著 1 From The Saturday Review, 18 Aug. GERMANY. THE German sticks seem to be tying themselves up into something like a faggot. Esop himself could not have pointed the moral of union and strength more forcibly than their industrious neighbor who came to Baden in search of stray bits of wood which he might break up to light his fire. The regent of Prussia is influenced in his German policy by scruples which seem excessive to some of the wisest of his countrymen. His anxious respect for the rights of the princely houses is scarcely reconcilable with the permanent interests of the nation. As long as six-and-thirty sovereigns divide the federal territory, it is scarcely possible that Germany can assume her true position as the greatest of continental powers. The imperfect military organization of the league can only be corrected by placing all the northern and western contingents under the absolute control of Prussia; and the scandals which have occurred in Electoral Hesse prove that the authorized intervention of the same power is necessary to correct the abuses of civil administration. The prince of Prussia, or his successors, must hereafter overrule the misdirected delicacy which declines a patriotic duty because it seems to tend to personal aggrandizement; but nevertheless, the refusal to disturb German arrangements, on the invitation of France, was at the same time prudent and dignified. The impudent pretext which was put forward to justify the seizure of Savoy furnished a sufficient illustration of the overtures which were addressed to the supposed cupidity of Prussia. The pamphleteers of Paris showed, with imprudent logic, that the mediatization of Hanover and of Brunswick would furnish as legitimate a ground of compensation to France as the recent aggrandizement of Piedmont; but the representative of Germany, even if he thought it desirable to reform the ancient tenure, was not disposed to pay a fine for enfranchisement to the lord of the adjacent manor. There is reason to believe that, if the concurrence of England could have been obtained, Prussia would not have been indisposed to resist by force the lawless and menacing annexation of Savoy and Nice. The immediate object of securing the Rhenish Provinces from invasion has, for the present, been secured at a cheaper cost, but one of the alternatives which are held out by France still presses upon Germany. Internal division, occasionally moderated by common fears, is better than actual dismemberment; but any serious attempt to create a sounder organization would probably be met by a revival of French pretension. For the time, the princes of the confederation seem to be cultivating the most harmonious relations. The king of Hanover, who lately allowed his minister to hold out a French alliance as a menace to Prussia, was frightened by the visit of Napoleon III. to Baden, and was won over by the loyal frankness with which the compliment was received and slighted. The grateful guests invited the prince regent to complete the union of Germany by the renewal of friendly relations with Austria, and the interview of Töplitz seems to have led to an understanding which, in connection with the English armaments, accounts for the pacific language which has recently been employed by France. No foreign power will ever venture an attack on united Germany; and it seems probable that, at the present moment, an invader would be met by the whole force of the confederation. The permanence of the concord among the governments must depend on the removal of the causes which have hitherto produced constant dissension. It is possible that the emperor of Austria may have promised substantial concessions to Prussia, in reference to the Hessian question, to the composition of the Diet, and to the command of the federal armies; but if no serious change has been effected, the existing friendship will be as liable to accidents as any ordinary alliance between foreign states. It will be no hardship for France to wait till the re-opening of some standing quarrel again leaves an opportunity for external intrigue. One statement, which is probably true, augurs well for the genuineness of the recent approximation between the governments. Austria is said to have acquiesced in the wise refusal of Prussia to guarantee the Venetian territory unless the expected Italian attack is supported by France. Last year's experience has perhaps convinced the statesmen of Germany that there is no chance of aid from England in any war which may be directed against the independence of Italy. The reported intention of Austria to act against Garibaldi in Naples is menacing to the peace of the world, as it would furnish an excuse for the interference of France, and at the same time ensure the neutrality of England. If the contingency should unhappily arise, Prussia would probably attempt to confine the theatre of war within the limits of Italy. If France took the initiative against Austria, even on the Venetian frontier, the whole of the German Confederation would at once enter into the struggle; but, in a single-handed war between Austria and Italy, it would be unnecessary, imprudent, and unjust for Prussia to interfere. Venetia is, unfortunately, a constant source of danger to Europe, as it involves a stand ing antagonism between national feeling and legal right. It is impossible to blame the government of Vienna for clinging to a possession which is constantly menaced as it has been obstinately defended; yet it is certain that if Italy were abandoned, and Hungary effectually conciliated, Austria would become invulnerable. growing divergence of internal policy. The evils of duality will be reduced