PHID. There is, then, no essential difference between the worship of a God, and that of a hero or superior man; and the Deities themselves are only images of this energy which inspires men with rea

son.

Soc. Thus, then, Anaxagoras reasoned; and now I will repeat his own words: "With you, Socrates, it is easy to converse, because you are willing to confess your ignorance, though you esteem knowledge above all things. You would have me give an opinion of this work of yours, whether it is well or ill designed. And you wish me to converse with you upon the nature of the Gods, as I have done with others-but not always in a manner to gain the reputation of piety. First, then, for the work. If anything can be said with certainty of this Deity, it is that he cannot be otherwise represented, than by a combination of all the marks of power and obedience; for he bears the attributes of obedience in union with those of power. But his obedience is that of a man, and not that of a slave; and if he endured the tyranny of a mortal, it was in obedience to the commands of a God. It will be proper, therefore, to give him an air of cheerful acquiescence and lively courage-as of a servant ready to obey a just command. Because of his immense and unremitted toil, the muscular envelop of his body will have a disproportionate vastness, seeming to bury and obscure the bones and viscera, and giving to the head and extremities an effect of littleness, as though they were unnaturally small. Since the form of the body expresses the temper and habit of the person, this Deity cannot be represented with the angular frame and face of Vulcan, nor with the smooth elegance of Hermes; but like the pancratists, who perform every exercise, his body will discover equal flexibility and power, every muscle appearing ready for its proper service, but all vast, round, and well pronounced." Such, O Phidias, were the words of Anaxagoras, regarding the mode of representing Hercules.

PHID. Did he say in what manner the marks of divinity may be distinguished? Soc. As I remember he spoke thus: "To you, Socrates, these particulars seem proper to be observed; but if I say that the divinity should appear, not only in the face, but in every feature of the body, do I seem to have said anything absurd" Not absurd, I answered, but impossible to be observed: for to me it

seems impossible to know the marks of divinity, even in the features; and if any statuary has expressed them, it was by accident, or by a close imitation of some prophet, or sage, at the moment of his inspiration. To me, on the contrary," said Anaxagoras, "the art of the statuary seems as certain as that of the poet or rhetorician; and like theirs, to be rational, and subject to rules. The arts of speech intend always an expression of some thought, or passion; and the same passion is expressed always in the same manner. The composer of fictions, by discovering in one character a variety of passions and emotions, following the swift order of events, shows us the existence of a superior power, presiding over and controlling them. The form of this power or principle, (which is divinity in the soul,) is made apparent by the manner in which it rules over and controls the inferior energies. He then is the true poet, who is able, by a fictitious or real history, to discover by its proper effects a certain form of the superior principle, showing by the choice and order of description its effects upon the heart and mind. But the forms of this principle are the forms of the Gods, and the marks by which we know them. In Zeus we discover authority; in Juno regal pride; in Minerva prudence; and in Hercules obedience. In every divine or heroical character some one form appears of this energy. But if the maker of fictions and mysteries can show the presence of any form of the rational principle, it must be through a knowledge of it in his own mind."

Tell me then, I exclaimed, whether a knowledge of this ethical reason is not equally necessary to the statuary, if he would truly represent the Gods and heroes? "How," he answered, "can it be otherwise? Is it not apparent, that whoever would represent a thing must have an idea of it; and that this idea cannot be a something hastily acquired and faintly known, but must live as an active power presiding over the mind and hand, shaping every line and poising every stroke?-or do I speak extravagantly?" Not extravagantly, I replied, but you speak impossibilities. "And yet," rejoined he, "it is necessary to have an idea of perfection, if we mean to approach to it in action; for it is impossible otherwise to forgive or be forgiven. The works of a good man, though imperfect, discover his idea of what is best.

Why not say the same of statues and paintings, that though the best of them are gross performances, compared with what they signify, or symbolize, they strike us with delight when they intimate a certain dignity of idea in the workman." To me, I answered, it seems necessary that no one can truly express a quality of the soul, unless he is in some degree endowed with that quality. But if an artist will content himself with a careful imitation of nature, selecting models which have the marks of virtue, may he not accomplish much without aiming to know the thing he represents? "If the art of a statuary," he replied, "intended only to produce images of living men, with all their imperfections, it might happen that the images of a few, taken at favorable moments, might discover traces of divinity. But it is required of an artist that he be able, not only to imitate what is set before him, but to make images of the vices and virtues: as of pride, courage, magnanimity, justice; distinguishing these, not by arbitrary symbols, as the barbarians use, but by the marks which discover them in nature; as, magnanimity, by a certain mixture of severity and openness; pride, by a lofty and swelling manner; goodness, by a benign and amiable expression, and the like. If he is able to do this, he may represent whatever he imagines; but he cannot represent pride, without a model or image of pride in his mind. If this image is that of an individual, as, for example, Pericles, (who has a certain pride,) he will continually model images of Pericles; but if this image is conceived through an experience in his own person, he will be able to compose a statue of pride by its natural marks: just as the poet and the actor, through the same knowledge, are able to impersonate it in the character of a king or hero. But an actor who should imitate the gait of Pericles, or a poet who should repeat his say. ings, would be entitled to no more of our admiration, than an artist who copies a limb with all its blemishes." It seems then, I answered, that a statuary cannot represent a character without some knowledge of the natural marks by which it is distinguished from other forms of reason. But is it necessary to be a hero that we may represent one, or to be just that we may represent justice?

