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continued for many years to the young | but the foreign policy of Italy has not kingdom; Mr. Gladstone's offer of a joint varied, and will not vary. The attitude of occupation of Egypt, have all contributed the Italian government towards the Euroto make this feeling strong. Not long pean powers is not affected whether the before his death, Signor Minghetti com- Foreign Office is presided over by a poliplained most bitterly of the refusal by tician like Signor Mancini, who was forSignor Mancini of the English proposal eign minister when the Austro-German for the co-operation of Italy in arms with alliance was first made, or by a soldier England with regard to Egyptian affairs. and diplomatist of very different views, There never was a greater surprise than like General Count di Robilant. Count that refusal. At the time when the pro- di Robilant, in spite of his early training, posal was made, not only the English borne witness to by his armless sleeve, government but the whole of the Italian which is I believe a reminiscence of Noembassies were under the impression that vara, is said to have been very Austrian it would be accepted. But the good was in his sympathies since his residence at done by the offer itself, for it is always Vienna and his marriage with an Austrian gratefully remembered. No doubt the lady; but the least Austrian of Italian Italian statesmen are abler men as a rule politicians, were he to replace the general than the Italian diplomatists, but some of at the Consulta, would carry out the same, the latter are clever, and Count Corti, if that is the Bismarckian policy. Italian he, as Signor Bonghi, I believe, once told foreigh policy may be said to be so thorhim, can hardly think himself the equal of oughly accepted by the electorate as to be Prince Bismarck, is a man of remarkable independent of Parliamentary groups or ability. But on the occasion of which I parties, and no variation in the policy is speak, the diplomatists were right, the to be looked for because any given polistatesmen were wrong, and an Italian alli- tician is at the head of the Cabinet or is ance with England would have given to minister for foreign affairs. The proceedItaly without risk that position which the ings in the Chamber, after the recent disRed Sea expedition was intended, but has aster at Saati, may be taken to exemplify failed, to gain. In August, 1884, there this. The government of Signor Depretis was a development by England of the demanded a vote of confidence. Signor policy of consulting Italy with regard to Bonghi and other influential members of Egypt. The French always defend their the Right consented to vote with the gov claim either for exclusive influence or more ernment on the Abyssinian question, aloften for joint influence with ourselves in though they withdrew their support in the Egypt by pointing to the large number of next division, not as approving or disapsubjects and "protected subjects" they proving of the African policy, but merely possess in that country. But there are because certain personal modifications in more real Italians than real French in the ministry had not taken place. The Egypt, and the proper way to meet undue news of the disaster came upon the ChamFrench claims is to point to those of Italy ber while it was in the midst of a stormy and Greece. I cannot but think that it discussion on the votes for public works. must have been Germany which warned The suddenness of the news could not Italy to keep out of Egypt, for Italy in fail to call forth a great deal of demonrecent years has taken her policy as sub- strative rhetoric in an assembly of Italmissively from the German Empire as in ians; but although the minister obtained 1866 she took her policy from France. eventually only a diminished majority, the Still, the refusal of the offer and the sub- speeches which were made on the recepsequent regret at the refusal have not tion of the news all breathed identical made the Italians angry with us but only sentiments of patriotism, though prowith themselves; and if Germany did give nounced by men belonging to all the difbad advice, that advice has not had seri- ferent groups. The money asked for ously bad results. was voted almost unanimously in the Chamber, and quite unanimously in the Senate. The subsequent demand for a vote of confidence prevented a unanimous manifestation of patriotism, but the Afri can policy was never really in question. Like all divisions in the Italian Chamber, this one was determined on personal grounds, and it was Generals di Robilant and Ricotti who were personally attacked.

