without experience of the evils of European interference and intrigues on our continent, the conviction of the truth of the great principle proclaimed by Mr. Monroe-and of the expediency of solemnly declaring it was earliest forced upon us. Its utterance was precipitated by events over which we had no control, though we might, in their result, be largely affected by them. The whole of this continent had, at successive periods preceding that to which we are now referring, been declared free and independent. The colonies of Spain and Portugal had all withdrawn themselves from the control of the mother country; and with various fortune, but unfaltering determination, were waging battle with what remained of the armies of their oppressors. The contest had been long and bloody-the issue was still undecided.

In Europe the tide of the French revolution seemed stayed. Its child and champion, after bestriding that region of the earth like a Colossus, overthrowing at a nod, thrones, principalities and powers, had himself been overthrown-and, like Prometheus, chained to a rock in the ocean, was doomed to perish beneath the vulture beak of his own fierce passions and disappointed hopes.

A Holy Alliance undertook the restoration of ancient usages and ancient privileges; they carved, and they cut, in order to establish a "balance of power." They "mediatized " some little sovereigns who stood in their way, and they magnified some large ones who would not be put out of the way. They subverted the constitutional government of Naples, denounced the constitutional government of Spain; and, having settled Europe upon the sure foundation, as they fancied, of prescriptive rights and monarchical institutions, they had leisure to turn their attention to the American continent.

They were not wholly without a pretext for so doing. The nature of the conflict carried on in the former SpanishAmerican colonies, was bloody and remorseless to a degree that shocked the common feeling of mankind; thus far, too, it had been unproductive of any countervailing benefits; the issue was still doubtful, blood still flowed, rapine, lust and slaughter, still ravaged countries, than which no fairer or finer are shone upon by the sun in his unceasing round. Humanity therefore seemed to appeal to man and heaven against the continuance of such hostilities, and when

Spain joined her appeal too, and invoked the aid of the Holy Alliance to put a stop to such a warfare, and to bring back her revolted colonies to the mild dominion which they so ungratefully sought to throw off, there was motive and cause enough for the interposition of the High Contracting Parties.

At this precise juncture, well informed by the faithful, intelligent and competent ministers who, then at European courts, represented this Republic, President Monroe uttered his calm but memorable protest. It alluded to nothing done, or meditated in the Councils of the European Alliance-it was pointed at no particular case, and offended by no exceptional allusions or reservations-but broadly, firmly, and irrevocably took the ground that whatever nations, having colonies in America, might do, or forbear to do, in regard to those colonies-the United States could not see "with indifference" the intervention of other nations, not thus situated, with the affairs of this continent. Weighty, well considered, and of decisive effect, were the words then and thus spoken by the American President. They paralyzed at once the inchoate movements for a European intervention, diplomatic in form, but military and coercive in fact; and Spain was left to her own time and resources to subjugate, if she could, or recognize as independent when she would, her former colonies.

The result of the conflict, when it once became apparent that Spain would not receive any aid in carrying it on from other powers, could not remain doubtful, and before long not a Spanish soldier was left, in hostile guise, on the continent of America. With all the natural sympathy of a free people in the struggles of others to become free, we had looked upon the fierce conflict; yet faithful ourselves to the obligations we prescribed to others, we interfered not in it. But when the strife was ended, and independent governments were established and sustained, where before colonial bondage alone existed, we, first among nations, recognized that independence; and when, subsequently, Mr. Canning, as Prime Minister of England, following our lead in recognizing the new nations, declared with ostentatious egotism in the House of Commons that he had called the South American nations into existence," he assumed as his own, a trophy which, in truth, belonged to Henry Clay and the American Congress.

These nations were not insensible of the importance of our early friendship, nor unmindful of it, and when a time came in which they could with calmness examine their own position, their relataions to each other, to Europe and the United States, and thus be enabled to appreciate the value of an American system of nations-if the phrase may be allowed-as contradistinguished from the European system, their first care was to invite our attendance and coöperation in an American Council-a Council for consultation, and not for alliance-a Council where the greater experience, the greater weight, and the assured position as a people, of the United States, could not fail to exercise a large and salutary influence. Hence sprang the CONGRESS OF PANAMA, of which we will now proceed to sketch the history as briefly as possible.

The protracted struggle between Spain and her colonies first led to the suggestion that all these colonies should make a common cause and a common effort. Difficulties, however, occurred in reducing this idea to practice, and although the Western States of South America were greatly aided in the achievement of their independence by the unpurchased valor of their sister republics on the Atlantic border, there was no general plan of coöperation for the common object. It was not, indeed, until the struggle was virtually abandoned by Spain, that the treaties between Colombia and Peru in 1822, and in the three succeeding years, between Colombia, Chili, Guatemala and Mexico were made.

