121] vestigation of the validity thereof." force in New Mexico touching wills, if any, Act of The following four sections were enacted found in Compiled Laws of 1884, p. 114. This section was substantially re-enacted "§ 1446. No judge of probate shall have 1884, p. 1402, par. 72. The volume of 1884 "S 1447. When any probate judge shall "S 1448. It shall be the duty of any person to whom may have been returned a document, such as are mentioned in this Act, to present the same to the district court of their respective county at the first regular term of said court; and it shall be legal for said court to examine such documents, together with the observations submitted by the probate judge who may have refused his approval; and it shall be the duty of the said district court, at the same term, to declare the validity or nullity of such documents, and to return the same, after making its decision, to the party interested. Upon this Act the Supreme Court of New Mexico has held as follows: "We are therefore of opinion that the Legislature intended, by the language used in that section, to adopt the common law, or lex non scripta, and such British statutes of a general nature, not local to that Kingdom, or in conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States, nor of this Territory, which are applicable to our condition and circumstances, and which were in force at the time of our separation from the mother country." Browning v. Browning, 3 N. M. 371. In regard to the argument made, that by the provision in the Organic Act of New Mexico, declaring that the jurisdiction of the probate courts should be " 'as limited by law" (Act of Sept. 9, 1850, $ 10, 9 Stat. 449), the practice and procedure of the com"§ 1449. If, in the judgment of any pro- mon law touching matters of probate came bate judge of this Territory, any will, codi- into force in New Mexico, regardless of any cil or any other testamentary disposition statutory provisions of the Territory, which does not merit his approval, he shall return view is sought to be supported by a reference the same to the party interested, as required to Ferris v. Higley, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 375 in section 1447; but in this case the probate [22: 383], it may be said, that that case rejudge shall grant letters of administration to lates only to the jurisdiction and not to the the person or persons appointed as testament-practice of those courts: and that, in Hornary executor in said documents in preference buckle v. Toombs, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 648, 656 to any other person who may also solicit [21: 968], this court, speaking by Mr Justice them: Provided, That any proceedings had by said judges of probate not in conformity with the provisions of this Act shall be declared null and of no effect by the district court, and all at the cost of the said probate judges." Bradley, said: "From a review of the entire past legislation of Congress on the subject under consideration, our conclusion is that the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding of the territorial courts, as well as their respective jurisdictions, subject, as before said, to a few express or implied conditions in the Organic Act itself, were intended to be left to the legislative In addition to the foregoing, may be men-action of the Territorial Assemblies, and to tioned the following, by which all laws in the regulations which might be adopted by No further change in the Probate Laws was made until 1889. [128] [124] the courts themselves. Of course, in case of C. E. COOK ET AL., Piffs. in Err., 0. UNITED STATES. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 157-185.) Public Land Strip, annexed to Eastern Dist of Texas-circuit court for that district jurisdiction of trial for murder in Pu Land Strip-Act of 1889, constitutionalit -place of trial of crime committed outsid State-ex post facto law-evidence. From an examination of the provisions of the "Laws of Velarde," which, under the provisions of the Kearny Code, remained in force until modified by statute, we are of opinion that the practice and procedure of the probate courts were matters of statutory regulation; that the probate judge had juris-1. diction to admit wills to probate by receiving the evidence of the witnesses; and that his judgment was valid and, although reviewable on appeal, was conclusive unless appealed from and reversed. It is to be remarked that, in the findings of fact made by the Supreme Court of the Territory, it is not stated that William Bent was not present at the probate and was not cited to appear, but it is stated only that the record does not disclose whether or not he was summoned to be present. Sections 1860, 1863 and 1869 of the Com. piled Laws of New Mexico of 1884 are as follows: 2. 3. "g 1860. The following suits or actions may be brought within the time hereinafter limited, respectively, after their causes ac-4. crue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially provided." "S 1863. Those founded upon accounts and unwritten contracts, those brought for injuries to property, or for the conversion of personal property, or for relief upon the ground of fraud, and all other actions not herein otherwise provided for and specified, within four years." "S 1869. The times limited for the bringing of actions herein shall, in favor of minors and persons insane or under any legal disability, be extended so that they shall have one year from and after the termination of such disability within which to commence said actions.” It was held by the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in Browning. Browning, 3 N. M. 371, that the limitations of the Statute of January 23, 1880, of New Mexico, of which those three sections are a part, applied to proceedings in the probate court. We think this construction was correct, and that the present suit is an action to annul a former judgment of the probate court. Such is the character of the judgment declaring the former probate to be null and void. Moreover, by sections 1446-1449 of the Compiled Laws, before quoted, the course of procedure of the probate judge was distinctly defined, and he had no power to declare the will void. On the contrary, his proceeding, not being in conformity with the provisions of the Act of January 26, 1861, was, as declared by that Act, null and of no effect. Judgment affirmed. 