to the lowest point if Austria begins to take the people into account, at the same time that the loyalty of the prince regent disarms the jealousy of the minor courts. By an understanding between the two leading powers, the grand dukes and the secondary kings might be forced or enA growing confidence is felt in the new couraged to adopt Prussian maxims of adcouncil of the empire. The special reforms ministration at home, and to acquiesce as which it will probably originate will be less obedient viceroys in the decision of their significant and valuable than its own exist- superiors on questions of peace and war. ence and the publicity of its discussions. If the great central nation were once perAll constitutional experience and much sound manently united, French pamphleteers might reason may be alleged in favor of elected finally desist from publishing new versions assemblies, but it is more important that of the future map of Europe. councils should assemble than that they should represent bodies of electors. Independence of opinion and freedom of debate, wherever they are found, correct the distinc- WARS have often been compared to lawtive faults of an absolute monarchy; and, suits, and the analogy has never been closer notwithstanding its imperfect organization than in the case of the present dispute with and the indefinite nature of its functions, China. A numerous section of the communthe council of the empire has already given ity will recognize but too familiarly the proca new character to the domestic policy of ess of quarrelling without anger, of pursuAustria. The Emperor Francis Joseph, ing claims which it is not desired to enforce, though he has never yet displayed either in- of finding that every step in litigation rentelligence or generosity, may perhaps have ders it more difficult to abandon the suit, been taught by adversity to emancipate him- and, above all, of accumulating costs which self from the degrading influences of female bear a constantly increasing proportion to narrowness and bigotry. He has submitted the value of the subject matter. In many to hear some salutary truths from a portion instances, there is not even the miserable of his nobility, and he may have begun to satisfaction of throwing the blame on the suspect that his vast dominions by no means attorney, for it seems as if every stage in exist for the sake of himself, his courtiers, the proceedings had been justified by pruand his priests. The relation of internal dence or necessity. The perplexed client contentment to foreign policy must have can only attribute his troubles to an overbeen impressed even on the dullest under- ruling destiny, or, in other words, to the imstanding by the compulsory peace of Villa- perfection of human foresight, and to the franca. Even after the disasters of Ma- mutual inability of different persons to ungenta and Solferino, the Austrian army in derstand one another's motives and intenthe Quadrilateral outnumbered the exhausted tions. When nation deals with nation, the enemy on the outside of the fortresses. The difficulty is enormously increased, and it opportunity of a signal vengeance on the reaches its highest development in the relatriumphant invader was unavoidably thrown tions between European nations and China. away, because the continuance of the war With barbarians, as with dogs and horses, for another month would have given time it is possible to establish an intelligible mefor an insurrection in Hungary. The coun- dium of communication, either by elaborate cil of the empire may possibly conciliate the fairness and benevolence, or by the more different provinces by restoring their local usual method of superior force. The peculrights, while the comparatively liberal policy iar civilization of China renders it necessary which it will recommend in Germany may to adopt some formal or legal rules of interperhaps lay a solid foundation for harmony course, and yet it is impossible to apply even with Prussia. Up to the present time, the the lax international morality which has bewhole influence of Austria has been directed come traditionally established in Christento the support of the petty princes, whose dom. The Chinese authorities never fail to subserviency was in turn secured by the un- encroach on weakness, and they often pass popularity of their own administration. The great body of the nation, especially in the northern states, necessarily looked for a counterpoise in Prussia, so that the natural rivalry of the two great monarchies was sustained and embittered by a permanent and over without resentment the hostile acts of foreigners; but it is unsafe to calculate either on their presumption or on their endurance. The government of Pekin neither blusters nor truckles according to any simple formula, and accordingly it becomes necessary to pre Where so much may be said on both sides of the question, it is as well to leave it unsaid. The immediate occasion of the present war is also unfortunately in a high degree questionable, but in the middle of a campaign it is too late to examine the merits or the quarrel. pore, in negotiation or in war, for paradoxi- | it ought to have been commenced at the cal and unexpected results. The disputes time of the original collision, when Mr. at Canton, and the consequent display of Gladstone characteristically advocated the English force, led to Lord Elgin's promising right of the Chinese to destroy the invader treaty, and the attempt to ratify the engage- by poisoning their wells. Even if the govment produced the disaster on the Peiho. ernment of Pekin were, in the first instance, The results of the English and French ex- entitled