mortgagees, who, however, ultimately sold the testator's reversionary interest in 1869, and out of the proceeds of sale retained the mortgage debt and handed over the balance to the executors. Upon the testator's residuary estate becoming divisible in 1894,

Held, that the testator's executors were entitled to retain as against the son's share of the residue, the amount of the mortgage debt retained by the mortgagees, and the payments made by the executors to the mortgagees, with interest at 4 per cent., but were not entitled to retain the amount contributed by other beneficiaries, nor to damages caused by the sale of the reversion instead of waiting for it to fall in.-Watson, Re, Turner v. Watson, CH.D. NORTH, J., 571.

5. Retainer-Surety-Promissory note-Money due, but not paid-Receiver-Administration-Claim after chief clerk's certificate filed.-A surety who is one of the executors of a testator is entitled to exercise his right of retainer in respect of the debt for which he is surety, if due though unpaid, out of the assets of the testator paid into court by the executors in an administration action; and such claim is not made too late even if first made after the chief clerk's certificate has become binding.-Giles, Re, Jones v. Pennefather, CH.D. KEKEWICH, J., 283.

6. Will-Leaseholds specifically bequeathed-Assent -Vesting-Inland Revenue-Estate Duty-Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 30) s. 9 (1).—Leaseholds specifically bequeathed pass to the executor as such, and consequently estate duty upon them is primarily payable out of the general personal estate of testator, as they do not come within the exception in section 9 of the Finance Act, 1894.

Leaseholds specifically bequeathed, upon the assent of the executor, vest absolutely in the specific legatee, and no deed of assignment by the executor is necessary.-Culverhouse, Re, Cook v. Culverhouse, CH.D. KEKEWICH, J.

See also PROBATE, 18.

EXTRADITION :

1. Criminal law-Falsification of accounts-Warrant of committal—Extradition Treaty with France, article 3, clauses 2, 18-French Code Pénal, art. 147 Faux en écriture de commerce"-Larceny Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), s. 83-Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 24), s. 1—Extradition Acts, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52) and 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 60).—Where in proceedings for the

extradition of a foreign subject evidence sufficient to justify a committal is given of the commission by him of acts which constitute a crime, both according to English law and according to the law of the foreign State, and within the Extradition Treaty, extradition cannot be refused on the ground that the crime imputed falls under different headings or classes of crime in the English and foreign systems of criminal law, or in the English and foreign versions of the Extradition Treaty.

The extradition was demanded of a French subject on a charge of "faux," the ordinary English equivalent of which is "forgery." He was committed by the magistrate upon evidence showing that he had committed acts constituting the offence of "faux en écriture de commerce "" under article 147 of the Code Pénal, and covered by head 2 (French version) of article 3 of the Extradition Treaty with France, and also constituting an offence (not amounting to forgery in English law) under section 83 of the Larceny Act, 1861, and section 1 of the Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875, and covered by head 18 (English version) of article 3 of the Extradition Treaty.

Held, that the committal order was rightly made.-Arton, In re (No. 2), Q.B.D., 351.

2. Delivery up of British subject-Treaty with Belgium-Extradition Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52), 88. 2, 6.-In 1876 a Treaty was signed between England and Belgium for the mutual surrender of fugitive criminals, and by an Order in Council the Extradition Act, 1870, was made to apply to this Treaty. In 1887, by a declaration between the two countries, it was provided that "in no case, nor on any consideration whatever, shall the high contracting parties be bound to surrender their own subjects.'

Held, that while the contracting parties are not bound, they may under this Treaty surrender their own subjects; and that therefore the British Government had a discretion to surrender a fugitive criminal in this country, notwithstanding the fact that he was a British subject.-Galwey, Re, Q.B.D.,

313.

1888, provides that the committee of a fishery district created under that Act, "subject to any restrictions or conditions as to expenditure" made by the council or councils by whom they are appointed, may appoint fishery officers.

Held, that the section refers to restrictions and conditions in existence at the time of the appointment, and that a council is not exempt from contributing to the expenses of such an appointment, under section 10 of the Act, for the reason that they disapproved of the expenditure subsequently to the appointment. Reg. v. Plymouth (Mayor of), Q.B.D., 620.

