convenience in having only one court. Each is at present inefficient, or less efficient than it might be, from precisely contrary faults; the Judicial Committee wants a head, the House of Lords wants a body. The difficulties in the way of providing an effective head for the Judicial Committee seem insuperable. Lord Brougham's Bill for that purpose met with a reception not encouraging to renewed attempts. And the President of the Council is, of course, a mere political appointment without the slightest reference to his legal acquirements. And in providing a body for the House of Lords, we must either select such legal dignitaries as are already members of the Judicial Committee, in which case we run into the incongruity of having the same individuals constituting two Supreme Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction according as they sit in this room or that; or else, we must select and create other worthy legal dignitaries, who, probably, will be scarcely of equal reputation with the former, and will certainly all together swell the number beyond what is decent or expedient or economical. This consideration, although we think we have rightly placed it both last and least, is yet of no light moment.

The Bill now before the House of Lords enacts that the two proposed new judges shall, if Privy Councillors, be members of the Judicial Committee. But this is throwing water into the sea. There are already thirteen members of this Committee. It is a head that is wanted to that body-not additional joints to the tail.

It is intended of course in the passage through the House of Lords to replace the clause which originally authorized their lordships to summon any of the equity judges to give their assistance in cases of appeal, and which clause was omitted by the House of Commons as involving a question connected with the privileges of the Upper House. That clause would go far to provide some remedy for the defect which we have remarked in the constitution of the House of Lords as a Court of Appeal, viz. the absence of a body. In general it consists of the Lord Chancellor. But why was this idea not to be carried out further than as regarded the English equity judges alone? In deciding on questions of Scotch law, why should their lordships not have the power of requiring the valuable assistance of the Scotch judges? In matrimonial causes, why should they not be empowered to summon the judges of the Ecclesiastical Courts? There is less occasion for providing any assistance of this description for the Judicial Committee, as it is already strong in numbers, and the members are judiciously chosen from those who have attained eminence in all branches of the law.

But it

is possible they might deem the same assistance of advantage occasionally, and particularly in connection with ecclesiastical law. It was Lord Brougham who pointed out the extremely difficult and often obscure nature of the questions which under this head come within their cognizance. It would no doubt be somewhat harassing to our judges to be thus rendered liable to summonses in different directions by courts entirely independent of each other's action and control. That is one of the inconveniences which would be avoided by the merger of the two jurisdictions into one.

The only other provision in this Bill which affects the Judicial Committee, beyond adding the two new judges, if Privy Councillors, to that Committee, is sect. 15, which reduces the quorum of the Committee for hearing appeals from four to three. The change we suppose is deemed necessary to meet the convenience of members, or it would not have been made; since change for changing's sake, always an evil, is nowhere so much to be avoided as in the machinery for the administration of justice. The change, however, such as it is, has nothing but the convenience of the members to recommend it. Of all numbers of judges, four is that which is certain in case of difference to secure the largest majority-three against one; and it would have seemed a more fitting opportunity to insert a clause reducing the quorum in a Bill by which the whole number of the Committee was being diminished-not where (as in the present Bill) the Judicial Committee is being augmented. It affords, however, a very clear proof of the unfitness of the House of Lords, as at present constituted, to form a court of appeal. For if it be found so extremely inconvenient to convene a quorum of four of the Judicial Committee as to suggest a measure which, like the present, diminishes the quorum and increases the number of the whole body from which the quorum may be taken, how much more impossible must it be to get together any satisfactory quorum in the House of Lords, where the "Law Lords" are seldom more than five or six in all, and where the appeals are nearly twice as numerous as before the Judicial Committee?

But dismissing the consideration of the amalgamation of the courts of ultimate appeal, which is not alluded to in the Bill, the next object is to provide for the proper discharge of the duties at present discharged by the Lord Chancellor as a Judge of Appeal in the Court of Chancery, and, in general, most efficiently discharged. The present Bill aims at effecting a very considerable alteration here. It provides for the appointment of two new judges, who may without the Lord Chancellor exercise all this appeal jurisdiction. And it may safely be sur

mised that the effect will be that these two will for a great part of the year have to perform all the appeal business usually done by the Lord Chancellor, although the Bill affects carefully to provide that either of these new judges sitting with the Lord Chancellor, or the Lord Chancellor sitting alone, may hear any such appeals.1 So long as the Lord Chancellor has all the other multifarious, onerous duties of his office to perform, he will be compelled, at all events from January to August, or during three-fourths of the judicial year, to avail himself of every legal means of relief. In order conscientiously to discharge those functions which he alone can discharge, he must abstain from taking up any business for which the legislature has already provided a substitute. We think that the decisions of the new Court of Chancery, two judges sitting as contemplated, will be no whit superior in weight, in consistence, or in expedition. The multiplication of judges by no means multiplies the authority of the decision, even if unanimous. The decisions of the Court of Queen's Bench, of Common Pleas, or Exchequer sitting in Banco are not, even when unanimous, of higher authority than those of the Lord Chancellor sitting alone. And introducing a plurality of judges introduces also the possibility of a division in opinion. If the judges of the proposed court of appeal be equally divided in opinion, it is provided that the decree, &c. appealed from shall be affirmed; but it is unnecessary to point out how much more encouragement there is under such circumstances for prosecuting a further appeal to the House of Lords, than if the first appeal, thus dubiously affirmed, had never taken place at all. Neither is a tribunal with many judges more rapid in its decisions than a tribunal which consists but of one single judge. The responsibility thrown upon a single judge may, it is true, in many cases, and especially while

It shall be lawful for her majesty from time to time, by letters-patent under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, to appoint two persons, being or having been respectively barristers-at-law of fifteen years' standing, to be and be styled Judges of the Court of Appeal in Chancery; and the Lord Chancellor, together with such two judges for the time being appointed as aforesaid, shall form the Court of Appeal in Chancery (s. 1).

