PRECEDENTS. I. WILL OF REAL AND PERSONAL ESTATE IN TRUST CHILDREN. WILL of REAL and PERSONAL ESTATE. BEQUEST of PRECEDENT I. JEWELS, PLATE, and FURNITURE to the testator's WIFE. BEQUEST of a LEASEHOLD HOUSE to the WIFE. BEQUEST of Pecuniary LEGACIES, one being to the FOR WIDOW AND WIFE, and one to the SEPARATE USE of a woman. GENERAL DEVISE and BEQUEST of REAL and PERSONAL estate in TRUST for SALE and CONVERSION. THE MONIES arising therefrom (after payment of funeral and testamentary expenses, debts and legacies) to be INVESTED and the INCOME paid to the WIFE during her WIDOW HOOD; and subject thereto the CAPITAL to be divided among the TESTATOR'S ISSUE, as the WIFE shall APPOINT, and IN DEFAULT of appointment among SONS ATTAINING TWENTY-ONE, and DAUGHTERS ATTAINING THAT AGE or MARRYING equally. HOTCHPOT, ADVANCEMENT, MAINTENANCE, and ACCUMULATION clauses. TRUST IN DEFAULT of CHILDREN becoming entitled for the testator's BROTHERS and SISTERS and their ISSUE per stirpes. POWER to POSTPONE the SALE and CONVERSION of real and personal estate, and DIRECTION as to INTERMEDIATE INCOME. POWER of LEASING for Twenty-one years. POWER for trustees to DETERMINE subject-matter of SPECIFIC BEQUESTS, APPORTION FUNDS, and SETTLE QUESTIONS. Clause SUPPLEMENTAL to STATUTORY provisions as to APPOINTMENT of and INDEMNITY to TRUSTEES. DEVISE PRECEDENT I. WILL OF REAL AND PERSONAL ESTATE IN TRUST FOR WIDOW AND CHILDREN. of TRUST and MORTGAGE estates. APPOINTMENT of EXECUTORS and GUARDIANS. I, A. B. of &c. (a), hereby revoke all wills, codicils and other testamentary dispositions (b) heretofore made by 1. Revocation of me, and declare this to be my last will. I BEQUEATH prior wills. 2. Bequest to wife of personal and household effects. What passes by bequest of "household goods" or "furniture." to my wife C. B. all my (c) watches, jewels, ornaments of the person and wearing apparel, and all my plate, plated articles, furniture, linen, glass, china, pictures, prints, musical instruments, books and other articles of household use or ornament, horses, carriages, saddlery, harness, and stable furniture, live and dead stock, tools, implements and utensils, and wines, liquors, (a) It is desirable to give not only the testator's present address and description, but also any former address or description by which he may be described as a stockholder in the books of the Bank of England or a shareholder in any company or in legal instruments, with a view to save trouble in establishing his identity. (b) The revocatory clause should of course extend not only to wills, but to all other previous testamentary dispositions, if such be the intention; see Re Savage, L. R. 2 P. & D. 78. (c) Upon the question what articles pass by way of specific bequest by such expressions as "household goods" or "furniture" or the like, see the cases collected in 1 Jarm. Wills, 3rd ed., p. 721, note (b); 2 Williams' Executors, Part III., book iii., chap. 2, s. 4, pp. 1181, et seq., 7th ed. It seems that a bequest of furniture will pass tenant's fixtures (see Paton v. Sheppard, 10 Sim. 186), an effect which would in some cases be inconvenient and contrary to the intention. In Kelly v. Powlet, Amb. 605 (see p. 610), it was said that" the word 'household furniture' has as general a meaning as possible. It is incapable of a definition. It is capable only of a description. It comprises everything that contributes to the use or convenience of the householder or ornament of the house." The authorities cited in the above-mentioned note in 1 Jarm. Wills, show that a bequest of "household effects" extends to consumables; but not to property bought to trade with or merely personal ornaments. See also the same note as to the words "live and dead stock." It will be inferred that the expressions in the text are sufficient to decide almost every possible question in favour of the legatee; but should any doubt arise, it may be met by means of the power afterwards given to the trustees (see p. 54, infra) of determining the subject-matter of specific bequests. PRECEDENT I. WILL OF REAL AND PERSONAL FOR WIDOW AND CHILDREN. and household stores and provisions, [(d) which respectively at the time of my death shall be in or about, or belonging to or appropriated for my dwelling- ESTATE IN TRUST house at or any other dwelling-house which at the time of my death shall be my principal place of residence, and in or about, or belonging to or appropriated for the stables, coach-houses, outbuildings, gardens, and pleasure grounds thereto belonging]. I ALSO 3. Bequest of BEQUEATH to my said wife, for her absolute benefit, my to wife absoleasehold messuage or dwelling-house situate at, in lutely. leasehold house (d) The words in brackets should be inserted only in cases in which the testator has more than one dwelling-house, and the furniture of one only of the houses is intended to be bequeathed. If the testator has office fittings and furniture at his place of business which are not intended to be included, such furniture and effects must of course be excepted from the bequest. In framing Effect of legacy bequests of this nature it should be remembered that a general un- of goods at a qualified bequest of chattels or effects in a particular house would particular place. pass ready money, whether in coin or Bank of England notes; though bonds, promissory notes, or other securities would not pass, for choses in action have no locality; see Marquis of Hertford v. Lord Lowther, 7 Beav. 1, in which the substance of most of the prior authorities on the effect of a description with reference to locality will be found either in the argument or the judgment; Swinfen v. Swinfen, 29 Beav. 207; see also 2 Williams' Executors, Part III., book iii., chap. 2, s. 4, pp. 1178, et seq., 7th ed. In the case of a specific legacy of goods at a particular place, the legacy will be adeemed by their permanent removal in the testator's lifetime, but not by temporary removal (see the cases cited in 1 Jarm. Wills, p. 721, note (b)). Articles intended to be, but not yet taken to a place, will not pass as articles in that place (ibid., but see Rawlinson v. Rawlinson, 3 Ch. D. 