and leave the other party to his remedy at law. No such principle has ever been acted on in this court. It has been so laid down over and over again, and in a recent case that was cited at the bar before Sir Edward Sugden, that unless this Court can execute every part of the contract, this Court will not compel a specific performance of a part. When this case therefore comes to a hearing, I am of opinion, according to the facts as they at present stand, and according to the statement of the principle I have mentioned, this Court cannot restrain Mr. Croll from purchasing acids elsewhere, because it cannot compel Mr. Hills on his side to furnish all the acids that may be necessary for the manufacture carried on by Mr. Croll. If the Court cannot do this, it cannot restrain the parties at the hearing. It is quite clear that upon this interlocutory application the Court cannot restrain Mr. Croll from purchasing acids elsewhere. I apprehend, therefore, the decision of the Vice Chancellor, which proceeded on the principle I have stated, and which, I believe, is the principle of this Court, as to that part of the case is correct; and, I think, it equally applies to that part of the notice of motion with respect to the licences, because that forms a part of the general contract: if the Court cannot execute the whole of the contract it cannot execute the contract in part. Therefore, I am of opinion that in this case the motion must be refused, and refused with costs. Legacy-Construction-Vested or Contingent Interest in Remainder. A testator bequeathed the residue of his personal estate to trustees, upon trust to pay three annuities; and after the death of the survivor of the three annuitants, upon trust, for the children of his two brothers and sister as tenants in common at twenty-one; but, if any of them died under twenty-one, the shares of them so dying were to go to the survivors:-Held, that one of the children having attained twenty-one, and having died in the lifetime of the annuitant, his personal representatives were entitled to his share. NEW SERIES, XIV.-CHANC. David Williams, by his will, dated the 4th of October 1832, after bequeathing certain legacies, gave the residue of his personal estate to his executors, upon trust, to pay an annuity of 40l. to each of his three sisters, during their respective lives, for their separate use, and then continued as follows:-" And upon the decease of the survivor or longest liver of them, my said sisters, upon this further trust, to pay and divide the whole of the residue of my said estate and effects, unto and amongst all and every the children of my said brothers John and Thomas, and of my said sister Margaret, in equal shares and proportions, share and share alike, as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants; the shares of such of them as shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, at the time of the decease of the survivor of my said sisters to be paid at such her decease; and the shares of such of them as shall not then have attained that age, to be invested in the purchase of government stocks or securities, and the interest and dividends arising from the share of each of such children, to be paid and applied in and about his or her maintenance and education, in such manner as my said trustees for the time being shall think proper, until such children respectively shall attain the said age of twenty-one years, when my will and desire is, that their respective shares be paid to them. Provided always, and my will further is, that if any of the said children shall happen to depart this life before attaining the said age of twenty-one years, then and in that case the shares of such of them so dying as aforesaid, shall go and belong to the survivors of them, and to be equally divided between them in the manner and at the time herein before directed." The testator died in October 1840, leaving his three sisters surviving; and this suit was instituted for the administration of his estate. There were children of each of the testator's brothers and sister, John and Thomas Williams, and Margaret Morgan; the two children of Margaret Morgan attained twenty-one and died; and a question was now raised before the Court, whether, in consequence of their death in the lifetime of the annuitants, their respective shares had lapsed, or whether, upon respectively attaining the age of twenty-one, 3 M Solicitor's Bill-Taxation-Statute 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73.