The reviewer does not mention any protest against this declaration formally made by any of the powers of Europe; nor are we aware that any such has ever been received by our government. But, whatever may be the extent of our acknowledged right to act upon it, we have no doubt, as we remarked in the last number of this Review, that it embodies what is now the actual feeling and determination of this country, and that it will be fully and promptly acted upon, whenever the contemplated casus shall occur. Indeed, our past history furnishes a case precisely in point, and involves a precedent which, we doubt not, would be promptly followed. The struggles of the Spanish colonies in South America for their independence, it will be remembered, attracted the attention and enlisted the sympathy of the government and people of the United States to a remarkable extent. We were the first to recognize their national character; and our most assiduous endeavors were then put forth to restore peace between them and Spain. On the 10th of May, 1825, Mr. CLAY, then Secretary of State, addressed to Mr. Middleton, our minister at St. Petersburg, instructions to endeavor to engage the Russian government to use its best exertions towards terminating the contest. In that dispatch occurs the following passage: "You are authorized, in the spirit of the most perfect frankness and friendship which have ever characterized all the relations between Russia and the United States, to disclose without reserve, the feelings and the wishes of the United States in respect to Cuba and Porto Rico. They are satisfied with the present condition of these Islands, now open to the commerce and enterprise of their citizens. They desire for themselves no political change in them. If Cuba were to declare itself independent, the amount and the character of its population render it improbable that it could maintain its independence. Such a premature declaration might bring about a renewal of those shocking scenes of which a neighboring island was the afflicting theatre. There could be no effectual preventive of such scenes, but in the guaranty, and a large resident force, of foreign powers. The terms of such a guaranty, in the quotas which each should contribute of such a force, would create perplexing questions of very difficult adjustment, to say nothing of the continual jealousies which would be in operation. In the state of possession which Spain has, there would be a ready acquiescence of these very foreign powers, all of whom would be put into angry activity upon the smallest prospect of a transfer of those islands. The United States could not, with indifference, see such a transfer to any European power." This dispatch certainly indicates the view taken by our government of its duty and interest in regard to the occupation of Cuba or Porto Rico by any European power. But the matter does not rest even upon that. In the summer of 1825, a large French fleet visited the American seas, and its object was believed in Mexico to be the invasion of the island of Cuba. The Mexican government promptly called upon that of the United States, through Mr. Poinsett our minister, to fulfill the pledge of President Monroe we have already quoted. In rehearsing these facts in a letter to Mr. Poinsett, Mr. CLAY remarks that what the United States would have done, had the contingency happened, may be inferred from a dispatch to the American minister at Paris." The dispatch thus referred to is from Mr. CLAY to Mr. BROWN, and bears date 25th November, 1825. Our government, through Mr. CLAY, therein uses this very explicit and peremptory language: "Another consideration to which you will advert in a friendly manner, is the present condition of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. The views of the Executive of the United States in regard to them, have been already disclosed to France, by you, on the occasion of inviting its coöperation to bring about peace between Spain and her former colonies. In a spirit of great frankness, it was stated to the French government, that the United States could not see, with indifference, those islands passing from Spain to any other European power; and that, for ourselves, no change was desired in their present political and commercial condition, nor in the possession which Spain has of them. In the same spirit, and with the hope of guarding, beforehand, against any possi ble difficulties on that subject that may arise, you will now add that we COULD NOT CONSENT TO THE OCCUPATION OF THOSE ISLANDS BY ANY OTHER EUROPEAN POWER THAN SPAIN, UNDER ANY CONTINGENCY WHATEVER." Language of precisely the same tenor was addressed to the other leading European powers. Thus, in a letter addressed to Mr. MIDDLETON, United States minis * Am. Review. Vol. ii., p. 559. ter at St. Petersburgh, under date of December 25, 1835, Mr. CLAY directs him to inform the Russian government that the United States have recommended to the republics of Colombia and Mexico a suspension of any military expedition which they might be preparing against the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. He states that he has addressed official notes to the ministers of those republics, urging such a suspension, and he then adds: "You will observe it intimated in those notes, that other governments may feel themselves urged, by a sense of their interests and duties, to interpose, in the event of an invasion of the islands, or of contingencies which may accompany or follow it. On this subject, it is proper that we should be perfectly understood by Russia. For ourselves we desire no change in the possession of Cuba, as has been heretofore stated. WE CANNOT ALLOW A TRANSFER OF THE ISLAND TO ANY EUROPEAN POWER. MR. BROWN TO MR. CLAY. “Paris, January 