It was in virtue of these treaties that a Congress of American nations was agreed upon, and the Isthmus of Panama named as the place of holding it. In 1825, Colombia, Mexico, and Central America, by their ministers at Washington, formally invited the United States to be present by a minister or ministers at that Congress, after having, in the first instance, with great consideration, privately informed themselves whether such formal invitation would be unobjectionable and agreeable to this government. It was also intimated distinctly by these ministers that their governments "did not expect that the United States would change their present neutral policy, nor was it desired that they should take part in such of the deliberations of the proposed Congress as might relate to the prosecution of the existing war with Spain."

John Q. Adams, then President of the United States, accepted this invitation, in the spirit in which it was given. In his message of 15th March, 1826, to the House of Representatives, in reply to a resolution of that body calling on the President for information respecting the mission and its objects, Mr. Adams says:

"I deem it proper to premise that these objects did not form the only, nor even the principal motive for my acceptance of the invitation. My first and greatest inducement was to meet, in the spirit of kindthat spirit by three sister republics of this ness and friendship, an overture made in hemisphere. The great revolution in human affairs which has brought into existence, nearly at the same time, eight sovereign and independent nations in our own quarter of the globe, has placed the United States in a situation not less novel, and scarcely less interesting than that in which they had found themselves by their

own transition from a cluster of colonies to a nation of sovereign states."

The general objects of the Congress so far as the ministers from this country were to take part in it, are thus briefly set forth in a report from the Secretary of State, H. Clay:

"The President believed that such a

Congress as was contemplated might be highly useful in settling several important disputed questions of public law, in arranging other matters of deep interest to the American Continent, and in strengthening the friendship and amicable intercourse between the American powers."

There would seem, in this exposition of the spirit in which the invitation was given and accepted, and of the motives recommending such a Congress, nothing that patriotism should question, or that an enlightened regard for our own interests, or for preexisting obligations towards other nations, could render inexpedient. Our neutrality, so faithfully observed when the battle was raging, could not be hazarded by attendance at a peaceful council, especially under the reservation that the ministers of the United States were to take no part in any deliberation respecting the future conduct of the nominal war still existing; nor was the principle so wisely laid down by Washington endangered-that we should avoid entangling alliances with other nations.

Nevertheless, the annunciation by the President in his message to Congress of

December 6, 1825, that the invitation to attend the Congress of Panama "had been accepted, and ministers on the part of the United States will be commissioned to attend at those deliberations, and to take part in them so far as may be compatible with that neutrality from which it is neither our intention, nor the desire of the other American States, that we should depart," was received by the party in opposition with vehement censure and denunciation.

The President was charged with an unconstitutional exercise of authority in thus assuming to accept the invitation of our sister republics, and in instituting a new mission without first ascertaining the sense of Congress, or at least of the Senate; with hazarding our neutrality, and with seeking to entangle us in inconvenient and dangerous alliances with other countries, in opposition to the established policy and received opinion of our own. The danger of giving offence to Europe by thus interesting ourselves in the councils of the nations of our own Continent, was largely dwelt upon, while the character, deeds and destinies of the American Republics were proportionably depreciated.

Nothing moved from his high designs by this clamor, the President on the 26th Dec. sent in to the Senate the names of Richard C. Anderson, of Kentucky, and John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, "as envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to the assembly of American Nations at Panama." In the message communicating these nominations, the President, after referring to that passage in his annual message which announced the invitation to the Congress of Panama, and its acceptauce, thus proceeded :

"Although the measure was deemed to be within the constitutional competency of the Executive, I have not thought proper to take any step in it before ascertaining that my opinion of its expediency will concur with that of both branches of the Legislature: first, by the decision of the Senate upon the nominations to be laid before them; and second by the sanction of both Houses to the appropriations, without which it cannot be carried into ef* [From the papers communicated,] it will be seen that the United States neither intend nor are fexpected to take part in any deliberations of a belligerent character; that the motive for their attendance is neither to contract alliances, nor to engage in any undertaking

fect.

or project importing hostility to any other nation. But the South American nations, in the infancy of their independence, often find themselves in positions, with reference plicable to which, derivable from the state to other countries, with the principles apof independence itself, they have not been familiarized by experience. The result of this has been, that sometimes in their intercourse with the United States, they have manifested dispositions to reserve a right of granting special favors and privileges to the Spanish nation as the price of their recognition; at others they have actually established duties and impositions operating unfavorably to the United States to the advantage of European powers; and that they might interchange among themsometimes they have appeared to consider selves mutual concessions of exclusive favor, to which neither European powers nor the United States should be admitted. In most of these cases, their regulations unfavorable to us have yielded to friendly The consenexpostulation. *

taneous adoption of principles of maritime neutrality, and favorable to the navigation of peace, and commerce in time of war, will also form a subject of consideration to this Congress. The doctrine, that free ships make free goods, and the restrictions of reason upon the extent of blockades, may be established by general agreement, with far more ease, and perhaps with less danger, by the general engagement to adhere to them, concerted at such a meeting, than by partial treaties or conventions with each of the nations separately. An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting that each will guard, by its future European colony within its borders own means, against the establishment of any may be found advisable. This was more than two years since announced by my predecessor to the world, as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American Continents. It may be so developed to the new Southern nations, that they will all feel it as an essential appendage to their independence."

