seize and improve every advantage which the falling fortunes of the Portuguese presented, and to contribute by stratagem, as well as by arms, to subvert the once flourishing establishments of that nation.

The English Company, equally sensible with the Dutch of the various benefits that the India trade was capable of yielding, and equally active, zealous, and industrious, in the pursuit of it, were less experienced than them in the details of commerce, less supported by the government of their country, and less gifted, as it would seem, with that large thought, and those comprehensive views, which systematised and guided the speculations of their more successful rivals. Dispirited in their exertions by the languid government of James the First, the English Company extended not their views to the formation of any regular plan for the acquisition of territory, and the attainment of a dominion in India. The naval victories which had been gained over the Portuguese, and the embassy of Sir Thomas Rowe, had, indeed, raised the character of the English nation in Hindustan; and the company thereby obtained many important advantages in their intercourse with the Mogul empire, which the Dutch had long sought for in vain. But they were principally indebted for those advantages to the circumstance of their appearing in India purely in the character of merchants, to the strict probity and unassuming manners with which they supported that character, and to the striking contrast which their whole conduct

presented to that of the Portuguest and Dutch. It is only as merchants, therefore, that the company are to be considered at this period of their history.

The profits of the company's trade were greatly disproportioned, both to the zeal and industry with which it was carried on, and to the capital employed in it. In the year 1612, when the individual shares of the proprietors were forined into one general capital, or joint stock, the sum amounted to 1,500,000/. which exceeded by 900,000l. the joint stock of the Dutch Company. Yet, in the course of fifteen years, from 1617 to 1632, the profits of the English Company amounted only to twelve and a half per cent. on their capital; so that at the time of which we are now treating (1619), seven years after the formation of their joint stock, they could not have divided more than six per cent,➡ The comparison of these profits with those of the Dutch in the same period of time, after making an adequate abatement for the difference between the capitals of the rival companies, shews a striking disparity in the progress of their mercantile prosperity, whilst it exhibits an eminent example of the efficacy of an uniform and rigid system in the economy and con- . duct of commercial affairs. There was, however, a considerable annual balance in favour of the English Company. In the course of nineteen years which elapsed since their original establishment, they had exported 548,000 907. in Spanish silver; and in woollen cloths, tin, lead, and iron, to the value of 292,000,2862.

292,000,2861.*; amounting in all to 840,000,3761. and making, on an average, the annual sum of 44,000,227. In the same period of time, the company imported, in pepper, cloves, mace, nutmegs, raw silk, muslins, and precious stones, to the value of 621,000,255lt which, when deducted from the amount of their exports, leaves a balance in their favour of 219,000,1211.-In the year 1618 the company had sustained some severe losses by the depredations of the Dutch, notwithstanding the complaints and remonstrances which the former had so repeatedly made. Under pretence of the English traders interfering with some of their assumed and ideal privileges in the Indian islands, the Dutch attacked and captured twelve ships, seven of which they actually condemned and sold. The company, however, had still twenty-one ships in constant employment, the collective burthen of which was 10,000 tons, and which engaged the service of 2500 seamen. In India they employed 120 factors or super-cargoes, who were stationed at the different places where they had erected warehouses, and other buildings, for the purposes of their trade. Of these places, and of the commercial connection which the English established with them, a brief account has been given in the third chapter of this History; and the nature and importance of that connection does not here demand a fuller description. The company

possessed not any portion of territory, or any sort of dominion in India, except in the island of Lantore, of which they had obtained a grant from the native Malay chiefs, and in which they had begun to form a settlement, and to exercise some degree of authority. That authority was founded both on a feeling of interest in the benefits which the natives derived from the European trade, and on the favourable opinion which they entertained of the English: it was maintained by a sense of mutual advantage, and with that good understanding which grew out of the nature and circumstances of its origin. The island was governed by a commercial agent of the company, who had under him thirty other Englishmen, in the capacity of clerks, overseers and warehousemen; and these, together with about 250 armed Malays, constituted the only force by which it was protected. In the islands of Amboyna, Banda, and Poolaroon, the company possessed extensive factories, in each of which there were stationed ten agents. Macassar, at Acheen, in the island of Sumatra, and at Bantam, in the island of Java, they likewise possessed factories, though of an inferior description to those in the Molucca islands §. Such was the footing of the English Company in the Indian Archipelago, where the dominion and ascendancy of the Dutch were now so firmly established.