10, 1826. "SIR-In order to comply with the instructions contained in your dispatch, No. 3, 1 obtained an interview with his Excellency, the Baron de Damas, on the 2d instant. I reminded him that in the month of July last, I had, in a spirit of frankness, disclosed to him the views of the to the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, and President of the United States, in relation that I had then stated to him that the United States could not see, with indifference, these islands passing from Spain to any other European government; and that, for the United States, no change was desired in their political and commercial condition, nor in the possession which Spain has instructed to add, in the same frank and of them. I informed him that I was now friendly spirit, and in order to guard against all possible difficulties that might arise on the subject, that we could not consent to the occupation of these islands by any other European power than Spain, under any contingency whatever. "The Baron de Damas appeared to concur entirely in the view which I took of been mentioned to the British government. I told him that a similar communication Nothing, certainly, could be more explicit and peremptory than these emphatic the subject, and inquired whether it had and repeated declarations. It was distinctly and solemnly proclaimed to the world, by our government, under PRESIDENT ADAMS, through Mr. CLAY, his Secretary of State, that the declaration made by PRESIDENT MONROE, in 1823a declaration hailed throughout this country with what was described by a western member of the Congress * then assembled, as 'perhaps an imprudent enthusiasm "--was to be thenceforth enforced as a rule of action: that this con tinent was "no longer open for colonization by any European power;" and that, therefore, the United States could not allow a transfer of the Island of Cuba to any European power in any contingency whatever. Nor was this regarded by the European powers to whom it was addressed, as an unjust or unwarrantable assumption on the part of the United States, or as, in any respect, an encroachment upon their just rights. None of them, not even France, against whose supposed designs it was especially directed, protested against it. On the contrary, it was acquiesced in by them all. In the case of France, this is shown to have been the case, by the following extract from the reply of Mr. BROWN to the instructions of Mr. CLAY, of which an extract is given above, under date of November 25, 1825. had been made to Mr. Canning, and I had sufficient reason to think that the British government CONCURRED with the President in the policy of not disturbing the possession of these islands, in favor of either of the great maritime nations." And in a dispatch addressed to the Baron de Damas, and dated January 2, 1825, the day of the interview, Mr. BROWN says: ་་ "Having understood your Excellency to say that the policy and views of the United States, as disclosed by me, corresponded with those of His Majesty's government, I shall not fail," &c., &c. Here, certainly, is nothing like a protest against the declaration of President Monroe, nor do we find anything of such a nature in the subsequent diplomatic correspondence, except, indeed, Mr. Rush's reports of protests made in conversation by the British Secretary. On the contrary, Europe seems actually, and even avowedly, to have "acquiesced in that declaration." Even upon the ground of the Edinburgh Review itself, therefore, it seems apparent that the United States have a "prescriptive right" to act upon it. That they have repeatedly and emphatically * Mr. Cook of Illinois. See Niles' Register, vol. xxx. p. 87. proclaimed their intention so to act, we have clearly shown. To such action it would not become England, of all nations on the earth, to take exception. She has always claimed the right of interfering in the affairs of other powers, and of preventing or counteracting their policy, whenever she deemed it inconsistent with her own selfish and ambitious purposes. Indeed, so firmly established does she consider this right, so thoroughly is it held to be interwoven with her public law, that one of her leading Reviews deems it sufficient refutation of a principle as laid down by Grotius, to exclaim, "If this were international law, what would become of the right of intervention to preserve the balance of power -or of the right of preventing aggression by preventing the accumulation of the means of attack?" This is put forward as an unanswerable reductio ab absurdum. And the extent to which, in her practice, she has habitually pushed this asserted right-though scarcely a year of her long and active existence has passed without its exercise, though the world has repeatedly been shaken through all its kingdoms and principalities by its assertion, and though the greatest event of modern times, the downfall of Napoleon by what has been styled the "dishonest victory of Waterloo," was achieved by it-may best be understood by the following opening paragraph of a proclamation issued by Lord Ellenborough concerning Affghanistan, a nation as really sovereign and independent of Great Britain as Mexico or the United States: "Secret Department, "Simla, Oct. 1, 1842. "The government of India directed its army to pass the Indus, in order to expel from Afghanistan a chief BELIEVED to be hostile to British interests, and to replace upon his throne a sovereign represented to be friendly to those interests, and popular with his subjects." Only, therefore, in violation of her own fundamental maxims of public law, and in direct hostility to her uniform practice, can England contravene the principle first solemnly pronounced by President MONROE, acted upon by our government under the administration of President ADAMS through Mr. CLAY, his Secretary of State at that time, approved and upheld by our leading statesmen, and by more ably or emphatically than Mr. WEBSTER, and recently reproclaimed 7 none VOL. III.