IN ten counties of Eastern Pennsylvania, 162,503 miners have laid down their tools and stopped mining anthracite coal because they have failed to come to terms with their employers. They refuse to work unless they can obtain an acceptable contract. In that respect they take the same position as any individual who seeks to obtain the best wages and working-conditions possible. The majority of these men are employed by ten large coal companies which produce about 74 per cent of the anthracite coal and own about 90 per cent of the reserve coal lands. These companies are known as 'railroad' companies because they are or have been owned by the railroads penetrating the anthracite coal fields. The so-called 'independent' coal companies produce the remaining 26 per cent of anthracite coal, one half of which is mined by nine of these independents. Thus the failure of nineteen coal companies and a union representing over 160,000 anthracite miners to come to an agreement upon wages, hours, and workingconditions faces millions of people with the prospect of a shortage of fuel, inadequate heating-facilities, and high prices.

Chronic undersupply of anthracite coal for the last ten years makes this situation all the more formidable. In contrast to the effects of a strike in the bituminous industry, the loss of production of anthracite cannot be quickly made up. It is estimated that the

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bituminous mines in operation at present could produce about 400,000,000 tons more than our yearly demand. Whether anthracite colliery capacity is made inadequate because of physical limitations upon production, exhaustion of the most accessible deposits, decrease in labor supply, or because of the deliberate policy of the coal companies, is a matter of controversy. All of these factors may bear upon the situation, but one thing is certain actual production is below estimated capacity. Production reached its peak in 1918, when the mines operated 293 days. Since the war the mines have been running about 270 days out of a 308-working-day year, except as the mines have been closed by strikes.

In so far as chronic undersupply may be explained by a shortage of labor, it appears to be an undersupply of miners' laborers, who were formerly recruited extensively from the ranks of European immigrants. The United States Coal Commission reported that the present limitation of mining capacity cannot be attributed to the lack of skilled miners growing out of the Pennsylvania requirement of certification of miners. The Commission concluded that an undersupply of unskilled laborers is not a limitation on capacity over which the operators have no control. Other industries have increased their working forces since the war, and 'it therefore appears that earnings and conditions of labor offered by the anthracite

industry, viewed in the aggregate, have not attracted labor in the same degree as have the wages and conditions offered by other industries.'

In every controversy there are two Isides to be heard. Both sides have a story to tell and a cause to defend. The people who want an uninterrupted supply of coal should not be an uninterested public. One-sided condemnations of either the miners or the operators will not control the conditions that cause strikes. What follows is an attempt to let each side state its case in its own terms.

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From the standpoint of the miners, the controversy centres around (1) an increase in wages, (2) better workingconditions, (3) full recognition of the union, and (4) better living-conditions. Nothing startling is revealed by this classification, but the first two of these items increase the cost of production, which is guarded zealously by the operators. The demand for full recognition of the union is the result of a longstanding controversy, while the request for better living-conditions is understandable by everybody.

The miners demand a ten-per-cent increase for contract miners (pieceworkers) and one dollar per day for those employed by the day. How much this demand would actually increase the labor cost per ton of coal can only be a guess, because nobody knows how many days per year the mines will work or just how many tons will be produced. The miners are more concerned about the yearly wages they make and the standard of living they can enjoy than they are about labor

cost.

The most recent authoritative figures on wages in the coal industry were collected by the United States Coal

Commission for the year 1921. According to these figures for the anthracite industry, 20 per cent of the contract miners (pieceworkers) who drew wages in the same mine on every pay-roll throughout the year earned more than $2400, and 10 per cent more than $2700. But 20 per cent earned less than $1700, and 10 per cent less than $1500. The average expressed as the earnings of the 'median full-year contract miner' was $2000. These were the earnings of the highest-paid occupational group, and they do not include those who obtained part-time work by shifting from mine to mine. The average number of days on which the mines hoisted coal was 271.

Contract miners' laborers, inside daymen, and outside day-men are also classed as major occupational groups. Of those who drew wages in the same mine on every pay-roll throughout the year, over 63 per cent of the first group, over 52 per cent of the second group, and over 53 per cent of the third group earned less than $1500. Of these groups those earning more than $2700 were mere fractions of one per cent. The median earnings for these groups were $500 or $600 lower than for contract miners.

