it is, that we may often observe, that when any one fees a new thing of a kind that he knows not, he prefently afks what it is, meaning by that inquiry nothing but the name. As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the fpecies, or the effence of it; whereof it is indeed ufed as the mark, and is generally fuppofed annexed to it.

Cause of fuch refer

ences.

§. 8. But this abftract idea being fomething in the mind between the thing that exifts, and the name that is given to it; it is in our ideas, that both the rightness of our knowledge, or the propriety or intelligiblenefs of our speak-. ing, confifts. And hence it is, that men are fo forward to fuppofe, that the abftract ideas they have in their minds are fuch as agree to the things exifting without them, to which they are referred; and are the fame also, to which the names they give them do by the ufe and propriety of that language belong. For without this double conformity of their ideas, they find they fhould both think amifs of things in themselves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

Simple ideas, may be falfe in reference to others of the fame name, but are leaft liable to be fo.

f. 9. First then, I fay, that when the S. truth of our ideas is judged of, by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have, and commonly fignify by the fame name, they may be any of them falfe. But yet fimple ideas are leaft of all liable to be fo mistaken; because a man by his fenfes, and every day's obfervation, may easily fatisfy himself what the fimple ideas are, which their feveral names that are in common ufe ftand for: they being but few in number, and fuch as if he doubts or mistakes in, he may eafily rectify by the objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is feldom, that any one mif- 1 takes in his names of fimple ideas; or applies the name red to the idea green; or the name fweet to the idea bitter much lefs are men apt to confound the names of ideas belonging to different fenfes; and call a colour by the name of a tafte, &c. whereby it is evident, that the fimple ideas they call by any name, are commonly

the

the fame that others have and mean when they use the fame names.

Ideas of

mixed modes

moft liable to be falfe in

§. 10. Complex ideas are much more liable to be falfe in this refpect: and the complex ideas of mixed modes, much more than those of fubftances: becaufe in fub- this fenfe. ftances (efpecially thofe which the common

and unborrowed names of any language are applied to) fome remarkable fenfible qualities, ferving ordinarily to diftinguish one fort from another, eafily preferve thofe, who take any care in the use of their words, from applying them to forts of fubftances, to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed modes we are much more uncertain; it being not fo cafy to determine of feveral actions, whether they are to be called juftice or cruelty, liberality or prodigality. And fo in referring our ideas to thofe of other men, called by the fame names, ours may be falfe; and the idea in our minds, which we exprefs by the word juftice, may perhaps be that which ought to have another name.

Or at least to

be thought

falfe,

And why.

§. 11. But whether or no our ideas of mixed modes are more liable than any fort to be different from thofe of other men, which are marked by the fame names; this at leaft is certain, that this fort of falfhood is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas of mixed modes, than to any other. When a man is thought to have a falfe idea of juftice, or gratitude, or glory, it is for no other reafon, but that his agrees not with the ideas which. each of thofe names are the figns of in other men. §. 12. The reason whereof feems to me to be this, that the abstract ideas of mixed modes, being men's voluntary combinations of fuch a precife collection of fimple ideas; and fo the effence of each fpecies being made by men alone, whereof we have no other fenfible ftandard exifting any where, but the name itself, or the definition of that name: we having nothing elfe to refer these our ideas of mixed. modes to, as a ftandard to which we would conform them, but the ideas of thofe who are thought to use those names in their most proper fignifications; and fo As our ideas conform or differ from them, they pass for

true

true or falfe. And thus much concerning the truth and falfhood of our ideas, in reference to their names.

As referred to real exiftences, none of our ideas can be falfe, but those of fubftances. Firft, fimple ideas in this fense not falfe, and why.

S. 13. Secondly, as to the truth and falfhood of our ideas, in reference to the real exiftence of things; when that is made the ftandard of their truth, none of them can be termed falfe, but only our complex ideas of fubftances.

