did explore, and make most important discoveries, as high up as the 58th parallel, three and four years before any English or other foreign vessel appeared on the coast at all-establishing for Spain a claim, certainly incontestible, unless the principle of right, by prior discovery, be utterly denied; and finally, that the Nootka Sound Treaty, ratified in 1792, (only seven years after these discoveries,) has not a single phrase or word, which can be construed into a relinquishment of the Spanish sovereign title; but simply concedes certain hunting and trading privileges-rigorously withheld before with establishments, "settlements," for that purpose, (that is, the use of the country,) the express terms being, that "the sovereignty shall be in abeyance," thus plainly leaving that abstract title to be as valid, after any (reasonable) term of years, as it was before the Convention took place. This was the argument for our right through Spain, and we have not, as yet, seen any objections successfully invalidating it. Mr. Gallatin, indeed, in his recent able letters published in Washington, affirms that England did practically question and deny the exclusive Spanish claim to the Pacific Coast, by making the colonial charters which she granted, in the seventeenth century, along the Atlantic, extend across the continent to the "South Seas," that is, to the Pacific Ocean. What a 66 practical questioning" was that! To stretch a vague pretensionon the vaguest of all principles, indefinite contiguity-for an unknown distance-across a continent of wilderness -three thousand miles of forests, rivers and mountains, utterly unexplored to an unknown ocean, whose shores no vessel of hers had ever coasted, but where another nation had already planted settlements not many leagues below the point where the lowest of these grants would strike the coast, and had explored to a higher parallel (the 43d) than would bound the highest! The granting of those indefinite charters is, in fact, among the most absurd things in all history. It is only to be compared, in ridiculousness, with the pope's bull, which has been so much ridiculed, and, in truth, bears a strong likeness to it. Nor is it of any more account, that Queen Elizabeth declared to the Spanish ambassador, Men

*Campden's Elizabeth, year 1583.

doza,* that "this imaginary propriety [sovereignty] could not hinder other princes from transporting colonies into those parts where the Spaniards inhabit not, forasmuch as prescription without possession is little worth." These things are mere forms, words. The question is, why, for two hundred and fifty years, vessels were not sent into those seas? colonies planted? legitimate ascendancy made to take the place of tenantless sovereignty? This would have been a practical denial of exclusive claim, amounting to something. Is it said, that the establishment of Meares, at Nootka Sound, 1788, was an attempt to do this? or is to be looked upon as virtually doing it? But this came too late to be legitimate. To say nothing of the title by prescription, which so long sufferance had now perfected, Spain, we repeat, had just completed such important discoveries along the whole coast, (prior to any made by England,) as in themselves gave her a new and perfect title. We cannot, indeed, repress our surprise, that this, the most important point of all, should be so constantly and willfully overlooked by the assailers of that title. We again assert, that if a claim by prior discoveries be not worthless, the three distinct explorations of Perez, Heceta and Bodega, surveying many parts of the coast, from California to the 58th parallel, in the years 1774, 1775-Cook arriv ing there in 1778-established for Spain a claim which cannot be overturned; and that England appears to us, in that controversy, to have been utterly in the wrong. It was her power, and Spain's weakness, which made that dispute end as it did. England is often magnanimous; but she has never refused to extend her dominion-most of all, her commerce; and the most ambitious and grasping of all her ministers, William Pitt, was then at the head of affairs. It is simply asked, what would Great Britain have done, had she been in Spain's place? The answer needs not to be intimated.

One other point has been raised. It is urged (in the Edinburgh Review and elsewhere) that the Spanish title, when made over to us by treaty, in 1819, had then become invalidated by "non-user,” or neglect to occupy. We see not how this can be. It must of course depend

on the length of time necessary to destroy an original title by non-occupation. Now the only date to be reckoned from is, necessarily, that of the Nootka Treaty (1792) when the rights of Spain were put forth by her, and to some extent admitted by England. But in 1815 we began to negotiate with Spain for her title -pending which transaction, of course, she would abstain from settling the coast. Are twenty-three years time enough for a nation to lose all hold on a valuable territory, because not choosing for a while to settle it? Surely not. And especially not in this case; since, by that treaty, no settlements by the English in the mean time could confer any territorial rights on them-and still more, because that period of twenty-three years was more confused and turbulent, more filled with mighty and terrible wars, hindering all the arts and occupations of peace, than almost any period of the world's history.

As to the claim in our own right, by discovery and exploration of the Columbia River, it is most evident to every one that we have strong grounds here for holding a part of Oregon, whether the Spanish title be worth anything or not. To declare the former of no avail because we assert the latter, is undoubtedly preposterous: if left as our only ground in which case alone, however, could it be urged to its full value-it would justly give us as high, at least, as the 49th degree and De Fuca's Straits. The facts and arguments on these points are so plain, they need not be enumerated.

