to him because he desires their return. And thus begins the possibility of being and existing.

The second is Ammon; and he like the first is eternal. Through him all things have form. He is the infinite Space and the eternal Order. Thus begins the possibility of forms.

The third is Eros, who is also Myrionymus. Through him the substance and the form, the time and the order of times, become one. He also is eternal. Because, of these Principles, none can be without the other, they are co-eternal. In the beginning there was no beginning; time and space were not.

The first Substance, through Ammon and Eros, created the universe, originating nature in his mind. Nothing can come of nothing: he, therefore, produced all beings out of his proper essence. While he alone creates, all is subject to Fate and Necessity; for these are the names of the forms of his power. He is also the original of equity, and of all compensation.

When the world was ready, Eros began, and produced life with intellect; and the universe became full of living beings, such as are able to continue their species. When Ammon began, reason was produced; for reason is the harmony of Eros and Phtha. In Ammon we are created, and by him we discern and know the eternal.

Thus was the world, and all that it contains, created by the first Principles, in harmony and unity, from their own Being. But the One Being of all is dark, and has no name, though we may call him Phtha, or pure Being.

ISCHOм. Is it a dream you relate? Soc. Yes, nothing better. It is even worse it is the shadow of dreams.

ISCHOм. What would it profit me to know all that can be known of this kind? Soc. As little, without virtue, as to possess riches without Athene. It would be, I think, an incumbrance.

ISCHOм. Why then do you, Socrates, employ so much of your life about it? Soc. Why does Ischomachus read Homer?

ISCHOм. It is a banquet of imagination.

Soc. Are we the worse for Homer? ISCHOм. The better, rather. He fills the mind with images of magnanimity. Meditating these, we contemn our own littleness, and learn to emulate their spirit. The constancy and fortitude of the son

of Laërtes make me ashamed of despair.

Soc. See, then, the value of a dream. ISCHOм. But in this of Diotime's there is no substance. I find no use for it. It teaches no virtue, and helps me in no other respect.

Soc. Have we not already learned thus much from it—that all science is visionary and fictitious, an invention of the intellect, striving to express the inexpressible? But that is not all. Athene, the divine Prudence, has aided the mortal Ischomachus in procuring for him a certain happiness. Socrates, the dreamer, has made it evident to him that he is himself a temple of Athene, consecrated to her service. Ischomachus did not adopt this opinion because Socrates desired him to do so, but because it seemed necessary; and now he has gained no advantage over himself, but desires to return into his former ignorance.

ISCHOм. It was the vision of Diotime which seemed to me of no utility, and not the conduct of Socrates.

Soc. Come, now, let us consider it carefully; and if we find no utility in Diotime's vision, I will learn no more of them.

ISCHOм. I am of this opinion-that they are perfectly useless, and therefore unworthy of our attention.

Soc. But it is conceded that a know

ledge of the gods and of our ancestors is not without its use?

ISCHOм. It is not only conceded, but seems to me established.

Soc. Upon what grounds?

ISCHOм. That they are examples or images of excellence, which we meditate and imitate.

Soc. How is it possible for either you or me to imitate Ulysses?

ISCHOм. His equity and fortitude, at least, are imitable, if the gods will aid us.

Soc. But for the deities of Homer, or those of Orpheus and Hesiod, what avails it to know them? They are no exemplars, as I think.

ISCHOм. But if our arguments are of any worth, ideas of the gods are ideas of the very essence of those virtues and powers of whose active force the heroes and demi-gods are true exemplars. I concede, then, O Socrates, the importance of a just knowledge of the deities, when I am made to confess that the name of a divine power is no other than the name of the essence of a virtue. What, for example, can be more favorable to the

practice of prudence than the just idea of prudence, as a principle presiding over the selfish energies of the animal? Or what can be more favorable to knowledge than the right idea of what is spiritually admirable and powerful? or what to true courage than the idea of magnanimity? And these are all deities, if our conclusions may be respected. But for the misty visions of Diotime, I regard them with no respect.

Soc. I am in some anxiety, Ischomachus, not to have the name with you either of a sophist or a disputative idler; but if I cannot convince you, out of our own concessions, that I have justly at tributed a certain importance and excellence to these speculations on the primal causes of things and the original of deity, I shall be left under that disgrace. Answer me, then, lest I be ashamed: is any action to be respected if it leads either to no consequence, or to any pain or unhappiness?

ISCHOм. None.

Soc. Every good action is therefore good because it leads to some happiness, or to some pleasure; but if it leads to pain, it is not good.

ISCHOм. It seems to me that all good ends in pleasure, and all evil in pain.

Soc. An animal seeks a pleasure for the instant only, and for itself. May we say, then, that the goodness of a man is in this, that he procures happiness for others, though at the cost of pain to himself? or shall we say, that the joy of being the cause of happiness to others is so vast, a lover of men will sooner cease to exist than suffer a momentary interruption of the joy of magnanimity?