§. 14. Firft, our fimple ideas being barely fuch perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given power to external objects to produce in us by established laws and ways, fuitable to his wifdom and goodness, though incomprehenfible to us, their truth confifts in nothing elfe but in fuch appearances as are produced in us, and must be fuitable to thofe powers he has placed in external objects, or elfe they could not be produced in us: and thus anfwering thofe powers, they are what they should be, true ideas. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of falfhood, if the mind (as in most men I believe it does) judges these ideas to be in the things themselves. For God, in his wifdom, having fet them as marks of diftinction in things, whereby we may be able to difcern one thing from another, and fo choose any of them for our uses, as we have occafion; it alters not the nature of our fimple idea, whether we think that the idea of blue be in the violet itself, or in our mind only; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light after a certain manner, to be in the violet itself. For that texture in the object, by a regular and conftant operation, producing the fame idea of blue in us, it ferves us to diftinguish, by our eyes, that from any other thing, whether that diftinguishing mark, as it is really in the violet, be only a peculiar texture of parts, or elfe that very colour, the idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact, resemblance. And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that causes in us that idea: fince the name blue notes properly. nothing but that mark of diftinction that is in a violet, difcernible only by our eyes, whatever it confifts in:

that

that being beyond our capacities diftinctly to know, and perhaps would be of less use to us, if we had faculties to difcern.

Though one man's idea of blue fhould

be different from ano

ther's.

§. 15. Neither would it carry any imputation of falfhood to our fimple ideas, if by the different ftructure of our organs it were fo ordered, that the fame object fhould produce in feveral men's minds different ideas at the fame time; v. g. if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes were the fame that a marygold produced in another man's, and vice verfa. For fince this could never be known, because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body, to perceive what appearances were produced by thofe organs; neither the ideas hereby, nor the names would be at all confounded, or any falfhood be in either. For all things that had the texture of a violet, producing conftantly the idea that he called blue; and those which had the texture of a marygold, producing conftantly the idea which he as conftantly called yellow; whatever thofe appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to diftinguish things for his ufe by thofe appearances, and understand and fignify thofe diftinctions marked by the names blue and yellow, as if the appearances, or ideas in his mind, received from thofe two flowers, were exactly the fame with the ideas in other men's minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the fenfible ideas produced by any object in different men's minds, are most commonly very near and undifcernibly alike. For which opinion, I think, there might be many reafons offered: but that being befides my prefent bufinefs, I fhall not trouble my reader with them: but only mind him, that the contrary fuppofition, if it could be proved, is of little ufe, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life; and fo we need not trouble ourselves to examine it.

6. 16. From what has been faid concerning our fimple ideas, I think it evident, that our fimple ideas can none of them be falfe in refpect of things exifting with

First, fimple

ideas in this fense not

falfe, and

why.

out

out us.

For the truth of thefe appearances, or perceptions in our minds, confifting, as has been faid, only in their being anfwerable to the powers in external objects to produce by our fenfes fuch appearances in us; and each of them being in the mind, fuch as it is, fuitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it reprefents; it cannot upon that account, or as referred to fuch a pattern, be falfe. Blue and yellow, bitter or fweet, can never be falfe ideas: these perceptions in the mind are just fuch as they are there, anfwering the powers appointed by God to produce them; and fo are truly what they are, and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be mifapplied; but that in this refpect makes no falfhood in the ideas; as if a man ignorant in the English tongue fhould call purple fcarlet.

modes not

falfe.

§. 17. Secondly, neither can our comSecondly, plex ideas of modes, in reference to the effence of any thing really exifting, be false. Because whatever complex idea I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern exifting, and made by nature: it is not fuppofed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath; nor to reprefent any thing but fuch a complication of ideas as it docs. Thus when I have the idea of fuch an action of a man, who forbears to afford himfelf fuch meat, drink, and clothing, and other conveniencies of life, as his riches and estate will be fufficient to fupply, and his ftation requires, I have no false idea; but fuch an one as represents an action, either as I find or imagine it; and fo is capable of neither truth or falfehood. But when give the name frugality or virtue to this action, then it may be called a falfe idea, if thereby it be fuppofed to agree with that idea, to which, in propriety of fpeech, the name of frugality doth belong; or to be conformable to that law, which is the ftandard of virtue and vice.

Thirdly,

ideas of fub

ftances when

§. 18. Thirdly, our complex ideas of fubftances, being all referred to patterns in things themselves, may be falfe. That they are all falfe, when looked upon as the representations of the unknown effences of things, is fo evident,

falfe.