three or four hundred pounds will not only take men off from acting in this business, but even from thinking of it, while a great part of the officers of our army from absolute necessity are quitting the service, and the more virtuous few, rather than do this, are sinking by sure degrees into beggary and want." Early in the year, in view of the great importance of inducing his best officers to remain, Washington repeatedly impressed upon Congress that those who should serve to the end of the war ought to receive half pay for life. April 21, he again wrote to John Banister, a member of that body: The spirit of resigning commissions has been long at an alarming height, and increases daily. The Virginia line has sustained a violent shock in this instance. Not less than ninety have already resigned to me. The same conduct has prevailed among the officers from the other States, though not yet to so considerable a degree; and there are but two just grounds to fear, that it will shake the very existence of the army, unless a remedy is soon, very soon, applied. There is none, in my opinion, so effectual as the one pointed out. This, I trust, will satisfy the officers, and at the same time it will produce no present additional emission of money. They will not be persuaded to sacrifice all views of present interest and encounter the numerous vicissitudes of war in the defense of their country, unless she will be generous enough on her part to make a decent provision for their future support. I do not pronounce absolutely that we shall have no army if the establishment fails, but the army which we may have will be without discipline, without energy, incapable of acting with vigor, and destitute of those cements necessary to promise success on the one hand or to withstand the shocks of adversity on the other. It is indeed hard to say how extensive the evil may be if the measure should be rejected or much longer delayed. I find it a very arduous task to keep the officers in tolerable humor and to protract such a combination for quitting the service as might possibly undo us forever. The difference between our service and that of the enemy is very striking. With us, from the peculiar, unhappy situation of things, the officer, a few instances excepted, must break in upon his private fortune for present support, without a prospect of future relief." Speaking of his own motives, Washington wrote to the President of Congress: Personally as an officer, I have no interest in their decision, because I have declared, and I now repeat it, that I never will receive the smallest benefit from the half-pay establishment; but, as a man who fights under the weight of a proscription and as a citizen who wishes to see the liberty of the country established upon a permanent foundation, and whose property depends upon the success of our arms, I am deeply interested. But all this apart and justice out of the question, upon the single ground of economy and public saving, I will maintain the utility of it; for I have not the least doubt that, until officers consider their commissions in an honorable and interested point of view, and are afraid to endanger them by negligence and inattention, no order, regularity, or care, either of the men or public property, will prevail. To prove this, I need only refer to the general courts-martial which are constantly sitting for the trial of them, and the number who have been cashiered within the last three months for misconduct of different kinds. At no period since the commencement of the war have I felt more painful sensations on account of delay than at the present; and, urged by them, I have expressed myself without reserve.c After more letters and much discussion Congress resolved, May 15, that officers serving until the end of the war should thereafter receive half pay for seven years; provided that no general should receive more than the half pay of a colonel. To noncommissioned officers and soldiers a gratuity was to be given of $80. a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 6, pp. 151, 152. JEALOUSY OF A STANDING ARMY. Although the want of an adequate standing army had twice forced Congress to clothe Washington with dictatorial power, the military legislation of 1778 was much hampered by the fear and jealousy of such an establishment. Writing to Mr. Banister in relation to several matters, Washington states: The other point is the jealousy which Congress unhappily entertains of the Army, and which, if reports are right, some members labor to establish. You may be assured there is nothing more injurious or more unfounded. This jealousy stands upon the commonly received opinion, which under proper limitations is certainly true, that standing armies are dangerous to a state. The prejudices in other countries have only gone to them in time of peace, and these from their not having, in general cases, any of the ties, the concerns, or interests of citizens, or any other dependence than what flowed from their military employ; in short, from their being mercenaries, hirelings. It is our policy to be prejudiced against them in time of war, though they are citizens, having all the ties and interests of citizens, and, in most cases, properly totally unconnected with the military line. a a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 5, p. 328. CHAPTER V. CAMPAIGN OF 1779. TROOPS REQUIRED AND FURNISHED. The beginning of the year found the Army stretched out in winter quarters from Newport to the Delaware, and too feeble in numbers to take the offensive. During the campaign, our movements in the North were limited to an almost passive defense, while the British contented themselves with sending two marauding expeditions of about 2,500 men each to Connecticut and Virginia. These expeditions, though unopposed, were offset in July by the surprise and capture of Stony Point and Paulus Hook. In the South the only event of importance was the failure, in October, of a combined attack with the French upon Savannah. Leaving a strong garrison in New York, Clinton sailed for Savannah in December with some 9,000 troops. To counteract his designs the Virginia and North Carolina troops of the Continental Army were ordered to the South, while the rest of the Army went into winter quarters, mostly in New Jersey. The Continental establishment as constituted by the law of March 29, 1779, consisted of 80 battalions, distributed as follows: Writing from West Point, on the 18th of November, to the President of Congress, Washington states the condition of his army at the time when the British troops, nearly double his own in effective strength, were concentrated in New York before their expedition