All the jurisdiction, powers and authorities of the said Court of Appeal may be exercised either by one only of the judges for the time being appointed under this act and the Lord Chancellor sitting together as such Court of Appeal, or by both of the judges so appointed sitting as such court apart from the Lord Chancellor, either in his absence from the said Court of Chancery or during the same time as he is sitting in such court: provided always, that the Lord Chancellor shall and may also while sitting alone or apart from such two judges have and exercise the like jurisdiction, powers and authorities, as well as all such other jurisdiction, powers and authorities as might have been exercised by the Lord Chancellor if this act had not been passed (s. 10).

the judge is yet new to the bench, induce delay by the anxiety of deliberation. But the habit of exercising such a responsibility continually, augments the self-reliance and readiness of the judge; so that in general a judge is rapid in proportion to his experience.1 And judgment, sometimes reserved, is in many instances given immediately after the reply. On the other hand, where many judges have to give the decision, it is almost in every case necessary that they should consult, if they agree to ascertain whether the agreement proceeds upon like grounds,-if they differ, to ascertain whether consultation may not remove the disagreement.

In our view then, the proposed alteration is no great improvement. The decisions of the new court will not be more rapid (probably not so rapid), will not command more respect, and will tend more to encourage appeals to the House of Lords than the decisions of the Lord Chancellor sitting alone as heretofore. There is, indeed, one very important advantage which this court will have, in being enabled to hold its sittings from day to day during the whole year; and having thus a great deal more time at its disposal than the Lord Chancellor has under the existing arrangement, it may be expected, although working somewhat slower than the Lord Chancellor, to get through a great deal more work in the course of the year. And it is also but fair to admit that a very numerous and respectable party of law reformers are in favour of having a plurality of judges even in the intermediate Court of Appeal in Chancery. But while some may prefer a single judge for these appeals, and others may think a court of four judges not too numerous, all will allow that a court of two judges sitting from day to day throughout the year is much better than no court at all, or a court sitting only twice or thrice a week, as is the case at present.

The effect of the proposed measure upon the next order of courts, however, viz., those of the Vice-Chancellors' and Master

1 Even Lord Eldon, with all his habits of procrastination, which endured to the very close of his life, is scarcely an exception to the rule above laid down. Lord Brougham in 1826, P. D. 18th May, expressed in very eulogistic terms, the almost intuitive facility with which "his extraordinary subtle and nimble fancy could bring his faculties, which were great, at the smallest period of time to bear on the largest and most difficult questions. The Lord Chancellor

made up his mind soon, but the infirmity under which he laboured led him into those subtle speculations which so long held back his opinions. He could see through the greatest difficulties at a glance. But of what avail was it to the suitors of his court that he made up his mind quickly? It was no benefit to them, as he would not express it."

2 These observations apply merely to a Court, like the Lord Chancellor's, of intermediate appeal. The court of ultimate appeal ought certainly to consist of several members.

of the Rolls, is wholly beneficial. The state of matters at this period last year must be fresh in the minds of our readers, when Sir J. Knight Bruce was the whole effective Court of Chancery, and Lord Brougham was the whole effective House of Lords. In order to prevent the recurrence of any such confusion from a similar coincidence of sickness among our equity judges, the present measure provides, that in case the court of the Master of the Rolls, or any Vice-Chancellor, shall be closed by illness or otherwise, the Lord Chancellor may authorize one of the judges of the said court of appeal to sit in lieu of the Master of the Rolls or such Vice-Chancellor, and the judge sitting under such authority may, for the purpose of disposing of any cause or matter which has been partly heard by him, continue such his sittings, notwithstanding the Master of the Rolls or ViceChancellor, in whose stead he has partly heard such cause or matter, may also be sitting for the hearing of other causes or matters (s. 13). This is a very judicious provision, since experience has shown us how it is very possible that occasion may arise when it may be required; and by preserving a familiarity with judicial proceedings in the superior courts, these judges will preserve themselves from that stiffness which might mar their utility if they were reserved entirely for the more solemn duties of appeal practice.

An accu

If it were but for this single provision, therefore, we think the present measure worthy of support. But it might have been very beneficially extended to meet other obvious cases. mulation of causes, &c., may easily arise before the Master of the Rolls, or one of the Vice-Chancellors, notwithstanding these judges continue in full health and activity. Such an accumulation has in fact already taken place more than once, and has generally been cleared away by removing a certain number of the causes, &c. set down before the overburthened judge, and placing them on the cause list of some other judge whose list was not so full. But this may not always be convenient: one judge may be overburthened, when the others have all as much as they can do. It would have been a simple matter to have extended the provisions of the 13th section already quoted, by giving the Lord Chancellor authority in such a juncture to appoint one of the additional judges of the said court of appeal to sit and hear some of the accumulations in the same manner as the judge before whom they are set down.

We hope that now, when the Court of Chancery will not necessarily follow the person of the Lord Chancellor, that other petty nuisance (which operates, however, as a great and continual obstruction to business), viz., the sittings of the Court of Chan