the Spirit of Contradiction: Or we delight in Novelties: Or we love to be fingular.

These are the Things that too often both give Birth to our Controverfies, and alfo nourish and foment them

If we would but caft thefe Beams out of our Eyes, we should both fee more clearly, and certainly live more peaceably. But whilft we purfue bafe and fordid Ends, under the Pretence of maintaining Truth, we fhall always be in Error, and always in Contention.

Let us therefore quit ourselves of all our Prepoffeffions; let us mortify all our Pride and Vain-glory, our Paffion and Emulation, our Covetousness and Revenge, and bring nothing in the World to our Debates about Religion, but only the pure Love of Truth; and then our Controverfies will not be fo long, and they will be more calmly and peaceably managed, and they will redound to the greater Good of all Parties.

And this I dare fay farther, to encourage you to labour after this Temper of Mind, That he that comes thus qualified to the Study of Religion, though he may not have the Luck always to light on the Truth, yet with all his Errors, be they what they will, he is more acceptable to God, than the Man that hath Truth on his Side, yet takes it up or maintains it to ferve a Turn. He that believes a Falfhood after he hath used his fincere Endeavours to find the Truth, is not half fo much a Heretick as he that profeffeth a Truth out of evil Principles, and proftituteth it to unworthy Ends.

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The Third Rule is, Never to quarrel about Words and Phrafes; but fo long as other Men mean much-what the fame that we do, let us be content, though they have not the Luck to exprefs themselves fo well.

I do not know how it come to pass, whether through too much Heat and Eagerness of difputing, that we do not mind one another's Senfe, or whether through too much Love to our own manner of thinking or speaking, that we will not endure any thing but what is conveyed to us in our own Method: But, really, it often happens, that most bitter Quarrels do commence, not fo much from the different Senfe of the contending Parties concerning the Things they contend about, as from the different Terms they use to exprefs the fame Sense, and the different Grounds they proceed upon, or Arguments they make ufe of for the Proof of it.

For my Part, I verily believe that this is. the Cafe of feveral of those Disputes, in which we Proteftants do often engage at this Day. I do not think, in many Points, our Differences are near fo wide as they are fometimes reprefented, but that they might eafily be made up with a little Allowance to Mens Words and Phrafes, and the different Methods of deducing their Notions.

It would be, perhaps, no hard Matter to make this appear in thofe Controverfies that are fo much agitated among us concerning Faith and Fuftification, and the Neceffity of good Works to Salvation; and imputed Righteousness, and

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the Difference between Virtue and Grace; with fome others, if this were a fit Place for it. The Difference that is among us as to thefe Points, is poffibly, not much greater than this, That fome Men in these Matters, fpeak more clearly and fully; others, more imperfectly and obfcurely. Some Men convey

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their Sense in plain and proper Words; others delight in Metaphors, and do perhaps extend the Figurative Expreffions of Scripture: Some reafon more clofely, and upon more certain Principles; others poffibly may proceed upon weaker Grounds, and mifapply Texts of Scripture, and difcourfe more loofly. But both Parties (especially the more moderate of both) feem to drive at much-what the fame Thing, tho' by different Ways, as appears from this, That being interrogated concerning the Confe quences of their feveral Opinions, they generally agree in admitting or rejecting the fame.

But Fourthly, Another Thing that would make for Peace, is this; Never to charge upon Men the Confequences of their Opinions, when they exprefly difown them.

This is another Thing that doth hugely tend to widen our Differences, and to exafperate Mens Spirits one against another, when having examin'd fome Opinion of a Man, or Party of Men, and finding very great Abfurdities and evil Confequences neceffarily to flow from it, we presently throw all those into the Dish of them that hold the Opinion; as if they could not hold the one, but they must neceffarily own the other: Whereas, indeed, the Men

we thus charge, may be fo innocent in this Matter, that they do not in the leaft dream of fuch Confequences; or if they did, they would be fo far from owning them, that they would abhor the Opinion for their Sakes.

To give you an Inftance or Two in this Matter: It is a Doctrine maintain'd by fome, That God's Will is the Rule of Justice; or, That every Thing is therefore juft or good, becaufe God wills it. Thofe that are concerned to oppofe this Doctrine, do contend, that if this Doctrine be true, it will neceffarily follow, that no Man can have any Certainty of the Truth of any one Propofition that God hath revealed in Scripture; because, fay they, his eternal Faithfulnefs and Veracity are by this Doctrine made arbitrary Things. Granting now that this can by juft Confequence be made out, yet I dare fay, thofe that hold the aforefaid Doctrine would be very angry, and had good Reafon fo to be, if they were told that they did not, no, nor could not, upon their Principles, certainly believe the Scripture.

Some Men think that they can with demonftrative Evidence make out, that the Doctrine of God's irrefpective Decrees doth, in its Confequences, overthrow the whole Gospel; that it doth deftroy the Nature of Rewards and Punishments, cuts the very Sinews of Mens Endeavours after Vertue, makes all Laws, Promifes, Exhortations, perfectly idle and infignificant Things, and renders God the most unlovely Being in the World. Now fuppofing ail this to be true, yet it would be a moft unjuft

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unjuft and uncharitable Thing to affirm of any that believe that Doctrine, (many of whom are certainly pious and good Men,) that they do maintain any fuch impious and blafphemous Opinions as thofe that are now mentioned.

The Sum of all is, that a Man may believe a Propofition, and not believe all that follows from it: Not but that all the Deductions from a Propofition are equally true, and equally credible with the Propofition from whence they are deduced: but a Man may not fo clearly fee through the Propofition, as to difcern that fuch Confequences are really deducible from it So that we are at no hand to charge them upon him, unless he do explicitely own them. J

If this Rule was obferv'd, our Differences would not make fo great a Noife, nor would the Errors and Heterodoxes maintained among us, appear fo monftrous and extravagant; and we should fpare a great many hard Words, and odious Appellations, which we now too prodigally beftow upon thofe that differ from us.

The Fifth Rule is, To abstract Mens Perfans from their Opinions; and in examining or opposing these, never to make any Reflections upon those.

This is a Thing fo highly reasonable, that methinks no Pretender to Ingenuity should ever need to be called upon to obferve it: For it feems very abfurd and ridiculous in any Argument, to meddle with that that nothing concerns the Question. But what do Perfonal Re

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