sable to give effect to its acceptance, the committee are relieved from their embarrassment, and enter at once upon the free and full examination of the propriety and expediency of the proposed mission.

They do this, not less in compliance with the President's expressed hope that their opinions may concur with his, than with what is conceived to be the right of the Senate, in all cases" where it is proposed to create a new office by nomination, or to despatch ministers to foreign states for the first time, or to accomplish by such missions objects not specially declared, or under circumstances new, peculiar, and highly important," to extend its inquiries not merely into the fitness of the persons nominated, but into the propriety or expediency of the mission itself, and into all the circumstances and objects connected therewith, or to be affected thereby.

The first objection of the Committee is, that this new and untried measure was in conflict with the whole course of policy, uniformly and happily pursued by the United States, of avoiding all entangling connections with any other nation whatever. For such departure no sufficiently cogent reasons had been assigned. During the fierce struggle of the new States for independence, the United States, notwithstanding their natural sympathies with nations thus engaged, adhered unfalteringly to the neutrality which they had proclaimed as the rule of their conduct; nor until these States had become independent in fact, by the expulsion of the Spaniards, did this country recognize them. But when it did so recognize them, it was done freely and joyfully, and ministers were commissioned without delay to several of the new Republics. Through these Ministers all the objects may be attained which could be attained at the proposed Congress, and without any deviation from existing usages.

An examination of the reasons assigned by the new States for desiring the attendance of the United States, and of the motives of the President of the United States for acceding to this desire, did not remove the objections of this Committee.

There is too much vagueness and latitude in the whole scheme. Before the destinies of the United States should be committed to the deliberations and decisions of a Congress composed not of our own citizens, but of the representatives of many different nations, it was to be

expected that the objects of such deliberations should be accurately stated and defined, and the manner of their accomplishment clearly marked out. The President himself made this suggestion in the first instance, and required as a condition of his acceptance of the invitation proposed to be given, that these preliminary points should be arranged in a manner satisfactory to the United States. The Committee express both surprise and regret that the Executive should have decided subsequently to send Commissioners at once, without insisting on that condition.

Under these circumstances, the Committee have no other explanation to give to the Senate, as to the objects to be accomplished at this Congress, than what may be collected from the language of the Mexican minister in reply to the Secretary of State, that they are those "to which the existence of the new States may give rise, and which it is not easy to point out or enumerate;" and it is expected that ample powers are to be granted to our ministers, to accomplish all the enumerated and all the undefined objects that might arise, without any knowledge as to how these powers are to be used and exercised. The Committee unhesitatingly express the opinion that nothing known to them requires or justifies at this time, the commissioning to this Congress of agents endowed with undefined powers, to accomplish undefined objects.

It in no wise changes this view, that the Senate have the power of rejecting any agreement or treaty which might be made for the mere act of entering into a negotiation is sometimes productive of embarrassments from which it is difficult to escape; and hence, until the objects of negotiation are distinctly known and approved, it is better to abstain from it altogether, than to confide in the power of the Senate to refuse its assent afterwards.

Turning from the objects thus indefinitely shadowed forth, as likely to occupy this Congress, to those more distinctly enumerated, the Committee object that the different States take different views even of these and that while some of the topics enumerated by the foreign ministers are not at all referred to by the President in his message to the Senate, other topics are mentioned in that message which find no place in the communications of those ministers.

The first and great object of the Congress

according to the Mexican and Colombian ministers, would seem to be the resistance of any interference by a neutral nation between the new States and Spain, and the manner and proportion in which each State should cooperate to this end. But the President of the United States assures the Senate that "the motive of the attendance of the United States, is neither to contract alliances, nor to engage in any undertaking or project importing hostility to any other nation." Here, then, at once was difference of opinion between the President and the representatives of these foreign States, upon the most vital point on which the deliberations of this Congress were to turn-a difference which must unavoidably cause injurious doubts in those States, as to the interest we take in their welfare, and our disposition to comply with their wishes.

The next subject stated by the Mexican minister is, "the opposition to colonization in America by the European powers," or, in the language of the Colombian minister," the manner in which all colonization of European powers on the American Continent shall be resisted "an object to be effected by the joint and united efforts of the States to be represented at the Congress.

