415 evident, that there needs nothing to be faid of it. I fhall therefore pafs over that chimerical fuppofition, and confider them as collections of fimple ideas in the mind taken from combinations of fimple ideas exiling together conftantly in things, of which patterns they are the fuppofed copies: and in this reference of them to the existence of things, they are falfe ideas. 1. When they put together fimple ideas, which in the real exiftence of things have no union; as when to the shape and fize that exift together in a horfe is joined, in the fame complex idea, the power of barking like a dog: which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a falfe idea of an horfe. 2. Ideas of fubftances are, in this refpect, alfo falfe, when from any collection of fimple ideas that do always exift together, there is separated, by a direct negation, any other fimple idea which is conftantly joined with them. Thus, if to extenfion, folidity, fufibility, the peculiar weightiness, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedness than is in lead or copper, he may be faid to have a falfe complex idea, as well as when he joins to thofe other fimple ones the idea of a perfect abfolute fixednefs. For either way, the complex idea of gold. being made up of fuch fimple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed falfe. But if we, leave out of this his complex idea, that of fixedness quite, without either actually joining to, or feparating of it from the reft in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea, rather than a falfe one; fince though it contains not all the fimple ideas that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exift together.

§. 19. Though in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking I have showed in what fenfe, and upon what ground our ideas may be fometimes called true or falfe; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all cafes where any idea is called true or falfe, it is from fome judgment that

Truth or

falfhood always fuppofes affirma

tion or negation.

the mind makes,

makes, or is fuppofed to make, that is true or falfe. For truth or falfhood, being never without some affirmation or negation, exprefs or tacit, it is not to be found but where figns are joined and feparated, according to the agreement or difagreement of the things they ftand for. The figns we chiefly use are either ideas or words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propofitions. Truth lies in fo joining or separating these representatives, as the things they ftand for do in themselves agree or difagree; and falfhood in the contrary, as fhall be more fully fhown hereafter.

Ideas in themselves

nor false

§. 20. Any idea then which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to neither true the existence of things, or to any idea in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this alone be called falfe. For these representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really existing in things without, cannot be thought falfe, being exact representations of fomething: nor yet, if they have any thing in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be faid to be false representations, or ideas of things they do not reprefent. But the miftake and falfhood is,

But are falfe, 1. When judged agreeable to another man's idea, without be

§. 21. First, when the mind having any idea, it judges and concludes it the fame that is in other men's minds, fignified by the fame name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received fignification or definition of that word, when indeed it is not which is the moft ufual miftake in mixed modes, though other ideas alfo are liable to it.

ing fo.

2. When judged to agree to real existence,

§. 22. Secondly, when it having a complex idea made up of fuch a collection of fimple ones, as nature never puts together it judges it to agree to a fpecies of creatures really exifting; as when it joins the fixedness of gold.

when they do

not.

3. When

judged ade. quate, with

23. Thirdly, when in its complex idea it has united a certain number of fimout being fo. ple ideas that do really exift together in

417 fome fort of creatures, but has alfo left out others as much infeparable, it judges this to be a perfect complete idea of a fort of things which really it is not; v. g. having joined the ideas of fubftance, yellow, malleable, most heavy, and fufible, it takes that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold, when yet its peculiar fixednefs and folubility in aqua regia are as infeparable from those other ideas or qualities of that body, as they are from one another.

4. When: judged to reprefent the

real effence.

S. 24. Fourthly, the mistake is yet greater, when I judge, that this complex idea contains in it the real effence of any body exifting, when at leaft it contains but fome few of those properties which flow from its real effence and constitution. I fay, only fome few of those properties; for those properties confifting mostly in the active and paffive powers it has, in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one body, of which the complex idea of that kind of things is ufually made, are but a very few, in compariTon of what a man, that has feveral ways tried and examined it, knows of that one fort of things and all that the most expert man knows are but a few, in comparifon of what are really in that body, and depend on its internal or effential conftitution. The effence of a triangle lies in a very little compafs, confists in a very few ideas three lines including a space make up that effence: but the properties that flow from this effence are more than can be eafily known or enumerated. So I imagine it is in fubftances, their real effences lie in a little compafs, though the properties flowing from that internal conftitution are endless.

falfe.

§. 25. To conclude, a man having no notion of any thing without him, but by Ideas, when the idea he has of it in his mind (which idea he has a power to call by what name he pleases) he may indeed make an idea neither anfwering the reafon of things, nor agreeing to the idea commonly fignified by other people's words; but cannot make a wrong or falfe idea of a thing, which is no otherwise known to him but by the idea he has of it: v. g. when VOL. I I frame

Ee

I frame an idea of the legs, arms, and body of a man, and join to this a horfe's head and neck, I do not make a falfe idea of any thing; because it reprefents nothing without me. But when I call it a man or Tartar, and imagine it to reprefent fome real being without me, or to be the fame idea that others call by the fame name; in either of thefe cafes I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be termed a falfe idea; though indeed the falfhood lies not in the idea, but in that tacit mental propofition, wherein a conformity and refemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having framed fuch an idea in my mind, without thinking either that existence, or the name_man or Tartar, belongs to it, I will call it man or Tartar, I may be justly thought fantaftical in the naming, but not erroneous in my judgment; nor the idea any way falfe.

More properly to be called right or wrong.

§. 26. Upon the whole matter, I think, that our ideas, as they are confidered by the mind, either in reference to the proper

fignification of their names, or in reference to the reality of things, may very fitly be called right or wrong ideas, according as they agree or difagree to those patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them true or falfe, it is fit he use a liberty, which every one has, to call things by those names he thinks beft; though, in propriety of speech, truth or falfhood, will, I think, fcarce agree to them, but as they, fome way or other, virtually contain in them fome mental propofition. The ideas that are in a man's mind, fimply confidered, cannot be wrong, unlefs complex ones, wherein inconfiftent parts are jumbled together. All other ideas are in themfelves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their patterns and archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they difagree with fuch archetypes.

СНАР.

§. I.

Of the Affociation of Ideas.

Something in moft men.

unreasonable

HERE is fcarce. any one that does not obferve fomething that seems odd to him, and is in itfelf really extravagant in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men. The leaft flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-fighted enough to efpy in another, and will by the authority of reafon forwardly condemn, though he be guilty of much greater unreasonablenefs in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

Not wholly

from felf

S. 2. This proceeds not wholly from felf-love, though that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair minds, and not love. given up to the over-weening of felf-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many cafes one with amazement hears the arguings, and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, though laid before him as clear as day-light.

Not from

§. 3. This fort of unreasonablenefs is ufually imputed to education and preju- education. dice, and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the disease, nor fhows diftinctly enough whence it rifes, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly affigned for the cause, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itfelf but yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther, who would trace this fort of madnefs to the root it fprings from, and fo explain it, as to fhow whence this flaw has its original in very fober and rational minds, and wherein it confifts.

§. 4. I fhall be pardoned for calling it by fo harsh a name as madness, when it is confidered, that oppofition to reafon deEe 2

A degree of madness.

ferves