In order to approximate more closely what the anthracite workers are now earning, it is necessary to add the tenper-cent increase received in their last contract of 1923. But it must be kept in mind that these figures of earnings are not actual rates and that they will vary according to the number of days worked, according to the differences in wage-rates paid for each occupation, and according to the differences in working-conditions in each mine and each district. Furthermore, they do not represent the wage situation as affected by part-time work because of labor turnover. The above figures apply simply to two thirds of all

contract miners and inside day-men, to three fourths of all outside day-men, and to one third of the miners' laborers. Therefore the use of these figures to characterize anthracite wages presents the most favorable aspect of the wage situation.

In the mind of the miners this constant conflict over wages is caused by the claims of the investors accelerating at an intolerable rate as against the claims of the employees and the public. These investors' claims take the form of charges for depletion, interest, royalties, and profits. The miners pointed out to the Coal Commission, to which was delegated the task of investigating the causes of strikes, that they had been taught by 'bitter experience that the main cause is the ever-accelerating claim of the holders of anthracite securities. For every increase in national demand for coal, for every increase in technology and productivity, the investor demands the full increment, keeping prices at the maximum which the traffic will bear, and wages at the minimum upon which the miners can be made to exist. There is no solution for the economic problem of anthracite until this intolerable grip is relaxed; until the public-service function of the industry is frankly recognized; and until the claims of investors are confined to reasonable limits, the standard of living of the miners permitted to grow with the productive expansion of the industry, and the price to the consumer adjusted to these two factors.'

Whether or not one agrees with the miners, this is a statement in no uncertain terms of an issue that affects the present and the long-time adjustment of wages.

The employers resist the demands of the miners for wages, hours, and working-conditions that will increase the cost of production of coal. They claim

the miners enjoy higher annual earnings than any other workers of whom they have found record. They want the miners to make a long-term agreement 'with provision for the adjustment of wage-rates during that term so that wages may be conformed to changing economic conditions.' No elaboration is made of this principle of adjustment that would indicate whether or not wages would be changed merely in connection with changes in the cost of living. Nor is there any mention of the way the principle would bear upon the adjustment of working-conditions that largely determine the miner's opportunity to work and earn.

But, aside from the question as to whether or not the miners should receive the increase which they have demanded, there are many other factors that affect their earnings. These they have included in their demands in a form that has meaning mostly for the operators and for those who may happen to be familiar with mining conditions.

They demand uniformity in dayrates, and the carrying-out of the task of equalization of rates that was delegated to the Anthracite Board of Conciliation by the last contract. This diversity of rates is an inheritance from the days of individual bargaining, which was crystallized into the form of a precedent by the award of the Anthracite Coal Commission in 1903. The demand involves more nearly equal pay for equal work.

They demand that when pieceworkers are put in abnormal workingplaces, in which it is impossible to make the usual wage, the miner shall be paid the average of his customary earnings. This shifts the cost of producing coal in abnormal places to the operator, to whom it belongs. The payment of a uniform rate per ton to the pieceworker, regardless of adverse mining

miner.

The miners request that they be paid twenty cents per inch for the removal of refuse ten feet in width, and thirty cents per inch for blasting top and bottom rock. The issue here, again, is whether the miner can make his usual wage at the rates agreed upon.

The law of Pennsylvania provides that the contract miners shall be paid according to the weight of the coal which they send out, rather than according to a rate per car, which may vary in capacity. But it also permits the operators and miners to agree to some other form of payment than according to weight. This is the joker in the law that has always left the advantage with the operators. If the operators insisted on payment by the car as a condition of giving employment, the acceptance of that mode of payment constituted an agreement. Payment by the car permits the operators to increase the capacity of the car and to compel the miners to do more work for the same rate. For these reasons the miners demand that the wage-rate shall be based on a ton of 2240 pounds.

The miners also insist on the abolition of unreasonable penalties and dockage for impurities that may have been loaded with the coal. They demand that the penalties and the amounts docked shall be a matter of agreement between the local mine committee and the management.