"is

you from it. "If the knowledge of a thing by its marks," continued the sage, indeed the thing itself, what you have supposed would follow. But no man confounds the knowledge or idea of pride with the being proud; or the idea of what is proper to anger with the being easily angered. Let us admit, then, that a certain degree only of a quality is necessary to a knowledge of it; but that extreme pride or irascibility is not necessary to a true idea of these qualities." I am willing, I answered, to admit this. "To me, then," he continued, it seems evident, that a poet, or a statuary, or an actor, must possess in some degree the virtue and the fault which he impersonates, and that the more admirable his own virtue, the more profound will be the sources of his knowledge; but that this knowledge is the fruit of a peculiar energy, or power in reason, able to rule over, and represent the passions, and able also, to conceive and personify images of the virtues, but not able to rule over or command them." To you, therefore, answered I, it seems, that the justice and the magnanimity of the artist, enable him to see the marks of these qualities in others; and that a small degree of virtue in me makes me sensible to a much greater degree in another, through this genius, or power of conceiving virtue in the intellect? To this he assented. Is there then, I asked, a power in the human spirit which is proper to it, and which all men in some degree possess a power by which they are enabled to perceive in others the marks of reason, and so perceiving, to venerate it; and is there also a power or genius, of representation, which enables them to form ideas, and impersonate what they revere? Then he assented. But is not this the power, I continued, which enables the orator to express the grandeur of his own soul, as the poet does, feigning the greatness of another? Again he assented. Say, then, continued I, whether he who has no grandeur of soul can express the marks of grandeur in marble, or in words; or whether by the genius of representation, he can depict anything greater than himself? For but now you asserted that to know the signs of justice in another, it is necessary that we should ourselves be inclined to justice; and if this is true at all, it is so altogether; and they will best discern virtue in others who have most of it in themselves. How, then, can I represent virtue as Homer

PHID. A hard condition, O Socrates, you would have laid upon us!

Soc. See, then, whether he relieved

has done, unless I have the virtue of Homer ? But if I have it not, though I revere, can I represent it? Then Anaxagoras, after meditating a while, made answer as follows. You have arrived, O Socrates, at a wonderful result in regard to artists and poets, and, indeed, to all men, having discovered the nature of this genius which represents virtue as known, or venerates it as unknown. Whatever virtue is in ourselves we may represent, provided the Creator has endowed us with the genius or energy; and if the poet or the statuary is by nature a hero or a king, he will represent kings and heroes, by their real marks; but if he personates what is superior to himself, as a God or a divine man, he fails in the representation, and is compelled to invent artificial symbols, to express the power, or the degrees of power, which he ignorantly reveres. Is not this, then, O my friend, the reason of that ancient amity between poets and heroes, that they are alike sons of glory, and full of greatness; but to poets the creative, and to heroes the military genius, is accorded." But for that third kind, I replied, who revere though they cannot comprehend what shall be said of them? That they too," he answered, “are the children of the Supreme, and his peculiar servants. Like Hercules, they cheerfully obey and execute, and are always employed in good works: nor is their glory less, but rather greater; and all men love them."

PHID. Mysteriously, indeed, he talked with you! I have heard that he was an atheist, and believed in no God but mat

ter.

Soc. As if I, beholding Phidias, should believe only in his skin. Anaxagoras denied that ideas should be mistaken for the beings which they symbolize; and affirmed that no man may comprehend a being superior to his own.

PHID. But if we cannot comprehend, how can we worship?

Soc. By acknowledging this very inability. We just now agreed that worship is not knowledge, but a confession of inferiority.

PHID. In kind, or in degree?

Soc. In kind, as I think. For if I worship what is only superior in degree to myself, I might fall upon my knees to every man who appeared wiser or stronger than I.

