made for the voluntary relinquishment of the office. It being now clear that there is no formal surrender of the office, nor any formal resignation, it is said that the resig nation must be inferred, because there was no attempt to procure a re-appointment under the act, and because there was a submission to the appointment of another person to the same office. The argument goes, I think, to this length: that if a man hold an office, the duties of which before the act passed he was well able to perform, but by the passing of the act he was placed in such circumstances that he could not perform the duties, without sacrificing more than the office itself was worth, from a new election being compulsory, if he finds himself unable to compete with the rival candidate, and for these and other sufficient reasons he forbears to contest the election or acquiesces in the appointment of another, which it was neither his interest, as affected by the act, nor within his power, as affected by the state of the borough, to prevent, he is to be deemed to have resigned, and for that reason he is to be held not to be entitled to any compensation. I feel assured that no such consequence was intended by the legislature; and I think that it is not within the meaning of the words of the act. It is said, however, that Mr. Parr declined to propose himself for re-appointment, in consequence of an agreement entered into between himself and Mr. Arnold; and that his resignation, abandonment, or relinquishment of the office for all these words are used-is proved by his examination before a committee of the House of Commons, and by declarations made by himself to a witness of the name of Parrott. Four witnesses who have been examined to these matters have deposed to this effect: Rickman says that Parr held the office of town clerk to the 1st of January 1836, when he resigned the office and retired, and, as the witness believed, in consequence of an arrangement previously entered into between Parr and the leading members of the Conservative party, as he believed, because of the general notoriety of such arrangement; and because he believed the majority of the Conservative members were personal friends of Parr, and because Parr was friendly, and acquiesced in the election of Arnold, and because, on the remonstrance of the liberal party, Ledgard, a friend of Parr, said, that as the parties opposed to him would have reform, they must pay for it; and in answer to the third interrogatory, the same witness says, on Mr. Parrott remarking how extraordinary it was that Parr should consent to retire, his successor being of the same party, and that the world would clearly understand that it was only to obtain compensation; Parr replied, that if he (Parrott) was in the same situation, he might do the same. I have stated the evidence of Rickman, because he has expressed himself intelligibly, and stated intelligent reasons, such as they are, for his belief. Hodges and Rogers, two other witnesses, have given evidence very much to the same effect, with this exception, that the words that follow, after the repeated use of the word "because," are not stated as reasons for the witness's belief; but, if they have any meaning at all, are used as the means of demonstrating the allegations that Parr resigned and retired from his office, in consequence of an arrangement generally understood, talked of, and known. Parrott, however, is the witness most relied on in this part of the case, and he says, the question as to the disposition of the office was much discussed; it was a question of interest, and was productive of much anxiety between the parties during the election; and the course which would be adopted with respect to the office by the Conservative party, in case such party succeeded in obtaining a majority of town councillors at such election, was very generally understood, talked of, and known, as having been arranged and agreed upon, and intended by and among the old members of such party, such course being to the effect which he particularly states in his evidence; and then he says, that from his knowledge of the proceedings of the party, he believes that they intended to adopt that course, and the intention was matter of general notoriety; and he then proceeds to say, that Parr held the office of clerk to the magistrates, which he could not continue to hold under the act with the office of town clerk and clerk of the peace, and that after the election Parr continued to the 1st of January 1836, to hold the offices of town clerk and clerk of the peace, when he resigned the same, and was not re-elected or re-appointed thereto; and to the third interrogatory, Parrott says, Parr was not removed from either of the offices, but he was not re-elected or reappointed by reason of his having previously resigned or retired therefrom, and such resignation or retirement was, as the witness believes, in consequence of a previous arrangement, and with the consent of Parr. He then states the expression of his own surprise that Parr consented to retire, and how extraordinary it was, and that the world would clearly understand that it was only to claim compensation for Parr; Parr said in reply, "if Parrott was in his situation he would do the same." I have read this evidence with my best attention, and supposing the witness to be a competent witness, as to which there are serious doubts, the result is, that there was much excitement in the borough, and a great deal of talk of what would be done with Parr's offices, if the Conservatives