ISCHOм. Either; but I prefer the last. Soc. There are other kinds, therefore, and degrees of happiness to be enjoyed besides those of the body; and even besides those of justice and prudence. For the love of glory, as for that of justice, a man will lay down his life; but who ever died for the love of prudence, or for a pleasure of the body, or for possessions? But if the price given be so much greater, the thing purchased is of so much more worth. The magnanimity of a moment pays well for the sufferings of an age. But you have conceded this in saying of the heroes of Homer, that they served as exemplars of virtue. A hero is one who, for the sake of the love and admiration of men, will resign his life.

ISCHOм. All this I may concede, without anything gained for Diotime.

Soc. Somewhat hastily you thrust aside the dreamy Diotime: for we are now agreed that the aim of a rational life is to procure the joy of magnanimity or of justice, or both; but if there be any other joy worthy of reason, Diotime has it; for her soul is continually absorbed in meditation. In all things the presence of a deity is visible to her. She beholds the Eternal Equity presiding over matter. Eros reveals himself to her in the harmony of life. His idea fills her intellect with a pure splendor. Living thus in perpetual communion with the best, and the true, she regards all things with a benignant gravity. Of glory she takes no thought, and having no possessions, is ignorant of the mine and thine. Diotime gives away all she possesses, trusting in the goodness of men; and by the favor with which the people regard her who think her a prophetess, she is never in want, and the house is esteemed fortunate where she enters. Diotime, therefore, for her simple self, has no need for our doctrine of utilities, nor of Homer's exemplars: and if she communicates the secret of her knowledge, (for she is versed in all sciences and arts,) in a manner somewhat abstract and difficult, we may well spare our contempt; seeing that in the very thing for which all strive, self-contentment and a rational joy, she has the victory.

ISCHOм. But what is her wisdom to us?
Soc. Or our prudence to her.

ISCHOм. It is in vain, O Socrates, to contend with you in this matter; but to me this woman is odious.

Soc. It seems unnecessary to have argued circuitously in her defence. ISCHOм. How so?

Soc. Is there not a lawful and natural pleasure of affection?

ISCHOм. Yes, and so necessary, life would not be tolerable without it.

Soc. But there is another pleasure of conflict, and another of use and possession; and another of fiction and imagination, and another of science; and why then, if these are natural, is it not lawful to enjoy them all and severally?

If I, then, or Diotime take a pleasure in geometrical or metaphysical sciences, or in the dreams of Theosophy, shall any one be angry because of the inutility of these pursuits? Wherein, pray, is the utility of Love? Love is rather a master

of all utility, and if any man is base enough to prefer wealth before affection, he is called a dog and no man.

ISCHOм. I have been assured, Socrates, that you make utility an universal test. Soc. Why not? But first answer me? Would it be of use to me at this moment, if as much wheat were in my possession as may be got from the harvest of all Attica?

ISCHOм. O yes! Though you could not eat it yourself you could exchange it for a multitude of things.

Soc. But I have no need for this multitude of things; and all that exceeds necessity, is not for utility, but for luxury. To possess the grain of Attica would consequently be of no use to me.

ISCHOм. But it would be of use to others, for you might distribute it among the poor, or sell it at moderate prices, or store it against a famine or invasion.

Soc. We have discovered, therefore, another kind of utility in possessions, in the opportunity they give us of exercising justice and beneficence. And this is the kind which I have taken to be a rule or test. My property is valuable to me according to the use I make of it, for the sake of equity, generosity, and beneficence. My courage is serviceable to me, as I exercise it in defence of what is justly mine, and for the sake of those who are dependent on me. My love is of use to me, as it teaches me to ascend from the love of one to the love of all. My intellect does me a service, when I can discover by it the nature of the true, the great, and the venerable,

ISCHOM. I will argue for no other utility but this.

Soc. Say, then, whether this happiness which the wise Athene confers upon her votaries, is the only possible or desirable kind?

ISCHOм. To me it is so. But Diotime and Socrates worship other powers.

Soc. There is One of whom all speak with reverence, and whom all may worship, who is greater than Athene, or than Zeus; perhaps, if we direct our prayers to him, he may confer upon us a happiness superior to these, but not adverse to them.

ISCHOм. I desire to know his attributes. Soc. It is necessary to ascend with caution to this idea.

ISCHOм. Suffer me to follow your steps.

Soc. Say, then, of all that exists, can

Soc. Of the material, there is ether, which is the body of fire and light; air which is the medium of life; liquid, which is matter fluent; and earth which is solid. But of these, the three last are mutually convertible; air may become liquid; liquids change to solids; and the reverse. But fire and light, the two forms of ether, pass into all bodies, and are a part of all, nor have they an independent existence. But if all things are thus mixable, and mutually convertible, they are essentially one, and must have but one name. What shall that name be?

ISCHOм. Let it be Substance.