It is then clear that not the slightest modification of Italian foreign policy may be expected to result from any changes which may occur from time to time in the occupancy of the Consulta. Since Signor Depretis has been prime minister, there have been as many changes at the Italian Foreign Office as there have been in the constitution of the government majorities;

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Italian intrigue in Albania has been during the last few years so little heard of that it is perhaps only necessary to mention that in 1879 intrigues were rife, and that they must be expected to be set on foot again in the event either of the disruption of the Austrian Empire or of an Austrian advance upon Salonica. The future of Albania must depend upon the wishes of the Albanians. The Albanians are not numerous enough to be likely to form an independent power of themselves, but they are a tough race of fighting men who will be able to make their voices heard in the ultimate decision of their destiny. There are so many of them in Greece that I should have thought that they might have joined Greece in personal union with less loss of national characteristics and of dignity and self-respect than would be involved in their accepting Italian conquest. My strong sympathies with Italy do not prevent my being glad that the intrigues of the Consulta were divulged to the whole world by the publication of the famous letter dated from the Roman Foreign Office on the 6th of April, 1879, by Signor Corte, the Italian consul at Prevesa, and addressed to Moukhtar Pasha. In it Signor Corte explained the agreement of the Italian ministry with Moukhtar's project of colonizing Greek Epirus by Mahometan Albanians and of opposing the occupation of Novi Bazar by Austria. These intrigues are, I hope, matters of the past, and probably came to an end when Count Torinelli resigned the general secretaryship of the Italian Foreign Office. I repeat the expression of my hope that the future of Albania may depend less upon the Italian government than on the wishes of the Albanians themselves.

The colonial policy of the Italian gov-| defend themselves than it is in the passes ernment, as well as its foreign policy, is of the Alps. The possession of Tripoli likely to maintain its continuity notwith- would only weaken Italy in the event of a standing the changes in the Cabinet. A conflict with France, by increasing the military disaster of course always brings already onerous duties of her fleets and down upon the ministry in power more or armies. less popular indignation, and the satirical prints of Rome have been full of pictures displaying Signor Depretis with a background of skeletons in Italian uniforms bleaching in the African desert. The disaster in Abyssinia will, however, probably not seriously check Italian colonial enterprise. The Italians have hitherto emigrated to the colonies of other nations rather than colonized for themselves. There are said to be at present two millions of Italian subjects aboad. Many of them, of course, are only temporary emigrants, who have left Italy for France or for Egypt, in the hope of making a fortune with which to live at home. In the South American republics, however, there is a vast number of Italian permanent settlers. In the Argentine Republic there are one million, and more than one-third of the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres are Italians. The tide of emigration, too, is increasing. Two hundred thousand people left Italy last year, of whom the greater portion went to this part of South America, and the Argentine Republic is rapidly becoming an Italian State. Irish, British, Scandinavian and German settlers thrive only in temperate latitudes, in which there are no new countries left to annex; but the Italians are able to endure lot climates, and it is not impossible therefore that, late as it is in the day, an Italian policy of colonization may succeed. This is the reason which induces them to persevere in their Red Sea policy. The main motive which the Italians have in attempting to open up a portion of the African coast is commerce. Italy wishes to establish important posts which will bring into its hands the commerce of central Africa, which is now diverted to the north, to the Congo, and to Zanzibar. But Italian designs on Africa are not confined to the Abyssinian coast. I spoke in the first article of this series,* of the promises with regard to Tripoli, as well as to Tunis, which were made to Italy at Berlin. The French protectorate of Tunis still rankles in Italian breasts, and the desire to obtain Tripoli as a set-off is only checked by the fear of extending the common frontier of Italy and France in a district where it would be more difficult for the Italians to

* Germany, LIVING AGE, No. 2225.