should have a majority; that people understood (why or how is not explained) that an arrangement was made by the leading Conservatives, that Parr should resign or retire, and be replaced by Arnold, and the people also understood that Parr would himself prefer to have compensation under the act, rather than continue in his office of town clerk; that when the day of election came, Arnold was elected without opposition from Parr; that Parr, notwithstanding the general notoriety of the arrangement, and his own belief that it would be acted upon, expressed his surprise at the proceeding, and said, that the world would clearly understand that it was only to obtain compensation for Parr, and Parr thereupon said, if Parrott was in his situation he might do the same. It is plain, that very little of this can be considered as legal evidence. From the fact that Parr held two offices which, under the act, he could not continue to hold together, and from the fact that he did not oppose the election of Arnold, and from his subsequent claim to compensation, it is probably to be inferred that he thought it better for his own interest to lose the offices and obtain such compensation as he might be able to obtain for the whole, than to contest the matter with Arnold, for the chance of keeping such of the offices as the act enabled him to hold together, receiving only such compensation as he might be able to obtain for the one or more which he was disabled from holding with the rest. In fact, however, no formal surrender or resignation was made, but as an election between competing candidates does not usually take place without previous preparation, and as no preparation was made by Parr to oppose Arnold, who was supported by persons who were, in politics or party, allies of both Arnold and Parr, it was easy to infer Mr. Parr did not mean to make any attempt to procure his re-election, and it was not difficult for heated, political, or party adversaries to infer some improper or corrupt arrangement, especially as the suggestion was under consideration. But the short fact of the case is simply this, that the office of Parr was filled up by the appointment of another person, without any opposition on the part of Parr. By those acts which were done under the provisions of the statute 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 58, I think that Parr was removed from his office. When the cause was under my consideration on a former occasion, the allegations in the bill, to which a demurrer was filed, precluded me from considering the case as a case of removal from office, which, on the evidence, I now consider it to be; I then thought it was to be considered as a case in which Mr. Parr had not been re-appointed to his office, and notwithstanding the reasons suggested by the authority for which I entertain the highest respect, I own I am not now satisfied that the view I then took of the case was erroneous. But it is not necessary now to consider that, because I think, in the absence of the evidence of resignation, the circumstances which occur make this a case of removal, and so thinking, I am of opinion, that on his removal Mr. Parr was entitled to an adequate compensation, regard being had to the manner of his appointment, and his term or interest in his office, and all other circumstances of the case. Mr. Parr, however, claimed and obtained security for compensation for his office of town clerk, and all the other offices which he alleged to be connected with that office : one of these offices, namely, the clerk to the commissioners of taxes, he seems, in fact, never to have lost, and from that circumstance alone, it appears to me, that the amount of compensation for which he obtained security cannot be entirely sustained. With respect to the other offices, I should have been very glad if I could have found any satisfactory authority for my judgment. Lord Cottenham, in expressing his assent to the proposition which I have stated on the subject, said, with perfect correctness, that much would depend on the particular circumstances of each case. It is, no doubt, to be determined upon the facts of each case, whether an office lost together with corporate offices, from which the officer was removed, was or was not a connected or dependent office; and whether the loss has arisen from the loss of the corporate office. I agree with the argument, that for the purpose of establishing a claim for compensation for the loss of a connected or dependent office, it ought to be shewn, first, that the office was connected with or understood to be connected with or dependent upon the corporate office lost; and, secondly, that the loss of it was connected with the loss of the principal office; but it does not appear to me to be required by the act, that a connected or dependent office, or an office understood to be so, should be itself a corporate office. It was contended in the Court of Queen's Bench, that the word "office," as used in the act, being collocated with the words "place, situation, employment, or appointment," ought to be understood in a greater latitude than an office strictly legal ; and it was held, the office of clerk to the Justices, which was sworn to be incidental and appurtenant to the office of town clerk, who had received the emolument of it, was an office for the loss of which the town clerk, although re-appointed, was entitled to compensation. This I consider to be an authority on which I may declare that Mr. Parr being removed from his office of town clerk is entitled to