SECT. II.—The Description of the Passions, together with a General Division of them into three Ranks.

It is evident from the nature of things, that there must be in pure and separate spirits some affections correspondent to most of those passions which our spirits feel who dwell in animal bodies. They have love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sorrow, fear and hope, as well as we: But while we dwell in these bodies, the affections of our minds will be accompanied with some commotions of animal nature, and some peculiar sensations, whereby, as I hinted, they obtain the name of passions. Now it is exceeding hard, if not impossible, for us precisely to distinguish how far the animal nature, and how far the mind or spirit, are concerned in producing all these effects, and in raising these sensations or commotions which we call passions. I shall confine myself, therefore, in this discourse, only to give some account of these complex workings of our compound nature, as we find them in our present embodied state.

The passions may be thus described: They are those sensible commotions of our whole nature, both soul and body, which are occasioned by the perception of an object according to some special properties that belong to it. See Section III. Remark 2, and 3. An object which is suited to excite the passions, must have one of these three properties, viz. it must be either rare and uncommon, or good and agreeable, or evil and disagreeable: Or at least we must have such an idea and apprehension of it before it can excite any passion in us.

Now if we will distinguish the chief passions of our nature according to their objects, and confine ourselves to the common words and names whereby they are usually called, we may make three ranks of them; which for distinction's sake, I shall name the first, second, and third rank. The two first are primitive, the third is derivative.

The first rank of passions are these three; admiration, love, and hatred. If the object be rare and uncommon, it excites admiration or wonder. If we look on it as good or any way agreeable to us, it may engage our love; but if it be evil or disagreeable, it moves our hatred. Note here, I take the words good and evil, and consequently, the words love and hatred, in a very large sense, which I shall account for afterwards.

The second rank of chief passions are the divers kinds of love and hatred, which also are distinguised by their objects. If the object appear valuable, it raises a love of esteem; if worthless, the hatred is called contempt.

If the object appear fit to receive good from us, it is love of benevolence, or good will: If it appear rather fit to receive evil from us, the hatred is called malevolence, or ill-will. If the

object appear pleasing, and fit to do us good, it raises the love of complacence, or delight; if it be displeasing, and unfit to do us good, it excites a displicence or dislike.

From love and hatred in their different kinds, but chiefly. from complacence and displicence, arise several more chief passions, which may be called the third rank, and which are also distinguished by their objects. Note, In this pair of passions, complacence and displicence, and in all the third rank, which is chiefly derived from them, the pleasing object is more properly called evil, than in the passions before-mentioned.

If the good be absent or unpossessed, and possible to be obtained the passion of love grows up to desire; if the evil may possibly come upon us, the hatred expresses itself in aversion, or avoidance: Though there may be also an aversion to some evil from which we are sufficiently secure. If there be any prospect of obtaining the absent good, there is a passion excited which is called hope; but if the absent evil be likely to come upon us, it raises the passion of fear.

Fear also arises from a present or expected good in danger of being lost: And there is a hope of security from some absent threatening evil, or of deliverance from some evil that is present. If the good be actually obtained, or the evil prevented, it excites our joy and gladness; if the good be actually lost, or the evil come upon us, it causes sorrow and grief. Whoever helps us to attain this good, or prevents the evil, excites in us gratitude: Whosoever hinders our attainment of good, or promotes the evil, raises our anger.

There are very few, if any, of the passions for which we have any name, and which are usually taken notice of in the heart of man; but they may be reduced to some or other of those general heads, as I shall explain them. I do not pretend to lay down. this distinction and arrangement of the passions of man, as an uncontroverted or certain thing: But upon the best survey I can take of the various workings of the heart of man, as well as of the several authors who have written on this subject, I do not find any of them lead me into an easier or better scheme than this. A good logical scheme and arrangement of things has some advantages in it; it shews us the relations of various things to each other, their correspondencies, their similitude and differences; and it greatly assists the memory: But it is still of more importance to describe the several passions with justice and truth as they are in nature, than to range them in logical classes and just order.

SECT. III.—A Further Account of the Nature of the Passions, in some Remarks concerning them.

It appears by what I have already said, that the passions are certain principles or powers in man of a mixed nature, beVOL. II.

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longing partly to the soul or mind, and partly to the animal body, that is, the flesh and blood: For it is evident, that when we perceive any object with such properties as before mentioned, we find usually some ferments of the blood, or natural spirits, or some alterations which affect the body, as well as we feel special impressions on our minds. What these special ferments are, or what the distinct commotions of the nerves, or inward parts of animal nature of the several distinct passions, is not easy to determine with exactness: It requires a good skill in anatomy, and long and watchful observation of the workings of the several passions, to write on this subject with success. The ingenious Descartes has aimed at it in his treatise on this subject, and perhaps hath as Irappily performed it as could be expected, considering how much less acquaintance with animal nature the learned world had arrived at in his age. I proceed now to give some further account of these pathetic powers of human nature by the following remarks:

I. It is not necessary that the object which excites our passions should be something actually present with us; for if there be but the idea of it found in the mind or imagination, it is sufficient to raise intense passions; sometimes horror and fear may be unruly and violent when the objects or occasions of them are far distant; but they are supposed to be approaching: And sometimes the very absence of pleasing or displeasing objects may the occasion of grief or joy; but it is then the perception of this absence that is the immediate cause of them.