2. Salmon fishery - Boundary Crown, primâ facie claim-Practice.-Where in a pending cause it appears that the Crown has a prima facie claim to salmon fishings in dispute, the court ought to direct intimation to be given to the Crown authorities, and stay proceedings pending the decision of the Crown as to whether it will interfere.-Ogston v. Stewart, P.C.

FOOD and DRUGS ACTS.-See ADULTERATION, 1, 4-8; JUSTICES, 3.

FRAUDS, STATUTES of :

Interest in land-Landlord and tenant-Parol agreement for non-continuous letting and hiring of land-Entry on land for purposes of occupation after agreement-Exclusive possession during occupationStatute of Frauds (29 Car 2, c. 3), 8. 4.-Defendant verbally agreed with plaintiff to hire a field for three consecutive bank holidays, and to pay for the use of it the total sum of £45, which sum was to be paid by three equal payments on the days in question. Defendant occupied the field on the first of the three bank holidays only, and paid the instalment on account, but refused subsequently to pay the balance of the £45, and by way of defence to an action by the plaintiff, pleaded that under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds the agreement was void.

Held, that section 4 of the Statute of Frauds was no defence, because upon the evidence it appeared that the parol agreement was a single letting (although the period for the agreed letting was not continuous) at a single rent; and there had been an entry by the defendant on the land after the agreement for the purposes of occupation, and a payment of rent on account of entry.-Smallwood v. Sheppards, Q.B.D. 44.,

See also PRACTICE, 41; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1.

FRIENDLY SOCIETY:

Dissolution-Infant members--Instrument of dissolution signed by fathers and guardians-Consent of governing committee Action by trustees-Friendly Societies Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 63), 88. 9, 13, 15, 21, 25, 27-Friendly Societies Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 60), 88. 6, 9, 13, 15, 21, 25.-A friendly society consisting entirely of members between the ages of six and eighteen, and formed under the Friendly Societies Act, 1855, as a juvenile branch of a parent lodge, the government thereof being placed in the hands of a committee appointed by the parent lodge, was held precluded from dissolving itself under section 13 of the Act of 1855,

or

section 25 of the Act of 1875, without the consent of that committee.—Rudd v. James, C.A. GAMES:

·

Prescription-Claim for inhabitants of adjoining parishes.-The inhabitants of more than one parish cannot claim by custom a right of recreation on

1. Betting-Illegal Betting-Unlawful user of a place for the purpose of betting-"Place"-Betting Houses Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119), s. 3.-The respondent, who was a bookmaker, was on several consecutive days standing on or near the same spot between two stays which supported a hoarding erected on a piece of vacant ground, and was there making bets on horse-races with persons who came to him for the purpose. The vacant ground was not circumscribed otherwise than by the hoarding which partially surrounded it.

Held, that the ground between the stays of the hoarding was a "place" within the meaning of section 3 of the Betting Houses Act, 1853, and that the respondent was guilty of the offence under that section of using a place for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto.

Doggett v. Catterns, 13 W. R. 390, and Whitehurst v. Fincher, 17 Cox C. C. 70, distinguished.—Liddell v. Lofthouse, Q.B.D., 349.

2. Partnership-Action for account-Bookmaker,8 business-Place used for betting-Betting Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119), s. 3.-In an action by a turf commission agent or bookmaker against his partner, who was the active partner and transacted the business at race meetings, for an account of the profits of the business,

Held, that, inasmuch as the conduct of a bookmaker's business did not necessarily involve any violation of the provisions of the Betting Act, 1853, and it appeared that the plaintiff contemplated that the business would be carried on in conformity with the rules of Tattersall's enclosure at meetings, and not in such a manner as to come within the prohibition of the statute, the plaintiff was entitled to relief at the hands of the court, and the order must go for an account, notwithstanding that the defendant might have acted illegally at meetings.

Construction of the word "place" in the Betting Act, 1853, considered.-Thwaites v. Coulthwaite, CH.D. CHITTY, J., 295.

3. Stock Exchange-Transactions in stocks and -Right to recover shares-Deposit of securities as cover—. securities-Gaming Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 109), s. 18.-On certain written terms, which amounted to speculation in differences, S. opened an account and deposited with the appellants, who were outside brokers, certain securities as cover for any balance which might be found due to them. The result was a loss to S. above the value of the securities. In an action by S. to recover his securities the jury found on what was considered sufficient evidence that the transactions between the parties were gaming transactions.