At

From the view which has been

in 1681.

+ Id. ibid.

Id. ibid.

taken

taken of the situation of these rival companies, it is manifest that the Dutch had no grounds whatever for that alarm at the conduct of the English with which they affected to be possessed, and that the plea of necessity and self-defence, with which they endeavoured to justify their repeated aggressions, was entirely without foundation. There is no evidence of the English having even cherished a wish of supplant ing the Dutch in the spice islands; and if they had, it must have been repressed by a conviction of the utter impracticability of its accomplishment. But the fair dealing of the English traders, together with their unambitious conduct, gave the native merchants so favourable an impression of their character, that it served to expose and mark the opposite proceedings and manners of the Dutch, who thereby foresaw the essential injury which, through such a circumstance, their authority and influence would in time sustain. In order effectually to prevent a consequence which would strike so deeply at their interest, the Dutch had only two courses to pursue-either to adopt a milder policy in regard to the natives, or to deprive the English of all participation in the spice trade; and avarice, which was the ruling principle of the Dutch Company, (perhaps of all mercantile associations) naturally prompted them to follow the latter course. Thus the usual avidity and jealousy of trade became, in the Dutch Company, such fierce and ungovernable passions, that neither the friendly alliance subsisting between their country and England, nor a sense of equity, nor the dread of ultimate retaliation, could restrain them. Every artifice was, therefore, practised, which their subtlety could

contrive, to obstruct the intercourse between the English and the natives, to endeavour to create dissention between them, to throw every possible impediment in the way of their trade, to entrap them into a violation of their arbitrary privileges, and by all these means, finally to provoke them to remonstrate with such vehemence and bitterness, and to adopt such measures in their own defence as might give a colourable pretence for making those reprisals which were the end of all their machinations.

The mutual irritation which arose from this state of things, the inconvenience of which it was productive, and the material losses which the English Company had suffered, became at last a matter of national consideration and complaint. The directors of the English Company had before this time instituted an enquiry into the differences which subsisted between their servants and the Dutch settlers in India; the result of that enquiry was submitted to the directors of the Dutch Company, together with certain propositions for an amicable accommodation, and, two negotiations between the rival companies were successively opened; but the commissioners who were appointed to conduct these negotiations, carried with them to their conferences all that animosity with which their masters were inflamed; so that their discussions, which were designed to appease and to adjust their differences, served only to embitter and embroil them, and their negotiation was broken off with so much increased' resentment on both sides, that it became indispensable for the governments of England and Holland to interpose their authority. In consequence of this interposition,

the

the respective companies were desired to appoint new commissioners for the adjustment of their dissentions, who were to act under the direction of the plenipotentiaries of the king of England and the StatesGeneral, and with their assistance, advice, and concurrence, to negotiate a treaty of amity and peace. Accordingly the commissioners and plenipotentiaries met at London, in the beginning of June 1619, and, after much tedious investigation, and many long debates, concluded, on the 7th of July, a solemn treaty of friendship and alliance between the two companies, which was afterwards ratified by the King and the States-General.

