they naturally inferred, that having triumphed over this powerful enemy in the days of his greatest force und union, they might reafonably prefume on his inability to oppofe them, while diftracted by internal feuds, and feemingly rent to pieces by the rancours and animofities that characterized the parties dividing the nation, which had extinguifhed all fentiments of humanity, and rendered them inexorably bent on their mutual deftruction. But while the coalefced powers eagerly contemplated the divifions and diftractions of the French nation, they loft fight of thofe feeds of miftruft and fufpicion that were profoundly fown among themfelves. The plan to reduce France to its own limits, was attended with collateral views, that neceffarily tended to promote jealoufies of each other amongst its enemies; and to break the bonds of the alliance they had formed to prevent the dangers apprehended from the aggrandizement of France. This fpirit of reciprocal fufpicion did not however manifeft itself to any extent during the firft campaign in Flanders in the year 1793. The warmth with which hoftilities were at the commencement profecuted againft a people that avowed themselves the enemies to all Kings, kept alive the determination to cooperate vigorously against them. But the fucceffes of the allies on their first entering into action, the repeated defeats of the French armies, and the reduction of fome of their ftrongest towns, induced the coalefced powers to imagine that the completion of their defigns would not meet with great difficulties. Hence they overlooked the neceffity of acting with the firmeft and moft indiffoluble concord. Inftead of remaining in that compactnefs of ftrength which had procured them their firft advantages, they thought themselves able to divide their ope rations. Thus, by feparating their force, they rendered it ineffectual for the great and principal purpose they primarily propofed, and loft the only opportunity of accomplishing it which they could reafonably expect. The clofe of the campaign of 1793 in the low countries, left the French armies in poffeffion of fo many advantages, that the most expert in military affairs, were con vinced that they would retain their fuperiority in the campaign that was approaching. This opinion was corroborated by their fucceffes on the Rhine, and on the other frontiers of France, and above all by the total fuppreffion of the various infurrections against the republican government in fo many pro vinces of that country. The diligence and activity with which that government purfued its meatures, the vigour which animated the officers and foldiers of its numerous armies, the abilities of the many commanders that were continually ftarting up to notice, the indefatigable exertions of all men employed in the public fervice, ftruck their enemies with aftonishment. However inimical to the principles that actuated the French, their moft der termined adverfaries could not for bear admiring the courage and ca pacity of thofe who were at the head of that nation. The opening of the campaign in the year 1794 plainly fhewed how refolutely the French were bent, not only to preferve the advantages they had gained, but to carry them to the B 2 utmest utmost extent their arms would powers. Obedience to the will enable them. The approaching and orders of their rulers was the year feemed pregnant with events that would decide the fate of France, and eventually that of all Europe. Nor did the generality fcruple to predict, that, however adverfe fortune had proved to the allied powers, they were fill doomed to greater calamities. The prodigious efforts of the French government evinced how strongly they were perfuaded, that, on the iffure of this campaign the confirma tion of the deftruction of the Republic would entirely depend. In order to fecure a fyftem which they confidered as fuperior to all others, and to which their attachment en creafed in proportion to the endeavours of their enemies to deftroy it, they loaded the nation with every fpecies of burthen and hardfhip for its prefervation. The military lift exhibited by France to the eyes of Europe for the year 1794, was fuch as to occafion the most ferious alarm to the coalition. The whole ftrength they had been able to collect for a conteft in which they were fo deeply concerned, and the decifion of which was to quickly approaching, did not exceed 360,000 men; while the troops fent into the field by France alone,more than doubled that number. But France relied as much, if not more, on the temper of the men that compofed its armies. Tutored by thofe who raifed them, and no lefs by thofe who were employed to teach them military difcipline in the maxims of republicanifm, fo violently predominant in France, they took up arms with far other views and ideas than those that ac tuated the foldiers of the combined fole motive that actuated these ; whereas the French foldiers went to battle, fome of them, animated with the deadlieft fentiments of revenge against men whom they looked upon as the bafe inftruments of tyranny and oppreffion; others, by the hope of rifing in the army, and acquiring both fame and fortune; and all of them by a defire of maintaining the military reputa-. tion of Frenchmen. Delivered from thofe anxieties which had arifen from the inteftine commotions, which had proved fo difficult to be fuppreffed, the repub lican administration was now at liberty to exert the whole ftrength of France in thofe quarters where its fuccefles would prove moft decifive. These were the low countrics, and thofe lying towards the Rhine. The former appearing the more important scene of action, it was chiefly there that the French propofed to make the greatest efforts. The flower of the German and British armies being ftationed in that country, with the double view of protecting it from the invafion of France, and converting it into the principal place of arms, from whence, to annoy the French, it became the chief object of these to fruftrate both thofe defigns, and efpecially the latter. The preceding campaign in thofe parts had terminated by a general action that had covered the French troops with particular glory. They had defeated in the battle of Maubeuge, that lafted two entire days, the moft illuftrious commander in the allied armies, Prince Cobourg, who had taken fo advantageous a pofi tion, that he feemed perfuaded the French would find it impoffible to attack him with fuccefs. The reputation they obtained by vanquifhing the Prince in a pitched battle, the firft he had loft during the campaign, added a luftre to their arms, and infpired a confidence in their officers which never after abandoned them. Jourdain, the