The President concurs in the end, but differs as to the means of attaining it; his views contemplating only "an agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders." Here, again, is essential difference between the views of the President and of the other parties. Moreover, if the President only meant that each nation, by its own power and means, should protect its own territory from encroachment, whether "by European or other foreign States whatsoever," there could be no necessity for treaty stipulations to do that which all nations of right would do; but if more is meant, more could not be stipulated, without violating the well-settled policy of the United States, and putting at hazard their best interests.

Two other topics are suggested by the ministers of Mexico and Colombia: "the means of abolishing the African slave-trade," and "the relations of Haytı to the American States." To neither of these topics does the President allude; they are both, therefore, summarily dismissed by the Committee-the first, on

the ground that the United States do not assume the right to dictate to others on that subject, nor to proclaim abstract principles, of the rectitude of which each nation has the right of deciding for itself; the second, because the United States should never permit themselves to enter into discussion with any foreign State whatever, as to the relations they should be obliged to entertain with any other people not parties to such discussion.

Besides these primary objects suggested by the Mexican and Colombian ministers, the minister from Guatemala, who also joins in the invitation, intimates that, "as Europe has formed a continental system, and held a congress whenever questions affecting its interests were to be discussed, America should also form a system for itself." How far this suggestion meets the views of the President does not appear; but the Committee, because it seems the prominent object of the proposed Congress, argue strongly against it as inexpedient and injurious in itself, and, moreover, as one concerning which there is no authority in the government of the United States to negotiate at all.

The substance of the argument may be thus stated. The Committee doubt the authority of the United States Government" to enter into any negotiation with foreign nations for the purpose of settling and promulgating either principles of internal polity, or mere abstract propositions, as parts of the public law. And if the proposed Congress is viewed but as a convenient mode of conducting a summary negotiation, relative to existing interests, important to this continent alone, it not only may, but most probably will, be considered by all other civilized nations as a confederacy of the States therein represented, for purposes as prejudicial to the Old, as they are supposed to be beneficial to those of the New World.

Whenever this suspicion shall be entertained by the nations of the Old World, and especially by those who still hold possessions on this Continent, it must be obvious to all that consequences much to be deplored will unavoidably result.”

Having disposed of all the topics enumerated by the different ministers as those proper to occupy the attention of the Congress, the Committee turned to those indicated by the President, but nowhere alluded to by the other parties, and they at once start an objection of dignity-in

the possible case that the Congress, not finding these topics included in their programme, may refuse to consider them, and thus place the United States in "a degraded position."

The first of these topics is "the establishment of principles of a liberal commercial intercourse." This, the Committee think, may be more surely accomplished, as far as it can be accomplished at all, by separate negotiations with the separate States; each of which having peculiar interests, productions and wants, can but judge of the nature and extent of commercial intercourse it may suit it to encourage. The consentaneous adoption of principles of maritime neutrality, favorable to the navigation of peace and commerce in time of war," is the next object which the President suggests. The reasoning applicable to "commercial intercourse," is alike applicable, the Committee think, to the commerce of peace; and as to the rules of war applicable to navigation, the Committee see "great risk of compromising and destroying the relations of neutrality which the United States are now maintaining, should they involve themselves by any compact relative to belligerent rights, entered into with only one of the parties to the present war, during its continuance."

Hence the Committee conclude that "the great maritime states of Europe would most probably consider that the United States had seized the occasion of this war to enter into a confederacy with the other States of this continent, now actually engaged in it, for the purpose of settling principles intended materially to affect their future interests."

"The advancement of religious liberty" is another topic suggested by the President; and as a motive for some effort in this behalf, the fact is noticed that in some of the Southern nations an exclusive church, without toleration of any other, has been incorporated with the political constitution.

The Committee look upon this topic as altogether objectionable, and unfit to occupy the deliberations of Congress upon any suggestion from the United States: first, because it would contradict our well-settled practice not to intermeddle in the internal affairs of other states; and secondly, because, of all topics, that touching the religious faith or profession of any people is the most delicate and sacred. The Committee confidently express the opinion, that if ever an intima

tion shall be made to the sovereignties represented at the Congress, that it was the purpose of the United States to discuss there their plan of civil polity, or the interests of their religious establishments, the invitation given to us would soon be withdrawn.