PHID. But what said Anaxagoras in regard to the marks by which greatness may be represented?

Soc. Thus, then, he continued: "Since there are two modes of representationnamely, by a symbol, which is mystical, and by the natural sign, which is artistical-the poet and the statuary will desire to have a knowledge of the natural signs of character, and will labor diligently to acquire them. They will be able not only to imitate what they have seen, but to represent what they imagine. Their imaginations are symbolic of their own emotions and character; not like the dreams of a drunkard, but like those of a God. The excellence of what they imagine will be. first, in the thing signified, and secondly in the beauty of the mark or symbol. Phidias has a passion of magnanimity in his soul, and Pericles has an equal passion; but they will diversely discover this: one in war or in oratory, the other in a poem or in the statue of a magnanimous hero. If any man is inspired with greatness, or with prudence, or with justice, or with any other virtue, his inspiration forces him to discover, in some manner, the quality of his spirit. In the strictness of his dealings, the man of wealth discovers his regard for justice, and wins the confidence of the citizens. The hero shows them that he values the fame of courage and constancy above all other things; and at once all men accord it to him. These are driven by necessity to perform many gross and laborious duties, that their virtue may be conspicuous. But the orator and the artist are able to show forth the noblest qualities by the force of words alone, or by the gestures and natural graces of the body. But the power of imagining great qualities, and that of beautifully representing them, are not always conferred upon the same person. I may be able to imagine the quality of justice, and see the signs of it, though I am unable to imagine or shape forth the perfect image of a just person; but the statuary will be able, not only to conceive, but to personify justice. The desire of the artist is, therefore, to know the natural marks of character; for by these he is enabled to express the greatness of his own soul. But if he fails to acquire a knowledge of these marks, he will resort to artificial symbols, invented as substitutes. As when a speaker, unable to describe a glorious action, declares only that it was glorious; putting a word for a thing: or, when an orator, wishing to seem admirable, advises promptness and vigor, but cannot say

what it is that is prompt and vigor

ous.

PHID. By Hercules, I have known such! But Anaxagoras had not heard our new tragedians, who fill the mouths of their heroes with a kind of metaphysical wisdom, while they compel them to actions fit only for slaves and voluptuaries. By the Gods, if they are admitted to Elysium, the heroes will avoid their society!

Soc. Is it just, then, to be in a rage with their ignorance?

PHID. Not with their ignorance, but with their treachery; for they use the symbols and names of virtue to mislead mankind-like traitors who carry a banner into an ambuscade.

Soc. They are what they are. But hear Anaxagoras.

PHID. Go on; I desire to hear him. Soc. Thus, then, he continued: "For you, Socrates, if you mean to make images of the Gods, it will be necessary to acquire a knowledge of these beings, or rather, of the qualities in men of which they are sources: as of justice and wisdom, in Zeus; of virtuous prudence in Athene; of knowledge, with the love of glory, in Apollo; and of all inferior qualities in inferior Gods. But because these beings have no body, they cannot be truly represented, and must therefore be symbolized, either by signs and ceremonies significant of their powers, or by human figures, to express their place and authority in man: for to the worshiper it is indifferent whether the power of the God is suggested to him by a statue, or by a ceremony; both are symbolic and equally remote from the reality. The statuary, therefore, will observe the signs of character in the face and limbs, and in the carriage and motion of the body.

PHID. It is impossible to represent motion by a picture or a statue.

Soc. But a poet may represent it to the mind's eye, and the actor may impersonate it, and the musician can give a feeling of it; or am I wrong?

PHID. The gesture of an image in marble should be always at a point of rest, as when the dancer balances in his step, or the wrestler is just equaled by his antagonist, or the orator pauses an instant at the close, keeping an attitude of persuasion: an eagle may be seen poising himself, or even soaring upon the ether; but if Theseus, in the marble, rushes down to Hades, I expect at each

moment to see him fall headlong. But proceed.

Soc. "Because the head, and especially the face," he continued, "is the most expressive part of the figure, it will be necessary to have a perfect knowledge of their parts, both internal and external. For in animals, the form of the internal determines that of the external parts. But this knowledge (of the head and face) is much more difficult than that of the body. Strength is easily represented in the limbs, as beauty is in the face; because these parts are the natural seat of such qualities: but to confer beauty upon the limbs is as difficult as to impart vigor to the face. In regard to those qualities to which strength and beauty are subordinate-serving only to recommend and grace them-they appear either in the gesture of the body, or in the expression of the features. But because the knowledge of the superior qualities is inexpressibly difficult, and subject to rules known only to the most skillful, very few have been able to compose statues which fitly represent them; and the greater number are content with an outside of beauty and strength, as in a Lydian woman or a boxer. A few, only, have given a divine expression to the head, as in that of Zeus, and of Homer; and the works of these few are inces santly copied and applied to other subjects. But the science of this art remains unknown, nor has any man pretended ever to be able to teach it."