Soc. There is, then, but one Substance, by whose variety all existence is produced. But what is this of which we are speaking?

ISCHOм. Substance, the first Matter.
Soc. I am not answered.

ISCHOм. It is impossible to say what it is, if all things are made from it. Soc. Where is it?

ISCHOм. Everywhere, in Space.

Soc. Perhaps not. Is it an idea, a dream of I know not what, with which we are engaged? or is it that veritable Substance which is everywhere?

ISCHOм, I percieve, Socrates, that it is an Idea; or, if you will, a dream which just now occupies us.

Soc. When shall the imagination of man be otherwise occupied than with ideas? or is it possible for the whole to exist in a part, the real world in a little brain?

ISCHOм. The gods laugh at us!

Soc. It is reason that laughs at the littleness of its servant, intellect. We contemptuously sport with ideas: only the superstitious worship them.

ISCHOм. Now you speak as I wished to have you. I have always seen the futility of science. Why be obstinate with a system, or vehemently assert a belief? I am weary of this folly. Why go about to establish a dream?

Soc. Ideas, O sceptical Ischomachus, are exceeding necessary for the sake of conversation; they are a kind of natural alphabet for the use of reason, which would otherwise be dumb and inactive.

ISCHOм. True. But I would have their futility better known. I would have men trust rather to the substance.

ISCHOм. It is useless to contradict or interrupt you. Proceed, then, with the idea of the One.

Soc. As there is but one substance, so there is but one life. Every animate being resembles every other. All in stincts are directed to the same ends. Nor are those of man in any respect superior to those of other animals. All animals may therefore be regarded as existing in the sole and common principle of life; and all their acts are instances and illustrations of certain laws of life, as those of dead matter are of the laws of necessity, or naked fate. Remembering that we are engaged, as before, with an "idea of life," and not with life itself, (since the true being of life can be known only to the creative intellect which produces it,) let us seek now to attain the idea of reason, or of a power whose function it is to reconcile life with the world, and by which the body of man is connected with the past and future, acting in reference to what is eternal. Because intellect is itself only a form of life and a vehicle of mere images,(which form in it, and are redissolved, like ice in water,) it may symbolize, hut cannot express, reason. From this cause it happens that a science or virtue, of itself, makes no man virtuous. For virtue is the act of reason, and science is a product of intellect, acting under reason. If any man has a science of geometry, he is infallible in the acts proper to it, because intellect is superior to sense; but it is not superior to reason.

ISCHOM. But how will all this lead to the idea of a God?

Soc. Having attained the idea of a universal substance, which is one, and of a universal life, which is one, is it not apparent that these two beings differ as matter and form; as rest and motion; as shade and light; as negation and affirmation; as time and order of time; as the no and the yes; the fixed and the free; the hate and the love; the limit and the liberty; the difference and the like ness; the understanding and the imagi

nation ?

Our knowledge of matter is by limits, necessities, impediments, shadows, cessations: our idea of life is by freedom, possibility, active power, light, movements, form, (species,) reproduction and self-sustentation. We understand and

nent, but that its species are perishable; we imagine living species, that they are permanent as to the form, and perishable as to the substance; for a species is like a wave which stands perpetually on the verge of a cataract-its substance flows through it. The life of an animal is a perpetual present; it knows neither a past nor a future, for it is wholly a form, devoid of real being. But the being of reason extends backward on the retreating, and forward upon the coming time; it connects our immediate present with a past and a future. Reason, therefore, is a lord of proprieties and fitnesses, being cognizant of what is omnipresent and eternal. Its laws are neither of the present, nor of the past, nor of the future; but of all these. They are consequently eternal, and, at a glance, embrace all time. For of time, we say that it has parts and an order; and the time of to-day is not the time of yesterday; and of space, we say that it has a here and a there; and of number, there is a many and a one; and of substance, a motion and a rest. But in the eternal there is no past nor future; in the omnipresent there is no space; in being no motion nor rest; and in infinitude neither one nor many. But of God we say, that He is eternal, omnipresent, omniscient, infinite. That He alone is the Reconciler of the fixed and the free, the yes and the no, the light and the dark, the life and the death: that He is the Mediator of all extremes, because the extremes originate from Him. But it is the office of Reason so to mediate. Reason, therefore, is the image of Deity. We have now arrived at the intellectual idea of Deity, by forming that of reason. Let us say, in a word, that the one is the source out of which life and matter arise as antagonists, and in which they are reconciled and become one, and we have the greatest idea intellect may attain. Put now this idea, as the faint and far-removed shadow of the Image of the Eternal, and consider the distance between that image in man and its ineffable Type, and all is given that mere intellect can give of Deity.

ISCHOм. You have not acted with your usual caution, O my friend, in thus overwhelming the harmony of our discourse with a crash of sounds too loud and rapid for my sense to bear. Each of these I might have heard easily by itself, but the whole together confounds me.