-NO. I. by our present Executive, and, so far as we are aware, universally sustained by the people of this country. It cannot be necessary, nor will the limits of this article allow us, to develop the argument à fortiori by which the necessity of enforcing this principle in the case of California, may easily be shown to be far more imperative than in that of Cuba. A glance at a globe, or a Mercator's map, will convince any one that the occupation of that province by Great Britain would give to that power, for all time to come, absolute dominion of the Pacific Ocean, with all its islands, coasts and commerce, and place her in a position which might at any moment become infinitely dangerous to our safety and prosperity. In an individual, selfdefence is an instinct. In a nation it becomes a duty-one, too, of paramount obligation, far superior in binding force to any other, inasmuch as it lies at the foundation of all others, and as obedience to it is the sole condition upon which other duties can be discharged. As in individual cases, too, the obligation of national self-preservation comprises more than resistance to imminent and actual assault. It enforces in peace preparation for war that is to say, the adoption of such measures as shall, in the event of war, put the national existence and safety beyond the hazards of any contest, and out of reach of any hostile blow. Though it neither sanctions nor requires injustice or wrong, it often supersedes the common rules of international law and, where clear and undeniable, justifies acts for which no public law exists. This broad but fundamental and essential principle, though it cannot invalidate existing rights, wherever they may exist, will most certainly forbid the extension of European dominion over at least this portion of the American Continent. And upon these grounds, sufficiently broad and perfectly tenable as we believe them to be, we have ventured the assertion that England cannot expect to occupy California with the acquiescence or indifference of the United States. We have left ourselves but small space for reference to the efforts of the United States to become possessed, by purchase from Mexico, of this portion of her territory; but, fortunately, little is required. We have, indeed, upon this subject no authentic information whatever. In the Mexican letter of the London Times, dated Sept. 29, 1845, to which we have already made allusion, we find the statement purporting to be made on authority, that on the 6th of August, 1835, Mr. Forsyth, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Washington, wrote to Mr. Butler, Chargé d' Affairs at Mexico, and ordered him to arrange the affairs of Texas, and to make all sacrifices to get possession of the Bay of San Francisco by insisting on a frontier line drawn from the Gulf of Mexico, following the Rio Bravo, to the 27th degree north latitude, and from that parallel to the Pacific." That this statement did not emanate from any American source, may be inferred from the misnomer of Mr. Forsyth's office; but that it is substantially correct we have no doubt. That the acquisition of California has for some years been desired, and perhaps sought, by our government, is very generally believed; and the report, with which we set out, that Mr. SLIDELL has gone to Mexico clothed with power to effect this purchase, comes from sources apparently worthy of confidence. We trust that whatever negotiations may be held on this subject will be conducted with all the secrecy essential to success. The London Times of a very recent date, tauntingly declares that the" publicity of democratic diplomacy" may safely be relied on as a guaranty that nothing can transpire in or through this country pejudicial to the interests of England without her timely and sufficient knowledge. With regard to Mr. Slidell's negotiation, we must repeat, we have misgivings of his success. England stands ready, we doubt not, to give a larger sum for California than our government is likely to offer. If, as she seems to believe her paramount and imperative policy must be to check the further growth of the American Union, and to make perfect her net-work of military posts and stations, from which, at any moment, she may strike with most effect upon every side, her interest certainly lies in the acquisition of the bay and harbor of San Francisco. Nor can we escape the fear that Mexico would greatly prefer such an arrangement to that which we propose. She has not yet abandoned her project of reconquering Texas; and she must feel the need of a powerful ally. She cannot be unaware that her to be worth the plundering, and weak enough to be plundered with impunity. She must feel the force of the European argument, that a single-handed contest with the United States may end in the extension of the American Union to the Isthmus of Panama, and she may deem it well to offer San Francisco as a price for the "guaranty of the integrity" of the Mexican Republic. And, at the least, by such an arrangement, she may hope to strike a severe and effective blow at the transcendent, overshadowing greatness of the United States; "And this, if not victory, is yet REVENGE!" We have endeavored, in the course of this article, to show, 1. That California, a region of vast resources, and destined, at no distant day, to hold important relations to the comand ought, in the natural course of merce and politics of the world, mustevents, and for the general good of humanity-pass from its present dominion into the hands of another race, and under