Held, that the deposit was not made "to bide the event" of a wager, but as security against a debt which might arise from a gambling transaction, and therefore not within the 18th section of the Gaming Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 109), and consequently the securities might be recovered.Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan, H.L., 497.

4. Stocks and shares Payment of differences Money deposited as cover- -Repudiation of gaming contract-Betting Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 109), s. 18. -The plaintiff deposited with the defendant a sum of money as cover in respect of certain gaming transactions in stocks and shares entered into with the defendant. Before the plaintiff gave notice that he repudiated the gaming contracts, the

deposit had been absorbed by the winnings of the defendant.

Held, that, having regard to the provisions of section 18 of the Betting Act, 1845, the money could not be recovered.-Strachan v. Universal Stock Exchange Co., C.A., 90

GAS:

1. Supply-Arrears of rates-Company-Receiver and manager-Whether tenants of company - Gas Works Act, 1847 (c. 15), s. 16-Gas Works Act, 1871 (c. 41), 8. 11. A gas company supplied the mill of a milling company with gas. A receiver and manager of the milling company was appointed by debenture-holders, and he entered into possession of the mill and continued the business. At that time there was a sum due to the gas company for arrears of gas rates during the milling company's occupation.

Held, that the receiver and manager was merely custodian of the milling company's property, and not an incoming tenant of, or a purchaser from, the milling company; and that the gas company was entitled to refuse to continue to supply gas unless the arrears were paid.

Smith, Re, Mason, Ex parte [1893], 1 Q. B. approved.—Paterson v. Gas, Light, and Coke Co.,

C.A.

2. Supply of gas-Breach of statutory duty— Remedy-Right of action-Gasworks Clauses Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 41), ss. 11, 12, 36.—Where a gas company to whom the provisions of the Gasworks Clauses Act, 1871, apply cause damage to a consumer by reason of their failure to supply to him gas sufficient in quantity and quality to satisfy the requirements of the Act, an action will not lie by the consumer against the company in respect of such damage. The only remedy for breach of the statutory obligation of the company is by proceeding for penalties under section 36 of the Act.-Clegg, Parkinson, & Co. v. Earby Gas Co., Q.B.D., 606. See also NEGLIGENCE, 1.

GAVELKIND.-See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 5.
GIFT.-See SOLICITOR, 14.

Metage on Grain (Port of London) Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. cap. c.)-Construction-Grain brought in "for sale."-The Metage on Grain (Port of London) Act, 1872, imposes a duty upon "all grain brought into the port of London for sale."

Held (affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal, ante, p. 55) that the duty was only payable upon grain imported for sale as grain, and that grain, which was imported in order to be manufactured before sale into a substance which could not be described as “grain,” was not liable to duty. -Cotton v. Vogan, H.L.

GUARANTEE See BANKRUPTCY, 23; CONTRACT, 1;
PRACTICE, 17.

HABEAS CORPUS.-See EXTRADITION. 3.
HEIRLOOMS:-
:-

Will-Actual possession - Chattels bequeathed in trult for person for time being entitled to "actual possession" of real estate.-Where real estate was limited to a person for life and to his son in tail, and chattels were bequeathed as heirlooms in trust to go along with and to be enjoyed by the person for

HUSBAND and WIFE.-See DIVORCE; MARRIED
WOMAN, 9; PRACTICE, 12.

INCOME TAX.-See INLAND REVENUE, 9-14
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY :-

Deceased Member's property-Intestacy-Distribution-Discretionary power-Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 39), s. 27.-The power given to the committee of an industrial society by section 27 of the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1893, of distributing the property of a member who has died intestate to the next of kin without letters of administration is a discretionary power, and an action will not lie to compel the committee to exercise their discretion.-Escritt v. Todmorden Co-operative Society, Q.B.D., 544.

See also BILL OF SALE, 3.

INFANT:

1. Maintenance Income Contingent interestConveyancing Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 41) 8. 43.Where property is settled on trust for such members of a class as shall attain twenty-one, the accumulated income will be divisible into as many shares as there are members in existence, one of such shares being payable to each adult, and one of such shares being applicable under the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 43, for the maintenance of each infant.