A movement which indicates the same

desire for expansion, but which is supported by wholly different and much more sentimental pleas, is the Irredentist agitation. Generally considered, the Italia Irredenta movement is declining. The feeling which exists in France for the restitution of Alsace has no counterpart in Italy, and the circumstances of course are wholly different. In a sense it is true that as Italy represents the principle of Italian race history, Nice, Corsica, Malta, the Italian cantons of Switzerland, the

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Trentino, Trieste, the Dalmatian coast, and others of the former possessions of that republic of Venice of which Italy believes herself the heir, must sometimes tempt Italian politicians. So long, moreover, as the house of Savoy rules Italy, the cradle of the kingly race cannot be forgotten. On the other hand, it is admitted by all Italians who know the facts, that the Italian cantons of Switzerland and the duchy of. Savoy do not desire to be Italian. The Italian cantons desire to remain Swiss. Lakeside Savoy, which smokes Swiss cigars and had sooner not pay double duty on them, and which dislikes the blood-tax, may desire to be Swiss rather than French, but Italy has no hold on the affections of the people. In the county of Nice there is a great deal of anti-French, and some little Italian feeling, and in the event of the destruction of the French army at the hands of Germany, it is just conceivable that Nice would once again become Italian without armed resistance. When I read, however, under the title of "England and Europe," an article on the foreign relations of this country, by a thoroughly competent judge, whose remarks upon many points are full of wisdom, I was amazed to find that his account of Italy is comprised in less than a single page, and concludes with the statement that if war should break out, Italy, as the price of her adhesion, would "look first to the restoration of Nice." If it is possible to make any confident prediction with regard to foreign affairs, I should have thought that it is certainly clear that, whatever else Italy may ask for, she will never go out of her way to ask for Nice. For Italy to take Nice from France would be for her to repeat the folly of Germany in taking AlsaceLorraine, with the difference that Italy is obviously inferior to France in military strength, and with the certainty that from that time forward, France, unless destroyed, would strain every nerve to take the country back. There never was much in the Irredentist movement as regards the Ticino. In Savoy, I repeat, there is a good deal of local Savoyard feeling, but no Italian feeling proper, and those in Savoy who are anti-French mainly incline towards Switzerland. In the county of Nice there is a great deal of local independent feeling, but Nice never was Italian in its sympathies, and if called upon to choose between France and Italy would, by a large majority, unhesitatingly again choose France. Corsica, also, is Corsican rather than either Italian or French.

There is a good deal of Greek and other non-Italian blood in Corsica, and Italy does not find her islands so easy to rule as to make it wise for her in any event to seek to burden herself with more. In certain circumstances the Italian movement with regard to the Dalmatian coast might become formidable, but for the moment it may be disregarded. Germany does not wish that Austria should ever cede Trieste, and Hungary will cling to her Adriatic port. The local feeling in Malta, England, were she wise in the matter, could easily content. There remains, however, the question of the southern Tyrol.

The question of the possible annexation of the Italian Tyrol to Italy involves two sides of Italian policy, the Irredentist policy and the policy of pourboire. The Trentino in my opinion will probably one day pass to Italy, and its ultimate destiny is already practically accepted by its inhabitants and by the voice of Europe, as was that of Lombardy and of Venice long before they fell to the Italian kingdom. In the autumn of 1869 Napoleon III. made overtures to Austria and Italy with a view to an alliance against Prussia, but Signor Minghetti held out against some of his colleagues and, it is said, against the king. It was then proposed that France, Austria, and Italy should guarantee mutually their possessions, and that in the event of war with Germany, Austria should be given territory at the expense of Prussia, and that Italy should take the southern Tyrol. It is believed that the negotiations then broke down because Signor Minghetti insisted on the evacuation of Rome by France, and, indeed, went further in declaring that it was not for the partisans of Italian unity to oppose the foundation of German unity. Napoleon III. then sought a merely Austrian alliance, which, with all respect to the memory of Count Beust, he certainly thought he had obtained, and the southern Tyrol had a respite from proposals of Italian annexation. That territory, in my belief, Italy sooner or later will undoubtedly receive from the necessities of Austria. There is probably no thought of Nice or Savoy or even Corsica in the minds of those members of the Italian Right who are the most strongly inclined towards an Austrian alliance. They know that to take advantage of any difficulties of France, however grave, for the purpose of reannexing Savoy or Nice, or of seizing Corsica against the wishes of the popula tion-for the Italian party are a small minority both in the county and the duchy