302); but a bequest of furniture of which the testator should die possessed, comprises furniture ordered by him but not delivered at his death. The words "belonging to or appropriated for" in the text would in most cases apply to articles intended for the house, but not yet placed there. A specific bequest of the testator's furniture and plate and other household effects and personal ornaments to his widow, or some other member or members of his family, is so generally expedient and so usual, that it is considered that if the draftsman find that his instructions do not provide for it, he may suggest its insertion, or at least draw attention to its omission. PRECEDENT I. WILL OF REAL ESTATE IN TRUST CHILDREN. the county of, and the stables and coach-houses thereto belonging, To hold the same unto my said wife, her executors, administrators, and assigns for all the term, FOR WIDOW AND estate, and interest therein to which I shall be entitled at my death, she, nevertheless, as from my death, paying the rent reserved by, and at her own expense performing the covenants contained in the lease under which at my death the said house, stables, and coach-houses may be held, and indemnifying my estate therefrom. I BEQUEATH to my said wife the sum of £--, to be paid to her within one calendar month after my death (e). I BE 4,-and pecuniary legacy. 5. Bequest of legacy; Time for payment of and interest on legacies. Interest on (e) The object of this legacy is to furnish the wife with the means of defraying her immediate expenses, as the annual income afterwards provided for her will probably not be available for some time after the testator's death. If such a legacy is not given, the omission commonly proceeds from inadvertence, and may be pointed out by the draftsman. Legacies are generally payable at the end of a year from the testator's death, and if not then paid will carry interest at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum from the end of the year, unless any other time of payment or rate of interest is directed by the will (see Consol. Gen. Ord. of the Court of Chancery xlii., rule 11, Morgan, 5th ed., p. 152). Even if an earlier payment be directed by the testator, the executor cannot be compelled to make it, as he is entitled to take the twelvemonth to ascertain the state of the property (see 2 Williams' Executors, 7th ed., p. 1387, and the cases cited in notes (p) and (9) thereto); and the terms of the will may be such as to extend the period allowed to the executors, and as from which interest will commence running (Thomas v. Att.-General, 2 You. & Coll. Exch. 525); but if the assets are clearly sufficient, the executors may pay the legacies or any of them within the year. If the will directs payment previously to the end of the year, the legatee, though he cannot require actual payment at the time specified, is entitled to interest from that time. Of course, however, the object of a legacy to the testator's widow like that in the text, is that it may be paid immediately, and not to accelerate the period from which it will carry interest; and in the case of a clearly solvent estate, the executors should consider it their duty to comply with the testator's directions by availing themselves of the power to make immediate payment. An exception as to the time from which interest runs, exists QUEATH to the sum of £ the sum of £. I BEQUEATH to for her sole and separate use independently of her husband (if any) for the time being, and of his debts, control and engagements, and her receipt shall be a sufficient discharge for the same. I DEVISE when the legatee is a child of the testator, or one to whom the testator has put himself in loco parentis. In that case, where the legatee is an infant, interest runs from the death, in consequence of the presumption that maintenance is intended, unless the testator has made other provision for that purpose (2 Williams' Executors, 1288), but an adult child is not within the exception (see Raven v. Waite, 1 Swanst. 553, in which the principle and extent of the exception are discussed in the judgment; Wall v. Wall, 15 Sim. 513). Where a legacy is charged on real estate only, and no day of payment is mentioned, interest is given from the testator's death (2 Williams' Executors, p. 1423, n. (r), and see Pearson v. Pearson, 1 Sch. & L. 11); but in Turner v. Buck, L. R. 18 Eq. 301, the principle was held not to be applicable to the case of legacies payable out of the proceeds of sale of real estate, in which case interest is only payable from the period at which the sale may reasonably be effected, namely one year from the testator's death. If the legacy is contingent or deferred, interest will in general be payable from the time appointed for payment and not before (2 Williams' Executors, p. 1428). But this rule is also subject to the above-mentioned exception where the testator is the parent of or in loco parentis to the legatee, in which case interest by way of maintenance will be allowed from the testator's death, unless other provision is made by him for the purpose (Id. pp. 1428—9, Re George, 5 Ch. D. 837). If the event in which the legacy is made payable should happen in the lifetime of the testator, it seems that it will carry interest from his death (Pickwick v. Gibbes, 1 Beav. 271). If the payment of a legacy is postponed with a direction that when the period of payment arrives it shall be paid with interest, the interest will be computed from the end of a year after the testator's death (Knight v. Knight, 2 Sim. & St. 490). The intermediate income of a fund set apart to meet contingent legacies will, as between the tenant for life of the residue and the remainderman, belong to the former (Allhusen v. Whittell, L. R. 4 Eq. 295). As to the right of a legatee to interest where the legacy is given subject to a limitation over upon a divesting contingency which takes effect, see 2 Williams' Executors, pp. 1430--1. PRECEDENT I. WILL OF REAL AND PERSONAL ESTATE IN TRUST FOR WIDOW AND CHILDREN. legacy to an infant child of the testator runs from the death. female for her for conversion. Interest on contingent and future legacies. |