We have reiterated this full corroboration of Mr. Buchanan's general statement-with a purpose. We are unwilling, for one, that the country should in any degree discredit the broadest title which, on abstract grounds, under the law of nations, can justly be made out for us. If there are just grounds of title to be urged by the opposing claimant under the same received law of nations; if there are other considerations in their favor not under that law, but under a far better one, the law of reasonable right—which unquestionably there are, and which we, with our new institutions, new thoughts, new policy, are peculiarly the people to acknowledge; let these things, in any practical disposition of the question, be carefully weighed, liberally allowed-but let us not fail to place on record before the world the original preponderance of the grounds of our claim.

But the chief reason at present in thus

justifying and strengthning the abstract argument of the Honorable Secretary of State and the Administration, is to show the greater height of the position from which they have fallen!

More closely to observe the exact nature of that position, we will state succinctly the actual rights of England, also, in the Oregon region. If our previous arguments have been correct, she has very little to urge of abstract, positive claims-very few original grounds of title to the soil-corresponding to those which the Americans unquestionably possess. She has none by occupancy, since the Nootka compromise (as already often remarked) conferred merely privileges of trade and hunting, with "settlements,” that is, posts, for that purpose--such as the Fur Company have had there ever since-but left "the sovereignty in abeyance." She has none by treaty, since that same Nootka compromise was the only treaty she ever made touching that region-except the repeated conventions of joint occupancy entered into with us, which, of course, left the "sovereignty" just where it was before. That she should have any by prescription, is necessarily out of the case, since her earliest knowledge of the country dates only from Cook's voyage to that coast, in 1778. Her sources of title must, then, be reduced to two-contiguity and discovery. The former she can allege, because her Canadian territory stretches west to the Rocky Mountains, and therefore lies over against a portion of Oregon-that part, namely, above the 49th degree, as that parallel was the boundary agreed upon with Great Britain, in 1818, between our territory and hers, from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky Chain. This claim is, indeed, of less value than our own below the 49th degree, since the nearest settlement in Canada is a thousand miles farther from Oregon than are our western frontiers, and the necessary and consequent force of this ground of claim is always affected by the greater or less proximity of a nation's inhabited soil to the region in dispute. It must, also, meet the force of the Spanish title, which, if valid, covers the whole coast, and extending inland, would reasonably reach back to the Rocky Mountains. But this opposition of claims does not hinder each from having its force under the law of nations-for, as we remarked above, the conventional principles of that law were from the first indefinite and contradictory, so that a claim by contiguity must often

conflict with another based on discovery. Here, then-a point to which we did not allow sufficient weight in our former article-England has, if not a preponderant claim, yet a reasonable consideration in her favor, which we cannot disregard, and which, in fact, we tacitly allowed in offering, as early as 1818, to let the same boundary of the 49th degree continue over the mountains down to the Pacific. Great Britain, however, has a counter claim to the Spanish title, in the north of Oregon, superior to this. She discovered, explored, and occupied with trading-posts, (before any American had been in that quarter,) the second great river of Oregon-Frazer's River-which runs from above the 54th degree southward about to the 49th degree, thus traversing nearly the whole of that region which so many other circumstances seem to have conspired to allow her. Undoubtedly, this claim, too, must meet the Spanish title, which, if valid, would certainly extend to the distance of two or three hundred miles inland, and would thus cover the whole of the section traversed by that river. Still, it cannot reasonably be left out of the account-especially as Spain never set a foot in the interior, from California to the 54th degree. It might, perhaps, almost be called a case of the conflict of those indeterminate principles allowed to govern such questions, (although the discovery of the coast was prior by some years to that of the river ;) and all such cases furnish plain grounds for compromise. At any rate, to quote from our former article: "As the discovery and exploration of the Columbia must be, in the eyes of other nations, and of England herself, a most important consideration' in our favor, supporting the exclusive Spanish title when assailed by England, so her discovery of Frazer's River is a just 'consideration' in her favor, against that title, as urged by us."

But these absolute grounds of counterclaim are not those on which this nation should most readily concede to England a part of Oregon. By no legitimate col. onization, indeed, but by a guarantied sufferance and privilege-determined in solemn treaty, before we owned the title -British subjects have been in undisturbed possession of all the northern part for a period of forty years, and have, in that time, established lines of trade, hunting interests, and various rights of property, that cannot be overlooked. What touches us more nearly

we have, ourselves, since acquiring that supposed exclusive title, admitted the same arrangement, leaving them joint tenants with us, with privileges of trade and settlement co-equal with our own; we have, at three different times, renewed that arrangement; we have, ourselves, again and again, for more than a quarter of a century, negotiated with England, to ascertain and settle conflicting rights-thus tacitly acknowledging that she has rights; and we have made three offers to compromise, by a line that would leave her four ninths of the whole territory.

