and for better securing the said sum of 4,000l., and to be assigned and disposed of as he or they should direct or appoint. And he found that letters of administration of the personal estate of the said John Salt were, on the 12th of February 1829, granted to John Salt, his father; and that the lastnamed John Salt having died in December 1834, letters of administration de bonis non to the said John Salt the intestate, bearing date the 18th of July 1838, were granted to Charles Salt. And the Master having considered the said state of facts and evidence, he was of opinion and found that there had been a complete title made to the estate mentioned, and that a proper conveyance thereof had been executed by all necessary parties, and that such title was shewn in or about the month of July 1838, (which was subsequent to the filing of the plaintiff's bill,) and that such conveyance was executed on the 18th of May 1839. Exceptions were taken to the Master's report, and the question was now argued, whether this was a matter of conveyance or of title on the part of the plaintiff. It was contended that as he could at any time, with the consent of the mortgagee, make a good title, the question raised was one of conveyance and not of title. On the part of the defendant it was urged, that upon the abstract which had been delivered at the time the bill was filed, and on which the Master made his first report, finding that a good title had been shewn prior to the filing of the plaintiff's bill, it appeared that the whole legal and equitable interest in the estate were in the plaintiff and his trustees; that the abstract did not disclose any mortgage, and if the sale had been completed upon it, the purchaser might have paid his purchase-money to the plaintiff, and might afterwards have had to satisfy the claim made by the mortgagee; that even if the abstract had disclosed the mortgage, the Master would not have been justified in reporting that a good title was shewn, unless it had also appeared that the mortgagee was willing to join in the conveyance. Mr. Stuart and Mr. Cayley Shadwell, in support of the exceptions. Mr. Bethell and Mr. Blunt, for the Master's report. The following cases were cited— Wynne v. Griffith, 1 Russ. 283. The VICE CHANCELLOR.-This case appears to me to be very simple. The Master first made his report upon the state of facts laid before him; after which there appeared to be a further state of facts, which made it quite right to send it back to the Master. The Master has now made a subsequent report. In pursuance of the reference, according to the abstract which was first delivered, Sarah Powell appeared to be the owner of a term of years for securing the sum of 4,000l., and it also appeared, as I collect, that the legal estate in fee simple, subject to the term, was vested in one John Salt, so that it might well happen that Avarne, who was the vendor, might have a perfectly good title; it appearing on the abstract, which was then delivered, what was the state of it, namely, that there was a mortgage term vested in Sarah Powell, and the legal estate in fee was in John Salt; then it appears that the bill in question in .. the cause was filed on the 25th of November 1834. It appears by the subsequent abstract, that administration of the personal estate of John Salt was committed to John Salt his father; then John Salt the father died, and in the month of July 1838, administration de bonis non of John Salt the son was committed to Charles Salt; and it also appeared by the supplemental abstract, that by an instrument dated the 18th of August 1825, Sarah Powell declared herself to be trustee of the term for John Salt. Now the question is, whether the abstract, which first of all disclosed these facts, disclosed a good title. It appears to me that when an abstract shews that the equitable title is vested in the vendor, and that there is a legal term in some person as mortgagee, and that there is a legal estate outstanding in a given person, that that abstract shews a good title. And though it may subsequently happen that the termor may die, and though the person representing him or the owner of the legal estate in fee simple may die, yet that a good title is shewn, when it is shewn who has the whole equity if existing, and in what person the outstanding portion of the legal estate is vested. Now the case of Wynne v. Griffith appears to me to be right, so far as it goes, because it is quite manifest there was a grave question whether the lease and release which had been executed by the four parties, in favour of whom the power of appointment was given, did vest the legal estate in the party who was named as releasee, there being words of appointment, as well as words of release. În the first part of the argument of the cause, the objection made was, that it did not appear in whom the legal estate was vested. That is a different case altogether, and, therefore, Lord Gifford thought that it was an objection to the title, because there it did not appear in whom the legal estate was; and it appears by the report that on my arguing the cause, his Lordship thought it right to send the case for the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas. There were cases, no doubt, to support this, that the legal estate did not vest in the releasee to uses, but still in the argument of the certificate it was thought by the then Master of the Rolls right to send the case to the Court of Queen's Bench, and they certified in the ⚫ same way as the Court of Common Pleas had done, and then it was thought there was an end to the objection; but in the case of Wynne v. Griffith it was not known whether the equitable estate was shewn to be in the vendor. It appears to me that the case of Wynne v. Griffith is consistent with the proposition of Sir E. Sugden (1)" That if the seller has vested in him legally or equitably all the interest in the estate, it cannot be objected to the Master's report in favour of the title, that the legal estate is outstanding, although in a lunatic, against whom no commission has issued." Where the legal estate was shewn to be in a person who happened to be a lunatic, that made it necessary to get the estate out of the person: it was something which must create expense, but still the right to call for it was shewn in the person who had the equitable fee simple. Now I thought it right to have a full discussion of this point, in order that it might not be thought that the Court had not well considered it. I think I should