-Business in Court of Common Pleas. An order for the taxation of a solicitor's bill may be made ex parte after the expiration of one month from the delivery of it, but within twelve months. The procuring a quietus on a bond for malt duties, to be registered by the senior Master of the Court of Common Pleas, is not business done in that court, so as to preclude the Master of the Rolls from ordering the taxation of a bill containing items for such business. The petitioner, Mr. Gaitskell, had been employed by Mr. Burr, to conduct the sale of some freehold property; the sale took place in July 1843, and the purchase-money for the several lots exceeded 30,000l. In October 1844, before the conveyances were all completed, the petitioner, at the request of Mr. Burr, sent him a bill of costs amounting to 1,9571. The bill was sent by coach, in a parcel, which contained a letter from the petitioner to Mr. Burr, and was headed "Edward Burr, Esq. to W. Senhouse Gaitskell, as to the sale of the Dunstable Brewery," and on the 1st of January 1845, Mr. Burr received a further bill of costs for 401., which was sent in a parcel, containing a letter to him from Mr. Gaitskell. Several letters passed between the parties respecting the bills; and on the 19th of February 1845, Mr. Burr obtained an order ex parte from the Master of the Rolls, for the taxation of them; by which order Mr. Burr was required to procure the Master's report within a month. Mr. Gaitskell then presented a petition to the Master of the Rolls, stating that he had acted for many years as Mr. Burr's solicitor, and that none of his previous bills had ever been objected to that these bills had been drawn up in great haste, and with the belief that they would be settled without taxation; and that there were many omissions and errors in them and he prayed that the order of the 19th of February might be discharged for irregularity. The petition was heard in March 1845, when his Lordship dismissed it with costs, without prejudice to Mr. Gaitskell's right to present another petition to amend his bill. Mr. Gaitskell thereupon presented a petition to the Lord Chancellor, and prayed that both the orders of the Master of the Rolls might be reversed. Mr. Cooper and Mr. Miller, in support of the petition.-The order for taxation was irregular on four grounds:-1st. The order was made more than one month after the bills had been delivered, and, therefore, notice ought to have been given to the solicitor of his client's intention to apply for such an order (1). The act expressly refers to (1) The 37th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. enacts, That no attorney or solicitor shall bring an action for his bill of costs until the expiration of one month after he shall have delivered unto the party to be charged therewith, or sent or left for him, a bill of such fees, charges, and disbursements, and which bill shall either be subscribed with the proper hand of such attorney or solicitor, or be inclosed in or accompanied by a letter, subscribed in like manner, referring to such bill; and upon the application of the party chargeable by such bill within such month, it shall be lawful, in case the business contained in such bill or any part thereof shall have been transacted in the High Court of Chancery, or in any other court of equity, or in any matter of bankruptcy or lunacy, or in case no part of such business shall have been transacted in any court of law or equity, for the Lord High Chancellor, or the Master of the Rolls; and in case any part of such business shall have been transacted in any other court, for the Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, Ex special directions to be given in the event of an order being obtained after the expiration of a month, and as such directions cannot properly be given without the presence of the solicitor, an order of course is irregular. 2ndly. The bills were not signed by the solicitor, nor was there any letter accompanying them, so as to satisfy section 37. of the statute; this section is taken from the statute of 2 Geo. 2. c. 23, and under that act, signature of the bills was always held necessary. 3rdly. All these bills have, in fact, been paid by retainer, as the solicitor has received the purchase-money, and handed the balance to his client, and retainer is equivalent to payment. 4thly. None of the business which is charged in the bills, was done in the Court of Chancery, but part of it was done in the Court of Common Pleas, inasmuch as the vendor had given a bond to the Crown for malt duties, and a quietus was entered in the Court of Common Pleas (2): and therefore the Master of the Rolls had no authority to make the order. Ex parte Prickett, 1 New Rep. 266. chequer, Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster, or Court of Pleas at Durham, or any Judge of either of them, to refer such bill, and the demand of such attorney or solicitor, to be taxed and settled by the proper officer of the court in which such reference shall be made, without any money being brought into court; and in case no such application shall be made within such month as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for such reference to be made as aforesaid on the application either of the solicitor or his client, with such directions and subject to such conditions as the Court or Judge making such reference may think proper; and such Court or Judge may restrain such solicitor from commencing or prosecuting any action for his bill of costs, upon such terms as shall be thought proper; but after the expiration of twelve months from the delivery of the bill, no such reference is to be made except under special circumstances to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge, to whom the application shall be made. (2) Under the stat. 2 Vict. c. 11. s. 9, which enacts, "That whenever a quietus shall be obtained by a debtor or accountant to the Crown, and an office copy thereof shall be left with the senior Master of the said Court of Common Pleas, together with a certificate, signed by the Accountant General, that the same may be registered, the said Master shall forthwith enter the same in the said book of debtors and accountants to the Crown, in alphabetical order, by the name of the person whose estate is intended to be discharged by such quietus, with the date, and shall for any such entry be entitled to a fee of 2s. 6d." Bourn, 4 Campb. 