and the island-would be to cripple Italy forever, inasmuch as she would from that time forward be forced to be continually armed to the teeth against the French. But the friends of Austria and the enemies of Austria concur in desiring, and in expecting to obtain, the Italian Tyrol. The friends expect to get it as a free gift for helping Austria against Russia, and the enemies expect to get it as a prize upon her downfall. It is just possible that although the Italian franchise has been greatly extended, the foreign policy of the majority of the people, that is, the foreign policy of the Catholic contadini, might prove to be different from the policy of the majority of the existing electors, although I do not think so, but supposing that ultimately, when the suffrage is again extended, the pro-German policy should disappear, the southern Tyrol will not less surely, but in a different way, be lost to

Austria.

The only section of the Italians who are warm in their friendship for France are a remnant of old Garibaldians deeply attached to republican institutions. The lack of friendliness for their great western neighbor does not arise from ingratitude or from Irredentist tradition, but from a series of irritations; one of the earliest of which was the continued occupation of Rome by French troops so long as men could be spared for the purpose, and one of the latest of which is the ridiculous pleasantry of finding in the imaginary Khroumir a pretext for the sudden occupation of Tunis. That there is bad blood between the two nations is seen in the disturbances which occur in all great centres of population where French and Italian workmen are brought into contact. The old feeling of irritation towards Austria has almost subsided, and Italy, or, to speak more accurately, the present electorate of Italy, seems very willing to enter I sum up, then, my view upon both the into alliance with its former foe. As to Irredentist and the pourboire policy by Germany, moderate politicians in Italy deasserting that practical politicians in Italy cline to be irritated at expressions of gratiwould no more think of rousing a feeling tude addressed by the imperial government in favor of the cession of Malta by En- to the pope for his aid at the recent elecgland or of Corsica by France than would tions. The phrase in the pope's letter practical politicians in Germany or France which seemed to point to a hope of the raise a similar cry for Heligoland or for the restoration of the temporal power has been Channel Islands. The different feeling explained away as having been written, which exists with regard to the Trentino during the illness of the pontifical secreis due to the plain fact that in that directary of state, by a juvenile hand, and, tion there is, on the borders of Italy, a population which desires union with Italy, and also that in that quarter Italy knows that she has a wretched frontier. Sentiment and the desire for security concur in this particular instance, and Italians of all groups are united in a desire to obtain from the Austrian alliance the Tyrol so far as Botzen. Looking more generally to Italian foreign policy I should explain that, in desiring the maintenance of the status quo upon the Mediterranean, Italy not only hopes to protect herself against any desire to reconstitute the temporal power, but also hopes to hold Russia's ambition in check. Italian public opinion, supported, as it believes, by that of England, strongly resists the expansion of Russia in south-eastern Europe. I must frankly admit that the language with regard to the maintenance of the status quo is pushed farther in Italy than the facts would warrant. All sections of Italian politicians repudiate the desire to ask for the Trentino as the price for services rendered. But in private they frankly hold language very different from their public

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although the explanation need not necessarily be believed, it is an interesting fact that it has been offered and accepted. But what is perhaps more important is, that Italy at once demanded an explanation at Berlin, and received from Berlin the strongest possible denial on the part both of Germany and Austria of any dream that, under any circumstances, the position of the supreme pontiff would be regarded by those powers as a matter calling for their interference. Although Italians outside the government are hardly aware that these completely satisfactory explanations have been given, they take Prince Bismarck's speeches in a very friendly spirit. They say that the German government could not do less than publicly express gratitude to the holy father for his co-operation in the triumph of imperial ideas. They smile at the recollection that the first great interference of the pope in modern times in Europe has been an interference in support of the policy which the kingdom of Italy strongly desires to see prevail. They point out that this very interference on the part of the Vatican in an important internal question in a foreign country is a

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patent proof to all Europe of the complete | in his defence, and should he be proved liberty of action which the supreme pontiff to be incompetent it does not follow that enjoys, though, or because, deprived of there are no capable commanders in the temporal power. The successors of Cavour and of Minghetti declare that the pope's action is a triumph for the Italian goverment, and that it is a realization of what, that party have always affirmed, that the power of the papacy would become far more effective if delivered from the trammels of a temporal kingdom.