the sway of another political system. establishment of her sovereignty there, 2. That Great Britain is seeking the being moved thereto, not only by her general lust for colonial possessions, but the other monarchies of Europe, she feels, by the necessity which, in common with of interposing a barrier to the growth in American Union, and of thus checking wealth, dominion and power, of the the progress of republican liberty, by which she believes her own institutions, and the position of the family of European sovereigns, to be seriously menaced. design would be inconsistent with the 3. That the accomplishment of this interests and the safety of the United States; that it would be in direct hostility to fundamental principles they are pledged to sustain; and that the paramount law of self-preservation will impel them to assume that, like the European occupation of Cuba, it is an event which they "CANNOT PERMIT IN ANY CONTINGENCY WHATEVER. from whatever point it may be viewed, In all its aspects and relations, and tion-one to be decided in the light of this is preeminently an AMERICAN questhe future, and upon the broadest and most essential principles of that American system which is fully discussed in another portion of this Review.* We have not allowed ourselves, therefore, to make the remotest party reference in any part of our remarks-though our citations from American authorities, as will have been seen, are entirely from sources connected with that party with whose principles and welfare this Review is fully identified. We hope and trust that a timely purchase of California by the United States, and the adjustment of pending questions of difference between our government and those of Great Britain and Mexico, will avert the necessity of an appeal to the terrible arbiter of irreconcilable international disputes. Should such an appeal, through the madness or selfish ambition of any of the contestant parties, be finally taken, the struggle, as has been remarked by a distinguished Senator of the United States, will involve far more than the questions out of which, as a pretext, it may grow and not only will the entire territory bordering on the Pacific coast, from the Gulf of California to the Russian frontier, extending over twenty-three degrees of latitude, and embracing a region capable of becoming more populous and powerful than is France or the United States at the present day, become the prize of contending nations, but a contest will ensue between opposite systems of political existence-systems in their nature essentially hostile, and between which, in the judgment of many men of foresight and wisdom, there is yet to be a final, and for one or the other a fatal, collision. Most earnestly and sincerely do we hope the prophecy may prove fallacious, and the contest be forever averted. Should, however, the irresistible progress of events throw its tremendous weight upon us, it will not become the American nation, as the only republic of mark on the face of the earth, with timid shrinking or unmanly fear, to decline it, or to tremble for the result. Of its probable issue we have neither desire nor occasion to speak. We would avoid those κοηπους μεγαλους—the swelling words of national vanity which, Homer tells us, Jove never fails to abase and bring to shame as sedulously as that craven spirit which cowers in the presence of a foe, and hugs its wealth with its chains and shields its person by its shame, from possible wound or spoliation. This, however, cannot be amiss: the "Iron Duke" of England is reported to have said that "a war with America must be a SHORT War." Authentic or not, the saying is worthy its reputed author. Rem tetigit acu. It touches the heart of England's policy and necessity. Her power and resources are prepared for an onset terrible as a thunderbolt. Ours, on the other hand, are yet in abeyance. Time, an exigency, and the chivalric pulse of the nation's heart, would call them forth; and, therefore, upon us does it fall to repeat that previous declaration of the same stern warrior in the British Parliament, that a war between this country and Great Britain "CANNOT be a SMALL war." For such a struggle, long or short, we ardently hope no necessity may ever arise. By no unmanly concession, however— by no sacrifice of true honor, which is nobly defined by Wordsworth, as "The finest sense Of JUSTICE which the human mind can frame, Intent each lurking frailty to disclaim, And guard the way of life from all offence, SUFFERED or DONE,”— An by no timid shrinking from all the responsibilities of our conspicuous and perilous position, but only by a prompt adherence to the principles of justice, and the necessities of self-defence, can it be avoided or averted. In the course of time, and by the natural progress of events, we have come to hold a position, a system, a policy of our own. AMERICAN SYSTEM has grown up, which claims a distinct existence, a perfect independence of all European control, and the right to shape its policy and its history, without interference, as it promises to do without the aid, of any of the older nations of the Eastern world. To that system, and by its principles, must ou cause henceforth and forever be directed and guided. ""Tis well! from this day forward we shall know [sought: That in ourselves our safety must be That by our own right hand it must be wrought, [low. That we must stand unpropped, or be lain O DASTARD! WHOM SUCH FORETASTE DOTH NOT CHEER! We shall exult, if they who rule the land Be men who hold its many blessings dear, Wise, upright, valiant; not a servile band, Who are to judge of DANGER which they FEAR [stand!" And HONOR which they do not under See the article on the Panama Mission, p. 1. † Hon. W. P. Mangum, of North Carolina, Dec., 1845. |