68. Sandom v. Collins v. Nicholson, 2 Taunt. 321. 157; s. c. 2 Law J. Rep. K.B. 221. Weld v. Crawford, 2 Stark. N.P.C.538; s. c. Hullock on Costs, 539. Winter v. Payne, 6 Term Rep. 645. Mr. Walker and Mr. Willcock, contrà.The bills were not signed, but there was a correspondence between the parties, in which they are recognized and adopted on both sides, and the object of the statute in this respect is fully answered. As to the question of retainer, the solicitor retains a certain sum in his hands to meet a balance which has never been agreed upon; and one ground for the present application is that the bills were incomplete and defective, and in that state of things a payment of them, either by retainer or otherwise, cannot be presumed. None of the business is done in the Court of Common Pleas. The officer who enters the quietus is an officer of that court; but that circumstance does not affect the nature of the transaction. It. is merely a ministerial act, which the Court of Common Pleas never does and has no authority to direct. As to the other point, when an application is made to the Master of the Rolls, before the expiration of a month, it is quite clear that the solicitor need not be served with any notice; and where the application is made after the expiration of one month, but before the expiration of twelve months, from the delivery of the bill, it has always been ex parte, and the Master of the Rolls has usually added the proviso, that the Master's report should be obtained within one month. There is nothing in the act to prevent such a direction being inserted; and out of two hundred such orders, no appeal has been presented before the present case. In re Branson, 3 Bing. N.C. 783; s. c. s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 93. Const v. Barr, 2 Russ. 161. The LORD CHANCELLOR expressed his opinion against the first objection as to the bills not having been signed, and the third objection as to their being paid by retainer; and Mr. Cooper replied on the other two points. The LORD CHANCELLOR.-When I read the act of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, I am sure it was not the intention of the legislature to make any alteration in the law upon the point raised by the last objection. I was certainly struck at first with the generality of the words "business transacted in any court of law or equity;" but it appears that those words are borrowed from the statute of Geo. 2, and that statute has frequently been the subject of judicial decision. The doctrine of all the cases is, that, to bring a case within the meaning of those words, the business must be a proceeding either in a suit, or with a view to a suit. In In re Branson it was contended, that the bill was taxable under that statute, because there were charges for obtaining the acknowledgment of a married woman under the Fines and Recoveries Act, and inrolling the commissioner's certificate thereof; and it was said that this was an act done in court; but the Chief Justice, in giving judgment, said, "Though the deed is required to be inrolled in this court, it is not a proceeding in a suit; it is nothing more than a mode of conveyance." Every word of that applies mutatis mutandis to the present case. The charges in this bill are not for procuring satisfaction to be entered on a judgment, which is a proceeding in a suit, although a fictitious one, but for entering a quietus on a bond to the Crown for malt duties. Before the Pipe Office was abolished, a quietus was obtained from the Court of Exchequer, and when an office copy of it was produced to the senior Master of the Common Pleas, he entered it in the book of Crown debtors. After the Pipe Office was abolished, the question arose how these incumbrances were to be discharged. In In re Fleetwood an application was made to the Court of Common Pleas, for an order upon the senior Master, to make the entry without the production of an office copy of the quietus; and the Court then made the order that he should be at liberty to do so, but gave no opinion as to the effect of such a proceeding, and subsequently applications are made to a Judge at chambers for leave to enter was pursued in the present case; but those proceedings were neither proceedings in a suit, nor with a view to a suit, and, therefore, are not within the description of business transacted in a court