be upsetting the clear rule of law if I were to decide in (1) Sugd. Ven. & Pur. vol. 2. p. 40, last edit. 5th Order of 1828-Exceptions-Time. The six days allowed by the 5th of the General Orders of 1828, for the reference of exceptions to answers for insufficiency, must be reckoned from the expiration of the eighth day from the delivery of the exceptions. The exceptions must be referred within fourteen days. A motion was made to discharge an order by which exceptions to an answer had been referred for insufficiency. Exceptions were filed on the 8th of November last, and by the 5th of the General Orders of 1828 (1), the eight days allowed the defendant to submit expired on the 16th of November. The question then was, whether the six days limited for obtaining the order of reference of the exceptions expired on the 22nd of November, or whether the six days began to run only on the ninth and not the eighth day after the delivery of the exceptions, in which case the service by the plaintiff of the order on the 23rd of November was in time. Mr. Kindersley and Mr. Beavan supported the motion, and cited Taylor v. Harrison, 1 Myl. & Cr. 274. Mr. Wood, contrà. Dec. 3.-The MASTER OF THE ROLLS having referred to the authorities that had been cited the day before, observed, that having regard to the expression used by the Lord Chancellor, in Attorney General y. Clack, he must come to the conclusion that the six days limited by the 5th of the Orders of 1828, must be reckoned from the eighth day from the delivery of the exceptions. Order discharged. (1) Ord. Can. 6. This bill was filed against three defendants, one of whom, Nevill, by a supplemental answer to the usual interrogatory respecting books and papers, &c., stated, that he had in his possession eight boxes which had been deposited with him in the year 1826, by one of the other defendants, named Raby, for safe custody only, and that he had no knowledge of the purport or contents of the documents in those boxes; and that he was willing to leave them in the hands of his clerk in court for the usual purposes. Exceptions were taken and allowed to this answer, and the defendant then put in a further supplemental answer to the following effect :-That the eight boxes referred to in his supplemental answer, and therein stated to have been deposited with him by Mr. Raby, for safe custody only, belonged (as between this defendant and Raby) solely and exclusively to Raby; and that this defendant had no right, title, or interest, to or in the said boxes, or, according to the best of his belief, to or in the contents of the same or any of them, except in his character or capacity of a depositary for safe custody; and that this defendant was responsible to Raby for the safe keeping, and also for the due return on demand of the said boxes, and the contents of the same respectively; and that this defendant would be bound and compellable to deliver up the said boxes and the contents thereof to Raby, or his order, whenever thereunto required; and that he then held the same, subject in all respects to the direction and disposal of Raby; and that he was not, and to the best of his belief never was, authorized or emNEW SERIES, XIV.-CHANC. powered by Raby to part with the said boxes, or the contents thereof, or any of them, or to disclose or communicate the contents of the said boxes, or any of them, to any person or persons whomsoever, nor to take or permit to be taken, any copies or extracts of or from such contents, or any of them, without the express sanction or consent of Raby first had and obtained: and that this defendant had, as stated by him in his former supplemental answer, no personal knowledge whatever of the contents of the said boxes, or any of them, and was unable to state, as to his knowledge, remembrance, information, or belief, whether such contents, or any of them, were in any manner material for the purposes of the complainants in this suit, or whether the same or any of them did or not relate to, or concern, or in any manner affect the matters in the said bill mentioned, or any of them, or whether thereby, or by any of them, if the same were produced, the truth of the several matters in the said bill mentioned, or any of them, would appear and this defendant, in consequence of the manner in which Raby had been connected with the matters in the said bill mentioned, and for that reason only, supposed that the same, or some of them, might relate to or concern the matters in the said bill stated and charged, or some of such matters; and that when he made the offer, in his former supplemental answer, of producing and leaving the said boxes with his clerk in court for the usual purposes, he conceived that this Court would protect him from being called upon or required to do more in regard to producing and leaving the said boxes or the contents thereof with the clerk in court, than this Court might think he was in strictness bound or compellable to do, and could safely and properly do as such depositary for safe custody only as aforesaid; and inasmuch as Raby was a defendant in this suit, this defendant was advised that this Court could not and would not act upon such submission without notice to Raby, whereby, as between him and this defendant, this defendant would be fully protected, as at the time of putting in his former supplemental answer he believed he would be; and this defendant further stated, that for greater certainty and security he had caused the said boxes to be sealed up; and that except in respect of F such sealing up, the said boxes and the contents thereof respectively were, according to the best of this defendant's belief, in precisely the same state and condition as the same were in at the time of putting in his said former supplemental answer. Exceptions were taken to this answer, and the Master allowed them. The defendant excepted to the Master's report. The case was heard before the Vice Chancellor Wigram, who was of opinion, that the answer was sufficient, and he allowed the exceptions to the Master's report. The plaintiff's appealed from that decision. Mr. Koe and Mr. Collins, for the plaintiffs, contended, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a full discovery as to all the documents which were in the defendant's possession, either as owner or as a trustee; that he had offered by his former answer to produce the boxes and their contents, and to leave them with his clerk in court; and he could not now be permitted to draw back from that offer. The