General who commanded the French on that day, had now attained a degree of celebrity, which rendered him the principal favourite of the foldiery. It was he who had first turned the tide of fuccefs in favour of France at Dunkirk. Had it not been for his conduct and courage on that occafion, the French Republic muft have been reduced to the moft ferious diftrefs. The abilities he had difplayed, induced the government to entrust him with the command of the army on the Rhine, where the fortune of war, notwithstanding fome very brilliant fucceffes, had not proved to extenfively advantageous as in the Belgic provinces. The impetuous activity that marked the progrefs of the war on the part of France, was the principal caufe of its fuccefs. The French were continually forming and executing the boldeft enterprizes; and, tho' frequently foiled, ftill returned to the charge; and through their invincible perfeverance, feldom failed to fucceed. Befides General Jourdain, two other men began at this time to attract the public in a moft confpicuous manner; the celcbrated Pichegru, and the no lefs famous Hoche. Through their skill and valour, that experienced warrior, General Wurfer, had been fucceffively defeated; and the efforts of the Austrians and Pruffians to penetrate into France, had been completely fruftrated. In addition to the military talents of their commanders, a circumflance operated to the advantage of the French, of which it seems their enemies were not fufficiently aware. Though natives of a country lefs expofed to the rigours of winter than either Germany or the low countries, the commonalty in France had long been used to a courfe of living that qualified them to endure almoft every fpecies of hardfhip. From the high price of fuel, they were particularly inured to the bearing of cold; and, from their general poverty, were fatisfied with very moderate fupplies of food. Thefe two qualifications combining with the enthufiafin infufed by the principles they had fo warmly efpoufed, rendered them capable of enduring the greatest hardships attendant on a military life, and fitted them for the most ar duous undertakings that could be proposed by the many enterprizing and daring leaders with which their armies now abounded. In the depth of that rigorous winter which was felt throughout all Europe, from the clofe of 1793 to the end of the enfuing February, the French troops began to act in a variety of places in the Netherlands. Their operations were not of an important nature, and were chiefly calculated to keep them in action, and to fatigue their enetnies: nor were they attended with much fuccefs. Their firft onfets in the various fkirmishes wherein they were continually engaged, were ufually fo violent and impetuous as to bear down all refiftance: but the ifue of the conteft was frequently no lefs unfavourable to them than the B 3 beginning beginning had been advantageous. been flain, filled the combined The fact was, that notwithstanding forces with men very inadequate to the tafk of encountering an enemy noways unequal to them in military qualifications, and greatly above them in that spirit which is produced by national at tachment, enlivened by hoftile invafion, to the ardour of enthu fiatm. In the mean time, the preparations against them were carried on with a vigour and folicitude that ftrongly denoted how formidable they were efteemed, and what ef forts were thought neceffary to repel the attacks they were meditating. To this end the celebrated Colonel Mack, a foldier of fortune, who had raifed himfelf to notice and preferment merely by his courage and merit, was felected by the Auftrian miniftry to concert with the British government a plan for the fubfequent operations in the Netherlands; where, it was well known, the French had it in contemplation to atchieve a project of the firft magnitude, and which, in cafe of fuccefs, would wholly dif concert the meafures now taken by the confederacy. This project was, to collect an immenfe body out of their numerous armies, to con fift of the best and most expert troops in their fervice. This body was to be divided into five feparate corps. The two firft, each of great ftrength, were appointed to force their way, one into the territory of Namur, the other into that of Liege; in both of which, the latter efpe, cially, a great majority of the inhabitants were friendly to their caufe. Sanguine expectations were formed of both thefe expeditions; the fuccefs of which would have thrown the confederate armies into the tion. the most violent diforder, and by feparating them from each other, would have broken their co-operaDuring thefe operations, another no lets powerful divifion was to affail that part of the com bined armies that was pofted in the neighbourhood of Tournay, in order to prevent it from moving to the fuccour of the countries in vaded. In addition to thefe divers attacks, the strong towns of Valenciennes, Condé and Quesnoy, that had in the preceding year fallen into the hands of the allies, were each to be blockaded by a force fufficient to cut off all affiftance, and to carry on a regular fiege at the moment when the other parts of the general plan were under ex. ecution. This plan was certainly Do lefs: judicious than refolute: but while it was on the point of commencing, an officer of fome note in the French fervice, and who, from his fituation, was privy to the defign, renounced from fome difguft the republican party, and withdrew to the allies; to whom he difclofed the fchemes that were forming against them. A difcovery of this nature having of courfe put them on their guard, the whole des fign was at once frustrated, and wholly abandoned, to the great concern and indignation of the republican ministry, who had, at a heavy expence and trouble, made fuch preparations and arrangements for the bold enterprize in agitation, as would in their perfuafion have completely enfured its fuccefs. This unexpected difappointment did not, however, occafion the leaft relaxation in the other measures they had taken, to open the prefent campaign with as much brilliancy as they had clofed the former. Their two fortunate Generals, Jourdain and Pichegru, were now placed at the head of that prodis gious mafs of military force which was marching from every province in France to the Netherlands, and through the immenfity of which the republican adminiftration pros pofed, and doubted not to be fully able to cruth the much less formi dable strength of the coalition. A variety of confiderations combined at this time to fill the French with hopes, and their enemies with ap prehenfion. deep rooted rivalship between the of his command, by a Prince of the history |