to shut up the empire with a wall of pedition which lately left Hong Kong for brass, it by no means follows that the treaties the north are, for the present, extremely of Sir Henry Pottinger and Lord Elgin are doubtful. to be regarded as waste paper, for the de-. The majority of the few residents in Eng-fence of a possession which may at a former land who possess any special knowledge of time have been wrongfully acquired may China deprecate an undertaking which may often become both justifiable and necessary. be mischievous by its success as well as by its failure. It is asserted, with much plausibility, that the imperial government is the spring or regulator of a vast and delicate machine, which may at any moment become incapable of working. Notwithstanding temporary interruptions and local exceptions, the rule of Pekin maintains order among a In answer to the objection which is founded fourth part of the human race; and it is im- on the duty of maintaining the imperial govpossible to estimate the confusion which ernment, a well-known writer in the Times, might be produced by the withdrawal of the substituting his own experience for the ordicentral object of obedience. Provincial re-nary function of discussion and criticism, bellions have long since been recognized by asserts that the unity of the Chinese is a the Chinese mind as a customary exception mere fiction, and that their most remarkable to the general unity of the empire; but it is quality consists in their capacity for local or said that the humiliation of the government municipal organization. According to this by the capture of Pekin would dissolve the theory, the government and mandarins of allegiance of the subject population and pro- the capital are mainly responsible for all acts duce a state of universal anarchy. A com- of hostility to foreigners, and it is desirable mercial war which led to the destruction of to cripple their power and to punish their national industry would be as complete a ill-feeling by a vigorous attack on Pekin. mistake as an unreasonable demand which It must be admitted that the cool indiffermight drive a substantial debtor to bank- ence of the provincial authorities seems to ruptcy. It may be conjectured that the an- show that it is easier to establish friendly cient equilibrium of social order in China is relations in detail than to conclude a satistoo stable to be overthrown in a single cam- factory arrangement with the empire as a paign, and that the prophets of evil, like all whole. When one viceroy at the outbreak other theorists on the same subject, are too of a war leases ground for an enemy's camp, confident and dogmatic in their propositions. and another receives an English consul at On the other hand, their views are supported his own invitation, the bonds which unite by the moralists who, like Mr. Gladstone the official hierarchs with their august chief when he was out of office, regard a war for must be singularly elastic, if they are not the purpose of forcing admission to China already broken. The candid student inclines as a crime, which happens incidentally to be to either opinion in turn, as it seems to be also a blunder. There is no doubt that it is recommended by argument or authority; highly unsatisfactory to attack a population but, as a practical politician, he would probwhich can never be induced to maintain the ably refuse to take the most trivial step ordinary etiquette of hostilities. The na- either on the hypothesis that China is a hive tives are as willing to work for the invader with its indispensable queen-bec at Pekin, as to serve their own government, and the or on the assumption that it is rather to be mandarins themselves, at a short distance considered as a vast federal republic. There from the scene of action, interchange courtesies with the foreign officers. The governor-general of Canton has just granted to the English a perpetual lease of a piece of ground for the purpose of forming a camp opposite Hong Kong. The inquiry into the moral justification of the war would go deep into the principles of ethical philosophy, and is no more vulgar abuse of the great advantage of newspapers than the propensity to adopt positive opinions on insufficient grounds. Even the government has probably contented itself by issuing the most general instructions to Lord Elgin and to the naval and military commanders. If it proves to be true that the entrance be to the Peiho is strongly fortified, it may presumed that the generals and admirals will rather turn the defences than run their heads against a wall. The estimate which will be formed of their capacity will correspond with their success or failure even more closely than in ordinary wars, when the strategical conditions of the contest are approximately understood. After the result of the two former wars, the country will not be tolerant of defeat, nor is it possible to suppose that any superiority of numbers can enable the Chinese armies to meet the allies in the field. The principal danger is to be dreaded from the climate, from the nature of the country, and from a calculated absence of resistance. Those who are responsible for the conduct of the campaign have, of course, considered the nature as well as the extent of the difficulties with which they will have to contend. From The Saturday Review. NAPLES AND AUSTRIA. THE absurd report that Garibaldi had personally visited Naples illustrates the strangely anomalous relations which at present exist between the belligerents. The principal lieutenant of the invading general is elected to the Neapolitan Parliament. Naval officers resign their commissions in preference to undertaking