a divine book-revelation is impossible;' a truth which I acknowledge you could not have received by divine book-revelation, without a contradiction. You ought, indeed, to think very highly of Mr. Newman. It is well when God cannot do a thing that man can; though, I confess, considering the very wide prevalence of this pernicious error, it would have been better, had it been possible, that man should have had, a divine book-revelation, to tell him that a divine book-revelation was impossible. Great as is my admiration of Mr. Newman, I should, myself, have preferred having God's word for it. However, let us lay it down as an axiom that a human bookrevelation, showing you that 'a divine book-revelation is impossible,' is not impossible; and really, considering the almost universal error of man on this subject-now happily exploded-the book-revelation which convinces man of this great truth ought to be reverenced as of the highest value; it is such that it might not appear unworthy of celestial origin, if it did not imply a contradiction that God should reveal to us, in a book that a revelation in a book is impossible."

"Fellowes looked very grave, but said nothing.

"But yet," continued Harrington, very seriously, "I know not whether I ought not, upon your principles, to consider this book-revelation with which you have been favored, about the impossibility of such a thing, as itself a divine revelation; in which case I am afraid we shall be constrained to admit, in form, that contradiction which we have been so anxious to avoid, by making possible with man what is impossible with God.'"

"I know not what you mean," said Fellowes, rather offended.

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Why," said Harrington, quite unmoved, "I have heard you say you do not deny, in some sense, inspiration, but only that inspiration is preternatural; that every 'holy thought,' every lofty and sublime conception,' all 'truth and excellence,' in any man come from the Father of lights,' and are to be ascribed to him; that as Mr. Parker and Mr. Foxton affirm on this point, the inspiration of Paul or Milton, or even of Christ and of Benjamin Franklin, is of the same nature, and in an intelligible sense from the same source,-differing only in degree. Can you deem less, then, of that great conception, by which Mr. Newman has released you, and possibly many more, from that bondage, to a 'book-revelation' in which you were brought up, and in which, by your own confession, you might have been still enthralled? Can you think less of this than that it is an inspired' voice which has proclaimed liberty to the captive,' and made known to you 'spiritual freedom?" If anything be divine about Mr. Newman's system, surely it must be this. Ought you not to thank God that he has been thus pleased to open your eyes,' and to turn you from 'darkness to light,'-to raise up in these last days such an apostle of the truth which had lain so long 'hidden from ages and generations? Can you do less than admire the divine artifice by which, when it was impossible for God directly to tell man, that he could directly tell him nothing, He raised up his servant Newman to perform the office?" "For my part," said Fellowes, "I am not ashamed to say, that I think I ought to thank God for such a boon as Mr. Newman has, in this instance at

least, been the instrument of conveying to me: I acknowledge it is a most momentous truth, without which I should still have been in thraldom to the 'letter.'"

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Very well; then the book-revelation of Mr. Newman, is as I say, in some sort to you, perhaps to many, a divine 'book-revelation?" "

"Well, in some sense, it is so."

"So that now we have, in some sense, a divine book-revelation, to prove that a divine book-revelation is impossible?"

"You are pleased to jest on the subject," said Fellowes.

"I never was more serious in my life. However, I will not press this point any further. You shall be permitted to say (what I will not contradict) that, though Mr. Newman may be inspired, for aught I know, in that modified sense in which you believe in any such phenomenon,-inspired as much (say) as the inventor of lucifer matches,-yet that his book is not divine, that it is purely human; and even, if you please, that God has nothing to do with it. But even then I must be allowed to repeat; that at least you have derived from a book-revelation' what it would not have been unworthy of a divine book-revelation to impart, if it could have been imparted without contradiction. Such book-revelation, in this case, must be of inestimable value to man, because, without it, he must have persisted in that ancient and all but inveterate and universal delusion of which we have so often spoken. There is only one little inconvenience, I apprehend, from it in relation to the argument of such a book; and that is, that I am afraid that men, so far from being convinced thereby that a divine revelation is impossible, will rather argue the contrary way, and say, 'If Mr. Newman can do so much, what might not God do by the very same method?' If he can thus break the spiritual yoke of his fellow-men, by only teaching them negative truth, surely it may be possible for God to be as useful in teaching positive truth. I almost tremble, I assure you, lest by his most conspicuous success in imparting to you such important truth, and reclaiming you from such a fundamental error, which lay at the very threshold of your 'spiritual' progress, he may, so far from convincing mankind of the truth of his principle, lead them rather to believe that a 'book-revelation may have been very possible, and of singular advantage. But, to speak the truth, I am by no means sure that Mr. Newman has not done something more than what we have attributed to him, and whether his book-revelation be not a true divine revelation to you also."

