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CHAPTER VI.

THE EVOLUTION OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT (1815-1839).

SECTION I.-The rebellion in Lower Canada.

RESPONSIBLE government in Canada is the logical sequence of the political struggles, which commenced soon after the close of the war of 1812-15. As we review the history of Canada since the conquest we can recognise "one ever increasing purpose" through all political changes, and the ardent desire of men, entrusted at the outset with a very moderate degree of political responsibility, to win for themselves a larger measure of political liberty in the management of their own local affairs. Grave mistakes were often made by the advocates of reform in the government of the several provinces-notably, as I shall show, in Lower Canada, where the French Canadian majority were carried often beyond reason at the dictation of Papineau-but, whatever may have been the indiscretions of politicians, there were always at the bottom of their demands the germs of political development.

The political troubles that continued from 1817 until 1836 in Lower Canada eventually made the working of legislative institutions impracticable. The contest gradually became one between the governor-general representing the crown and the assembly controlled almost entirely by a French Canadian majority, with respect to the disposition of the public revenues

and expenditures. Imperial statutes, passed as far back as 1774-1775, provided for the levying of duties, to be applied solely by the crown, primarily "towards defraying the expenses of the administration of justice and the support of the civil government of the province"; and any sums that remained in the hands of the government were "for the future disposition of parliament." Then there were "the casual or territorial revenues," such as money arising from the Jesuits' estates, royal seigniorial dues, timber and land, all of which were also exclusively under the control of the government. The assembly had been given jurisdiction only over the amount of duties payable into the treasury under the authority of laws passed by the legislature itself. In case the royal revenues were not sufficient to meet the annual expenditure of the government, the deficiency was met until the war of 1812-15 by drawing on the military exchequer. As the expenses of the provincial administration increased the royal revenues became inadequate, while the provincial revenues gradually showed a considerable surplus over the expenditure voted by the legislature. In 1813 the cost of the war made it impossible for the government to use the military funds, and it resorted to the provincial moneys for the expenses of justice and civil government. In this way, by 1817, the government had incurred a debt of a hundred and twenty thousand pounds to the province without the direct authority of the legislature. The assembly of Lower Canada was not disposed to raise troublesome issues during the war, or in any way to embarrass the action of Sir George Prevost, who, whatever may have been his incompetency as a military chief, succeeded by his conciliatory and persuasive methods in winning the good opinions of the French Canadian majority and making himself an exceptionally popular civil governor. After closing the accounts of the war, the government felt it expedient to stop such irregular proceedings, to obtain from the legislature a general appropriation act, covering the amount of expenditures in the past, and to prevent the necessity of such a questionable

application of provincial funds in the future. This may be considered the beginning of the financial controversies that were so constant, as years passed by, between the governors and the assemblies, and never ended until the rebellion broke out. The assembly, desirous of obtaining power in the management of public affairs, learned that it could best embarrass the government and force them to consider and adjust public grievances, as set forth by the majority in the house, by means of the appropriation bills required for the public service. The assembly not only determined to exercise sole control over its own funds but eventually demanded the disposal of the duties imposed and regulated by imperial statutes. The conflict was remarkable for the hot and uncompromising temper constantly exhibited by the majority on the discussion of the generally moderate and fair propositions submitted by the government for settling vexed questions. The assembly found a powerful argument in favour of their persistent contention for a complete control of the public revenues and expenditures in the defalcation of Mr Caldwell, the receiver-general, who had been allowed for years to use the public funds in his business speculations, and whose property was entirely inadequate to cover the deficiency in his accounts.

The legislative council was always ready to resist what it often asserted to be unconstitutional acts on the part of the house and direct infringements of "the rights of the crown sometimes a mere convenient phrase used in an emergency to justify resistance to the assembly. It often happened, however, that the upper chamber had law on its side, when the house became perfectly unreasonable and uncompromising in its attitude of hostility to the government. The council, on several occasions, rejected a supply bill because it contained provisions asserting the assembly's right to control the crown revenues and to vote the estimates, item by item, from the governor's salary down to that of the humblest official. Every part of the official and legislative machinery became clogged by the obstinacy of

governor, councils, and assembly. To such an extent, indeed, did the assembly's assumption of power carry it in 1836, that the majority actually asserted its own right to amend the constitution of the council as defined in the imperial statute of 1791. Its indiscreet acts eventually alienated the sympathy and support of such English members as Mr Neilson, a journalist and politician of repute, Mr Andrew Stuart, a lawyer of ability, and others who believed in the necessity of constitutional reforms, but could not follow Mr Papineau and his party in their reckless career of attack on the government, which they thought would probably in the end imperil British connection.

The government was in the habit of regularly submitting its accounts and estimates to the legislature, and expressed its desire eventually to grant that body the disposal of all the crown revenues, provided it would consent to vote a civil list for the king's life, or even for a fixed number of years; but the assembly was not willing to agree to any proposal which prevented it from annually taking up the expenditures for the civil government item by item, and making them matters of yearly vote. In this way every person in the public service would be subject to the caprice, or ill-feeling, of any single member of the legislature, and the whole administration of the public departments would probably be made ineffective. Under the plan suggested by the government in accordance with English constitutional forms, the assembly would have every opportunity of criticising all the public expenditures, and even reducing the gross sum in cases of extravagance. But the same contumacious spirit, which several times expelled Mr Christie, member for Gaspé, on purely vexatious and frivolous charges, and con. stantly impeached judges without the least legal justification, simply to satisfy personal spite or political malice, would probably have been exhibited towards all officials had the majority in the assembly been given the right of voting each salary separately. The assembly never once showed a disposition to

meet the wishes of the government even half-way. Whatever may have been the vacillation or blundering of officials in Downing Street, it must be admitted that the imperial government showed a conciliatory spirit throughout the whole financial controversy. Step by step it yielded to all the demands of the assembly on this point. In 1831, when Lord Grey was premier, the British parliament passed an act, making it lawful for the legislatures of Upper and Lower Canada to appropriate the duties raised by imperial statutes for the purpose of defraying the charges of the administration of justice and the support of civil government. The government consequently retained only the relatively small sum arising from casual and territorial dues. When Lord Aylmer, the governorgeneral, communicated this important concession to the legislature, he also sent a message setting forth the fact that it was the settled policy of the crown on no future occasion to nominate a judge either to the executive or the legislative council, the sole exception being the chief justice of Quebec. He also gave the consent of the government to the passage of an act declaring that judges of the supreme court should thereafter hold office "during good behaviour," on the essential condition that their salaries were made permanent by the legislature. The position of the judiciary had long been a source of great and even just complaint; and, in the time of Sir James Craig, judges were disqualified from sitting in the assembly on the demand of that body. They continued, however, to hold office "during the pleasure" of the crown, and to be called at its will to the executive and legislative councils. Under these circumstances they were, with some reason, believed to be more or less under the influence of the governor-general; and particular judges consequently fell at times under the ban of the assembly, and were attacked on the most frivolous grounds. The assembly passed a bill providing for the independence of the judiciary, but it had to be reserved because it was not in accordance with the