That portion of the Senate of the United States, which claimed to be eminently friendly to the progress of free institutions, to the cause of liberty and the rights of man, could see nothing in the mission thus projected and explained, nothing in "an assembly of American nations," most of them just sprung into being-self-constituted and self-vindicated-to enlist their sympathy, or conciliate their judgment. On the contrary, they met the whole subject with a stern and pertinacious opposition.

The special message and the nomi

nations were, on the 28th, (two days after they were sent in,) referred to the Committee on foreign relations. On the same day, Mr. Branch of North Carolina (afterwards Secretary of the Navy under President Jackson), submitted a resolution and preamble, which were printed for the use of the Senate, of which the purport was, that the President" does not constitutionally possess either the right or the power to appoint ambassadors or other public ministers, but with the advice and consent of the Senate, except when vacancies may happen in the recess."

The Senate continued to occupy itself in secret session with this subject. On the 4th Jan. a resolution was adopted on motion of Mr. Macon of North Carolina, calling upon the President to communicate confidentially to the Senate any conventions between the new States relative to the Congress at Panama, and any other information tending to show the propriety of a mission from the United States to said Congress. On the 10th the President communicated the papeis asked for consisting of four Conventions between Colombia and Peru, Colombia and Chili, Colombia and Central America, and Colombia and Mexico-and of certain correspondence between the Executive government of the United States, and the governments of Russsia, France, Colombia and Mexico.

The Conventions between the new American States were all-1st, for a mutual, defensive alliance, in order, as the treaty betweeen Chili and Colombia expresses it, "to maintain their independence of the Spanish nation, and of any other foreign domination whatsoever;" 2ndly, for commercial purposes; and finally, for the convening of a " "general assembly of the American States."

The correspondence communicated consisted of copies of letters to and from our ministers in Russia, France, Mexico and Colombia; those of the ministers in Europe, related to the steps taken by them in conformity with instructions from the State department-to invite the governments to which they were accredited, to use their good offices in inducing Spain to put an end to the quasi war against her former colonies, by recognizing their independence, but more particularly to express to those governments the determination of that of the United States, "not to allow a transfer of the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico to any European Power" of which, at that period, some

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apprehension existed. The main object of the correspondence with Mexico and Colombia, was to dissuade both those governments from a purpose, then supposed to be entertained, of wresting from Spain the two islands above named.

On the 16th January, Mr. Macon as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, made a long report adverse to the views of the President, and concluding with this resolution:

time, for the United States to send any "Resolved, that it is not expedient, at this ministers to the Congress of American nations assembled at Panama."

The Committe of Foreign Relations of the Senate, was composed at that session of the following persons:-Mr. Macon of North Carolina, Mr. Tazewell of Virginia, Mr. Gailliard of South Carolina, Mr. Mills of Massachusetts, and Mr.

White of Tennessee.

On the 25th March, in the House of Representatives, Mr. Crowninshield from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House, reported favorably on the mission, and concluded with this resolution:

"Resolved, that in the opinion of this House, it is expedient to appropriate the funds necessary to enable the President of the United States to send ministers to the

Congress of Panama.”

The Committee on Foreign Relations of the House was thus constituted-Mr. Forsyth of Georgia, Mr. Crowninshield of Massachusetts, Mr. Trimble of Ohio, Mr. Archer of Virgina, Mr. Worthington of Maryland, Mr. Everett of Massachusetts, and Mr. Stevenson of Pennsylvania.

As these two conflicting Reports present substantially the argument relied on on either side, for the support of the views taken by each, we proceed to furnish a brief analysis of each, beginning in the order of time with that of the Senate, to which, in some sense, the Report in the House is a reply.

In entering on the examination of a subject of so much novelty, delicacy, and high importance to the character and future destinies of the United States, the committee of the Senate say, they were somewhat embarrassed by the declaration in the President's message that he had already accepted the invitation to send a minister to Panama. Inasmuch, however, as the correspondence of the Secretary of State intimates to the several foreign ministers who joined in the invitation, that the concurrence of the Senate was indispen