By this treaty it was stipulated, that there should be a general am; nesty of all injuries committed by both parties, all prisoners released, and all captured property restored; that the servants of both companies should maintain a friendly correspondence, and afford each other mutual aid on all occasions; that the commerce of India should be, free to both parties; that, for the advantage of trade, both parties should endeavour to regulate and lessen the excessive duties exacted in India, and discontinue the practice of giving presents; that a reasonable price should be fixed for all merchandizes in India; and at the public and private sales of Indian goods in England and in Holland, a stated price should be agreed on, under which, for a specified period, it should be unlawful to sell; that, with a view to avoid jealousies, the factors of both companies should agree together on a moderate price for the pepper of Bantam, and other places in the island of Java-that there should be a perfect freedom of trade in regard to the other merchandizes

of that island; that the English Company should enjoy a free trade to Poolicate on the coast of Coromandel, and bear half the charge of maintaining the Dutch fort and garrison there, in consideration of this privilege; that in the isles of Banda and Amboyna, the, trade should be regulated by common consent, of which one-third should be employed by the English, and the other two-thirds by the Dutch; that the merchandises of those islands should be bought by the factors of both companies at the current price, and be divided by lot; for which purpose it should be lawful for the Dutch and English to have free access to the forts and factories of each other; that, for the mutual protection of their trade, ten ships of war, mounting 30 guns cach, should be fitted out by each company; that the forts and garrisons in the islands of Banda and Amboyna should be maintained out of the duties levied on the exports of these islands, which duties should be assessed by the Dutch Council, and received by the agents of both companies; that, for the better protection of the spice islands, a council of defence should be established, consisting of eight persons-an equal number to be elected from each party, and to take precedency al-ternately; that the council of defence should be vested with the power of occasionally employing the ships of war in the transportation of merchandise from port to port in India, as well as of converting the merchant vessels of both companies to warlike purposes, in cases of emergency; that the losses sustained in any engagement for the common defence should be borne equally by both companies, and the captures and prizes be equally

divided

divided between them; that the forts and factories of both parties should remain in the hands of that party which possessed them at the ratification of the treaty; that, with regard to the proposal of the English Company to build forts for the security of their property, it should remain undecided, for the term of two or three years, so that there might be sufficient time to weigh the matter maturely, to consider of the nature and number of the fortifications necessary, and thereby to come to a determination satisfactory to both companies; that the forts taken from an enemy by the joint forces of both companies, should be equally possessed, garrisoned, and maintained by each; that the contracting parties should not prevent or exclude each other from trading with any of the nations of India with whom they might contract separate engagements; that the trade of all India should be free and open to both, as well within the possessions of either company, as in other ports; and, finally, that this treaty should remain in force twenty years; and if during that period of time any disputes arose between the servants of the two companies, which could neither be adjusted by the Council in India, nor by the Directors in Europe, they should be referred to the King of England and the States-, General of the United Provinces, to Le determined by them.

We have thus exhibited a full view of this famous treaty, from which such salutary consequences were expected to flow; but which, so far from producing even any temporary benefits, appears to have been wholly disregarded by the Dutch governors in India, who, shortly after they had proclaimed it, not only violated its principles,

but infringed its most positive stipulations. Some of these stipulations, indeed, were ill-adapted to do away that jealousy, and to prevent the recurrence of those disagree ments, of which it was the main object of the treaty to make a stable and final settlement. In those articles that relate to the. spice islands, the trade of which was the chief source of all the dissentions, it is unaccountably strange, that, instead of making an absolute and distinct separation of the trade and the affairs of the two companies, and of providing for the security of such a separation, the negotiators should have agreed on establishing a community of interests, and have employed their ingenuity in framing regulations for the distribution of the produce of those islands, and for the joint management of trade between parties who could never cease to feel their natural rivalry, and who could not soon lose the remembrance of their long and violent contentions. It required not any uncommon degree of sagacity in those negotiators to have foreseen the impracticability of such regulations, as well as the improvidence of them, if they had been practicable. The natural operation of such regulations might have excited disputes even between parties disposed to friendship; and between the servants of the Dutch and English Companies, they could not possibly have had any other effect, than that of furnishing new grounds of jealousy and of enmity. The English nego-· tiators were bound more particularly not only to avoid grounds of future dissention, but to insist on the strongest guarantees for the preservation of tranquillity; because the great inferiority of the power of their company would, in

the