any quarter, and, above all, the propriety of proving to the world that the fpirit of national refiftance had not entirely deferted the Dutch, and that they did not prefer the throwing themselves into the hands of the French to the danger of repelling a foreign yoke at the risk of their lives and individual property all thefe various motives combined, had induced the public in every country, to look on the hege of Nimeguen as an event that would terminate in great celebrity, from its duration, the number of brilliant actions it would produce, and the unyielding obftinacy with which it would on both fides be accompanied.

The fudden and unexpected difappointment of all thefe expec-, tations put an end to the hopes that had been entertained, that, laying afide the animolity of parties, the Dutch would at length Gordially unite in oppofing the threatened invafion of the French. Plain reafon pointed out the infatuation of committing themfelves to the good faith of ftrangers interefted in keeping them under fubjection, and preventing them from acting as an independent people.. Thofe Dutchmen who exhorted their countrymen to fubvert their prefent government, and call in the affiftance of the French to erect another on its ruins, did not confider that fo mighty and fo viotorious a nation would, like all other conquerors, confult their own views, and render thofe who submitted to them the inftruments of their future wars and conquefts. Hiftorical experience fpoke invariably this language; and, the pretended establishment of liberty, fa

continually held forth as an in ducement to join the French, was either the plea of that fond credulity which is incident to ignorance, and the ufual concomitant of fanaticifm and all violent paffions, or of that general enervation, felfifhnefs, and indifference to their country, which feems to have fallen on fo great a portion of the Dutch nation. The Hollanders had been now fo long unaccustomed to war, that they could not well be expected to meafure their ftrength with troops that had conquered the Emperor. As little was it to be expected that there fhould be any cordial union between the Belgians and Batavians for the fupport of the Emperor and the Stadtholder, whofe power and government were odious to fo great a portion of their respective people. If the Flemings and Dutch had been at liberty to follow their own inclinations, they would have remained neutral like the Danes, and the people of Hamburgh. There is a period of declination and degradation in the history of ftates, when they become reconciled to the idea of acting a fubmiffive and cunning part, and when they resemble the beadles and doorkeepers of those churches in Switzerland and Germany that are open to Lutherans and Calvinifts in their turn; and who pay equal refpect to whichfoever of these fectarians is in actual poffeffion.

That the French were determined to conquer for themselves, and in order to attain that end would employ all the means that could accelerate it, was obvious to all perfons of difcernment. The

moft

moft efficacious of thefe means, was, to fettle the government of every country of which they obtained poffeffion, exactly on the plan of their own. This was an act of the profoundeft policy. They feemingly divefted themfelves of all direct authority over the natives, whom they appeared to leave in the fulleft plenitude of their free. dom, both in their public and priyate concerns. But they took care, at the fame time, to retain it thro' the infallible influence of the power which they exercised in virtue of their oftenfible connexions with the ftate, and their fecret intrigues with the party that having firft introduced, was now neceffitated to fupport them.

That fuch would be the fate of the Dutch was no longer doubted: the unwillingness teftified by the inhabitants of both the towns and country to co-operate with the military against the French, was open and avowed. They feemed even fincerely defirous of their abfence; and exprefied their wishes with little or no diffimulation. Such a ftate of their minds was very aftonishing to thofe who were acquainted with the long ftanding habits of coolness and circumspection in their general conduct, for which the natives of this part of Europe have been fo ufually noted. It proved that uncommon pains must have been taken to alter their ideas; unlefs it may be fuppofed that, being convinced the career of the French was utterly ir, refuftible, they judged that the fooner they made terms with that conquering people, the better treatment they would experience.

Reafonings of this nature began

at this time to be very common among the commonalty, both in the Belgic and the United Provinces. Not only the lower but the middling claffes evinced a de cided repugnance to espouse the caufe of any king; and attributed the invincible character of the French to the conviction they were under, that they were no longer fighting for their kings, but for their country. A períuafion of this kind, well or ill founded, was alfo diffufing itself very fast in many parts of Germany; and was the real caufe of the repugnance which the people on the frontiers of the empire vifibly exhibited when called upon, with exhortatations and menaces, to join heart and hand in repelling the French from the confines of Germany. When thefe various confiderations are laid together, it was not furprizing that the French themselves, confcious of the partiality their caufe excited in the majority of the inhabitants of thofe countries they were invading, fhould, by fo flattering and cogent a motive, be actuated to the most indefatigable and daring exertions; and prove in the iffue fuperior to thofe who contended against them, under fo heavy a difcouragement as the hatred of the natives of those countries which they were employed to defend, not for them, but for their masters.