Marquis of Bute v. Stuart, 12 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 140. See also Taylor v. Rundell, 1 Phil. 222; s. c. 13 Mr. Heathfield, contrà, stated, that the defendant had no wish to withhold any information he possessed; but these boxes were left with him as a depositary; that he never held them as a trustee, and the Court would not require him to break open the boxes and examine their contents, particularly as Raby, the owner of the boxes, was himself a defendant, and equally bound with Nevill, to give a discovery of all matters relating to the suit; and that in Taylor v. Rundell, the defendant was an accounting party, which distinguished that case from the present one. The LORD CHANCELLOR concurred in the opinion of the Vice Chancellor Wigram, that the answer was sufficient, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any further discovery from this defendant respecting the contents of the boxes; and he dismissed the appeal, with costs. Nov. 14, 1844.-The LORD CHANCELLOR. -In this case an action had been brought in the Court of Common Pleas, by the defendant against the plaintiff, on a policy of insurance effected on the ship Sherbourne, for twelve months, at and from Calcutta. The defence relied on was, that the ship was not seaworthy. The present bill was filed for a discovery and an injunction. The plaintiff moved for the production of the letters, papers, deeds, &c., stated by the defendant's answer and the schedule thereto to be in his possession or power. The question was confined to certain letters, the dates of which are set forth in the further answer of the defendant, who contended, that he was not bound to produce those letters. The answer admits that Warren, the master of the ship, was sent out to India by the defendant, at the suggestion and under the advice of the defendant's solicitors, for the express purpose of collecting evidence on behalf of the defendant in support of the action, and that he was engaged there for two years and upwards in collecting such evidence; and that, as many of the witnesses were resident in India, and had been employed by Warren in the repair of the ship, it would have been impossible, without his presence and assistance, to obtain the evidence relating to the action. In a subsequent part of the answer, the defendant states that during the period the Master was absent for the purpose of collecting the evidence in support of the action, he wrote and sent to the defendant, and also to his solicitors, divers letters on the subject of such evidence, and the same were duly received by him, the defendant, and his solicitors, and are in the possession of the defendant's solicitors; but the defendant submits, that such letters are confidential communications, and that he is not bound to produce, and ought to be protected from producing the same, and that he is not bound to answer whether such letters or any of them relate, or in some manner, or in any or what manner, refer to the state of repair, or otherwise to the matters in the plaintiff's bill inquired after. The defendant, in his further answer, states, that the letters in question were written by the Master to the defendant and his solicitors in this country, whilst he was at Calcutta, acting by the direction and as the agent of the defendant's solicitors, in procuring evidence in support of the action in the amended bill mentioned, and that the contents of the letters relate to and concern such evidence. It does not appear to me that there is any inconsistency in these statements. He might have been sent out by the defendant, for the purpose of collecting evidence on behalf of the defendant, at the suggestion and by the advice of the defendant's solicitors; and might, in collecting such evidence, have acted under the direction and as the agent of the solicitors. The single question, therefore, is, whether letters written under these circumstances are privileged communications. First, as to the letters written by the solicitors' agent to the defendant. Where a solicitor is employed to collect evidence for his client during the pending of a suit, it is clear that his communications with his client respecting such evidence are privileged. But the solicitor cannot always act in his own person in collecting evidence: distance and other circumstances may render it impossible. Such was the case here. Many of the witnesses lived in India, and a voyage to India was required for that purpose. was necessary, therefore, that the solicitors should employ an agent; and whether that It agent was a clerk of the solicitors, or any other person, appears to me wholly immaterial. In performing his duty, he represented the solicitors, and his communications to his client on the subject of the evidence were communications with the solicitors, falling within the same principle, and entitled to and requiring the same protection. As to the letters addressed to the solicitors, by their agent, they would also be privileged, being written in pursuance of inquiries instituted by or under the direction of the solicitors, as to evidence in support of the action. I agree, therefore, with the Vice Chancellor in thinking that these letters ought not to be produced. I do not, however, concur with that learned Judge in considering this an extension of an admitted principle. I consider the case as coming within the same principle, upon which the communications of the solicitor himself would, under similar circumstances, be privileged. Motion refused, with costs. Estate-Tenant for Life-Timber. An estate was devised to A. for life, impeachable for waste, remainder to B. for life, without impeachment of waste, with remainder to C. in fee. It became necessary, during the life of A, to cut timber; the proceeds were therefore invested, and the interest paid to A. for life. A. died, and B. claimed the proceeds of the timber for his own benefit. C, the reversioner in fee, resisted the claim, and contended that they formed part of the corpus of the estate :Held, in conformity with Waldo v. Waldo, (12 Sim. 107; s. c. 10 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 312,) that B. was entitled to receive the proceeds. This was the petition of Sir William Owen, now Sir William Owen Barlow, Bart., and it stated, that Hugh Barlow, deceased, by his will, dated the 31st of October 1805, gave and devised, inter alia, his undivided moiety of certain estates mentioned in his will, and his undivided fourth part, and his entirety, of other estates, to his |