southward. The return I have the honor to enclose is an abstract taken from the muster-rolls of the troops of each State in October (South Carolina and Georgia excepted), and contains a complete view, not only of the whole strength of the forces of each and of the independent corps at that time, but of the different periods for which they stood engaged. I conceived a return of this sort might be material, and accordingly directed it to be made, the better to enable Congress to govern their views and requisitions as to the several States. They will perceive by this that our whole force, including all sorts of troops, noncommissioned officers, privates, drummers, and fifers, supposing every man to have existed and to have been in service at that timea point, however, totally inadmissible-amounted to twenty-seven thousand and ninety-nine; that of this number, comprehending four hundred and ten invalids, fourteen thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight are stated as engaged for the war; that the remainder, by the expiration of enlistments, will be decreased by 31st of December, two thousand and fifty-one; by the last of March, six thousand four hun dred and twenty-six; by the last of April (including the lines), eight thousand one hundred and eighty-one; by the last of June, ten thousand one hundred and fiftyeight; by the last of September, ten thousand seven hundred and nine; and by different periods, I believe shortly after, twelve thousand one hundred and fifty-seven. a The following table' gives the quotas assigned to the different States in 1779, and the total number of troops furnished: Conjectural estimate of militia employed in addition to the abore, c We see from the table that only two-thirds of the quotas required for the Continental Army were supplied, and that, compared with the previous year, there was a decrease in military strength of 10,000 men. BOUNTY. As the war went on the increasing difficulty of procuring recruits necessitated the payment of larger bounties. In addition to the bounty of clothing, of land, and of money already voted, Congress, on the 23d of January, authorized Washington to grant a bounty not exceeding $200 to each able-bodied veteran or new recruit who would reenlist or enlist for the war. With a view to transferring the recruiting to the several States, Congress, March 9, repeated the resolution of January 23, and recommended the States to fill their quotas by draft, and further resolved: a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 6, p. 401. American State Papers, vol. 12, p. 17. Exact returns of the militia were at this period not rendered. See report of General Knox, Secretary of War, American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. I. That a bounty of two hundred dollars out of the Continental Treasury shall be granted to each recruit who after January 23d hath enlisted or shall enlist during the war, or in case the State shall have granted as great or greater bounty the said two hundred dollars for each such recruit shall be passed to the credit of the State for whose quota he shall be raised. March 29, Congress recommended Virginia and North Carolina to raise as many battalions of regular troops for the particular defense of the Southern States as their circumstances would admit, the troops to be engaged only for one year and not to be compelled to serve in any enterprise or in any State north of Virginia. To these one year troops, a bounty was given not to exceed two hundred dollars. Large for the time as were the bounties granted by Congress, those offered by the States were still greater. The legislature of New Jersey, to fill the quota for its three battalions, offered two hundred and fifty dollars to each recruit, in addition to the clothing, land, and two hundred dollars allowed by Congress, while the legislature of Virginia, on the 3d of May, offered to every recruit for the war seven hundred and fifty dollars, a suit of clothes once a year, and one hundred acres of land. From this amount the bounty and clothing given by Congress were reserved by the State. The sum tendered by Virginia, when compared with the $4 offered by Congress in January, 1776, "for further encouraging the men more cheerfully to enlist in the service of their country," shows that in three years the price of bounties increased more than two hundredfold. The effect of these large bounties on the men already enlisted for the war, is thus described in Washington's letter of June 9 to the board of war: The enormous bounties given by the States, towns, and by individuals to men for very short temporary services are the source of the present discontents and of a thousand evils among the soldiers, and as long as they continue to be given so long will they excite dissatisfaction. They induce the soldier, who has undergone a long service, and who engaged for the war in the first instance on a very moderate bounty, to reason upon his situation, and to draw a comparison between what he receives and the great emoluments others get, and put him upon inventing means from which he will be able to derive the same advantage. And from this comparison and these considerations it is, I am convinced, that most of our desertions proceed, especially where the men do not go to the enemy. In consideration of the services of the soldiers who engaged at an early period to serve during the war, and the great disproportion between the bounties they received and those given to others for the service of a few months or perhaps not more than a year at most, I have sometimes thought it might not be improper to give them, by way of gratuity and as an acknowledgment, $100, which, besides operating as a reward, might have a good effect and quiet their discontent." In response to this letter it was resolved June 22 That Congress entertain a grateful sense of the virtue and services of those faithful and zealous soldiers who at an early period engaged in the armies of the States during the war, and to encourage a continuance of their exertions, and as far as circumstances admit, to place them on a footing in pecuniary matters with other soldiers, General Washington be empowered to order a gratuity of one hundred dollars each, to be paid to the men so enlisting during war. Call it by what name we may, it is plain that the bounty equalization authorized by the resolution was extorted from Congress by the dissatisfaction of the soldiery, and this is but one of many instances in which a reliance upon voluntary enlistments and bounties in preference to obligatory military service has proved a menace to freedom. a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 6, p. 198. |