We come now to the Administration. Mr. Buchanan undoubtedly saw the force of these circumstances on the British side. He virtually acknowledged them, indeed, by renewing the offer of a division of claims-or ".compromise," as he prefers to call it--by the 49th parallel. As a lawyer and a politician, however-still more, as a diplomatist—he, of course, felt himself compelled, not only to say nothing about them of his own accord, but to show that they had no existence! And it will be confessed, that partly from the stronger position on the American side of the question, partly from his creditable powers of reasoning, his argument was superior to any ever constructed on the part of England. We make no question, that-accompanied, as it was, with the evidence of a renewed proposal from us, to yield her a large portion of the country in dispute-the correspondence must have favorably impressed the European mind, not only with the preponderance of our claim, but with the liberality of our government. This impression must have been deepened by the additional fact, that the British Minister had rejected that offer, without even a reference to his government. Thus, then, the Administration and the country stood most favorably before the world on this question. With some unnecessary loudness of tone, at first, our government had yet committed no false step-had managed all by exposition and argument-had excelled the opposing government in controversy-had equaled it in concession-had even succeeded in placing its accredited agent in the wrong. How have they maintained this position? A question which we would not seek to answer, but for a purpose above personal or party spleen.

It is unquestionable, as all have felt, that Mr. Pakenham, in summarily rejecting the offer referred to, deserved all

the blame which Sir Robert Peel, in terms the more severe for their measured cour tesy, has bestowed upon him. It is also evident that our government was right, under such circumstances, in withdraw ing that offer: it was due to our national honor to do so. But the next movement was to be made by Great Britain. Accordingly, we find, from Sir Robert's speech, that the British Government, unable to make Mr. Buchanan's offer the basis of a new proposal of compromise on their part-as that offer had never been transmitted to them-and naturally unwilling to proceed without knowing what it was, yet anxious at once to settle a disastrous dispute, embraced the only alternative, and renewed a former proposal to arbitrate. This, the Administration peremptorily refuse. Why? From spleen, because the British Minister had as hastily rejected theirs? We will absolve even Mr. Polk from an impulse so child. ish. Besides, other reasons were given, which it is highly proper to consider!

Mr. Pakenham commences this second correspondence, with regretting, for his government, the failure of so many efforts to effect a friendly setttlement by negotiation-that from such a mode great advantages would doubtless have resulted to both parties-that, as it is, the most prudent, perhaps the only step, is to "refer the whole question of an equitable division of that territory, to an arbitration of some friendly sovereign or State" that this step, it was hoped, would be viewed as a proof of the confidence of England in the justice of her claim, yet of her readiness to incur the risk of a great sacrifice, for the preservation of peace-and that the proposal was "made in a spirit of moderation and fairness, of which the world would judge." Mr Buchanan, in reply, objects that the British Government, in proposing to refer to arbitration the " equitable division," that is, a partition, of Oregon, "assumed the fact, that the title of Great Britain to a portion of the territory is valid; and thus take for granted the very question in dispute." The title-the bare title alone should be referred. The proposition is accordingly rejected.

Now the objection to this " objection" is, that it was quite too legal. Mr. Buchanan has not forgotten the bar: he cannot fail to be guarded and finical; he remembers that it is a lawyer's maxim to "go for the whole and get what you can." He was willing, therefore, to put forward a mere technical obstruction, neglecting

the spirit of reasonable right in the matter-which is one of the greatest possible errors in a wise diplomacy. It was not, in fact, at all necessary for him to understand the term "equitable division," in the alarming light of asserting an original inherent title under the " law of nations"-a prior sovereignty in the soil. No one has contended more strenuously than ourselves for the superior validityabstractly considered-of the SpanishAmerican claim. But that claim, as we ha veshown, is hampered with incumbrances, many of which our own government has from time to time helped to heap upon it. It is met by various "circumstances," "considerations," even partial counter-claims, advanced under the the same loose rules that apply to itself; and it is on these grounds, we assert, that some sort of division of that country between us and England is " equitable”— or, in lieu of this, that the "reasonable rights" which have grown up there, in various ways, should be bought out. The Hon. Secretary knew no better then, than he had known before, that Great Britain does claim a superior title to parts of Oregon; he knew, too, that, on the grounds above named, we have ourselves for more than a quarter of a century been disputing, negotiating, making offers and counter-offers-all referring to a division of that same territory-the last of which offers came from his own hands; he knew, therefore, in whatever form the question should come before an arbitrator-as naked title or terms of partitionthese considerations would guide the decision to the same result, granting a "division"-"equitable," it should be hoped, thus presenting the very phrase he objects to! Why did he not, then, accept the proposal at once, like a man whose logic is not too keen for his common sense?