Italy might, of course, by avoiding an Austro-German alliance, and by keeping her hands free for eventualities, abstain also from maintaining so large an army as she has, at all events nominally, to support at present. I doubt, however, whether in any circumstances she could with prudence reduce her armaments. The Italian army is very numerous on paper; it is not very large in fact; and the Italian fleet is a cheap one considering its power, and it needs to be strong when we remember that Sicily and Sardinia have to be held, that an enormously long and very narrow kingdom has to be saved from being cut in half, and that Italy is directly menaced by the French positions at Carthage, in Corsica, and on the Riviera. Italy thinks, moreover, that a great European war is inevitable soon, and that owing to her geographical position she will be forced to take part in it as the permanent ally of one side, or else to sell her co-operation to the highest bidder. Italy has in her king a cavalry officer with a strong desire to distinguish himself in the field. She is nervously anxious about her generals. Perhaps the most important feature of the proceedings consequent upon the disaster at Saati is the censure passed upon the general commanding at Massowah. The Italian government expressed its disapproval of the actions of General Genè, and his position becoming untenable he has been replaced by General Saletta, who initiated the occupation and who knows the country well. At first sight this seems to bear out the suggestion made by me in the last article of the present series, that while the Italian soldiers may be as brave as they appear to have proved themselves at Saati, their superior officers are not to be depended upon for head work in difficult circumstances. Against this view, however, it should be remembered that all governments, when overtaken by sudden military disaster, are inclined to make scapegoats of the unfortunate commanders. General Genè has not yet been heard

* Austro-Hungary, LIVING AGE, No. 2237.

army. We have had our own reverses in Africa frequently within the last fifty years, but we have no lack of competent generals who might be trusted to retrieve all errors. Be that as it may, however, there is an impression abroad that Italian generalship may have some difficulty in regaining the reputation lost in 1866. King Humbert is an enthusiastic soldier and may be trusted to see to the efficiency of his troops so far as lies in his power. The Italians are quick in learning their drill, they can subsist on very little, and their Alpine regiments are unequalled for mountain warfare. In that excellent work, "Military Italy," which is, I believe, written by Captain à Court, of the Rifle Brigade, the author makes perhaps his only mistake when he states that the French Chasseurs, the men who would have to meet these splendid troops, are "selected" from 'gamekeepers, hunters, and foresters." The French, in my opinion, are utterly unfit to meet them, and it is probable that even if Italy were engaged with France in a single-handed contest the French could not, without great efforts, force the passes of the Alps.

The real value of the Italian army may, perhaps, be best ascertained from a careful consideration of the debate in December, 1886, in which the then minister of war, General Ricotti, explained the exact force which, after the first of April of the present year, Italy would be able to put into the field. He did not for one moment pretend that the enormous nominal force which Italy possesses, exceeding by one hundred thousand the number of instructed men possessed by Germany herself, would really be found when wanted; but he gave figures which would go to show that the Italian army can put into line about such a force as we should expect from the Italian war budget, namely, a force somewhat inferior to that of Aus tria. It is the combination of a large army and a powerful fleet which really makes Italy formidable; for if Italy has only the fifth army it has the third navy of all the powers.

Captain à Court has admirably pointed out how, for a young country, and a country with an overburdened budget, it was not possible to build ship for ship against France, and not within Italy's power to create a fleet numerically equal to that of France, but that what was possible was to build a small number of enormous sea

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