PHID. I should willingly listen to any one who would teach me such a science. Soc. Shall we, then, inquire whether it is possible to attain it?

PHID. Let us spare no pains to follow the inquiry: it seems to be a matter of the utmost consequence.

Soc. Let it be conceded that Anaxagoras said nothing extravagant, when he affirmed that the human body is not only the agent, but the image or symbol, of the spirit which informs it; and that every limb and feature must signify, in some manner, the quality of the man. The body, being therefore the natural and only image or symbol of the spirit, has its true stamp and expression in the parts as in the whole. It is to the soul, as the handle of an instrument to the hand which grasps it. But the shape of the hand determines the shape of the handle; and the use to which it is applied, the figure and quality of the blade. So, the various energies of the animal

predetermined the figure of its body. But when it happens that the substance is ill tempered, and the instrument weakly made, it will answer but feebly to its uses. And in the same manner it happens with the body of man-which is of a nature liable to various perversions that it rarely attains perfection, or is fitted freely to perform its offices.

PHID. Why may not one spirit be inferior to another, and fitted with an inferior body? Or why may not a powerful spirit inhabit a weaker body?

Soc. It seems to me absurd to say that one immortal being is inferior to another of its kind; nor is it right to speak of a spirit as of a thing that may be greater or less; for a spirit has no dimensions. We may say that less of it appears, because of the body's weakness; but not, that the spirit of one man is essentially inferior to that of another. Before God, all are equal.

PHID. I am perplexed with a doubt. The actions of some men are wholly passionate, while those of others seem full of reason. Say, then, whether passion and intellect flow from the spirit of reason, or whether one and the same energy is the cause of reason, passion and intellect.

Soc. Say, also, of sensual desire and of instinct. Our inquiry now is, whether the governing spirit is the same with the governed; whether the intellect, the passion, the fancy, and the brute instincts, are the same with that divine energy which governs and regulates them!which is absurd.

PHID. Is man, therefore, a body inspired by several souls or energies?

Soc. That he is moved by various energies no one denies; but if we choose to call them "souls," then he is, indeed, a subject of many "souls." But this is to amuse ourselves with words. Let the grosser energies be named INSTINCT, and no one will be offended; for we feel within us the instincts of irrational life. Then let the name Sour be applied to understanding, memory, prudence, fancy, passion and affection; which we have in common with the ape and other intelligent brutes. These are limited and perishable energies, full of pain and variableness. As for that "human soul," or, more properly, for that RATIONAL SPIRIT, we believe in its immortal nature, and confess that its office is to rule over the intelligences, and over the instincts. Do

we not?

PHID. We do, indeed; nor have I ever heard the contrary.

Soc. If, then, the body is the agent and instrument of the instincts and of the intellect and passions, will not these powers make themselves apparent in it by certain marks by which an intelligent, a passionate or an intellectual disposition may be distinguished from one that is gross and instinctive?

PHID. Evidently. But can we say of the inferior energies that they are essentially variable?

Soc. Can we say of two magnets, that the energy of one is essentially inferior to that of the other; or only, that one discovers or possesses more of the common power? Do they differ in degree, or in kind?

PHID. In kind; and the same will be said of two men-that they differ not in kind, (for the same power is in both,) but only in degree-and that one, because of the better disposition of his body, discovers more than another of the spirit which inspires all.

Soc. Every man carries in him the marks of his disposition, as dogs and tigers carry those of theirs; but the bodies of men have also other traits; as, of honor, kindness, magnanimity, rectitude, and the like; which no other animal discovers. Must we not say, then, that this body, with its inferior energies, is created to be the slave of the Rational Spirit?

PHID. How can it be otherwise? But I have seen men who differed little from dogs and cattle.

Soc. Say, rather, you have seen the bodies of men; and that in these bodies the marks of reason were the faintest possible.

PHID. Can we say, then, that a person gifted with observation might discern the shape of the soul by the form of the body?

Soc. We are already guarded, O Phidias, against so gross an absurdity! for we agreed that the human spirit is a being without shape or dimension, but full of power, and able to originate an infinite variety of action, when provided with a body through which it may act. Because the acts of the soul are limited by this condition, the marks of character in the body are the marks of the body's, and not of the soul's, excellence; indicating a greater perfection in the organ, and through this only, a greater activity of the Rational Spirit. Do I speak reasonably?