As it is not to be expected, however, that the lawyer should be entirely lost in the Secretary of State, we would not find fault with this "nicety of eye," were it not manifest that he raised the objection merely as a cover. To satisfy Mr. Buchanan's "legal scruples," the British Minister offered in reply, just what Mr. Buchanan had indicated. He offered to refer the question, not of partition, but of title; the arbitrator, however,-in case of finding neither possessed of a perfect title to the whole-was to make a division

according to the just claims of each." He suggests, moreover, that the reference might be made-not necessarily to a

government or crowned head, but to "a mixed commission, with an umpire appointed by common consent"-or to "a board, composed of the most distinguished civilians and jurists of the time." To this noble proposition-the noblest which one nation could offer and another receive one of the noblest, we may say, ever made in any age-what is Mr. Buchanan's reply? In that answer, we most painfully feel, he has not only not assumed the wise diplomatist-he has not even preserved the right-minded lawyer. It is an unexpected, unnecessary quibble, annexing a condition utterly unworthy in its origin and character, and useless in its results. This offer, says our Secretary, is exposed to the same " objection in point of fact, if not in form," which lay against the last. For if the arbitrator finds neither party possessing a complete title to the whole, he shall assign to each a portion according to their seeming claims, which "might, and probably would be construed into an intimation, if not a direct invitation to the arbitrator, to divide the territory between the parties." "The title, and the title alone, can be submitted." Arbitrators are naturally desirous to please both parties"-"make a compromising award," &c. The proposal is accordingly rejected.

Surely this is the absurdest mockery. Invitation to divide the territory! Do we then really design to have the whole? Have we for a quarter of a century been pretending to negotiate, to compromise, as a mere cover to an ultimate purpose? throwing up straw to see how strong the wind is making a smoke instead of a "council-fire?" And is it now the time to accomplish that purpose? Did Mr. Buchanan ever dream, that we could get the whole of Oregon by any management? Has he once imagined, that England does not believe in her claim? Past negotiations have failed:-does he yet hope to get the entire region by a skillful diplomacy-carefully to force it away from her?-to soothe her into a soft relinquishment? Does he suppose, moreoverdoes any reasoning man in this country, or in all Christendom, suppose, that any arbitrator or arbitrators, would, or should under the circumstances, do otherwise than award some kind of division of claims, or an equivalent for relinquished rights? What, then, does he hope for? What would he have?-War? If he wishes not this flagrant alternative, does he fear in arbitration some sacrifice, not to be thought of? This he intimates

at the end. Weak, pusillanimous, as it is, it stands the only colorable reason given. But it is utterly insufficient. "The United States hold the best title in existence to the whole." The President, therefore, "cannot consent to jeopard for his country all the great interests involved"-" cannot deprive the Republic of all the good harbors on the coast." Patriotic man! He had already offered to give up half of them! Could he have any reason to complain, if arbitration took away the same extent?-Or, can he pretend to see the danger of losing more than that? Certainly, for him or the Republic to fear such a result is equally preposterous, undignified, and unjust. If our claims are, on the whole, so strongly based, as Mr. Buchanan thinks them to be, as nearly the whole country is persuaded they are, how shall we insult Christendom with the doubtasserted, implied, or thought-that there is no Christian nation, nor any number of civil and judicial characters, in her limits, who would see the grounds of such claims, and do us justice?

And how would submitting "the title, and the title alone," advance the settlement of difficulties a single step? Were it to be decided that we had an abstract title, paramount, to the whole, we should still be forced to negotiate with Great Britain respecting those circumstantial rights which have grown up in that region through a period of forty years. should only have submitted to long uncertainty and delay, to find ourselves at the end in practically the same position as before.

We

We have a higher idea, than most persons seem to entertain, of the value of the Oregon territory and the Pacific harbors. Lying between the vast interior of this continent and Asia, that coast and its harbors hold a most important relation to the rest of North America. We know, too, that the most valuable harbors on the whole coast of Oregon, and among the finest waters in the world-are in De Fuca's Straits, near the 49th°. We confess, moreover, we should greatly prefer, with Mr. Pakenham, that this controversy had been settled by negotiation, for it is really a disgrace that two such nations should have negotiated so many years with "assurances of distinguished consideration," yet come to no definite conclusion on the matter. But this method so constantly failing, all considerations pointed to arbitration-an alternative always honorable in cases that