906 5. 6. The Public Land Strip, west of the 100th me: ian, bounded on the south by Texas, on the w by New Mexico and on the north by Colorado Kansas, was annexed by the Act of 1889 to Eastern District of Texas for such judicial p poses as by that Act appertained to the court h at Paris in that district. The Circuit Court of the United States for t Eastern District of Texas had jurisdiction to t defendant for the offense of murder committ prior to the passage of the Act of 1889, in t Public Land Strip, no prosecution for the offer having been commenced before the Act w passed. Such Act, so construed, is not in violation sec. 2, art. 3, of the Constitution, supplemented 1 the 6th Amendment, which provide for a trial the accused within the State and district whe the crime was committed, which district shɛ In respect to crimes committed outside of th have been previously ascertained by law. States, in some place within the exclusive juri diction of the United States, Congress is not fo bidden, by the second section of article 3 of th Constitution, from providing a place of trial di ferent from the one in which the accused migh have been tried at the time the offense was com mitted. A crime committed against the laws of the Unit ed States, out of the limits of a State, is not loca but may be tried at such place as Congress shal designate by law. The Act of 1889 is not an ex post facto law, in that it subjects the accused to trial in the Eastern District of Texas rather than in some other judicial district, as this does not alter his situation in respect to the offense or its consequences. 7. A report of the attorney-general of Kansas, to the governor of that State, in regard to the death of a person, which contains statements purporting to have been made by defendants, and which connected them with the killing of said person, is not evidence upon the trial of defendants for the murder of said person, although the attorneygeneral is the attorney of the defendants on trial and denies, as a witness, the truth of the statements therein contained. [No. 1811.] Argued Dec. 11, 12, 1890. Decided Jan. 26, 1891 States for the Eastern District of Texas, to review a judgment of conviction and sentence to death of plaintiffs in error for murder committed July 25, 1888, in the Public Land Strip, commonly called "No Man's Land." Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United Messrs. John F. Dillon, Geo. R. Peck, Wm. R. Day, Joseph Frease and Wm. H. Rossington, for plaintiffs in error: 188 U. S The Act of March 1, 1889, does not apply to past offenses. The Circuit Court of the United States for | upon these general propositions: That at the Eastern District of Texas had no jurisdic- the date of the alleged homicide the Public tion of the offense charged in the indictment. Land Strip was not within the jurisdiction United States v. Ta-van-ga-ca, Hemp. 304; of any particular State or federal district, United States v. Ivy, Hemp. 562; United States and that no court of the United States had v. Alberty, Hemp. 444; Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. jurisdiction to try the alleged offense, or if S. 4 Cranch, 75 (2: 554); Kring Missouri, any court had jurisdiction it was not the 107 U. S. 221 (27: 506); Re Murphy, Woolw. court below, but the Circuit Court of the 141. United States for the Northern District of Texas, or that of the District of Kansas in which the defendants were found and arrested; and that if the above Act of March 1, 1889-under which alone this prosecution was conducted-placed the Public Land Strip within the limits of the Eastern District of Texas, it did not, and consistently with the Constitution of the United States could not, give the circuit court for that district jurisdiction of offenses committed prior to its enactment. Cooley, Const. Lim. 370; Sedgwick, Stat. and Const. Law (2d ed.) 164, 166, 173; Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536 (28: 770); United States v. Starr, Hemp. 469; United States v. Heth, 7 U. S. 8 Cranch, 399, 413 (2: 479, 483); Gut v. Minnesota, 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 35 (19: 573); Decoe Mfg. Co., Petitioner, 108 U. S. 417 (27: 769). The admission in evidence, at the instance of the government, of the report of Ex-AttorneyGeneral Bradford was erroneous. Reg. v. Williams, 6 Cox, C. C. 343; The Lochlibo, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 645; Com. v. Hudson, 11 Gray, 64; People v. Safford, 5 Denio, 112; Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 N. Y. 230; 1 Whart. Ev. $549; 2 Phillipps, Ev. (5th Am. ed.) 831; Starkie, Ev. (10th Am. ed.) 250; Best, Ev. 645; Reg. v. Ball, 8 Car. & P. 745; Com. v. Welsh, 4 Gray, 535; People v. Jacobs, 49 Cal. 384; Melhuish v. Collier, 14 Jur. 621; Adams v. Wheeler, 97 Mass. 67; Stearns v. Merchants Bank, 53 Pa. 490; Cox v. Eayres, 55 Vt. 24; Bauskett v. Keitt, 22 S. C. 187, 197: Burkhalter v. Edwards, 16 Ga. 593; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, 41 Md. 268; Ryerson v. Abington, 102 Mass. 526; Hurley v. State, 4 L. R. A. 161, 46 Ohio St. 320. Messrs. W. H. H. Miller, Atty-Gen., and Wm. H. Taft, Solicitor-Gen., for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiffs in error, with others, were indicted in the court below at its October Term, 1889, and were convicted and sentenced to suffer death, for the crime of murder alleged to have been committed on the 25th day of July, 1888, in that part of the United States designated in numerous public documents as the "Public Land Strip," but commonly called "No Man's Land." It is 167 miles in length, 344 miles in width, lies between the 100th meridian of longitude and the Territory of New Mexico, and is bounded on the south by that part of Texas known as the "Panhandle," and by Kansas and Colorado on the north. The prosecution was based upon section 5339 of the Revised Statutes, providing that every person who commits murder within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, maga66] zine or in any other place or district of country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall suffer death;" and upon the Act of Congress of March 1, 1889, establishing a court of the United States for the Indian Territory and for other purposes, and attaching a part of that Territory, for limited judicial purposes, to the Eastern District of Texas. 