The fact that the class is capable of increase will make no difference.-Jeffery, Re, Arnold v. Burt, CH.D., NORTH, J., 61.

2. Religious education-Rights of father-Abdication by course of conduct.-Where a father had acquiesced in his two daughters being educated as Protestants until they had attained the ages of fifteen and eleven respectively, the court refused the father's application to have them educated as Roman Catholics, being of opinion that such a resumption of the father's authority would be contrary to the interests of the children.-Newton, Re, C.A., 470.

See also BANKRUPTCY, 6; DIVORCE, 25; FACTORY; FRIENDLY SOCIETY; TRUSTEE, 11; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 5.

INJUNCTION.-See COPYRIGHT, 2, 5; DIVORCE, 3, 6; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 11; MASTER AND SERVANT, 2, 3; PARTNERSHIP, 4; PATENT, 5; PRACTICE, 25, 25A, 26, 51; TELEGRAPH; TRADE NAME, 1, 2; TRADE UNION.

INLAND REVENUE:

1. Account duty-Annuity to widow of deceased partner out of proceeds of business-Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881 (44 Vict. c. 12), 8. 38, subsection 2 (c.)-Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889 (52 Vict. c. 7), s. 11. Under a covenant in a contract of co-partnery the widow of one of the

two partners became entitled, on the death of her husband, to be paid an annuity by the surviving partner out of the profits (if any) of the businesswhich, however, the surviving partner was not bound to carry on. Held, that the annuity was "property " which "passed" to the widow under a voluntary settlement within the meaning of section 38, sub-section 2 (c.) of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881, and section 11 of the Act of 1889, and was therefore chargeable with account duty.-AttorneyGeneral v. Wendt, Q.B.D.

2. Account duty-Marriage settlement of widowChildren by former marriage-Voluntary disposition -Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881 (44 Vict. c. 12), s. 38, sub-section (a) (c)-Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889 (52 Vict. c 7), s. 11.-The consideration of marriage extends only to the husband and wife and the children of that marriage; all other persons are volunteers in some sense.

In a marriage settlement made by a widow on her second marriage, shares belonging to her were given to her adult sons by her former marriage, and other shares belonging to her were assigned to trustees upon trust as to some, for the benefit of other children of the widow by her former marriage, and as to the residue upon trust in the events that happened, but subject to certain life interests, to all her children by her former marriage. The settlor died in 1890, within five months of the execution of the settlement.

Held (reversing the decision of the Queen's Bench Division, 43 W. R. 253), that the children by the former marriage were not within the marriage consideration, but were volunteers; that, therefore, the Crown was entitled to account duty under the Customs and Inland Revenue Acts, 1881 and 1889, as upon a voluntary disposition in respect of the shares taken by the children of the former marriage.

Gale v. Gale, 25 W. R. 772, 6 Ch. D. 144, distinguished.—Attorney-General v. Jacobs-Smith, C.A.

3. Account duty-Voluntary transfer-Customs and Inland Revenue Acts, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 12), 8. 38, sub-section 1, 2 (b); 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 7), 8. 11. The Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881, s. 38, sub-section 2 (b), enacts that account stamp duty shall be paid upon any property

voluntarily" transferred by the deceased into the joint names of himself and another person, so that the beneficial interest in such property accrues by survivorship to such other person.

Held, the word " 'voluntarily" is used in this sub-section in its ordinary meaning of "without compulsion" or "without obligation," and does not "without consideration."-Attorney-General v. Ellis, Q.B.D., 13.

mean

4. Estate duty-Settlement estate duty-Settled legacies-Duties payable out of residuary estate-Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 30), 88. 1, 2, 4, 5 (1) (a), 6, 8, 9.-Testator, who died after the Finance Act, 1894, came into operation, gave a pecuniary legacy to persons by way of succession, and bequeathed his residuary personal estate in shares, some of which were given absolutely and others to persons in succession.

Held, that under the Finance Act, 1894, settlement estate duty as well as estate duty in respect of both classes of the settled legacies should be borne by, and was payable by the executors out of, the general residuary estate.-Webber, Re, Gribble v. Webber, CH.D. NORTH, J., 489.

5. Estate Duty-Settlement-Power of appointment