of law or equity. The only remaining point was, that the order of reference ought not to have been made ex parte, but upon a special application. The petition upon which that order was made, was presented after the expiration of one month, but within twelve months from the time of the delivery of the bills. If a bill is taxed within twelve months from the delivery of it, this is the common order, in the usual form adopted by the Master of the Rolls. The act of parliament gives a discretion to the Court to make such order as it shall think proper. I do not think it is necessary that there should be any examination by the Court of all the particular cases in which an order with such a direction is made: the Court may make a general order in cases of this kind, that when such an application is made after the expiration of one month, the Master's report shall be obtained speedily. I am more confirmed in that opinion, and satisfied that that was the intention of the legislature when I refer to the enactment respecting the third class of bills, namely, those which are delivered after the expiration of twelve months. In that case, the act says that the bill shall not be referred for taxation, except under special circumstances. There is to be an examination and inquiry by the Court as to those circumstances, for the purpose of having the discretion of the Court exercised upon them; and as the legislature has provided in express terms in one case and not in the other case, but has left it to the Court to make the order, subject to such directions as it shall think proper, I think I am justified in coming to the same conclusion as the Master of the Rolls, that is, that it is not necessary that any inquiry or examination should be made in this class of cases, but that directions should be made to correspond with the particular course of proceeding, and the directions contained in this order of course, are suited to such course of proceeding. The application is ex parte, and if the party making it mislead the Court, there is no injustice in discharging orders of this description. I think, both the J. Krans, by his will, gave and bequeathed a legacy of 500l. to the petitioner, in case he should be alive at the decease of the testator's widow. The petitioner was a foreigner, and resided abroad at the decease of the testator, and the executors, under the provisions of the 36 Geo. 3. c. 52. s. 32, invested 500l. in the purchase of 600l. stock to answer the legacy. The testator's widow having died, the petitioner presented this petition claiming to be entitled to the said sum of 6001. The executors objected to the claim, on the ground that the petitioner was only entitled to the sum of 500l., the legacy bequeathed by the testator, and submitted, that this being a contingent legacy it did not come within the terms of the act. It was urged, in support of the petition, that the clause referred to applied to the present case, for that the petitioner was entitled to the legacy, and it was a legacy chargeable with duty under the act. and Mr. Tripp appeared for the petitioner, Mr. Heathfield for the executors. The VICE CHANCELLOR decided, that the act did not apply to cases where the legacy was contingent, but only where the legatee was at the time of the appropriation absolutely entitled, and that the petitioner was therefore only entitled to the sum of 500l., minus the legacy duty. This was a motion to dissolve an injunction, obtained on the 1st of January 1845, that the defendants Speirs and others might be restrained from demanding of the defendants Sir Charles Morgan and others, and that the defendants Sir Charles Morgan and others might be restrained from paying to the defendants Speirs and others, any larger amount in respect of a certain policy of assurance obtained upon the life of John Brassey than three equal fourth parts of the sum of 11,7401., and that the defendants Speirs and others might be restrained from proceeding at law upon the said policy in the names of the defendants Sewell and others for recovering such sums. The bill stated that in the year 1762 a society was formed for insurance on lives, called "The Equitable Assurance Society," and that by the deed of settlement constituting such society it was provided, that every person making assurance with the said society should subscribe and seal the said deed of settlement, and sign and seal a declaration or covenant that he or she did voluntarily enter into and become a member of the said society, and would during the whole term of such assurance bear and pay his or her part or share and proportion of any sum of money which might be imposed on or called for from the members of the said society, in proportion to their several interests therein, and would conform to and keep all the laws and regulations of the said society. That in June 1808, Richard John Brassey, banker, deceased, effected a policy of assurance upon his own life for the sum of 4,000l. with the said society, and that the said R. J. Brassey entered into and became a member of the society according to the deed of |