compensation, not only for the office of town clerk, but also for the office of clerk to the Justices, as connected with it. And on similar grounds, although not quite distinctly established by authority, I think him entitled to compensation for the loss of the several offices of solicitor to the corporation, clerk of the peace, solicitor to the quay committee, solicitor to the water bailiff, and prothonotary of the weekly court of record. Upon the other hand, it does not appear to me that either of the offices of undersheriff or solicitor to the coroner was so connected with the office of town clerk to the corporation, or so under the controul of the corporation, as to make them or the loss of them dependent upon the loss of the office of town clerk; and, in strictness, I think Mr. Parr was not entitled to compensation for the loss of them. There are three other offices in respect of which I have had much more doubt, namely, the offices of solicitor to the overseers and to the guardians of the poor of the town and county of Poole, solicitor to the surveyor of the highways, and solicitor to the lamp and watch commissioners; but not thinking it made out that these offices were connected with the office of town clerk, or that the loss of them was dependent on the loss of the office of town clerk, I think, on the whole, that the claim of compensation in respect to them has not been established. I do not think that the circumstances of Mr. Parr having continued to perform the duties of the offices of clerk of the peace and of clerk of the magistrates, until other clerks were appointed, for some time after he was removed from the office of town clerk, in any way interferes with his right to compensation. It therefore appears to me, that Mr. Parr, having been removed from his office of town clerk, is entitled to compensation for the loss thereof, and also to compensation for the loss of the several offices of solicitor to the corporation, clerk of the peace, clerk to the Justices, solicitor to the quay commissioners, solicitor to the water bailiff, and prothonotary to the weekly court of record; but that he is not entitled to any compensation for the loss of any of the other offices stated in his memorial. I must, therefore, refer it to the Master to take an account of the several sums of money received by Mr. Parr or his predecessors, for each and every year during the five years before the 9th day of September 1835, on account of the salaries, offices, emoluments, profits, and perquisites, in respect whereof he claims such compensation, distinguishing the office, place, situation, or appointment, in respect whereof the same shall have been received. And let the Master ascertain and state what, on the day of the date of the bond, was due to the defendant, as or by way of compensation for the loss of his said office of town clerk, and the several other offices for the loss of which he is hereby declared to be entitled to compensation; and the Master is to be at liberty to state special circumstances in relation to any of the matters aforesaid. And it must be declared that the bond is to stand as a security only for such sum of money as shall ultimately appear to be due to Mr. Parr for such compensation as aforesaid; and I shall reserve the further directions, and also the costs of the suit. On the 17th of December, an application was made to the Court to vary the minutes of the decree, by directing the account to be taken of the sums received in respect of the office, during the five years immediately preceding the 1st of January 1835, instead of the 9th of September 1835, which was not granted, the Court thinking it had not authority under the act to make any such direction. V.C. 1 Dec. 4, 16. J Legacy-Leaseholds-Trusts of Freehold. BOIDELL v. GOLIGHTLY. A testator gave his real estate in trust for his son for life, and after making several other limitations over, the remainder was limited in trust for his own right heirs for ever. "And as to all his leasehold, chattelhold, and personal estate, he bequeathed the same to his trustees, in trust for such person and persons, in the same order and succession, and for such and the same estates, rights, and interests, and subject to the same powers, provisoes, and declarations before limited or declared, concerning his freehold and copyhold estates, so far as the nature of the said leasehold and other personal estate and effects, and the rules of law and equity would admit of :"-Held, that the ultimate trust in the leasehold and personal estate vested on the decease of the testator in his son, who was his heir-at-law. This case came on upon further directions. The suit was instituted for the administration of the estate of John Geldart, who died in August 1818. John Geldart, at his death, was entitled to large reversionary interests under the will of his father, Francis Geldart, which fell into possession in April 1841. Francis Geldart, by his will, dated the 10th of April 1780, gave, devised, and bequeathed his real and personal estate to his trustees, in order to raise money, in the first place, for the payment of his debts and legacies. He then directed his trustees to pay out of the aggregate income of the two descriptions of property an annuity to his wife, and then to pay certain sums for the benefit of his son John Geldart, who was deaf and dumb, during his life. The testator directed the surplus of his property to be accumulated, and that if his son John should marry, the property should be held in trust for John's first