25 Stat. 278, chap. 333. The principal assignment of error is based Did Congress intend to attach the Public Land Strip to the Eastern District of Texas for any purpose? That necessarily is the question to be first considered. And it must be determined without reference to the Act of May 2, 1890, providing a temporary gov. ernment for Oklahoma; for that Act, while including this Strip within the Territory of Oklahoma, declares that all "crimes committed in said Territory" prior to its passage "shall be tried and prosecuted, and proceeded with until finally disposed of, in the courts now [then] having jurisdiction thereof," as if that Act had not been passed. 26 Stat. 81, 86, chap. 182, §§ 1, 9. We will be aided in the solution of the question of jurisdiction by recalling the history of the Public Land Strip, and various Acts of Congress, preceding that of 1889, which are supposed to have some bearing upon this case. The Public Land Strip was once a part of the possessions of Mexico. This appears from the Treaty of January 12, 1828, between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, confirming the previous Treaty of February 22, 1819, with the Monarchy of Spain. 8 Stat. 872, 374. When Texas achieved its independence this Strip was within its limits. Indeed, the Republic of Texas originally embraced the present territory of the State of Texas, as well as parts of what now constitutes New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado and Kansas. On the day of its admission into the Union, by the Joint Resolution of December 29, 1845, the judicial District of Texas was established, embracing the entire State. 9 Stat. 1, 108. Congress, by an Act of September 9, 1850, chap. 49 (9 Stat. 446), made certain propositions to Texas, one of which was that its boundary on the north should commence at the point where the meridian of one hundred degrees west from Greenwich is intersected by the parallel of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, and run from that point due west to the meridian of one hundred and three degrees; thence due south_to the thirty-second degree of north_latitude; thence on the latter parallel to the Rio Bravo del Norte, and thence with the channel of that river to the Gulf of Mexico. This proposition was accepted by Texas. Oldham & White's Digest Laws of Texas, p. 55. By [167] [168] [169] the same Act, § 2, the eastern boundary of | Northern District of Texas; and the United By the Act of February 21, 1857, vne State of Texas was divided into two judicial districts, the Western and the Eastern. 11 Stat. 164. The Northern_District was established by an Act passed February 24, 1879, with courts at Waco, Dallas County, and Graham, Young County, embracing one hundred and ten counties by name, including Sherman, Hansford, Ochiltree and Lipscomb in the Panhandle, immediately south of the Public Land Strip, and Hemphill, Wheeler, Collingsworth and Childress immediately west of the 100th meridian, and Hardeman, Wilbarger, Wichita, Clay, Montague, Cooke, Grayson, Fannin and Lamar immediately south of the Indian Territory, in the central and eastern parts of Texas, but excluding the Counties of Red River and Bowie in the latter State near the Arkansas line. The same Act enlarges the Eastern District of Texas and designates all the counties that should thereafter compose the Eastern and Western Districts, respectively. Under this Act the Eastern District embraced, among others, the counties next to Louisiana and Arkansas, including Red River and Bowie. 20 Stat. 318, chap. 97. An Act of Congress was passed January 6, Then comes the Act of March 1, 1889, chap. 333, above referred to (25 Stat. 783), which, it is contended, transferred the Public Land Strip from the Northern District to the Eastern District of Texas. By its first section a United States court, to be held at Muscogee, is established, "whose jurisdiction shall extend over the Indian Territory, bounded as follows, to wit: north by the State of Kansas, east by the States of Missouri and Arkansas, south by the State of Texas and west by the State of Texas and the Territory of New Mexico." It is given" exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United States committed within the Indian Territory as in this Act defined, not punishable by death or by imprisonment at hard labor." § 5. That court was also given "jurisdiction in all civil cases between citizens of the United States who are residents of the Indian Territory, or between citizens [170 of the United States, or of any State or Territory therein, and any citizen of or person or persons residing or found in the Indian Territory, and when the value of the thing in controversy, or damages or money claimed, shall amount to one hundred dollars or more: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to give the court jurisdiction over controversies between persons of Indian blood only." § 6. The seventeenth, eighteenth and twentyeighth sections of that Act are as follows: "S 17. That the Chickasaw Nation and the portion of the Choctaw Nation within the following boundaries, to wit: beginning on Red River at the southeast corner of the Choctaw Nation; thence north with the boundary line between the said Choctaw Nation and the State of Arkansas, to a point where Big 171] inconsistent with the provisions of this Act courts of the United States, sitting at Paris, Creek, a tributary of the Black Fork of the "g 28. That all laws and parts of laws 100th meridian, and represented the Public *Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1872, letter of Com'r Land Office of January 29, 1886; 1888, Rep. No, 2857; Id. February 7, 1888, Rep. 268. [172] [173] |