Having thus exhibited to the Senate the objects of the proposed Congress, as stated both by the foreign ministers and by the President, and their conclusion, after due consideration, against the adoption of the measure proposed by the President, the Committee might have here terminated, but for the revelation in some of the correspondence accompanying the President's message of still other objects, the chief of which was, "the present and future condition of Cuba and Porto Rico." From the papers referred to, it appeared that during the year 1825 serious apprehensions existed that Mexico and Colombia were about making a concerted attempt to wrest these fine islands from the Spanish crown. This was a cause of great uneasiness to the United States, who desire nothing better than that those islands should remain as they are; but who were not without solicitude, if the attempt of the new Republics should succeed, lest, eventually, anarchy not unlike that at St. Domingo might ensue, to the very great injury and danger of our own country and all others. On the other hand, they were not without apprehension that, in order to prevent the possibility of such a catastrophe, and with the knowledge that Spain was powerless to succor these rich colonies, France or England, or both, might seize these islands, and hold them nominally for Spain, but in reality for themselves. In this perilous contingency, the government of the United States took ground at once manly and frank. They instructed their minister at the court of Madrid to urge upon the Spanish king the hopelessness of the attempt to reconquer the revolted colonies, and to draw his attention specially to the danger which menaced those colonies yet faithful, and of such great value-Cuba and Porto Rico-and, by these and other weighty considerations, to bring him if possible to acknowledge the independence of the new States, and thus restore peace. They at the same time instructed their ministers at London, at Paris, and at St. Petersburg, to explain to each of those courts the danger which menaced Cuba and Porto Rico, to the end that they might coöperate with the

United States in the effort to induce Spain to put an end to the war; with special directions, moreover, to say distinctly to the governments to which they were accredited, that the U. States "would not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever."

While thus frankly explaining themselves to Europe, this government dealt with like frankness with Mexico and Colombia. After apprising the governments of both those countries of the steps taken by the United States with the chief powers of Europe, to induce them to hasten the period when Spain might recognize the independence of the new Republics, and explaining the position we had assumed with regard to Cuba and Porto Rico in the face of the world, the Secretary of State expressed the expectation and desire, that at least until the effect of this friendly interposition could be ascertained, the plans of Mexico and Colombia, if any such were entertained, of attempting the conquest of these islands, would be postponed.

The whole of this matter being developed by the correspondence which was laid before the Senate, the Committee seized upon it as another cause of objection to the Panama mission. Falling far short of the tone adopted by the administration, that "the United States would not, in any contingency whatever, consent to the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico by any European power other than Spain," the Committee feebly say, they are well aware that the United States can never regard with indifference the situation and probable destiny of those islands"-but, nevertheless, they think it highly inexpedient that the subject should be discussed at a Congress of the American nations; for, on the one hand, if the war continued, the United States could not, with any propriety, interpose to prevent the new Republics from striking their enemy where alone he is most assailable and most vulnerable by them; and on the other, if peace should supervene, all apprehension on the subject would cease. In neither event, therefore, was anything to be gained by the United States in bringing this subject before the Congress.

The Committee go on to argue at some length, that the moral force of the position of the United States, which alone enables them to render any effective service in Europe to the cause of the new

Republics, arises from their known determination not to mingle their interests with those of the other States of America. By making, or appearing to make, common cause with those Republics, in a general Congress, this moral force would be lost, and thereby not only the new States would be injured, but their own character and interests would be materially prejudiced.

In conclusion, the Committee, after objecting to the substance, object to the form in which the proposed Congress was called and arranged, as derogatory to the prepotency and eminence among American nations of the United States; and for all the reasons stated, and without entering into any investigation of the qualifications of the individuals nominated as ministers, they pronounce the mission inexpedient.

For two months after the Report was made, the Senate held the subject in deliberation. The secret sessions were numerous and prolonged, and it was only on the 14th March that the resolution appended to the Committee's Report against the mission, was disagreed to by the following vote :

Ayes: Messrs. Benton, Berrien, Branch, Chandler, Cobb, Dickerson, Eaton, Findlay, Hayne, Holmes, Kane, King, Macon, Randolph, Rowan, Van Buren, White, Williams, Woodbury-19.