son and the issue of such son, with remainder to the daughters of such son, and for default of such issue, in trust, after the death and such failure of issue of his son John Geldart, to pay all the residue of the yearly rents, issues, and profits of his said freehold and copyhold estates to his brother Thomas for life, and to the sons of Thomas in tail, and upon the death and failure of such issue of Thomas, to James Geldart for life, then to the children of James, then in trust for Frederick Geldart for life, with remainder to his children, and upon the death and failure of issue of Frederick, then to his, the testator's, own right heirs for ever. After these limitations, which related to the real estate, this clause followed :-"And as to all my leasehold estates, whether for lives or years, and all my chattelhold and personal estate and effects herein before given and bequeathed to my said trustees and executors, their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, which shall not be sold or disposed of by virtue of the trusts herein before declared, (but subject and without prejudice as aforesaid,) I do hereby declare, that my said trustees and executors, and the survivors and survivor of them, and the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of such survivor, shall stand and be seised and possessed of and interested in the same several last-mentioned premises from and after the decease of my said son, in trust for such person and persons, in the same order and succession, and for such and the same estates, rights, and interests, and with such remainders or limitations over, and subject to the several annuities, charges, powers, provisions, provisoes, restrictions, and declarations hereby limited or declared, concerning my said freehold and copyhold estates hereby de vised as aforesaid, so far as the nature of the said leasehold and other personal estate and effects, the rules of law and equity, the death of parties, and other contingencies will admit of." John Geldart died in 1818. Thomas Geldart died during the life of John Geldart, and the income was received by James during his life. James died without having had any children, and the income was then received by Frederick for his life, who also died without children. This case came on upon the 4th and 16th of December 1842, [reported 12 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 187,] where a question was raised, whether John Geldart was excluded from taking the real estates under the limitation to the testator's own right heirs, since the testator had provided a maintenance for him during his life, as for a person incapable of taking care of himself. The decree then made was, 66 That the ultimate limitation in trust contained in the will of Francis Geldart to the right heirs of Francis Geldart, vested on his decease in John Geldart, deceased, as the heir-at-law and customary heir of the said Francis Geldart." His Honour, upon being asked to make a similar declaration as to the personalty, declined to do so in the absence of the nextof-kin; a reference was therefore directed to the Master for the purpose of ascertaining who the next-of-kin were; and it was found that John Geldart, the testator in this cause, was the sole next-of-kin of Francis Geldart. Mr. James Parker, Mr. Teed, and Mr. Bacon, for the plaintiffs, now contended, that the plain meaning of the clause in the will of Francis Geldart, respecting the personal property was, that the same person was to take both estates in the same manner as an absolute interest; that the Court having decided who the person was who was entitled to the real estate under the former limitations, the personal property should be taken by the same person, and that the result of the authorities on the question was, that where the two funds were blended into one and given to the same person, under. language applicable to the real estate, there the heir was the party to take. Gwynne v. Muddock, 14 Ves. 488. Danvers v. the Earl of Clarendon, 1 Pleydell v. Pleydell, 1 P. Wms. 748. s. c. 2 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 212. Vaux v. Henderson, 1 Jac. & Walk. 388, n. Pyot v. Pyot, 1 Ves. sen. 335. Sir Charles Wetherell and Mr. Collins, contrà, submitted, that the limitations over being after failure of issue of the testator's (Francis Geldart's) son, and there only being a limitation to the first son, those limitations over would be void for perpetuity, the second, third, fourth, and other sons not being able to take. Rushton v. Craven, 12 Price, 599. s. c. 2 Law J. Rep. K.B. 45. Doe d. Burrin v. Charlton, 1 Man. & Monkhouse v. Monkhouse, 3 Sim. 119. Vaughan v. Burslem, 3 Bro. C.C. 101. As to the expression " right heirs," it was contended, that as by His Honour's judgment, on the former occasion, reported in the Law Journal Reports, it appeared that the estate was to descend to John, the personalty could not be conjoined in that limitation; that the personal property was undisposed of at the testator's death; and that the widow was entitled to her share. Mr. Stuart and Mr. Heathfield, Mr. Whitmarsh and Mr. Lewin, Mr. Koe and Mr. Osborne, Mr. Wakefield and Mr. Kenyon, Mr. Cooper and Mr. Elmsley, and Mr. Holmes, appeared for different parties in the suit. The VICE CHANCELLOR.—I shall not call for a reply, because the case was opened some time ago, when there was a very ingenious argument on behalf of Sir Charles Wetherell's client urged at the time, and I have had an opportunity in the interval of considering the case, and it really |