II. The passions are wont to be described as mere inward sensationst. But since there are some few of the passions that include acts of volition in them, or some propensities or outgoings of the will, as well as perceptions of the mind, such as the passions of desire, aversion, and their species, I chuse rather in this place to describe the passions in general, as some sensible commotions of our whole nature, both soul and body, which description may perhaps more fully comprehend all the passions.

III. Though most of the passions are confessed to be sensations, yet I have frequently in my "discourses of the love of God, &c." called them active and sprightly powers, because some of them include the act of the will in them, and very few of them

What I call here natural spirits, are sometimes called animal or vital spirits which are supposed to be the springs or mediums of animal motions, both inward and outward: But whether these be some refined spirituous liquids, or vapours drawn off from the blood, or whether they be nothing else but the elastic or springy parts of the air drawn in by respiration, and mingled with the blood and other animal juices, is not yet agreed by philosophers.

+ I have sometimes described the passions, as the soul's sensations of some commotions in animal nature, arising from the perception of peculiar objects, And I think it is not of much importance whether they be called the soul's sensations of commotions in the body, or sensible commotions of soul and body. I am sure both are included in every passion.

are so entirely passive, but they have a tendency to excite the person to lively and vigorous actions of some kind or other. And indeed this is the chief design of them in the nature of

man.

IV. Because several of the passions, or these commotions of animal nature, do particularly affect the heart, therefore the heart, in the common sense of mankind, is reckoned the seat of the passions, and they are sometimes called the passions of the heart. It was probably from this observation, that some ancient philosophers and writers among other nations, as well as the Jews, supposed the heart to be the special seat and residence of the soul or intellectual spirit, and on this account the heart in scripture, as well as in heathen writings, is used to signify the soul itself.

V. The ferment of the animal juices, and the motion of the blood, are not the only things which are affected while passion is raised; for most of the passions have some effects on the colour or features of the countenance, and especially on the eyes, and discover themselves by gestures or voices, or other outward signs: So sorrow is discovered by tears and groans, mirth by laughter, joy by a smiling countenance, and anger by frowning, &c. Whence it comes to pass that many of them are so happily imitated by painters.

VI. It is true, that the passions are generally, if not always raised or occasioned by the perception of some object, according to the special properties that belong to it yet there are several things in the nature and the life of man which greatly dispose the heart to particular passions, and render it much more susceptive of them; such as age, constitution, health or sickness, weather, &c. which I shall hereafter enumerate more particularly.

VII. Though the complexion of some persons make them more susceptive of these pathetic commotions in general than others are, and though the natural or accidental state or circumstances of some persons, and at certain seasons, dispose them more to particular passions, such as fear, anger, joy, hope, &c. yet there is scarce any person, whatsoever be his complexion, or his age, or his circumstances, who makes a strict and narrow observation of what passes within him, but will find almost all the passions of nature, at one time or other, rising in him in greater or less degrees.

VIII. Though the chief, and the original passions are these which were before named, viz. wonder, love, hatred, esteem, contempt, &c. yet they include a great variety of particular affections under them. In many of the passions the ferments of flesh and blood, and the sensations and motions of the mind, are so exceedingly swift and momentaneous, they are so joined and complicated with each other, and they run so often into one another

in an undistinguished mixture, that it is exceeding hard to give such an accurate and distinct account of all of them as one would wish or desire.

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IX. There is another thing, also, that makes a just and accurate scheme of the passions very difficult, if not impossible; and that is, that the language of men has sometimes made one word to signify very different passions or appetites; as for instance the word love signifies gluttony, which is the love of eating good victuals and friendship, which is the love of an equal intelligent being; and ambition, which is the love of honour; and concupiscence or lust; all these are called love. So modesty, which is the spring of innocent blushes, and the guard of virtue; and that blush of confusion and disdonour, which is the just effect of guilt, are both called shame. These are different ideas, but the same name still. Again, the language of men hath sometimes combined and associated several ideas of different passions into one word, or name; such as jealousy, suspicion, envy And sometimes where the passions themselves have scarce any difference, yet there are different names for them, as anger, and wrath, and fury And there are many other combined passions that have no name. A perfect scheme therefore is not to be expected.

X. Finally, I would give my readers notice, that several of these principles, qualities, or tempers in men, which I have ranked among the passions, may be called virtues and vices; as pride, envy, good-will, compassion, &c. and are so described by the writers of morality: But since they are often attended with particular forments or commotions of animal nature, and distinct sensations of the mind, I have given them a place amongst the passions. These things being premised, I proceed now to give some account of each general or original passion, with the particulars contained under it.

SECT. IV.-Of Admiration or Wonder.

The most primitive and original passions, or those of the first rank, are admiration, love, and hatred.

First, Admiration. When we perceive any object that is rare and uncommon, that is new and strange, either for its kinds or for its qualities; or when we meet with such an occurrence or event as is unusual or unexpected; or such as is at least unusual at such a particular time and place, we are struck with admiration or wonder: And that without any consideration whether the object be valuable or worthless, whether it be good or evil. We wonder at a very great or a very little man, a dwarf or a giant ; at a very little horse, at a huge snake or toad, at an elephant, or a whale or a comet, or at any rare performance of art, as moving machines, such as clocks, watches, with a variety of uncommon motions and operations; we wonder at a piece of extraordinary wit, skill or