service against Italians. The three-colored flag symbolizes the principles of both the contending parties, and the professed foreign policy of the royal government is, like the constitution itself, virtually dictated by Garibaldi. The ministers are probably doing their best to give reality to their cause, although it is defective in purpose, in meaning, and in basis, and wholly devoid of popular or military support; but the restored exiles, who are the natural leaders of the Liberal party, almost unanimously advocate Civilians on this side of the world can only annexation to Piedmont, while the king, the wish that the confederate armies may, if pos- court, and the reactionary portion of the sible, act apart; and they may hope, with army undoubtedly hope once more to esmore confidence, that any measures which tablish an irresponsible tyranny under the may be adopted will be short, sharp, and patronage of Austria. The programme or decisive. Experienced soldiers, who have manifesto of the government is like a column taken a part in the former wars, believe that taken from a report of some dismal social it is possible both to excite the Chinese into science association. "Cardinal reforms of a state of national hostility, and to teach legislative principles," "amelioration of them to fight. The nation may regard the the condition of the poorer classes," "imdefeat of the Tartar troops and the humilia-provement of public instruction," " progress tion of the imperial dignitaries with a toler- of material interests"-phrases of this kind ation which would break down during a may serve to amuse the leisure of idle genprolonged campaign. If the imperial gov- tlemen at Liverpool or Bradford, but the ernment were familiar with the state of Italians will not be regenerated by bits of opinion in England, there might be found stale abstractions which would be equally additional encouragement to resistance. consistent with the constitutional principles Whatever philanthropists or utilitarians may of New York, Rome, or St. Petersburg. assert, war, like punishment, can only be Soon after delivering themselves of their justified as the proper expression of right- string of platitudes, the ministers have been eous resentment. For the defence of free- obliged to proclaim a state of siege in the dom, for the redress of injuries, even for the capital, and to dissolve the electoral comreclamation of a disputed territory, it may mittees. In other words, constitutional freebe lawful, as it is natural, to resort to arms; dom is suspended by martial law, and when but a war unaccompanied by the excitement the crisis is over, the constitution itself will of anger is repulsive to the conscience. No probably have disappeared. In a few days, Englishman, with the exception of those who it is highly probable that the army and the in China itself have had time to cultivate mass of the people will have declared in fathe antipathies of neighborhood and famil- vor of the national cause. The rumor of iarity, desires to injure a hair of any China- Garibaldi's unopposed disembarkation in man's head, or to coerce his inclinations in Calabria seems to be confirmed by the stateany matter which is unconnected with the ment on the other side, that a few of his folpurchase of tea, and silk, and the sale of lowers had been defeated at Reggio and cutlery and Manchester fabrics. All free pursued into the interior. The Neapolitan nations place a large confidence in their rulers and agents, and the responsible authorities have in this instance affirmed that the war is unavoidable. The announcement that it is at an end will be accepted with far more readiness and satisfaction. accounts of Sicilian affairs always bore a similar relation to the facts, and it is probable that even the constitutional telegraph may not have unlearned the art of official lying. There are strong reasons for commencing the enterprise without delay, for the pres- If the auxiliary desired to conform to the and independence of Italy in opposition to an Austrian intruder. The understanding which was established at Töplitz can scarcely have included a promise of Prussian support in any such undertaking. Yet the arguments in favor of the justice and expediency of a prudent inaction are equally intelligible, and far more conclusive. For military purposes, it is evident that Austria would be stronger in defending the Min-country in a defensive war for the freedom cio than in attacking the Neapolitan territory, even if security were previously obtained against any opposition on the part of France. The Quadrilateral can only be endangered by a large regular army, while in Southern Italy light columns, raw levies, and daring partisans would hamper the movements of the Austrian masses, and endanger their communications. The appearance of a foreign invader would, moreover, remove any lingering difference of opinion as to the right of Garibaldi to represent the cause of Italy and Naples. The moderate Liberals have at present a sufficiently untenable position, but they could scarcely persuade themselves or others that they were defending the constitution with the aid of an Austrian army. The difficulties of interference are so numerous that rapid action on the side of Gar ibaldi will probably place the independence of Naples beyond the reach of attack. His foresight in postponing the immediate annexation of Sicily is proved by every additional complication in which the Sardinian government is involved. A dictator who is not recognized by unfriendly powers evades the necessity of answering many embarrassing remonstrances. Count Cavour may to a certain extent protest, with more or less |