The practice in most modern industries is to furnish the workers with the supplies, equipment, and tools that are needed to perform their tasks. The list of these things for which the miners demand payment indicates that the anthracite industry is far behind other industries.

When the miners are asked to work overtime they demand time and one half, and double time for Sundays and

tors with an economic incentive to reduce overtime and to obtain more time for leisure and home life lies behind this demand.

The miners claim that in the last two years 1000 men have been killed and 40,000 have been injured in the anthracite collieries. On the grounds of hazard they demand an increase in wages that will enable them to leave their dependents better protected.

In response to the demands of the miners for improvement in workingconditions, the operators consider such demands primarily to discover whether they increase the cost of production. As yet the operators have published nothing that indicates in detail whether they are prepared to concede any of these demands. The degree to which improvement in working-conditions makes for better industrial relations and greater productivity is relatively an unexplored field.

Closely related to the rates received per ton or per day is the opportunity to work and to earn. When contract miners, through no fault of their own, are not permitted to work in their regular working-places, they demand that they be given work by the day. When the mine works, they expect the management to readjust its working force.

When men are laid off, those longest on the working force expect to retain their jobs; when rehiring begins, the oldest in point of service expect to be called upon first. This is the gist of the demand for seniority rights.

If a company has several collieries, the men expect that an equal division of work should be made between collieries, instead of closing down some and keeping others on full time. They believe this should be done regardless of the increase in the cost of production from part-time operation.

Finally, they demand a five-day week, seemingly on the theory that enough coal can be produced in that time and that it will be conducive to greater regularity of production.

The adjustment of these demands for the improvement of the opportunity to work and earn would not only be affected by the methods that the manage ment employs in each mine, but it would also be influenced by the general regularity or irregularity of the operation of the mines. In both cases the effect on the cost of production would play a large part in the adjustments. Better methods of management and greater regularity of operation usually reduce the cost of production. But the demands for a more equal division of work between the collieries of any one company and for a five-day work-week might easily increase the cost of production under some circumstances. operators have not answered these demands in detail. In the adjustment of such important demands, the need is apparent for more thoroughgoing cooperation between the operators and the miners in order to arrive at a more reasonable solution than would result from the arbitrary action of either party.

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The operators want the miners to agree to continue work during further negotiations whenever they fail to reach an agreement before the expiration of the contract. In case further negotiations do not result in an agreement, the operators desire the miners to submit disputed points to arbitration. But the experience of the past has undermined the confidence of the miners in regard to the impartiality of 'disinterested public representatives,' and they believe that an agreement in advance to arbitrate cuts off the possibility of reasonable adjustment in joint conference. Furthermore, their president said, 'when the man who

toils in your collieries agrees to let some tribunal or third agency say what his conditions of employment shall be, what hours of labor he must work, and what compensation must be given, then he gives to that agency or that tribunal or that arbitration commission the power to determine the character of the house in which he shall live, the kind of food he shall eat, the degree of education his children shall receive, and to determine his standard and his status as a citizen. ... I do not know anyone except the man who works with his hands who is asked to arbitrate those fundamentals.'

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Neither the professions nor 'the trades or industry on the side of capital yield to some creative agency the right to determine for them what their (service or) products may be worth in the market of the world.'

The operators believe that an agreement in advance to arbitrate disputed points leads both parties to try to reach a direct agreement 'rather than incur the burdens, uncertainties, and vexations of arbitration.' Furthermore, they contend that such an agreement furnishes incentive to both sides to moderate and compromise their demands rather than attempt to maintain unreasonable positions. Arbitration becomes a 'spectre in the background which all desire to avoid.' In the opinion of the operators, they can take no more conciliatory attitude than to agree to let 'representatives of the public fix the wages they shall pay,' if they fail to reach an agreement with their employees.

The operators look upon the strike as 'a legitimate weapon to drive an economic bargain with a selfish employer,' but they claim that 'there is no moral right, or social justification, to organize strikes or lockouts in basic industries or transportation where (when?) disinterested agencies for adjustment and