The very lofs of the town, which has given occafion for the foregoing obfervations, was imputed to the fecret machinations of those within the walls who were labouring for the fervice of the French, and continually giving them no tice of whatever was tranfacted

ip

in the garrifon. While fuch practices were on foot, it was impoffible for either courage or military fkill to be of much avail; and thofe who were fo ready to extol the French for their exploits, ought to have acknowledged that, fituated as their enemies were, thefe deferved no lefs admiration for bearing up to refolutely against difficul ties, in their nature infurmountable; as they were infallibly calculated to baffle all intrepidity of fpirit and wisdom of exertion.

The lofs of Nimeguen was accompanied with that of another place, ftill more famous for the various fieges it had fuftained at different periods, during the three laft centuries. This was the strong and important town of Maeftricht. It had, by its noble defence againft commanders of the highest fame in their day, acquired a reputation which, it was prefumed, it would not fail to maintain; while thofe who were intrufted with its defence recollected the motives that fhould animate them. The garrifon confifted of select officers and foldiers, and amounted to upwards of 8000 men, abundantly furnished. with the means of a brave and obftinate resistance. The honour that would refult from the taking of fuch a place was a very ftimulating motive among the French. The perfon chofen to command on this occafion was General Kleber, who had already fignalized himfelf by his courage and conduct. He fummoned the town upon the 26th of Sptember; but was given to understand that it would not yield but in the last extremity. The befieging army was very numerous, and the corps of

engineers attending it compofed · of the most expert in that department. On the town's refufal to furrender, a number of batteries were planted on every spot from whence the town was annoyable. Their execution proved formidable; and it became neceffary for the garrifon to exert its utmost efforts to counteract them. As there was a confiderable body of cavalry in the place, a determination was taken to employ it in making a fudden and rapid fally on a battery, of which the fituation required an expeditious attack. It was accordingly attacked and entirely deftroyed, and one of the guns carried off. Encouraged by this fuccefs, the befieged made another fally: on the French batteries; but the enemy was duly prepared, and the attempt duly mifcarried. A third fally fucceeded better; and the battery againft which it was directed was almost entirely demolished. But thefe vigorous efforts, on the part of the befieged, produced no permanent benefit. The mountainous ground in the environs of the town, afforded fo many fitua tions to erect battering pieces; and those which were injured by the befieged, were fo fpeedily replaced by others, that the befiegers, being conftantly fupplied with heavy cannon, and constructing additional batteries wherever they could beferviceable, furrounded the townwith them in fuch a manner, that their firing continued without intermiffion. No part of the town remained unexpofed, and many parts were laid in ruins. This deftructive scene lafted feveral days. and nights, during which a great flaughter was made of the garrifon

and

and the inhabitants. The French having completed their approaches, and effected fufficient breaches, were preparing to give a general affault, when the magiftracy of the place waited on the Governor, to request he would not deliver them to certain death, by continuing a refiftance which could only terminate in a massacre of the garrifon and people. These remonftrances induced him to confent to a capitulation; by which the garrifon were to be confidered as prifoners of war till exchanged. On thefe terms Maestricht surrendered to General Kleber on the 4th of November, after having ftood a fiege of forty days, and fuffered a lofs of more than 2000 houfes and public buildings, either totally demolished or materially damaged.

The capture of two cities of fuch high confideration as Nimeguen and Maeftricht, filled the ruling party in Holland with the moft evident confternation; they now began thoroughly to defpair of being able to make head against France, efpecially as their domeftic enemies were well known to have formed the refolution of taking an active part in favour of the French, the moment they could do it with any profpect of perfonal safety.

The invafion of Holland was an object of univerfal expectation in Europe. The force under the command of General Pichegru, who was placed at the head of this great expedition, amounted to no lefs than 200,000 men. His abilities, and those of the officers who were to ferve under him, annexed

a fecurity to the enterprize, which equally elated the French and depreffed their enemies. In lefs than two years from the acceffion of the governing powers in the United Provinces to the confederacy which was to have reduced France, they found themselves on the point of becoming the subjects of that irritated power, by the most humiliating and difgraceful of all means, thofe of fubjugation and conquest.

The ftrength which was to oppofe this vaft and victorious army, confifted in the remains of the British troops and thofe in their pay, and of the Dutch troops. But their numbers were beneath confideration, when compared to the multitude of their enemies; and though far from deficient in military knowledge any more than in fpirit, they did not appear adequate to the arduous task of preserving Holland from the defigns in agita tion against it.

A neutral party fubfifted in Holland, which, without inclining to the Stadtholder or to his enemies, were decidedly averfe to the entrance of the French; which they forefaw muft put an end to the independence of the Dutch as a nation. But their remonftrances on the neceffity of a reunion of all parties against a foreign invafion, were loft in the fixed determination of thofe in authority to truft none but their adherents; and in the no less obftinate refolution of their antagonists to deftroy their authority through the affiftance of the French.

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