Noes: Barton, Bell, Bouligny, Chambers, Chase, Clayton, Edwards, Harrison, Hendricks, Johnston of Kentucky, Johnson of Louisiana, Knight, Lloyd, Marks, Mills, Noble, Robbins, Ruggles, Sanford, Seymour, Smith, Thomas, Van Dyke, Willy-24.

On the same day the nominations of Messrs. Anderson and Sergeant, as ministers, were confirmed.

We shall have occasion, after presenting the analysis of the Report in the House of Representatives, to enter into some detail as to the part taken, and the speeches made, in both Houses, by the friends and opponents of this measure a detail that will be rendered more intelligible by previously laying before the reader the argument on each side.

On the 15th March, the day succeeding that on which the Senate assented to the mission and confirmed the nomination of ministers, President Adams sent a message to the House of Representatives, in answer to a resolution of that House of the 5th of February preceding, asking information respecting the character and

objects of the proposed Congress, in which he forcibly exhibited the advantages which, in his judgment, might result from the assembling of that body, and from the presence there of representatives of the United States. After explaining the whole matter, and his acceptance of the invitation in behalf of the United States-subject to the advice and consent of the Senate-he informs the House that its "concurrence to the measure by the appropriations necessary for carrying it into effect, is alike subject to its free determination, and indispensable to the fulfillment of the intention."

This message, with the accompanying papers, (similar to those submitted to the Senate,) were immediately referred to the committee on Foreign Relations. From this committee Mr. Crowninshield, on the 25th March, made a Report concluding with a resoluton "that in the opinion of this House it is expedient to appropriate the funds necessary to enable the President of the United States to send ministers to the Congress of Panama.”

On this resolution a debate, protracted through several weeks, ensued, when an amendment, moved by Mr. McLane of Delaware, virtually nullifying the mission, even if otherwise authorized, prevailed by a vote of 99 to 95; whereupon the supporters of the original resolution abandoned it as amended-and the vote on it being taken next day, 21st April, it was lost-54 ayes, 143 noes.

The bill reported from the Committee of Ways and Means, making appropriations for the mission, was soon after called up; and after an attempt to strike out the enacting clause, which failed 61 to 134-the bill passed; and thus the mission received the sanction of both Houses.

We now return to the report of the Committee of the House.

The Committee first explain that the Congress of Panama is merely an "assembly of diplomatic agents, clothed with no power except to discuss and to negotiate, deputed by governments whose constitutions require that all engagements with foreign powers shall be subject to the ratification of some organic body at home." In order, moreover, to guard against all possible mistake as to the design of this Congress, it is expressly stipulated in the treaties between Colombia and the new Republics, that the meeting at Panama “shall not affect in

As to the objects of the assembly, the most entire liberty is left to the parties present to propose whatever may be esteemed of common good to this hemisphere, without dictation, or the semblance of dictation, by those governments whence the invitation to the United States had come. So far otherwise, indeed, was the fact, that in the letters of the Colombian minister to the Secretary of State, the utmost deference is manifested for the greater experience of the United States, and the expectation is expressed that they will avail themselves of the "opportune occasion" offered by this Congress, "to fix some principles of international law, the unsettled state of which has caused much evil to humanity." The letter adds: "It belongs to each of the concurring parties to propose their views; but the voice of the United States will be heard with the respect and deference which its early labors in a work of so much importance demand." The Committee conclude that "the objects of this assembly embrace in general terms the political and commercial relations of the United States with the new American Republics."

As to the principle which has regulated our diplomatic intercourse, the Committee demonstrate that the moving considerations for the missions maintained by this country have been the political and commercial relations of the nations with which they were established; and not the power or grandeur of such nations. Such being the general principle, it seems particularly applicable to the case of the Panama Mission, as at that Congress questions involving our most important political and commercial interests are to be discussed. If we should decline attendance, it would not only exhibit an ungracious spirit towards neighboring republics, but take from us the right of complaining of any results contrary to our interests which might there be accomplished.

The various objections to the mission are then considered by the Committee. As to its alleged unconstitutionality, it is replied, that the Constitution imposes no restriction on the appointment of foreign ministers by the proper authority. But it is assumed that the Congress at Pana