Then, again, it is asked what are the great and mighty effects upon the manners of the age, that such institutions are to produce? Great and mighty effects, none; but gradual and gentle effects, effects worth producing, sufficient to justify the expense and trouble bestowed upon institutions. It is, surely, not unfair to suppose that, of the numbers resorting to this Institution, some have felt a zeal for science, which they might not otherwise have felt; that this zeal may, in some instances, have furnished rational amusement to a whole life; in others, be productive of deep knowledge, and important discovery. Is it nothing to inflame young minds? is it nothing to please them with science, and to convey to them the first suspicion, that exquisite pleasure is to be derived from the mere occupations of the mind? Is it nothing to get science generally talked of, though it may not be profoundly discussed; and knowledge widely honoured, though it may not be greedily pursued? I cannot consider that man as a very attentive observer of human nature, who does not believe, that by all the conversation and occupation which this institution has occasioned, much talent has been awakened, much curiosity for knowledge excited, the dominion of perilous idleness abridged, and the sum of laudable exertions increased. It is the greatest of all mistakes, to do nothing because you can only do little but there are men who are always clamouring for immediate and stupendous effects, and think that virtue and knowledge are to be increased as a tower or a temple are to be increased, where the growth of its magnitude can be measured from day to day, and you cannot approach it without perceiving a fresh pillar, or admiring an added pinnacle. "But, then, such institutions increase the number of smatterers." To be sure they do! And is it not one of the most desirable of all things that they should be increased? If you plant 50,000 oaks in five acres, have you not a better chance of fine trees than when you only plant 10,000 in one acre? : Has the production of eggs ever yet been considered as unfavourable to the growth of chickens? or has any reasoner yet contended, that in any country where boys and girls are very numerous, men and women must be very scarce? Every one, in every art and science, is of course, at first, nothing but a smatterer. Of these, some cannot advance from stupidity; others will not advance from idleness; some get in the wrong road from error, some quit the right from affectation; a few only reach the destined point, -but, of course, the number of these last, will be directly and immediately in the proportion of those who started for the race. In short, I have no manner of doubt, if these institutions conduct themselves with as much judgment as they have hitherto done, — if they provide able and upright men to read lectures in this place; and if those men do, without countenancing any narrow and illiberal opinions, and without lending themselves to childish jealousies and groundless alarms, display at all times an honest zeal for sound knowledge, rational freedom, and manly piety, I see no reason why this Institution may not prosper, and be considered as a valuable addition to the public establishments of this country. That such may be its fate, is my most sincere desire, and ardent prayer and with these wishes for its prosperity, and with my hearty thanks to this elegant and accomplished audience, for the attention with which I have been heard, I conclude my Lectures: wishing to you all, every possible happiness till we meet again. LECTURE XX. ON THE ACTIVE POWERS OF THE MIND. 66 DIVISIONS OF THE ACTIVE POWERS INTO APPETITES, DESIRES, I HAVE had the pleasure of reading here two sets of Lectures, the one upon the Understanding, the other upon Taste. I come now to the consideration of the Active Powers of the Mind, or those principles of our nature which impel us to action. The distinction between the intellectual and the active powers, or the understanding and the will, is one of very great antiquity; far anterior, I fancy, to the time of Aristotle : and it appears to be one of the most convenient divisions, for arranging the complicated powers of the human mind. The two popular terms which express this division are head and heart; it being very natural that men, in their speculations concerning the connection of body and mind, should suppose that particular parts of the mind were more particularly associated with particular parts of the body. I need scarcely say that the notion is quite fanciful; that it would be quite as philosophical to say of an able man that he had a good liver, or to praise a virtuous man for the soundness of his lungs, as it would be to speak of the head of the one, or the heart of the other. I mention this bodily distinction, not from any idea of the justice of the hypothesis it involves, but merely to show that the com mon notions of mankind have always gone along with this distinction of the powers of the mind, into those which are intellectual and those which are active. This science of mental philosophy has often been represented as vague and unsatisfactory. It certainly is not capable of that precision which many others are; but its most sceptical enemies would not pretend to confound an idea with a feeling. Nobody would pretend to say that the mind is affected in the same manner by hard, soft, green, or blue, as it is by anger, shame, hatred, and love. Every one feels the necessity of dividing the two classes, and naturally conceives that they are subjected to very different laws. It is not impossible, perhaps, that we might possess every intellectual faculty we now have, without feeling the influence of one single appetite, desire, or affection. Constituted as we now are, there are moments in our existence, when the soul of passion seems to be entirely laid asleep, and when outward objects are noticed by the understanding without producing the slightest determination of the will: and there are opposite states of tempest and convulsion, when the passions confound the understanding in all its operations, and make it a false and faithless observer of the world without. In old age, in melancholy, and in sickness, the mind appears to be diseased, from the decay of all its active powers. In madness they all exist in excess. The great variety in human character, that astonishing difference between us, which leaves one man in the little field where he was born, and drives another out to command armies and senates, this difference principally depends upon the different degrees of curiosity and imitation in each, upon the empire which fear and anger exercise over them; upon how they love and how they hate; upon the nature and degree of all those active powers, which go to make up the constitution of their minds. The active principles of our nature are divided by Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid into appetites, desires, affections, self-love, and the moral faculty. They call those feelings appetites which take their rise from the body, such as hunger and thirst, which operate periodically after certain intervals, and cease only for a time, upon the attainment of a particular object. They mean by desires, those feelings which do not take their rise from the body; which do not operate periodically, and do not cease upon the attainment of a particular object. The most remarkable active principles belonging to this class, they consider to be the desire of knowledge, or curiosity, the desire of society, the desire of power, and the desire of superiority, or the principle of emulation. Under the title of affections, they comprehend all those active principles whose direct and ultimate object is the communication of joy or pain to our fellow-creatures. According to this definition, resentment, revenge, hatred, belong to the class of our affections, as well as gratitude or pity. When I explain what they mean by self-love, and the moral faculty, I must do it at full length. This division of the active powers I shall in general adopt, and propose to begin with the affections. The popular word for affections in their highest degree, is passion; and the objection to using it, is, that it only means the excess of the feeling: for instance, we could not say that a man experienced the passion of anger who felt a calm indignation at a serious injury he had received; we should only think ourselves justifiable in applying the term passion if he were transported beyond all bounds, if his reason were almost vanquished, and if the bodily signs of that passion were visible in his appearance. However, if I should hereafter use the common term passion, instead of the more accurate term affection, I beg to be understood to mean any degree of the feeling, however great or small. Emotion will be found to mean a short and transient fit of passion: however, I shall use it synonymously with the words passion and affection; or, if I do not, I shall say so. It must be allowed, I suppose, that, in strictness, |