Beyond this point the argument is carried on in its bearing. upon certain distinctions, made to evade its force. Beginning with the admission that Fellowes, although rejecting the idea of a Mediator, had through a human mediator, Mr. Newman, learned the folly of this idea, it is proved that this idea has been obtained, not from inward insight, but from external influences. The same fact is admitted, as to the influence of edu

cation, and external circumstances upon different nations: the Hottentot child growing like the Hottentot man around him, and the Englishman like his fathers. The inconsistency of this spiritual insight theory is still further shown by the admitted fact of man's advancement in successive ages; and the efforts of the advocates of the theory, in making converts. "How mankind should need such teaching if your theory be true; how if they need it, it is possible that you should give it if all external revelation of moral and spiritual truth be impossible; how, if it is possible it should be impossible for a God, by a Bible to give the like; how you can get at the souls of people at all except through the intervention of the senses and the intellect the latter of which you say has nothing to do with the soul, and surely the former can have as little; or how if you can get at them by this intervention it is impossible a Bible should-is all to me a mystery. But let that pass. If your last account be true one thing is clear, a splendid career is open to you and your friends. You can immediately employ this irresistible weapon for the verification of your views, and the conversion of the human race. Surely the least you can do is to be off as a missionary to China or India. Go to Constantinople, my dear fellow, and take the Great Turk by the beard. Nor can Mr. Newman do less than repair to Bagdad upon a second and more hopeful mission. You will let me know when you have demolished Mahommedanism, and got fairly into Thibet. Alexander's career will be nothing to it. But, alas! I fear it will be only another variety of that impossible thing a book-revelation.”

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The course of argument and of thought here presented, has a much wider application than to the classes by whom it is in this instance employed. It is as forcible in its reference to those from whom these infidel notions have been consistently developed. Mr. Morell and his German teachers would no doubt tell us that there were great differences between themselves and Messrs. Parker and Newman. And no doubt such differences exist. These latter, although formally abjuring logic, have carried out more logically the teaching and argument of the former on the subject of revelation and inspiration. They employ the same arguments, and as legitimately, in favor of

their scheme of spiritual insight. They urge the same difficulties to an external revelation of truth; insist upon the same facts of blunders and mistakes and imperfect Christianity in the inspired writers. "If I must take the position which Neander does, in answering Strauss," was the indignant criticism of one of his readers, "Strauss need hardly be answered. A revelation, full of mistakes and misconceptions, and disfigured by slips of memory in one place, and by human additions in another, has but little more command of my faith than one that is mythical." There are doubtless differences between the men, but their doctrines rest upon the same basis; the sufficiency of the human mind-whether we term it the rational or intuitional faculty, makes no real difference-to construct an a priori scheme of revelation, to say not how God has or does reveal truth to man, but how He only can; and, then, as a natural consequence, to reject any portion of such revelation which does not square with the preconceived system. The argument of Mr. Rogers applies to each and all of these classes alike. Nor do we believe that by any one not reasoning upon Atheistical grounds, it can be answered. Like the argument of the Analogy, it only needs the admitted premise of a Supreme Being of infinite perfection, to render it impregnable.

The discussion just noticed, and another on miracles, are the ablest portions of the book. The latter is too long for insertion. An abstract of the argument will give some idea of its completeness. The dry skeleton, which we place before our readers, can, of course, give but an imperfect idea of the animation and life-like turns of the argument as presented in full. The

The discussion begins with a definition of a miracle. spiritualist, who rejects all miracles as both impossible and unnecessary, after some little banter from his sceptical friend for being so positive in regard to a thing of which his ideas were so imperfect, essays the definition of Hume: "a suspension or violation of the laws of nature." This, however, is shown to be objectionable: first, on the score that the term law might imply to most minds the idea of a law-maker; secondly, that it might imply that we know anything of the real connection between cause and effect. The use of the term, therefore, to indicate simply the idea of established sequence,

so far as we know from experience, is agreed upon. This is still further modified by reference to certain variations from this order, which, however, never go beyond certain limits, and are therefore included in the natural order. "For example, we have seen the sun rise every morning and set every evening all our lives; and every one whose experience we can test, has seen the same. Every man who has come into the world has come into it but one way, and has as certainly gone out of it, and has not returned; and every one whose experience we can test, affirms the same. We therefore conclude on this uniform and invariable experience, that the same sequence took place yesterday and the day before, and will take place to-morrow and the day after; and we may fearlessly apply this principle to the past and the future. I know of no other reason for rejecting a miracle; and if I am to apply the principle at all to phenomena which have not fallen under my own observation, I must apply it without restriction."

This being agreed to, the further difficulty is started that our individual experience, or that of our neighbors, may not include that of the rest of the world; and the sum total of present experience may not answer for that of all past and coming time. To avoid this difficulty, therefore, and the imputation of assuming the fact, and in reality of begging the whole question at issue with the Christian, it is agreed that the general experience of man must be thrown out as the criterion, and that the miracle must be rejected upon the ground of its nonagreement with our own present experience.

The expediency of insisting upon the known falsehood of many supernatural stories is also discussed, and the plea rejected, lest it might be urged by the defenders of miracles, that as in science, and politics, and philosophy, and history, experience led us to anticipate truth, of which false facts and theories were counterfeits, so analogically, it would lead us to anticipate a system of supernatural truth amid the various. counterfeits and imitations of such systems which have been given to the world.

The way being thus cleared, it is proved that there could have been no creation, as being a stupendous and supernatural event, of which our experience knows nothing, and a change